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Pulp Fictions: The Role of Detachable Corporate Social Responsibility in Building Legitimacy 
for Uruguay’s Largest Ever Foreign Investment. 
Oliver Balch 
This thesis examines how practices of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) serve to legitimise 
Uruguay’s largest ever foreign investment, the US$2.5-billion pulp mill constructed by the Finnish-
Chilean firm Montes del Plata. Unusually, this investment prompted little social conflict, which runs 
counter to the community tensions frequently associated with large-scale infrastructure investments in 
Latin America. To explore this, the thesis takes an agency-oriented approach to the study of corporate-
community relations. It offers fresh insights for critical management scholars and anthropologists of 
corporations into the techniques of collusion and co-optation in large-scale foreign direct investment 
(FDI) projects. Based on participant observation with Montes del Plata’s community relations managers 
and their community interlocutors, conducted over separate periods during and after the mill’s 
construction, the thesis examines the legitimising impulse of corporate citizenship, both as concept and 
practice. I show how the company seeks to incorporate itself as a morally-infused entity through 
ongoing interactions between its representative agents and external actors. I argue that the form of CSR 
that emerges is neither moral nor responsible, but its command over social relations nonetheless makes 
it a potent force for corporate capitalism’s expansion. 
 
The mill owner attempts to manage its social and political relations in such a way as to secure the 
proximity needed for legitimacy-building, while creating the requisite distance to reduce onerous moral 
obligations; a balance that I analyse using the concepts of detachment and depoliticisation. The thesis 
opens with a discussion of the politics of representation, demonstrating how the agents of Montes del 
Plata (the Corporation) shape the local political ecosystem through the recognition, or not, of its 
counterparties’ claims to representativeness. Chapters 1 and 2 also explore the theory of personation, 
especially in the efforts by the Corporation’s community managers to infuse the company with moral 
characteristics. Their struggles in doing so invite consideration of a pragmatic approach to legitimacy 
building through the calculated management of social relations. Chapters 3 and 4 further show how 
principles of detachment and depoliticisation frame the Corporation’s approach to relationship 
management. Chapter 3 examines how participation and empowerment are utilised to depoliticise 
development goods and stage the Corporation’s detachment from their delivery. Chapter 4 examines 
the detachment effects of the changes to the region’s political economy sparked by the mill project, and 
how the mill owner depoliticises public expectations of job creation. The conclusion makes the case for 
a distinctive approach to FDI legitimation driven by detachment (and reattachment) and facilitated by 
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“Montes del Plata is committed to managing its business in a socially, environmentally and 
economically responsible manner.” 
Montes del Plata’s Management Policy1 
On summer evenings, with the day’s work done and the heat of the day in retreat, residents from 
Conchillas and the nearby settlements of Puerto Gil and Radial Hernández like nothing better than to 
jump in their cars and drive the short distance to the quiet hamlet of Puerto Inglés. Located on the banks 
of the flat-bottomed Río de la Plata on the south-western border of Uruguay, Puerto Inglés is blessed 
with two sandy beaches, a wind-sheltered bay and little else. Historically, Puerto Inglés has had little 
else going for it. Even now, the hamlet itself comprises just two short residential streets and a lone 
convenience store. Together, these cater to its permanent population of around fifty people.  
 
By the time the Río de la Plata reaches Puerto Inglés, its silt-brown waters have completed half their 
journey to the Atlantic Ocean. Born out of the confluence of the Río Uruguay and the Río Paraná, the 
river already looks like a shoreline lake or a brackish sea so distant have its banks become. About 25 
kilometres away across the water lies Argentina, Uruguay’s far more populous and economically 
powerful neighbour. Fifty kilometres to the south, meanwhile, the river trundles slowly passed the 
stone-walled city of Colonia de Sacramento. A popular tourist destination, the city serves as the capital 
of the eponymously named province of Colonia, one of the most fertile and affluent of Uruguay’s 19 
provinces.  
 
Over the last half-century, Puerto Inglés and the settlements surrounding it have become the sort of 
villages that time forgets. The landscape inland from the river is bucolic. Well-managed fields of soya, 
wheat and pasture stretch off to the horizon, the pastoral beauty punctuated only by the occasional 
isolated farmstead or barbed-wire fence. But life here is slow. And for the region’s youth, opportunities 
are limited. Most waste little time in relocating to nearby towns or far-off cities. It is mostly the elderly 
and the unambitious who stay put, their pace of life gradually syncing with the passage of the seasons 
and siestas in the shade.  
 
Only now, Conchillenses have a new neighbour. Montes del Plata is a foreign-owned pulp manufacturer 
and Uruguay’s largest ever foreign investor.2 By the time I arrived in the area in late 2012, two years 
had passed since this joint venture between Finland’s Stora Enso and Chile’s Arauco had announced its 
                                               
1 Montes del Plata’s Management Policy: Sustainability. http://www.montesdelplata.com.uy/sustentabilidad.php. 
Accessed 3 February 2016. 
2 www.montesdelplata.com.uy 
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intention to construct a US$2.5-billion pulp mill facility in this Uruguayan backwater.3 The company’s 
transmogrifying industrial investment was located on stretch of the riverbank called Punta Pereira, the 
site of an old quarry works about two kilometres downstream from Puerto Inglés. The cranes, the earth 
movers, the fencing, the lorries, the traffic, the skeletal outline of the mega-mill: all this paraphernalia 
of modern neo-extractivist capitalism was at complete discordance with the area’s historic tranquillity. 
In the months that followed, thousands of workers would gradually eviscerate the sandy scrub and 
scraggly undergrowth surrounding Punta Pereira, replacing it with steel and cement, stone and tarmac. 
By mid 2014, Conchillenses would find themselves with a mini-industrial metropolis in their backyard, 
its misshapen bulk permanently and implacably planted on the river bank. In the form of a 120-metre 
high cooling chimney, this futuristic Heracleion even had its own towering lighthouse.  
 
The resulting relationship between company and community lies at the heart of this thesis. I ask what 
Montes del Plata’s experience reveals about the micro-social relations and political exchanges that 
emerge from, and feed into, such mega-projects. In particular, I give close ethnographic attention to the 
blitz of well-financed corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices and discourses that came to 
characterise the pulp manufacturer’s community relations. What are they, how do they work, and what 
is their role in building corporate capitalism’s capacity for expansion and reproduction?  
 
  
Figure 1 Micro-region: Radial Hernández, Pueblo Gil, Conchillas, Puerto Inglés4  
                                               
3 Stora Enso press release, 9/09/2014: ‘Inauguration of Stora Enso’s joint operation pulp mill in Uruguay’. 
Accessed 7 June 2015: http://www.storaenso.com/about/news/inauguration-of-stora-enso%E2%80%99s-joint-
operation-pulp-mill-in-uruguay. 
4 Note, Puerto Inglés is referred to here as Balneario del Oeste, the municipal beach. ‘Plan local de conchillas y 
su microrregión departamento de colonia instrumento de ordenamiento territorial y desarrollo sostenible: 01. 
Memoria de Información.’ Published by the Intendenica Departmental de Colonia. December 2016. 
http://www.colonia.gub.uy/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/22.12.16-_-MEMORIA-GESTI%C3%93N.pdf. 
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I.1 Forestry in Latin America  
Montes del Plata’s Punta Pereira mill is demonstrative of an upsurge in investment in Latin America’s 
commercial forestry and pulp manufacturing sectors over recent decades, a phenomenon that has 
resulted in significant impacts for land use and economic activity in the region.5 Presently, nearly half 
(46.4%) of Latin America’s total land area is forested, representing almost one quarter (23.4%) of the 
world’s entire forest coverage.6 The proportion of planted forest stands at 2%, which is low in 
comparative terms (7% is the world average) but high in absolute terms (at 15.6 million hectares [m 
ha]).7 Moreover, the trajectory of commercial forestry is ever upwards, increasing by over two-fifths in 
size (up 44%) since 1990, with current expansion running at around 280,000 hectares per year. The 
highest levels of artificial afforestation are to be found in Brazil (7.7m ha) and Chile (3m ha), followed 
by Argentina (1.2m ha), Peru (1.2m ha) and Uruguay (1m ha). Of these major markets, the medium-
term expansion of forest plantations has been highest in Uruguay, where the planted forest area grew at 
6.9% per year between 1990-2015 (nearly quadruple the pace of Brazil, which registered 1.8% p.a.). 
Today, forestry occupies a disproportionately high percentage of total land mass in Uruguay, with 5.7% 
of its 17.5m ha now devoted to commercial plantations.8 This compares to 0.9% and 4% in the case of 
the region’s two largest forestry markets of Brazil and Chile, respectively.9  
 
Latin America’s forest and pulp production sectors date back to the early part of the twentieth century, 
although neither played an especially significant part in the region’s economies for much of this period 
(Marchak 1992, Mather 1990). This started to change in the 1980s, when both sectors began to grow 
rapidly (Lima-Toivanen 2012). The shift coincided with a global transition in the forestry sector away 
from natural-growth forest to farming managed forests and plantations; a transition assisted by moves 
towards more industrial modes of production (Bruno & Greer 1993). These developments meant a 
greater dependency in the sector on fast-growth soft woods. Highly versatile, soft woods such as pine 
and eucalyptus today provide the base material for modern pulp and paper manufacturing.10 Foreign 
investors have been instrumental in driving forward the forestry boom that Latin America has recently 
undergone, with an estimated US$30.27 billion in overseas investment capital pumped into the sector 
between 1991 and 2012.11  
                                               
5 See: Borregaard et al. 2008, Cubbage et al. 2007, Toppinen et al. 2010. 
6 FAO 2017, p.2 See: United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization. (July 2017). The state of the Forest 
Sector in the Region Secretariat note. p.2 http://www.fao.org/3/a-bt191e.pdf. Accessed 20 February 2018. 
7 ibid. p.3 
8 Based on World Bank data. http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/uruguay. Accessed 25 February 2018. 
9 ibid. 
10 Soft woods are also used extensively for saw-timber, furniture, panels, hardboards and laminated products. In 
pulp production, the dominant eucalyptus species is Eucalyptus urograndis, a hybrid of E.urophylla and E.grandis. 
Other important species comprise: E.saligna, E.grandis, E.dunnii and E.viminalis (Foelkel 2008). 
11 Calculated from FAO’s statistical database: http://www.fao.org/faostat/en/#data/FDI. 
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The reasons for the surge of investor interest in Latin American forestry are multiple.12 Climatic and 
soil conditions play an important role, both being ideal for the rapid growth of eucalyptus and pine 
species, particularly in the Southern Cone and Brazil (Gurlit et al. 2007). The average growth for the 
eucalyptus forests owned by the leading forest companies in Brazil is over 40 cubic meters per hectare 
per year (m3/ha/p.a) (Foelkel 2008). This compares to rates of between 19m3/ha/p.a and 4m3/ha/p.a in 
other temperate regions (FAO 2000). The low cost of land, the availability of cheap labour, changes to 
land use and ownership regulations and market liberalisation reforms also combine to make the region 
attractive to private investors, both domestic and foreign.13 Many of the early regulatory changes in 
favour of forestry were promoted as part of strategic reform packages advanced by multilateral lenders 
in the 1980s and 1990s (De Camino 1999, Querbach & Arndt 2017). The World Bank was particularly 
active in advocating for market reform measures, particularly in countries such as Chile, Argentina and 
Brazil (Christy et al. 2007, Seymour & Debash 2000). Uruguay’s 1987 reform of its Forest Law, for 
instance, formed the culmination of a series of pro-market reform recommendations proposed by the 
Washington DC-based lender over a period of more than three decades (Gutiérrez & Panario 2007, 
2014). 
By the 1990s, global industrial forestry passed a symbolic threshold, with production in the relatively 
new markets of Asia, Africa and Latin America outstripping the more traditional markets of Europe and 
North America (FAO 2010). This North-to-South transition has continued to this day (Kröger 2013c). 
The volume of planted forest in South America and Asia increased by 2.38% and 2.17% per year 
between 1990 and 2015, respectively. This compares to a mere 1.1% rise in Europe over the same period 
(FAO 2015). While the incentives highlighted above certainly make the South attractive for investors, 
the emergence of disincentives in Northern markets also helps explain forestry’s dramatic southwards 
shift. One major reason behind the recent search for new markets has been the gradual depletion of 
native boreal forests in the northern hemisphere (Robins 2015). In addition to these supply-side 
challenges, changes to the regulatory environment have also had a significant impact on forestry 
                                               
12 For the sector’s international backers, it has proved money well spent. The sale of forest products now generates 
annual revenues for Latin America’s forestry sector of around US$ 49 billion, equivalent to 0.9% of the region’s 
total Gross Domestic Product (FAO 2017:3). Relative to income generation (as opposed to total size of the 
economy, as per GDP), the sector’s contribution to average individual income is nearly double this proportion 
(FAO 2014). The pulpwood and fibre industry represents a major driver of this rapid growth. The production of 
this commodity, which is used primarily for paper and packaging, increased by 263% between 1990-2015 in South 
America, with total production levels reaching 26.6 million tonnes by 2015. Today, the majority of commercial 
forests are geared towards this burgeoning segment of the forestry sector (49%), outstripping logging (29%) and 
sawn wood and wood-based panels (22%).12 In 2015, average pre-tax earnings for pulp manufacturers in Latin 
America (31%) was more than double that for those in North America (15%), Asia (14%) and Europe (12%) 
(PWC 2016). 
13 See: Toppinen et al. 2010, Gonzales et al. 2008, Catalán & Cozzens 2009. 
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companies. Historically, both commercial timber and pulp production have been associated with a range 
of negative social and environmental impacts (Sonnenfeld 2002).14  
Over time, these negative impacts gradually have given rise to public concerns in Europe and North 
America, which in turn have led to a gradual toughening of environmental regulations, particularly in 
the case of the European Union (Brolund 2017). High regulatory costs have eaten into the industry’s 
profitability, impinging negatively on its competitiveness vis-à-vis companies operating in markets with 
lower regulatory thresholds (Korhonen 2015, Dijkstra et al. 2007). By the mid 1990s, relocating on a 
large scale to less stringent markets in the South made economic sense for forestry producers, especially 
in light of market liberalisation reforms. A number of scholars have compared this relocation of forestry 
operations to “pollution haven” strategies adopted by other foreign investors from contaminating 
sectors, such as the chemicals, mining, apparel and agri-business industries.15  
This geographic shift in global forestry and pulp production also coincided with a transition within the 
two industries towards larger and more technologically sophisticated operations (Toivanen & Lima-
Toivanen 2009). Latin America has been at the forefront of this trend. In the Suzano Papel e Celulose 
mill, for example, which was inaugurated in 2013 and is located in Brazil’s Maranhão province, the 
region boasts the second-largest mill in the world (by production capacity).16 The project came on the 
heels of the Veracel mill in southern Brazil, a joint project between Stora Enso and Aracruz Cellulose 
and one of the largest private investments in Brazil’s recent history (Andersson & Bartholdson 2005). 
For forestry operators, this shift in scale increased the land requirements for commercial plantations, 
which have typically been met through direct land sale or long-term leasing arrangements (Haltia & 
Kepi 1997). For pulp manufacturers manufacturers, meanwhile, the growth in production capacity for 
individual facilities significantly pushed up the requisite equipment, infrastructure and construction cost 
of investment. In addition, although environmental and social laws may be comparatively weaker in 
Latin America, the regulatory bar remains far from negligible. Taken together, these factors present 
                                               
14 Charges laid at the door of large-scale forestry production include poor working conditions (WRM 2007), the 
infringement of local livelihoods and the displacement of rural communities (Kröger 2012, Nylund & Kröger 
2012), the reduction of wildlife and biodiversity through monoculture growing methods (Sargent & Bass 1992), 
the destruction of native forests and the depletion of subterranean aquifers (Carrere & Lohmann 1996), among 
many others (Hidayat 2018, World Rainforest Movement 2018). For the pulp industry specifically, its heavy 
dependency on chlorine and other toxic chemicals has led to it facing additional criticisms around its links to 
excessive water and air pollution (Gavrilescu et al. 2012).  
15 See: Mani & Wheeler 1997, Birdsall & Wheeler 1993, Aliyu 2005. 
16 Owned by Valmet, the Suzano Papel e Celulose mill has capacity of 1.5 million tonnes of pulp per year. It is 
located in Imperatriz, in Brazil’s Maranhão province. See: http://www.valmet.com/media/news/press-
releases/2014/one-of-the-worlds-largest-pulp-mills-supplied-by-valmet-successfully-started-up-in-brazil-/. 
Globally, Pangkalan Kerinci in Sumatra, Indonesia, has the highest pulp production capacity. Owned by April 
group, the Indonesian mill is capable of producing up to 2.8 million tonnes of pulp per year. 
http://www.aprilasia.com/en/about-us/our-operations. Accessed 18 February 2018. 
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notable barriers to entry for small and medium-scale companies (Jalbert et al. 2017). As a result, much 
of the major investment in Latin America’s forestry and pulp sectors is linked to multinational 
corporations, which typically have larger reserves and greater access to cheap capital on the 
international finance markets (Kröger 2014, Nylund 2013). All the sector’s largest players tend to be 
international in terms of their operational scope, sales and capitalisation.17 This is as true for large 
domestically headquartered companies, such as Brazil’s Fibria and Chile’s CMPC, as it is for foreign 
investors. 
One of the related effect of the consolidation and growth of Latin America’s forestry and pulp sectors 
is an upsurge in forestry-related conflicts across the region.18 Such conflicts have been driven in some 
cases by public dissatisfaction with pro-forestry government incentives and with poor governance of 
the agro-forestry sector (Caruthers & Rodriguez 2009). In other instances, opposition has derived from 
the physical impacts of commercial plantations19 and large-scale pulp mills.20 Conflict scholars have 
tended to analyse these conflicts through a neo-institutionalist lens, noting the near inevitability of 
institutional conflict when formal (public) and informal (private) goals are out of sync. The absence of 
host governments or, more often, the institutional weaknesses of its agencies are also identified as 
contributing factors to forestry-related unrest.21  
As with other industries charged with causing harm, agro-forestry businesses have sought to allay public 
concerns by asserting their moral intent and their commitment to social and environmental good 
conduct.22 The result has been the growing uptake of CSR practices and policies by forestry companies 
operating across the region.23 David Sonnenfeld’s study of the impacts of social and environmental 
movements on pulp manufacturers since the 1980s substantiates the influence that civil society pressure 
has on the uptake of CSR in the pulp industry (Sonnenfeld 2002).24 Resource-based theorists also 
identify cost reductions, competitive advantage and synergistic value creation as other motivating 
factors for the adoption of CSR (Li & Toppinen 2011). As a marker of the ethicising endeavours of the 
sector, environment group WWF reports that over half of the major pulp and paper manufacturers in 
                                               
17 The largest five Latin America-domiciled pulp and paper companies comprise: Fibria (Brazil), CMPC (Chile), 
Celulosa Arauco (Chile), Suzano (Brazil) & Suzano Papel (Brazil). Latin 500 list: Latin America’s Top 5 Pulp 
and Paper Companies. http://latintrade.com/latin-500-latin-americas-top-five-pulp-and-paper-companies/. 
Accessed 25 March 2018. 
18 See: Gerber 2011, Kröger 2013a, Overbeek et al. 2012. 
19 See: Barton et al. 2012, Gerber 2011, Kröger 2012, 2013, Haughney 2012. 
20 See: Ernström-Fuentes 2015, Groglopo 2012, Sonnenfeld 2002. 
21 See: Eckerberg & Sandstorm 2013, Ibarra & Tirakuri 2007. 
22 See: Lindgreen et al. 2012a & 2012b, Lindorff et al. 2012, Sharma & Henriques 2005. 
23 See: Pätäri et al. 2016, Panwar et al. 2006, Vidal & Kozak 2008. 
24 See also: Gritten & Mloa-Yudego 2010. 
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South America now publicly disclose information on sustainability management issues such as 
responsible sourcing and clean production – higher than any other region in the world.25  
Although differing definitions of CSR abound (Dahlsrud 2008), most hold to Archie Carroll’s classic 
injunction for companies to identify and meet the “economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary 
expectations” of the societies where they operate (Carroll 1979:500). This dominant understanding 
anticipates that individuals or groups (habitually referred to as “stakeholders” in the business literature) 
with a claim over, or interest in, the ‘responsible’ company will legitimise the firm’s operations or, as a 
minimum, decline to oppose them.26 Larger companies tend to be more vulnerable to adverse reactions, 
hence the higher likelihood of mega-project sponsors (such as those dominating Latin America’s pulp 
sector) adopting CSR strategies (Eesley & Lenox 2011). While the macro pressures on large-scale forest 
operators to adopt CSR practices share many commonalities across the region, individual businesses in 
Latin America have not responded uniformly nor with the same level of commitment (Han & Hansen 
2012). According to conventional CSR theory, this variance in response derives from the diversity of 
internal and external factors impinging on corporate decision-making (Sethi 1975). In addition to 
generic regional factors, therefore, research into CSR practices by large players in Latin America’s 
agro-forestry sector cannot ignore the importance of specific local conditions in the areas where 
companies operate as well as unique institutional issues inherent to each individual business.27 
I.2 Rapid growth of forestry in Uruguay 
Uruguay is a relative late-comer to Latin America’s forestry boom when compared to the more mature 
markets of Chile, Brazil and Argentina (Lima-Toivanen 2012, Nylund 2013). Over the last two decades, 
however, this small, middle-income country of 3.45 million people has eagerly set about making up for 
lost time.28 In addition to Montes del Plata’s US$2.5-billion mill project, the country also counts the 
presence of a US$1.2-billion pulp facility, built by the Finnish company Botnia/UPM in the west 
Uruguayan border town of Fray Bentos.29  
Uruguay’s climatic and soil conditions are apt for the fast-growth species, predominantly eucalyptus, 
that form the backbone of the region’s pulp-oriented forestry production (Vihervaara et al. 2012). The 
                                               
25 WWF. ‘Over half of South America´s Pulp and Paper Production rated on WWF´s Environmental Paper 
Company Index.’ Published 17 November 2017. http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/deforestation/forest_ 
publications_news_and_reports/?317590/epcipandaorg. Accessed 23 March 2018. 
26 See: Clarkson 1995, Logsdon & Yuthas 1997, Deegan 2002, Gritten & Saastamoinen 2010. 
27 Vidal et al. 2010, Halme, 2007, Mikkilä & Toppinen 2008. 
28 World Bank. 2016. https://data.worldbank.org/country/uruguay 
29 The Finnish firm Oy Metsä-Botnia Ab (‘Botnia’) constructed the Fray Bentos mill between early 2005 and 
late 2007. The company was subsequently restructured, resulting in ownership of the mill passing over to 
Botnia’s parent company UPM in mid-2009. To reflect this transition, the mill’s sponsor is referred to in this 
thesis as Botnia/UPM. For details of the Fray Bentos project and the mill’s current ownership and management 
structure, see: https://www.upmpulp.com/about-upm-pulp/pulp-mills/fray-bentos/. Accessed 13 May 2018. 
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similarity of conditions to those of southern Brazil, where eucalyptus and pine plantations are already 
well-established, has enabled the transfer of existing plant technologies without the need for major 
genetic adaptation. Since the 1980s, Uruguay has gone from boasting an export economy in which 
forestry and pulp manufacturing barely featured to one in which it makes up over one fifth (21.2%) of 
total exports (valued at US$5.64 billion in 2016). Uruguay’s forest sector now outstrips even bovine 
meat, the country’s long-standing primary export (19.6%) (OEC 2017).  
The upsurge in commercial forestry is evident in changes to national land use trends (Fernández & 
Carámbula 2012). Most of Uruguay belongs to the Uruguayan Savanna ecoregion, with the main 
vegetation type classified as scrub and grassland known as '‘natural pasture’ (Locklin 2001). Moves to 
plant artificial forests for commercial development formed an important part of the government’s agri-
industrial development plan following the end of the last military dictatorship (1973-1985). Today, one 
million hectares (m ha) of the country’s total agricultural territory of 17m ha are dedicated to industrial 
forest plantations, mainly comprising eucalyptus (57%) and pine (43%) (MGAP 2016). This compares 
to a mere 31,000 ha in 1998 (Paseyro 2012). Furthermore, an additional 4 million ha are designated as 
“priority” for forestry in the future. In comparison, cereal and dairy farms occupy 757,000 ha30 and 
764,000 ha,31 respectively. The inauguration of the Botnia/UPM and Montes del Plata mills in 2007 and 
2014 respectively marked the symbolic culmination of the sector’s rapid transformation from an 
incidental economic activity to an industry of major national importance.32 The Uruguayan government 
is presently in negotiations with UPM to establish the country’s third mega-tonne mill, which is due to 
be located in the central Durazno province.33   
The enabling factors for the sector’s extraordinary growth trajectory in Uruguay mirror many of those 
witnessed in the rest of Latin America. The most obvious is state support. Uruguayan legislators have 
introduced a range of measures over the last three decades to stimulate investment and facilitate growth 
in the sector (Ehrnström-Fuentes & Kröger 2017a). The strongest signal of the government’s reformist 
intent came shortly after the return of democracy, with the introduction of the 1987 Forestry Law (Law 
15,939)34. Representing a major overhaul of existing legislation, the new law sought to encourage 
                                               
30 MGAP. 2017. Encuesta Agrícola ‘Primavera 2016’. 
http://www.mgap.gub.uy/sites/default/files/publicacion_primavera2016.pdf. Accessed 3 April 2018. 
31 MGAP. 2017. Estadísticas de la Producción de Leche 2016.  
http://www.mgap.gub.uy/sites/default/files/est_prod_leche_2016.pdf. Accessed 3 April 2018. 
32 The contribution to manufacturing following the start-up at full capacity of the two mills is credited with adding 
over 1% to Uruguay’s GDP, in 2008 and 2015, respectively. See: BBVA Research. 2016. Uruguay Economic 
Outlook First half 2016, p.6. 
33 UPM. 2017. UPM and the Government of Uruguay sign an investment agreement to establish a competitive 
operating platform for a possible new pulp mill in Uruguay’. Press release, 8 Nov. http://www.upm.com/About-
us/Newsroom/Releases/Pages/UPM-and-the-Government-of-Uruguay-sign-an-investment-agreement-to-
establish-a-co-001-Wed-08-Nov-2017-00-18.aspx. Accessed 3 April 2018. 
34 Parlamento del Uruguay. 1988. Ley Forestal. Ley N° 15.939. Montevideo. 9 Feb. Available at: 
https://legislativo.parlamento.gub.uy/temporales/leytemp3700087.htm. Accessed 4 April 2018. 
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investment in commercial forests by exempting project sponsors from all property taxes, income taxes 
and production taxes for a 12-year period. Other liberalising incentives in the bill included per-hectare 
subsidies, a common feature in the expansion of tree plantations in the global South (Bull et al. 2006). 
In Uruguay’s case, up to half the cost of a new commercial plantation could be covered by public 
monies. The Forestry Law also introduced a 15-year stay on import duties on raw materials, machinery 
and other goods. As noted by Uruguay XXI, the country’s inward investment body, the Forestry Law 
has successfully established the “protection, improvement, expansion [and] creation” of forest resources 
and forest-based industries as objectives of “national interest” (Uruguay XXI 2017a:24).    
Reforms in laws governing land rights further paved the way for new investment in Uruguay’s forestry 
sector (Piñeiro 2012). The establishment of land control marks a critical condition in the expansion of 
exotic-species tree plantations, especially when it leads to a minimisation of constraints on forestry as 
a land use. This occurred in Uruguay in 1999 with the repeal of Law 13.608/67.35 In addition, Montes 
del Plata and UPM were the beneficiaries of targeted incentives by the Uruguayan state. The most 
important of these was the granting of Free Zone status for their respective mills in Punta Pereira and 
Fray Bentos. By operating within industrial enclaves, the two Nordic investors were exempted from 
corporate income tax, export duties, value added tax and any other “current or future tax” (Uruguay 
XXI 2017b:4). The pair’s tax-free status came with the added assurance from the Uruguayan state that 
no future legislation would be introduced that might negatively affect their profitability36. The guarantee 
strengthened a similar promise of investment security included in a 2002 bilateral trade agreement 
between Uruguay and Finland (the government of which holds shares in the parent companies of the 
two mill operators).37 The victory of the Frente Amplio in 2005 (and again in 2010) brought the 
country’s first ever left-wing government into power but occasioned no dramatic change in the 
country’s agri-industrial economic policy nor in the state’s proactive support for industrial forestry 
(Moreira 2008). Indeed, in their in-depth examination of state support for Uruguay’s modern pulp 
industry, Maria Ehrnstrom-Fuentes and Marcus Kröger conclude that government backing was crucial 
not only to the sector’s “birthing” but remains “vital to further growth” (2017:202).  
Another phenomenon associated with Uruguay’s pulp industry is the lack of major domestic conflict, a 
rarity in Latin America’s otherwise dispute-ridden forestry sector (Vihervaara et al. 2012). In part, this 
can be explained by the absence of components habitually linked to forest-based conflicts. Geography 
                                               
35 The expansion of planted forests was also facilitated by other legislative reforms in the 1990s, including the 
lifting of a ban on private companies owning rural property and the introduction of short-term agricultural leases 
(replacing the previous six-year minimum). This last change was designed mainly for the benefit of producers of 
soya and other cash crops, which operate to far shorter timelines, but forestry firms also benefitted from the 
extra availability of rental land. See: Le Heron & Roche 1985, Ehrnström-Fuentes & Kröger 2017a. 
36 Article 25 of Law 15,921 pertaining to Free Zones states that: "The State guarantees the user the tax exemptions, 
benefits and rights provided for by law during the term of the agreement, subject to liability for damage or loss." 
37 Finland-Uruguay Bilateral Investment Agreement 2002. http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/mapped 
Content/treaty/1548 
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and demographics play an important role here. Despite Uruguay’s historic economic dependency on 
agriculture (87% of land remains dedicated to agricultural use, primarily pastureland for livestock)38 
and its strong cultural associations with rural life, today only around one in every 20 (5%) Uruguayans 
actually lives in the countryside.39 In Chile and Brazil, the proportion is double (10%) and nearly triple 
(14%) this, respectively, while in nearby Paraguay the percentage is eight times higher (40%). The 
urban dominance of Uruguay’s demographic means citizens do not materially encounter the rapid 
growth of commercial forest plantations on a regular basis.40 Another result of Uruguay’s lightly 
populated hinterland is the relative weakness of the country’s rural social movements (Sevilla Guzmán 
& Alier 2006, Moyo & Yeros 2005). These are no match for the nation’s long-standing agricultural 
lobby groups, which have historically supported the technological modernisation and export-driven 
industrialisation of the sector (Errea 2011).41 The presence of a well-networked and vocal environment 
sector, a high density of native forest,42 and the location of plantations close to urban centres, represent 
other common flashpoints that are not in evidence in Uruguay’s case. 
Yet, Uruguay’s forestry sector is not free of all structural factors commonly attributed to social conflict. 
Its leading businesses depend on precisely the same model of commercial forest monocultures as 
elsewhere in Latin America, giving rise to very similar environmental concerns around biodiversity loss 
and excessive groundwater use (Red 2006, WRM 2008). Likewise, recent research has pointed to the 
causal role of Uruguay’s forestry sector in the displacement of rural populations as high land prices and 
shifts in land use make traditional smallholder agricultural more challenging (Piñeiro 2012). The sight 
of millions of tonnes of pulp leaving the Fray Bentos and Punta Pereira export zones without a cent in 
tax has also begun to give rise to public questioning of the economic concessions gifted to UPM and 
Montes del Plata (Abelando 2016, Viñas 2016). This has led to wider discussion of the development 
                                               
38 CIA Factbook. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/uy.html. 
Accessed 12 April 2018. 
39 World Bank. Urban Population (% of total). Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL 
.IN.ZS? view=map. 12 April 2018. 
40 At 1.3 million inhabitants, the capital Montevideo accounts for over one third of the total population. World 
Population Review 2018, available at: http://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/montevideo-population/. 
Accessed 10 March 2018. 
41 The absence of a meaningful rural movement places Uruguay in marked contrast to other forestry markets in 
the region, notably Brazil, where the powerful landless peasants’ movement has been at the forefront of opposition 
to neoliberal extractivism. Another demographic factor contributing to forestry’s easy passage in Uruguay relates 
to its indigenous population, which is small in number (0.4% of the total population), poorly organised and 
predominantly urban. These attributes distinguish Uruguay from a country such as Chile, where the Mapuche and 
other indigenous communities have been at the forefront of forestry resistance (Oltermari & Jackson 2006, Meza 
2009, Carruthers & Rodriguez 2009). 
42 Uruguay’s total native forest only amounts to around 6% of total land area, according to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity. See: ‘Uruguay – Country Profile, available at: https://www.cbd.int/countries/ profile/ 
default.shtml?country=uy. Accessed 22 March 2018. Globally, average tree cover as a percentage of a country’s 
land mass amounts to 28%, according to Global Forest Watch. See: https://www.globalforestwatch.org/ 
dashboards/global. Accessed 22 March 2018. 
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benefits of the sector, albeit restricted to the fringes of media debate at present (Dufrechou & Jauge 
2016). 
In addition to consistent state sponsorship of the forestry sector, other political factors also help explain 
the failure of these legitimate concerns from crystallising into social opposition. The first relates to 
party loyalty. The entry into power of the Frente Amplio in 2005 marked the first time a left-wing 
government had taken office in Uruguay’s history. For the sake of party unity, many within its ranks 
who opposed the kind of capital-intensive resource extractivism modelled by UPM and Montes del 
Plata chose to hold back from overtly challenging the newly elected government (Cardeillac & Piñeiro 
2017, Rivarola 2014). Also playing an influential role was the support of the country’s construction and 
industrial trade unions (also powerful backers of the Frente Amplio), which saw the upfront labour 
requirements of the twin mill projects as a lucrative opportunity for their blue-collar members.43 
Paradoxically, however, it was the bi-national conflict with Argentina over the initial Fray Bentos pulp 
projects that most helped dampen public appetite for further pulp-related disputes (Kosonen 2008). 
Dating back to 2006, this initial conflict was spearheaded by the Gualeguaychú Assembly, a vocal and 
well-organised grassroots movement based in the eponymous town of Gualeguaychú on the Argentine 
bank of the River Uruguay, a little way downstream of Botnia/UPM and ENCE’s proposed mills and 
well within view.44 Alleging that the mills would cause localised water and air pollution, the Argentine 
protestors blocked an international bridge linking the two countries. The high-profile campaign gained 
political support from the Argentine government as well as international environment groups. In 
response to Argentine aggression (as Uruguayans saw it), the country’s right to pursue pulp production 
took on an almost patriotic status and served to strengthen “Uruguayan pride in their industrial 
development” (Nylund 2013:10). 
Numerous though the factors are in favour of Uruguay’s pulp industry, none offer a cast-iron guarantee 
that it will continue to buck the regional trend towards forestry-related conflicts. The neo-extractivist 
model on which the sector is premised still carries with it inherent social, economic, political and 
environmental tensions (Svampa 2012, Gudynas 2009). The public may not yet have protested against 
Uruguay’s embrace of large-scale industrial forestry, but nor does the sector command great popular 
affection (CIFRA 2015). Given the tentative, provisional nature of its public support, Uruguay’s 
industrial forestry sector has chosen to pursue a similar ethicising strategy as its peers in other Latin 
American markets. Over 80% of Uruguay’s planted forests and 100% of its forestry products are 
                                               
43 El País. 2017. Diez años después de UPM. 12 Nov. “…Sindicatos como el Sunca se movilizan actualmente por 
fuentes de trabajo.” [‘Unions like Sunca mobilised at the time on account of job opportunities’]. 
https://www.elpais.com.uy/que-pasa/diez-anos-despues-upm.html. 
44 See: Borras 2010, Beloqui 2013, Cortassa et al. 2013. 
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certified as ‘sustainable’.45 Forestry companies also feature heavily in the membership of the country’s 
main CSR association, Desarrollo de la Responsabilidad Social (DERES)46. Research into how foreign 
forestry corporations’ CSR programmes serve to build legitimacy both for themselves and for the pro-
foreign direct investment (FDI) policies of the Uruguayan government is therefore both timely and 
politically significant. 
I.3 Specificity of pulp production  
Pulp is the base ingredient for the production of paper, paperboard, newsprint, kitchen and toilet roll. 
The harvested wood is first processed either mechanically or chemically to separate the cellulose fibres 
from the unusable fraction of the wood, called lignin (Bajpai 2018). To produce paper, pulp then needs 
to be bleached. This typically involves the use of contaminating chemicals, chiefly chlorine. Modern 
techniques, such as those applied by UPM and Montes del Plata in Uruguay, seek to reduce 
contaminants by using alternatives to chlorine, such as oxygen, ozone and hydrogen peroxide (Bajpai 
2015).  
The 2007 inauguration of UPM’s mega-mill in Fray Bentos signalled Uruguay’s emergence as a 
potential “world landmark” in the modern global pulp industry (Foelkel 2008). The country’s status was 
further enhanced by the construction of Montes del Plata’s even larger facility in Punta Pereira. UPM’s 
current proposal to build a second large-scale pulp facility in northern Uruguay at a projected cost of 
US$ 3 billion cements the country’s pulp-making credentials (Oficina de Presidencia 2017, IMF 2018a). 
The sight of ocean-ready container ships leaving Uruguayan shores laden with virgin pulp is celebrated 
by the government as the culmination of a long-term economic plan that dates back to the 1987 Forestry 
Law (Uruguay XXI 2017a, 2017c). Both the Uruguayan state and pulp industry representatives are at 
pains to demonstrate that pulp production represents a driver of national economic development 
(MGAP 2015) – a reflection of the same “extractivist imperative” model of growth propounded by 
resource-rich countries across Latin America (Arsel et al. 2016).47  
                                               
45 With the active involvement of the national Forest Producers’ Association (Sociedad de Productores 
Forestales), Uruguay introduced new certification standards in 2010 in accordance with the Programme for the 
Endorsement of Forest Certification. See: www.pefc.org. The Association also oversees a voluntary National 
Code of Good Forestry Practices, which it claims “almost all the companies working in the sector have put into 
practice”. See: http://www.spf.com.uy/uruguay-forestal-forestacion-sostenible. See: El Observador. 2016. 
Uruguay tiene un 100% de su industria forestal con certificación sostenible. 8 July 2016. 
https://www.elobservador.com.uy/uruguay-tiene-un-100-su-industria-forestal-certificacion-sostenible-n938108. 
Accessed 5 April 2018. 
46 See Deres’ website: http://deres.org.uy/ 
47 Championing this narrative is the Uruguayan Association of Forestry Producers, the industry’s main business 
association. In a recent report on the sector’s economic contribution, for instance, it states that Uruguay’s forestry 
sector (of which pulp production is a major component) generates over 25,000 direct and indirect jobs (equivalent 
to 1.5% of total national employment), represents 17.5% of all exports, and contributes 3.6% to the country’s 
GDP. See: Sociedad de Productores Forestales del Uruguay (2017) Contribución de la cadena forestal a la 
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While Uruguay boasts a small domestic pulp and paper-making industry that dates back to the late 
nineteenth century,48 modern pulp manufacturing is barely more than a decade old. Compared to 
historically significant sectors of Uruguay’s productive economy, such as beef, textiles, agriculture and 
leather, pulp comprises a fledgling industry. Few Uruguayans have opportunities for physical 
interaction with raw pulp or the facilities that produce it. The country’s two major industrial units are 
both located on the country’s western border in isolated rural areas: Montes del Plata’s mill is built 12 
kilometres from the nearest major road. The commercial forestry plantations that support Uruguay’s 
pulp industry are also geographically remote. Most of the country’s new timber production is to be 
found on marginal land in the centre and north of Uruguay, where the population density is especially 
low (Boccardo & Lovazzano 2014). The number of Uruguayans employed directly in the pulp industry 
is also limited (Abelando 2016, Viñas 2016). The  total number of of direct jobs at Montes del Plata and 
Botnia/UPM is reported to be a mere 650 and 550, respectively.49   
In addition to the opaque nature of its materiality and its weak cultural salience, Uruguay’s modern pulp 
industry has at least three other defining attributes that run against the grain. All three relate back to the 
issue of novelty: it signals a new type of corporate ownership; it heralds a new type of agriculture, and 
it portends a new type of corporate governance. All three factors carry important political implications 
for pulp producers and raise questions about their wider social legitimation.  
I.3.1 New type of ownership 
The first and most obvious distinguishing feature of Uruguay’s nascent pulp industry is its international 
ownership. The scale of investment, technical expertise and market reach required for commercially 
viable pulp mills of the size of Montes del Plata lie beyond the capacity of Uruguay’s business sector. 
Pulp manufacturing is now a definitively globalised industry, with high barriers to entry (Luraschi 
2007). Although the global pulp industry’s supply chain and trade networks might have expanded 
rapidly in recent decades, European and North America corporations still dominate the worldwide 
market. Generous trade and investment deals, such as those granted by Uruguay, have enabled foreign 
multinational corporations to access new markets in Latin America with little if any restrictions on 
capital flows (World Bank 2013).  
                                               
economía uruguaya. Presentation, 23 November 2017. http://www.revistaforestal.uy/economia/valor-agregado-
la-cadena-forestal-se-aproxima-al-4-del-pib.html. Accessed 17 April 2018. 
48 The Fábrica Nacional de Papel (Fanapel) was founded in 1885, and closed in 2017. See: El Pais. 2017. Fanapel 
registró pérdidas por US$ 50,39 millones. 5 September 2017. https://negocios.elpais.com.uy/noticias/fanapel-
registro-perdidas-us-millones.html. Accessed 4 April 2018. 
49 For Montes del Plata, see: El Observador. 2017. MDP: producción y negocio, que son sustentables y sostenibles. 
2 September 2017. http://www.espectador.com/agro/356393/mdp-produccion-y-negocio-que-son-sustentables-y-
sostenibles. Accessed 19 June 2018. For Botnia/UPM, see: http://www.upm.com/EN/ABOUT -UPM. Accessed 
19 June 2018. 
 
  25 
  
 
Other economic sectors in Uruguay have high levels of foreign ownership, such as rice production, 
meat-processing and the wider agro-food sector (Salgado et al. 2009), but none to the almost 
monopolistic level of the pulp sector. The concentration of ownership is also unique. Uruguay’s pulp 
industry is owned and controlled by three foreign corporations: Botnia/UPM and, as joint owners of 
Montes del Plata, Arauco and Stora Enso. Together, they control virtually all of Uruguay’s pulp output. 
The sector’s domestic supply chain is slightly more diversified, with a number of Uruguayan-owned 
businesses providing logistical, transport, harvesting and other forestry-related services. However, the 
core of Uruguay’s pulp industry is financed by foreign capital, its output is destined for foreign markets, 
and its profits are accrued by foreign shareholders.  
The foreign ownership of the pulp industry operating in Uruguay is accompanied by the 
“foreignisation” of Uruguayan land (Piñeiro 2012). The first decade of this century witnessed a large-
scale shift in agricultural land ownership in Uruguay. According to Diego Piñeiro’s painstaking analysis 
of data from the government’s Office of Agricultural Planning and Policy, Uruguayan landowners lost 
a total of 1.8 million hectares in the balance between land purchases and sales from 2000-2010 (Piñeiro 
2012:485). Official statistics do not reveal the origin of the capital used in these transactions, but it is 
“highly probable” that a substantial proportion of the country’s new landowners are foreign, Piñeiro 
concludes. What government data can confirm is that, by 2010, one million hectares of Uruguayan land 
were in the possession of a dozen multinational companies. While the list features a number of 
international agri-businesses, it is topped by the pulp manufacturers Montes del Plata (230,000 hectares) 
and Botnia/UPM (200,000). The nature of corporate land-holding has also changed in respect to size, 
with plots of over 10,000 hectares now far more common than previously - a phenomenon that clearly 
concurs with the expansive land requirements of commercial timber plantations.50  
Uruguay’s corporate-led “land grab” coincides with the initiation of the country’s modern pulp 
manufacturing industry (WRM 2014). It cemented pulp manufacturing in foreign hands. The fact that 
pulp manufacturers own or control through leasehold much of the raw materials for production presents 
a major barrier for new entrants into the market. It also marked a shift towards the internationalisation 
of large-scale agriculture in Uruguay. Finally, it led to a far more speculative land market, resulting in 
price inflation and higher rents. These trends have affected small-scale farmers, particularly those 
producing for low-margin sectors of the domestic market, such as dairy (Figueredo & Menéndez 2013).  
The foreign status of the pulp industry, coupled with the shift in ownership of large tracts of Uruguayan 
agricultural land, raises important questions about the social legitimation of the sector. As stated, the 
conflict with Argentina over the Fray Bentos project has led to a discourse of pulp as a source of 
                                               
50 Piñeiro goes as far as to suggest that a category of “very large farm” be added to the existing land registry, 
distinguishing these modern agro-operations from the existing maximum category of “large farm” (2012:477). 
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national, even patriotic, pride (Nylund 2013:10). While undoubtedly beneficial to the sector’s initial 
reputation, this discourse contrasts strongly with the pulp industry’s non-Uruguayan ownership 
structure and the land-grabbing that this has helped precipitate (WRM 2014, Piñeiro 2012). The need 
to sustain its public image as an industry with Uruguay’s domestic interests at heart increases the 
commercial incentive for the pulp industry to present itself as responsible and oriented towards the 
national good. This opens a natural space for the promotion of CSR policies and practices (Gritten et 
al. 2009, Lima-Toivanen 2012).  
I.3.2 New form of agro-extractivism 
Extractivism in Latin America has long been associated with the exploitation of minerals, metals and 
hydrocarbons51, but this has been changing in recent years, as the term has come to define non-mining 
sectors in which raw natural resources are harvested in high volumes (Siegel 2017, Gudynas 2014, 
2015). Argentine sociologist Maristella Svampa (2016) described this process as the ‘Commodities 
Consensus’. Into this newly conceived category fall modern input-intensive agriculture, large-scale 
fishing, and commercial forestry (Veltmeyer & Petras 2014). At the apex of this “neo-extractivist” 
activity sits pulp manufacturing (Gudynas 2009, 2015, Chomsky 2016).  
As with traditional extractivism in the region, the raw materials extracted for these newer extractavist 
sectors are generally destined for foreign rather than domestic consumption. Exports of primary goods 
in Latin America more than doubled in the first decade of this century, increasing from just over one 
quarter (27%) of total exports in 2000 to three-fifths (60.7%) in 2011 (Cepal 2012). Moreover, the 
custom of undertaking value-added activities outside the resources’ country of origin, such as the 
manufacture of processed food, continues without any notable alteration (Ullrich 2016). The presence 
of two of the region’s largest pulp mills in Uruguay would appear to buck this trend, yet the fact that 
both facilities operate on territory legally constituted as international contradicts this impression. The 
controversies surrounding Latin America’s booming forest sector also reveal that extractivism’s 
reputation for social and ecological harm has not been lost in this new wave of ‘re-primarization’ 
(Kröger 2013b). As Hans-Jürgen Burchardt & Kristina Dietz powerfully contend, the upsurge in 
regional commodity-based growth this century highlights a “consolidation of the extractive, 
‘fossilistic’, agro-industrial growth model in Latin America” (Burchardt & Dietz 2014: 417).52  
Despite concerns about the socio—political impacts and ecological limits of such an economic model, 
Latin American governments have continued to argue that neo-extractivism, like its predecessor, 
contributes towards national developmental goals (Gudynas 2014, Brand et al. 2016). The rhetoric of 
socio-economic advantage is central to the Uruguayan government’s argument for granting state 
                                               
51 See: Bebbington & Bury 2013, Moore 2010, Svampa 2012, Deonandan & Dougherty 2016. 
52 The average for the Mercosur countries of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay amounted to 67.1% of total 
exports during this period. Uruguay alone registered a 74.3% proportion of exports from primary goods. 
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support to the country’s nascent export-oriented pulp investors (Oficina de Presidencia 2017). For all 
its optimistic rhetoric, however, the state’s ability to collect a meaningful portion of resource rents from 
pulp production was limited from the start given the favourable trade and investment terms gifted to the 
sector. This subsequently reduced the government’s ability to fund welfare programmes or to introduce 
economic stimulus packages for new or underperforming sectors of the economy (Kröger & Ernström-
Fuentes 2018, Gudynas 2015). The pulp industry has sought to build its own case for the sector as an 
agent of development assistance, focusing on its investment in energy and transport infrastructure, as 
well as its purchase of domestic services. In UPM’s publicity regarding its proposed new plant in 
Durazno, for instance, the Finnish investor stresses the knock-on benefits in terms of new roads, rail 
lines and port facilities.53 Montes del Plata’s management, meanwhile, make much of the 80MW in 
surplus energy capacity that it sells to the national electricity utility for public consumption.54  
Even so, the sector’s low fiscal contribution brings into question assumptions about the distributive 
benefits of Uruguay’s embrace of neo-extractivist forestry. Again, this places an onus on the main 
proponents of this new model to exhibit their credentials as CSR-minded ‘corporate citizens’.  
I.3.3 New framework of governance  
A third characteristic of Uruguay’s newly constituted modern pulp industry is the form of CSR that it 
adopted. The CSR teams at both Botnia/UPM55 and Montes del Plata showed a preference for a more 
strategic style of CSR influenced by contemporary Euro-American management trends and political 
assumptions.56 This differed from the more moral-based style born out of traditional Catholic business 
ethics that remains common for large companies across Latin America (Concari 2016). Both companies 
made prominent pledges to pursue a “responsible” and “sustainable” approach to the pulp business 
(Uruguay XXI 2016), conforming to now habitual corporate pledges “to do what’s right for the people 
and the planet”, to quote a statement by Montes del Plata’s joint-owner Stora Enso.57 More significantly, 
Uruguay’s twin pulp giants sought to maintain that “sustainable production” would also generate long-
term profitability and resilience for the sector (ibid).  
 
                                               
53 UPM, press release: UPM and the Government of Uruguay sign an investment agreement to establish a 
competitive operating platform for a possible new pulp mill in Uruguay. 8 November 2017. https://www.upmpulp. 
com/media/news-and-press-releases/2017/11/upm-and-the-government-of-uruguay-sign-an-investment-
agreement-to-establish-a-competitive-operating-platform-for-a-possible-new-pulp-mill-in-uruguay/. Accessed 3 
July 2018. 
54 The 80MW provided by Montes del Plata to the national grid represents about half its total generating capacity 
(170MW) and comprises around 5% of Uruguay’s total energy supply. Montes del Plata. Energía: limpia y 
renovable. https://www.montesdelplata.com.uy/celulosa-y-energia-4. Accessed 12 March 2018. 
55 See: Stora Enso: “A sustainable development of Uruguay’s Potential’.  
http://biomaterials.storaenso.com/sustainability 
56 For a summary of a Euro-American style of ‘strategic’ CSR, see Porter & Kramer 2011.  
57 See: Stora Enso: “A sustainable development of Uruguay’s Potential’. http://biomaterials.storaenso.com/ 
sustainability 
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Montes del Plata’s own CSR policy epitomises a trend observed among other foreign investors in 
Uruguay and across Latin America towards the adoption of international “best practices” (Bogiloff & 
Melgar 2007).58 Among the international responsible business initiatives that the Chilean-Finnish pulp 
operator put its name to are the United Nations’ Global Compact and Clean Development Mechanism, 
the Forest Stewardship Council, and WWF’s New Generation Plantations programme. In addition, it 
has adopted its own internal Code of Ethics, together with a list of seven Management ‘Principles’ that 
were designed to govern the mill operator’s decision-making and conduct.59 Of the latter, six include 
an explicit reference to either ethical conduct, social responsibility or environmental management.60 
Corporate responsibility, the company promised at the outset of its Uruguayan venture, would be 
“integrated into everything we do”.61  
 
Whether or not the pulp industry delivers on its own rhetoric, its promotion of an ambitious model of 
contemporary Euro-American CSR certainly raised levels of public expectation in Uruguay. Should the 
industry prove good to its word, however, it would need to go beyond the mere mitigation of its negative 
social and environmental impacts and also evidence a positive contribution to the country’s socio-
economic development. This commitment to be a positive force for good is made explicit in Montes 
del Plata’s Community Relationship Plan, a 36-page internal document published in 2012.62 The 
document sets out “tools, programme and actions” for “opening possibilities for social involvement and 
development to generate a firm relationship for the long term”.63  
 
The specificity of the pulp industry’s CSR position merits note because of the insights that it provides 
regarding how multinational corporations are currently governed in today’s globalised neoliberal order. 
One component of this debate is whether CSR standards should be made mandatory or remain voluntary 
as at present (Casanova & Dumas 2010). The discussion feeds into wider questions as to how neo-
extractivist companies should be regulated and held to account.64 From the 1970s onwards, Uruguayan 
businesses have been under growing legislative pressure to meet basic minimum standards in areas such 
as operational health and safety, worker rights and environmental protection. The monitoring role of 
state agencies has become progressively tighter in the modern Frente Amplio era, particularly with 
respect to labour rights (Notaro 2009, 2011). The pulp industry, however, has assiduously insisted that 
CSR stay voluntary and remain divorced from companies’ legal obligations. Instead, it prefers a 
                                               
58 See also: El Observador 2014, Contreras 2004. 
59 See: ‘Código de Ética y Conducta de Montes del Plata’ & ‘Política de Gestión de Montes del Plata’. 
https://www.montesdelplata.com.uy/documentos-12?page:493=2 
60 The exception is the first principle, which commits the company to: ‘Create economic value and 
competitiveness’. 
61 Montes del Plata’s Director of Sustainability. Private interview, 11 February 2013.  
62 Hard copy of the Community Relationship Plan provided by Montes del Plata’s CSR team. 
63 Montes del Plata’s Community Relationship Plan. p.4. 
64 See: Borras et al. 2012, Goodale & Postero 2013, Sevilla-Buitrado 2015. 
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governance approach marked by self-regulation, with the industry’s leading players pledging to audit 
their own operations and report (sporadically) on their performance.65  
The creation of a modern pulp sector in Uruguay represents a landmark in the country’s ambitious and 
long-standing strategy to shift its rural economy onto a more dynamic, agro-industrial footing. Yet the 
specific attributes of foreign ownership, neo-extractivist production methods and voluntaristic CSR 
standards that characterised Uruguay’s new pulp giants meant their social legitimacy was by no means 
secured.     
I.4 Montes del Plata: the particularities of the Punta Pereira pulp project 
Montes del Plata’s investment in Uruguay epitomises many of the macro-trends occurring in Latin 
America’s contemporary forestry and described above. Widely acclaimed as sponsor of Uruguay’s 
largest-ever foreign investment, the company is gigantic in scale, foreign in ownership, and neo-
extractivist in its business operations. The Finnish-Chilean joint venture is also illustrative of wider 
trends in the industry regarding the use of CSR discourses and practices to try and legitimise forestry 
projects sponsored by pro-FDI regimes (Borregaard et al. 2008).  
Social and political legitimacy has become an increasing concern for multinational businesses, not least 
for those in the global forestry sector.66 Despite government support for Montes del Plata’s 
unprecedented investment and the security of its Free Zone status, its operations and employment 
practices remain subject to national regulations and close monitoring by government agencies. Critical 
in the calculation of legitimacy is the notion of net positive value (Malik 2015, Porter & Kramer 2011). 
Is Uruguay judged better off or not for the presence of investors such as Montes del Plata? In the modern 
era of neo-extractivism, this is the question that foreign investors involved in large-scale infrastructure 
projects must increasingly answer.   
 
How large-scale FDI sponsors use CSR to lead host populations to answer in the affirmative presents 
one of the central problematics of this thesis. At issue is where and how the value of FDI projects is 
realised. For the majority of export-oriented projects, research suggests that economic value primarily 
occurs outside the host country while the lion’s share of costs remain local (Dasgupta et al. 2002, Meyer 
2004). In the case of extractivist projects, these costs often take the form of social harm and 
environmental damage.67 If a company’s negative externalities outweigh the positive value they bring, 
the net value of their investment can reasonably be considered questionable and its external audiences 
may cast its social legitimacy into doubt (Voegtlin 2011). If the economic value generated by a foreign 
                                               
65 See: Epstein 2007, Christensen 2013, Esau & Malone 2013. 
66 See: Melé & Armengou 2016, Parsons et al. 2014, Schepers 2010. 
67 See: Frankel & Rose 2005, Downey et al. 2010, Blanco et al. 2013, Smarzynska 2001. 
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investor is divorced from its negative externalities, meanwhile, those same audiences may very 
reasonable call into question its responsibility claims (as well as the regulatory concessions that allowed 
such a divorce to occur in the first place) (Demuijnck & Fasterling 2016, Parsons et al. 2014). One 
strategy that companies employ to rectify this public perception of imbalance is to construct a counter-
narrative of positive externalities. This is the origin of the ‘win-win’ rhetoric so beloved of the 
contemporary CSR movement (Benabou & Tirole 2006a). In short, FDI sponsors present themselves as 
moral agents bent on delivering developmental benefits for their host countries, thus securing for 
themselves political and social legitimacy – what management theorists define as ‘Social Licence to 
Operate’ (Joyce & Thomson 2000, Gunningham et al. 2004). As will be detailed in this thesis, Montes 
del Plata’s CSR programme provides an archetypal example of such a strategy.  
 
Uruguay’s largest ever foreign investor is not unique in pursuing a CSR-led legitimation strategy (hence 
its viability as case study for research purposes), but it does so with a prodigious intensity that is unusual 
for forestry companies operating in Latin America (Ehrnstrom-Fuentes & Kroger 2017). This 
exceptionality emerges from a variety of contextual factors. The first, and most obvious, is the size of 
Montes del Plata’s investment. At US$2.5 billion, the project’s final capital expenditure was more than 
double the final figure for Botnia/UPM’s mill in Fray Bentos.68 This earned the Punta Pereira mill the 
popular moniker of the country’s “largest ever foreign investment”, affording it a unique symbolic status 
in Uruguay and ensuring widespread national attention and public scrutiny (Mallea 2016). With 
research showing that activist campaigners are more prone to target emblematic brands on account of 
their high public profile (Sasser et al. 2006, Spar & La Mure 2003), the mill stood at additional risk of 
hostile attention from international campaign groups and other interested parties.  
 
Timing as well as size played an important role in Montes del Plata’s promotion of CSR discourses and 
practices (UN Global Compact 2011)69. Five years before the mill operator announced its investment, 
Uruguay had been convulsed by a dispute over its proposals for large-scale pulp production, at the 
centre of which was the Spanish pulp company ENCE, whose Uruguayan assets Montes del Plata had 
acquired. Indeed, the Spanish corporation had only located in Punta Pereira to ameliorate opposition to 
its preferred site in Fray Bentos.70 The dust was still settling when Montes del Plata’s construction 
contractors moved in. Uruguay and Argentina had only just emerged from four years of wrangling at 
                                               
68 The Fray Bentos mill represented a total investment of US$1.2 billion. See: ‘UPM Signs Agreement on 
Restructuring of Botnia ownership.’ Available at: http://www.upm.com/About-us/Newsroom/Releases/Pages/ 
UPM-signs-agreement -on-restructuring-of-Botnia-ownership-001-to-10-helmi-2011-19-03.aspx. Accessed 14 
May 2018. 
69 UN Global Compact. 2011. Comunicación de Progreso (COP) Empresa Montes del Plata Uruguay - Octubre. 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/system/attachments/12477/original/UN_Global_Compact_MdP.pdf?1319467
783. Accessed 25 March 2018. 
70 El Economista. 2006. Ence reubicará su planta en Uruguay en Punta Pereira. 13 December. 
http://www.eleconomista.es/flash/noticias/117693/12/06/Ence-reubicara-su-planta-en-Uruguay-en-Punta-
Pereira.html. Accessed 3 April 2018. 
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the International Court of Justice in The Hague over the legality of the former’s foray into large-scale 
pulp production.71 This legacy of this diplomatic controversy demanded that the management of 
Uruguay’s newest foreign investor tread extra carefully. “Our fear was that Argentina might protest 
again,” a senior executive at the company told me in 2015, reflecting back on the project’s initial 
announcement four years previously.72 Proving that the company was actively compliant with 
international best practices as well as national social and environmental standards was viewed as 
essential to mitigating this threat, the executive stated.  
 
Although newly constituted, Montes del Plata was not without its own skeletons. Aside from its links 
to ENCE, Uruguay’s largest ever investor came with two co-owners in tow, each with their own 
chequered histories. Arauco, the world’s second largest pulp producer,73 has faced at least ten major 
fines over recent decades for breaches of environmental regulations in its home nation of Chile.74 The 
most notorious case dates back to 2004, when a herd of endangered black-necked swans died close to 
its newly inaugurated pulp mill in Valdivia.75 Montes del Plata’s other owner, Stora Enso, stood accused 
of operating plantations without an environmental license in the Brazilian province of Bahia (FOE 
2011).76 The accusations, which emerged just prior to Montes del Plata’s creation, followed previous 
convictions for illegal deforestation and the inappropriate use of pesticides in the same region. Steps 
were needed to “ensure a similar situation does not arise in Uruguay”, the Uruguayan Foreign Minister 
said in response.77  
 
In addition to the exceptional emphasis Montes del Plata’s management placed on CSR, the case is 
notable for the apparent success of the strategy. The sponsor of the Punta Pereira mega-project enjoyed 
a remarkably smooth ride throughout its three-year construction cycle and beyond. Bar a few isolated 
contractual disputes with Uruguay’s main umbrella construction union, the Punta Pereira mill project 
was completed with a virtual absence of social conflict. This absence of conflict presents an intriguing 
research puzzle. How did Montes del Plata succeed in avoiding conflictive relationships where so many 
                                               
71 For further details of the proceedings of the case and the court’s judgements, see the International Court of 
Justice’s case notes. Available at  https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/135. Accessed 2 May 2018.  
72 Private interview with Sustainability Director. 2 February 2016. 
73 Arauco, Corporate Presentation. June 2017. https://www.arauco.cl/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/2017.06_ 
Corporate_Presentation.pdf. Accessed 15 February 2018. 
74 Reuters. 2016. Chile regulator to fine Arauco for 'green liquid' waste spillage. 11 January. https://www.reuters. 
com/article/us-copec-violation/chile-regulator-to-fine-arauco-for-green-liquid-waste-spillage-idUSKCN0UP26 
D20160111. Accessed 15 February 2018. 
75 World Rainforest Movement. ‘Chile: Pulp mill destroy biodiversity and people’s livelihoods.’ 
http://www.wrm.org.uy/oldsite/bulletin/104/Chile.html. Accessed 21 March 2018. 
76 Friends of the Earth International. 2011. Stora Enso accused of environmental crimes and corruption. Press 
release, 20 April 2011. http://www.mynewsdesk.com/se/pressreleases/stora-enso-accused-of-environmental-
crimes-and-corruption-619889. Accessed 16 Feb 2018. 
77 YLE. ‘Stora Enso Accused of Illegalities in Brazil.’ 8 October 2010.  https://yle.fi/uutiset/osasto/news/stora_ 
enso_accused_of_illegalities_in_brazil/5647285. Accessed 16 February 2018. 
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others in its sector have failed? And what role did CSR discourses and practices play in the conflict-
free passage of its mill project? Given Montes del Plata’s consistent rhetoric of responsibility, it is 
tempting to follow the company’s public interpretation of events: namely, that the appearance of 
harmony surrounding the project evidences the mill operator making good on its stated mission (MDP 
2017).78 
 
Such a conclusion requires a number of substantial and unfounded assumptions, however, all of which 
are common to conventional CSR theory. The most obvious of these is that lack of conflict derives from 
social approval. This conclusion is convincingly challenged by the forest conflict scholar Markus 
Kröger, whose recent study on the absence of conflicts argues that conflicts can occur invisibly as well 
as visibly (Kröger 2013a). The decision by citizens and others not to mobilise does not necessarily 
negate the presence of social disquiet or oppositional movements. Indeed, although communities 
affected by commercial forestry often report a very similar set of grievances, only some choose to 
mobilise. Why should this be? Research on conflict and social movements suggests a range of 
structural-functional, institutional and perceptual-ideational approaches to theorising this apparent 
anomaly (Eckerberg & Sandström 2013). Whichever approach scholars elect, analytical attention tends 
to focus on the distinctive qualities of the aggrieved,  rather than the aggressor.79 The tactics that 
corporate agents use to suppress conflict and dissuade communities from mobilising has, as a result, 
remained largely unstudied.     
 
Another primary assumption is that CSR practices work in developing market contexts on an almost 
quid pro quo basis. CSR theorists presume that social legitimation is granted to FDI sponsors on the 
basis of them delivering more tangible developmental goods and other positive socio-economic benefits 
than they do negative effects.80 Again, this quasi contractual relationship is by no means certain. As 
stated above, Montes del Plata was no cash cow for Uruguay. The generous terms of trade that it enjoyed 
limited its fiscal contributions, while its industrial sophistication reduced its employment requirements. 
As for its charitable contributions, local residents habitually dismissed this as “chirola” (small change).  
 
If CSR does not deliver manifest development benefits, then what is its relationship to legitimacy-
making? How does CSR help its corporate practitioners co-opt, cajole or otherwise create the conditions 
for social consent (or non-mobilisation)? Montes del Plata’s anomalous position as the sponsor of a 
                                               
78 MDP. 2017. Montes del Plata obtuvo doble reconocimiento de DERES por sus prácticas de sustentabilidad. 
Press release. 20 Dec. 2017. https://www.montesdelplata.com.uy/montes-del-plata-obtuvo-doble-
reconocimiento-de-deres-por-sus-practicas-de-sustentabilidad-8?nid=536&&page:1!=16. Accessed 26 April 
2018. 
79 A notable exception here is Marina Welker’s study of how the CSR activities of US mining company Newmont 
provoked villagers to attack a group of visiting environmentalists near its Batu Hijau mine in Indonesia (Welker 
2009). 
80 See: Suchman 1995, Vanhamme & Grobben 2009, Bowen 2017. 
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controversial investment that has, to date, prompted almost no conflict makes it a productive case study 
for interrogating these critical questions.   
 
I.5 Detachable CSR: corporate relations, legitimation & moral disposition  
This thesis discusses the efforts Montes del Plata’s management made to draw and redraw the space 
between the corporation and the institutions, groups and individuals within their network of social and 
moral relations. I term this process ‘detachable CSR’. By presenting themselves as responsible 
corporate citizens, foreign investors such as Montes del Plata are inevitably drawn into a web of ethical, 
political, and social relations. This can be advantageous in a wide variety of ways, from enhancing their 
external reputation for responsible business practice through to obtaining favourable concessions from 
regulators. Yet such relational bonds, if they are in any way authentic, typically bring expectations of 
community investment and other citizen-like behaviours that are extraneous to the core business of 
corporations and potentially detrimental to their profitability (Friedman 1970). FDI sponsors that adopt 
a strong CSR position therefore face a constant struggle as to how best to manage the depth and intimacy 
of their relational ties. The ideal is to be close enough to garner the benefits of relational proximity, 
while remaining distant enough to minimise the associated costs. Hence, the CSR strategy must be 
‘detachable’.   
The term detachable CSR contains two important internal dyadic connections. The first relates to 
detachability as a relational concept of both separation and cohesion. Detachability supposes a constant 
pull to create distance in overly proximate relations and to broker a divorce in the social and moral 
obligations that such relations incur. Yet, while the relational trajectory may be towards the loosening 
of ties, the term includes the supposition that intimacy is not only possible but, in certain circumstances, 
desirable. To be able to detach supposes a prior state of attachment from which a process of distance 
creation can occur. Corporations do not come into being with such attachments already in place. Some 
are foisted upon them, as per local community relations, while others are actively sought, as in the case 
of relations with influential legislators or media representatives. As a precursor to detachment, 
therefore, detachable CSR also considers how relations are created, maintained and, if necessary, re-
established. This fluidity in corporate-social relations derives from an understanding that such relations 
are neither uniform nor stable. Detachable CSR provides a way of conceptualising this state of constant 
flux, assuming a basis from which detachment can occur as well as the process of detachment itself.  
The second instance of coupling within detachable CSR relates to the ethical character of detachability. 
The relational dynamic between corporations and society that the term describes is not morally neutral. 
The fixing and detaching of relations plays out in a climate of ethical virtue. If and when a firm seeks 
to distance itself from its moral obligations, it endeavours to do so in a way that appears morally 
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defensible. To retain a chance of gaining or maintaining an appearance of social legitimation, a 
company’s management cannot sever relational ties without moral or ethical justification. To do so 
would be to make plain its lack of responsibility. From the simple perspective of reputation 
management, ethically unfettered detachment is ill-advised and ideally avoided. In this respect, it is 
important to note that the term ‘detachable’ is understood as descriptor rather than a substantive 
adjective. In other words, it does not replace CSR. This is not detachment alone. Instead, it qualifies the 
kind of CSR that a company’s leadership seeks to practice. To detach from, and feasibly reattach to, 
social relations may be the end goal of detachability. But to carry this out in a manner that retains the 
guise of responsibility and defensible ethical conduct: this is one of the fundamental distinguishing 
feature of detachable CSR.  
As such, the phrase detachable CSR attempts to capture the liminal and transitional state of engaged 
disengagement that characterizes the moral connection of modern companies to wider society. It 
provides a governing framework, either explicit or implied, for large-scale infrastructure sponsors such 
as Montes del Plata to maximise profitable relations and to minimise non-profitable relations, while 
keeping the incumbent costs of all types of relations to the lowest level possible. A key method for 
achieving this end is the attempted depoliticisation of themselves as corporate entities, on the one hand, 
and of their management of relations, on the other. This typically represents an effort in concealment, 
rather than character change. Given the social, economic and environmental impacts of their investment 
projects, extractivist-oriented FDI sponsors remain intrinsically and inevitably political. To be viewed 
as significant political actors, however, raises the risk of onerous social expectations being passed from 
the government onto them, especially in ill-governed or under-governed regions. As for their detaching 
and reattaching of relations, if this were seen as the political game-playing that it is, with some groups 
favoured and others not, then companies’ claims to corporate responsibility would be harder to retain.  
Thematically, the concept of detachability and its depoliticising intent resonates strongly with the 
relational theories of stakeholder management and legitimation that undergird much of the meso-level 
scholarship in political CSR (Frynas & Stephens 2015). While the mainstream CSR literature is 
primarily occupied with the practical application of such management theories, political CSR scholars 
focus instead on their political motivations and effects. The primary weakness of the mainstream 
approach is its normative focus, which leads to a concentration less on what managers do in reality and 
more on what they should do in ideal scenarios. Hence, the ubiquity of management formulas and 
typologies aimed at effective ‘stakeholder’ management and the acquisition of legitimacy. Feeding this 
bias is the corporate-centric assumption that corporate policies flow from internal policy models into 
real world environments unproblematically and unidirectionally. Ethnographic inquiries as to how 
corporate power is realised in dynamic and complex social settings and how rebuttals are negotiated are 
left largely unconsidered. As for Political CSR, its preferred focus on policy motivations and outcomes 
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means its proponents typically overlook the actual day-to-day mechanics of corporate social and 
political relations. So while detachability represents a theme that both orthodox CSR and political CSR 
studies hint at, existing research in this field as yet offers few insights into how a state of engaged 
disengagement is actualised in practice.   
The idea of detachability, and its sister theme of detachment, also has strong echoes in anthropology. 
Again, the relationship is not a straightforward one. Detachment and its equivalents represent contested 
terrain, associated as they are with what Bruno Latour famously defined as the Great Divide, the 
separating between us and them, science and politics, heart and mind, and all manner of other 
dichotomies (Latour 1993). It has become near dogma in contemporary anthropology, as across the 
social sciences in general, that all claims to detachment are illusory (Candea et al. 2015). As fact, 
detachment is impossible: everything is related, entangled, involved; no individual is capable of 
disconnecting from their own subjectivity or self-interest. As a principle, on the other hand, detachment 
is ethically unpalatable: knowledge can ever be divorced from power or politics, as postcolonial, 
poststructuralist, feminist and queer theories all attest. However, the categorical rejection of detachment 
as a valid epistemological and ontological concept has recently been opened up to question. Those 
supporting a push back against the cultural turn that valorises engagement and connectivity within a 
binding logic of relations have found unexpected support in work of Marilyn Strathern. Although 
Strathern is widely seen as a proponent of the relationality of persons, her study of kinship examines 
how human beings create (open) and limit (close) relational fields (Strathern 1995). For Strathern, the 
“cutting” of relations does not present an either/or scenario. Relations are not entirely attached nor 
entirely detached. Rather detachment and attachment are in constant interaction, and it is through this 
perpetual temporal interplay that new forms of the social can be seen (see also Jensen & Winthereik 
2015). Relations have a habit of truncating one minute and then cutting loose from one another and 
from the past the next, only to then reattach themselves again. Thus relations do not sever, but rather, 
as Penny Harvey and Hannah Knox put it, they “transform over time and emerge in new constellations” 
(2015:201), thus proving that distance-making and detachability are not as incompatible with relational 
anthropology as once assumed.81  
                                               
81 Bringing additional support to the conceptual validity of a detachable form of CSR is the notion of “stages of 
detachment”, as propounded by James Laidlaw (See: Candea et al. 2015:83-84) in his study of relations of 
exchange between Shvetambar Jain ascetics and their religious devotees in northern India. As Laidlaw argues, the 
seemingly inexorable move towards ever greater relatedness inherent to sociability can in fact hide internal 
negations of connectedness (ibid. 130-146). These negations may not be immediately visible; the Jain monks of 
Laidlaw’s ethnographic study do not abstain for exchange relations, but instead accept food donated to them by 
devotees. Yet their desire for, and perceived reality of, detachment is no less real, maintained as it is by internalised 
distinctions of relatedness and non-relatedness. The possibility of differentiating between internal and external 
levels of connectedness evokes Fredrik Barth’s seminal volume on “boundary maintenance”, which reveals the 
capacity of social groups to establish proximity among some while limiting it among others (Barth 1969).  
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The anthropology of CSR acknowledges the possibility of detachability in its analysis of how the 
mechanisms of CSR work to distance corporations from their stated responsibilities, especially to host 
communities. Again, such moves towards disconnection are not always easy to discern on the surface. 
Indeed, the desire for distance and boundary setting habitually runs contrary to the public rhetoric of 
CSR. The notion of empowerment, central to many contemporary CSR interventions, represents a case 
in point. Pitched as a means through which community participants can ‘realise their potential’ and 
participate more fully in the market for themselves, the reality is often shown to be very different (Rajak 
2008, Gardner 2012, Muñoz & Burnham 2016). Reconfigured as ‘empowered’ citizens, these new 
market actors frequently find themselves cut off from previous relations of corporate patronage and 
compelled to fend for themselves (Dolan & Johnstone-Louis 2011). The CSR trope of partnership has 
within its powers the same counter-intuitive potential. Ostensibly, corporate-community partnerships 
present an invitation to citizens and civil society groups to co-create local development programmes 
and other community initiatives (Rogan 2009). In reality, however, corporate-civil society alliances are 
rarely relationally neutral. While ‘partners’ are often drawn into proximate patron-client relations – not 
always of their own will – non-participants can find themselves excluded from the sphere of corporate 
beneficence (Rajak 2011). This reordering of relations is being camouflaged by visual and discursive 
depictions of corporate-community harmony.       
Detachable CSR invites a consideration of the politics of CSR free of the politically charged debate as 
to whether the ethical turn within international business is genuine (Henriques & Richardson 2005) or 
disingenuous (Fleming & Jones 2013). Instead, it is comfortable with ambiguity and contradiction, 
accepting that the locus of a company’s CSR efforts could simultaneously encompass “the good, the 
bad and the ugly”, to borrow from Bobbie Banerjee (2009). Drawing on lines of inquiry established by 
both the political literature on CSR and the anthropology of CSR, the explanatory power of the concept 
of detachability resides primarily in revealing the mechanisms of distance management in business-
society relations, not the motivations for such management.  
How is the non-binding, shifting nature of corporate relations built into the framework of CSR? How 
does the language of CSR encode expressions of corporate power as a detachable phenomenon, and 
how do the practices and programmes of CSR enable this power to then realign social relations in favour 
of business interests? As this thesis exhorts, the application of detachability to the study of CSR sheds 
new light on the political tensions caused by corporate capitalism’s expansion into new markets. In 
particular, it offers valuable insights into how these tensions are downplayed, as well how they are 
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I.6 Place in literature 
This thesis locates itself in the emerging field of critical CSR studies. In the interdisciplinary spirit of 
regional studies, it draws on two main bodies of literature: the critical study of management and the 
anthropology of corporations. The connecting theme in each case is a critical interest in the use of 
moralising practices and discourses of corporate capitalism, known to scholars and management 
practitioners alike as CSR.  
Both fields adopt as their starting-point a number of common assumptions. Firstly, they claim as short-
sighted and reductive the orthodox tendency within the CSR literature of “analyzing CSR by examining 
CSR”, as the critical management scholars Kunal Basu and Guido Palazzo put it (2008:124). Instead, 
theorists in both fields maintain that, as social actors embedded in specific social, cultural and political 
contexts, corporations co-create CSR strategies and actions in response to a range of internal and 
external factors that are often omitted from, or contrary to, their public explanations. In this sense, they 
fit within Gray el al.’s classic definition of political economy, as “the social, political and economic 
framework within which human life takes place” (1996:47). This willingness to step outside CSR’s own 
terms of reference and internal logics opens the door to rich research terrain concerning the motivations 
for, and framing influences on, companies’ approaches to CSR. These twin themes are generally 
ignored by the orthodox economic and business theories habitually applied in CSR studies.  
Another thematic preoccupation that critical management studies and the anthropology of corporations 
have in common relates to the relationship between CSR and power, an orientation that they both share 
with the overarching concerns of political economy theory (Scherer 2018, Dolan & Rajak 2016). First, 
both maintain that CSR represents a vehicle for corporations to exercise material and symbolic power 
over people.82 Second, both assume that an end point of CSR’s exercise of power is the expansion and 
reproduction of neoliberal capitalism, for which the concept of moral legitimation is a crucial 
component.83 The power dynamics inherent within CSR largely fall outside the purview of mainstream 
international business studies and management studies, which focus instead on more face-value 
questions such as economic value, resource allocation, corporate strategy and normative ethics.84  
This thesis shares this interest of critical theorists in the political role and behaviours of corporations, 
noting that this role is evolving constantly.85 The exponential increase in corporate power and influence 
vis-à-vis the state is widely recognised by political scientists and economists alike.86 This has led to 
                                               
82 See: May et al. 2007, Banerjee 2008a, Gond et al. 2016. 
83 See: Kinderman 2011, Banerjee 2008b, Hanlon & Fleming 2009, Castello & Lozano 2011, Palazzo & Scherer 
2011. 
84 See: Lee 2008, Secchi 2007, Chandler 2016. 
85 See: Sastry 2011, Welker 2014. 
86 See: Djelik & Etchanchu 2015, Abbot & Snidal 2010, Bartley 2007, Brinkmann & Brinkmann 2002, Cox 2012, 
May 2015, Bibic et al. 2017. 
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new ‘voids’ in global governance, which, in part, corporations have sought to fill with voluntarist codes, 
cross-sector initiatives, ethical standards and the other ‘soft’ regulatory frameworks associated with the 
apparatus of CSR - the so-called ‘new statism’ phenomenon (Wood & Wright 2015).87 Much of the 
focus of both anthropologists (Coumans 2011, Dolan & Rajak 2016) and critical management scholars 
(Frynas & Stephens 2015, Banerjee 2018) has concentrated on the novel constellations of power that 
are emerging as a consequence. How do these new regimes of authority work and where does the locus 
of accountability lie in a moralised market economy?88 How does the practice of CSR shape social and 
political relations, and how do these relations shape corporations in return (Crane et al. 2008, Lock & 
Seele 2017)? And how do corporations balance the social obligations assumed by CSR with the 
exigencies of capital (Harrison & Wicks 2013, Margolis & Walsh 2001)?  
 
I.6.1 Political CSR 
Political CSR comprises a sub-category of CSR studies that concerns itself with the ‘political turn’ 
within CSR practice over the last decade and more.89 Early discussions have focused on political themes 
such as corporate citizenship90, corporate political activity91 and the effects of globalisation on 
multinational corporations’ roles and responsibilities.92 These have coalesced around what CSR 
scholars refer to as ‘political CSR’ (Scherer 2018). Yet attempts to define ‘political CSR’ have proved 
difficult, with this field of study showing itself to be resistant to neat parameters.93  
In their recent review of the literature, Frynas and Stephens choose as their yardstick any activity by 
business “where CSR has an intended or unintended political impact, or where intended or unintended 
political impacts on CSR exist” (2015:484). ‘Political’ itself is ill-defined, but it is generally assumed 
to refer to the terrain traditionally occupied by government (Lawton et al. 2013). Examples of political 
impact, therefore, range from attempts by business to lobby government for competitive advantages 
(Halme 2002, Ruihua & Bansal 2003), unintended impacts on the development of state institutions 
(Cragg 2000, Kwok & Tadesse 2006) through to reactions to regulatory change and other forms of 
government intervention (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra 2004, Slager et al. 2012). While state-corporate 
relations occupy an important focus in political CSR, business theorists and others have begun to extend 
their focus into the wider terrain of governmental activities and relations. Notable for the purposes of 
                                               
87 See also: Jessop 2016, Palazzo & Scherer 2011, Banerjee 2014. 
88 See: Matten & Crane 2005, Aßländer & Curbach, 2014. 
89 See: Palazzo & Scherer 2007, 2011, Patriotta et al. 2011. 
90 See: Crane et al. 2008; Edwards & Willmott 2008; Matten et al. 2003. 
91 See: Hillman et al. 2004, Lawton et al. 2013, McWilliams et al. 2002 
92 See: Levy 2008; Scherer et al. 2006. 
93 See: Whelan 2012, Mäkinen & Kourula 2012, Frynas & Stephens 2015. 
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this thesis is political CSR’s interest in questions of economic development, environmental protection, 
community relations, democratic representation, and so forth.  
For direction in how to classify the political CSR literature and how best to place the contribution of 
this thesis within it, I draw on Bies et al.’s proposal to adopt a level of analysis approach (Bies et al. 
2007). This sees the literature categorised between the macro level (i.e. relating to the wider social, 
political and economic ecosystem in which business operates), meso level (i.e. focusing on relational 
issues between organisations) and micro level (i.e. pertaining to individual agency). The vast majority 
of political CSR research concentrates in the first two of these three levels (Frynas & Stephens 2015).  
The single-sited nature of this thesis does not naturally lend itself to macro-level analysis, however, 
which is overwhelmingly steered towards institutional theory (Matten & Moon 2008, Witt & Redding 
2012). For the most part, studies of this nature have sought to demonstrate the isomorphic influence of 
international and national legislation on CSR strategies.94 A related area of study concerns inter-
organizational negotiation around CSR standards (Helfen & Sydow 2013). Yet, the value of institutional 
analysis for the focus on this thesis is questionable as it has typically theorised companies as passive 
actors rather than political actors in their own right.95 The consideration that corporations not only seek 
to influence politics for their own instrumental gains but that they are themselves political actors, co-
creating the institutional environments in which they operate, represents a key departure point of 
political CSR from the conventional corporate political activity literature (Scherer et al. 2016). An 
important avenue of subsequent research has focused on the implications for existing models of political 
governance (Abbott 2012) and global democracy more widely (Thompson 2008).  
My research coincides most closely with the scholarship conducted at a meso-level of analysis, where 
stakeholder theory (Donaldson & Preston 1995, Mitchell et al. 1997) and legitimacy theory (De Blasio 
2007, Cashier et al. 2003) have come to dominate. Stakeholder theory has emerged as a mainstay of the 
business ethics and CSR literature over recent decades (Freeman 1984, Logsdon & Wood 2002). 
Political CSR diverges from its conventional counterpart is in its rejection of a normative (ethical) 
position of analysis in favour of a more descriptive (empirical) approach (Boesso et al. 2013). Instead 
of asking how companies should relate to their ‘stakeholders’ (Crane et al. 2004), they consider how 
CSR is shaped by dynamic relations with external actors (Gilbert & Rasche 2007). This has led to an 
interest among political CSR researchers as to how different stakeholder attributes impact on 
management decisions (Doh & Lucea 2013), as well as how corporate agents use stakeholder relations 
to influence regulation and shape political relations (Sharratt et al. 2007): two themes to which this 
thesis speaks in the context of the corporate-community sphere.  
                                               
94 See: Campbell 2007, Husted & Allen 2006, Kang & Moon 2012, Koos 2012. 
95 See: Doh & Guay 2006, Levy & Kolk 2002, Tan & Wang 2011 
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Studies in corporate legitimation share many links with stakeholder theory and other meso-level modes 
of analysis, particularly those deriving from the fields of political theory (Levy & Egan 2003, Janssens 
& Steyaert 2012) and political economy theory (Palazzo & Scherer 2011). This reflects Craig Deegan’s 
observation regarding the considerable overlap between legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory 
(Deegan 2002). As with stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory has developed at pace over the last two 
decades and now counts many frameworks and typologies for how legitimacy can be won, protected 
and strengthened (Palazzo & Scherer 2006, Suchman 1995).  
While these various interpretations compete for primacy, a common strand is the theoretical centrality 
of the idea of modern corporations having a ‘social contract’ (Weyzig 2009). The term is understood in 
the Hobbesian sense of corporations as ‘legal persons’, having concomitant rights and responsibilities 
(Orts 2013). As the accounting theorist Martin Matthews explains, society confers authority on 
corporations to derive benefits from the ownership and use of natural resource, yet “in order to allow 
their [corporations’] existence, society would expect the benefits to exceed the costs to society” 
(1993:26). The notion that “stakeholders will ascribe legitimacy to the corporation so long as they 
perceive that they will benefit from the company’s activities” has become a baseline assumption of 
contemporary CSR theory and practice (Castello & lozano 2011:12). From this theoretical perspective, 
the retention of a company’s social contract – or ‘social license to operate’96 – is viewed as a critical 
resource for corporate survival (Dowling & Pfeffer 1975). My research takes seriously the argument 
presented by much of the CSR literature and held by many CSR practitioners that CSR serves as a 
mechanism for the continued supply of social legitimation.97  
The question then turns on how CSR achieves this common quest for legitimacy. The literature divides 
into one of two interpretative camps here: isomorphic strategies,98 whereby corporate agents seek to 
gain legitimacy by conforming to the expectations of their ‘stakeholders’99; and managerial strategies, 
whereby firms use CSR to manipulate stakeholders in order to shift expectations in their favour or to 
co-opt or silence opposition voices.100 Mainstream CSR scholars have tended towards the former 
interpretation, in part because of their natural bias towards institutional theory and also because they 
tend to conduct their studies through a macro lens. Both camps posit CSR as a response to the emerging 
regulatory and political challenges that emerge within today’s globalised capitalist order,101 the size and 
scope of which make it resistant to individual corporation’s efforts at manipulation. This leads to 
                                               
96 See: Morrison 2014, 2016, Edwards et al. 2016. 
97 See: Scott 1995, Suchman 1995, Vaara & Tienari 2008. 
98 Suchman uses the term ‘isomorphic adaptation’ to refers to ‘the ways in which sector-wide structuration 
dynamics generate cultural pressures that transcend any single organization’s purposive control’. See: Suchman 
1995: 572. 
99 See: DiMaggio & Powell 1983, Meyer & Rowan 1977 
100 See: Donaldson & Preston 1995, Freeman & Reed 1983, Baum & Oliver 1991. 
101 Levy 2008, Patriotta et al. 2011, Scherer et al. 2013. 
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analysis of business action at a collective level, which has been accused of being overly normative 
(Kuhn & Deetz 2008) and of glassing over the complexity of relations between individual businesses 
and society (Baur & Arenas 2014). 
Given their interest in power relations, critical theorists overwhelmingly tend to favour a managerial 
lens of analysis in the construction and defence of corporate legitimacy (Mena & Palazzo 2012, Vogel 
2005). In light of my single-sited ethnographic research, this thesis follows their lead. Adopting a 
managerial perspective goes against the macro level of most existing research. The majority of previous 
studies have focused on the development of global CSR norms and initiatives, such as the United 
Nations’ Global Compact and Global Reporting Initiative, as tools for reconfiguring societal 
expectations in favour of corporate multinationalism.102 However, a recent shift within critical 
legitimacy theory to a national level focus has sparked new interest in the managerial position.103 One 
relevant line of political CSR research relates to how ethical business paradigms help multinational 
corporations exploit weak state regulations and governance gaps.104 This has led to a focus on how 
voluntary ethical standards permit the export of irresponsible norms to low-income and emerging 
markets by subsidiaries of Euro-American corporations (Escobar & Vredenburg 2011, Surroca et al. 
2013). Influential within this meso-level research is Palazzo and Scherer’s call to consider the discursive 
nature of legitimacy, noting that legitimacy is “socially and argumentatively constructed by means of 
considering reasons to justify certain actions, practices, or institutions” (2006:71). This requires the 
application of a critical lens to corporate communication strategies as well as mechanisms for 
stakeholder engagement and public dialogue.105  
While political CSR’s adoption and adaption of relational management theories such as stakeholder 
theory and legitimacy theory has opened new lines of inquiry in CSR studies, little scholarship has so 
far been focused at the micro level. This failure to consider internal decision-making processes, 
corporate psychologies and the influence of individual managers on CSR practices and outcomes 
represents a noted lacuna (Frynas & Stephens 2015). The absence of a micro perspective from CSR is 
not entirely surprising: it is the study of ‘corporate’ responsibility, after all. Yet, if corporations are 
understood as agglomerations of individuals working on behalf of owners (principals), as classic 
management-based agency theory attests (Panda & Leepsa 2017), then the employee agent must merit 
attention. To date, however, CSR theorists have tended to dismiss the value of studying individual 
agents on the grounds that corporate strategy involves the complex interaction of internal and external 
factors (Hart 1995:989).  
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The disregard for individual agents in the study of CSR has not gone uncontested, however. Jawahar 
and McLaughlin, for example, make the notable assertion that “managers’ beliefs, values, and 
ideologies are likely to influence the strategies that managers use to deal with different stakeholders” 
(2001:411). Nor are questions of individual managerial ethics absent from the register of wider business 
and management literature. In the wake of the ever increasing frequency of corporate scandals, for 
instance, the burgeoning field of behavioural ethics has begun to garner scholarly attention (Treviño et 
al. 2006), with issues such as ethical decision making (O’Fallon & Butterfield 2005), ethical conduct 
(Treviño & Weaver 2003) and the normalisation of unethical behaviours (Ashforth & Anand, 2003) 
sparking rich new lines of inquiry. The potential link here to CSR is evident, if not usually explicit.  
Where tentative attempts have been made to make a connection between micro and meso analysis is in 
the relationship between individual ethical leadership, on the one hand, and CSR strategy, on the other 
(Mayer et al. 2012, Pless et al. 2012). Maak et al. go as far as to explore how instrumental and 
integrative responsible leadership approaches impact companies’ political engagements (2016). Yet, 
the majority of existing studies restrict their focus to decision-makers in the boardroom rather than CSR 
agents or other employees on the ground.106 Efforts to conceptualise the motivations for, and influence 
of, non-executives on firm ethical conduct have so far been more limited. Notable exceptions within 
the business literature include studies on social intrapreneurship (Grayson et al. 2014), social and 
environmental entrepreneurship (Short et al. 2009) and sense-making (Basu & Palazzo 2008, 
Joutsenvirta 2009). Of particular relevance to the latter is the emerging literature on framing processes 
and the insights this offers into the creation of institutionalised cultural conventions through individual 
interpretative constructs (Gray et al. 2015). Academic interest in the micro processes involved in 
corporate ethicizing has also provoked research in non-business fields. A pertinent example is recent 
research in psychology (Penner et al. 2005) and behavioural economics (Bénabou & Tirole 2006b) into 
the pro-social behaviour of individuals within businesses. Yet, as Andreas Scherer observes in his recent 
literature review, our understanding of the processes by which political CSR and individual behaviour 
mutually affect each other remains weak (Scherer 2018:392).  
I.6.2 Anthropology of Corporations  
As with political CSR, the anthropology of corporations is born out of a critical interest in the ever-
increasing space that business corporations occupy in the social and material fabric of everyday life.107 
The multiple guises of modern companies – as employers, as purveyors of goods and services, and as 
generators of capital – evidence themselves in various ways, from the abstract and global to the local 
and personal. The recognition of corporate actors as legitimate and necessary subjects of analysis marks 
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a response, albeit belatedly, to the call by Sherry Ortner over three decades ago for anthropologists to 
pay more attention to corporations and their “relations of power, domination, manipulation, control and 
the like” (1984:142). Behind Ortner’s assertion is the well-founded prediction that the gradual 
globalisation of economic neoliberalism would lead to modern transnational corporations morphing 
into new institutions of governance - a conviction shared by proponents of political CSR.  
Extractivist FDI projects in developing countries represent one of the most dramatic manifestations of 
this expansion of private corporations into public life and their impingement on contemporary social 
experience (Veltmeyer 2016, Santos & Renfrew 2017). Not before time, multinational businesses of 
Montes del Plata’s ilk have recently begun to enter into the economic and political anthropology 
literature with greater frequency and in increasingly protagonistic roles.108  
The anthropology of corporations can be broadly divided into two categories: that which concerns itself 
with the lives of corporations (their births, deaths and biographies), as Purnima Bose and Laura Lyons 
describe (2010); and that which focuses on how corporations shape the lives of those around them, both 
institutional (media, state, non-governmental, etc.) and personal.109 The fact that this thesis finds Montes 
de Plata at its birth stage invites reflections on the life of the company, but, as with the political CSR 
literature, its primary investigative thrust focuses on how corporate agents use instruments of discursive 
and material power to frame their operating environments.  
Over recent decades, the deployment of political agency by corporate agents has become increasingly 
sophisticated and strategic. A feature of this phenomenon is the packaging of their changing political 
role and concomitant social relations in the ethicising language and practices of CSR. Anthropologists 
have duly turned their attentions to the task of unpicking and examining the apparatus and effects of 
CSR and its inherent political character.110 As with political CSR, the focus of this nascent anthropology 
of CSR has tended to avoid the more popular debate about whether its subject of attention is a 
smokescreen for the ills of corporate capitalism (Fleming & Jones 2013, Sharp 2006) or a trailblazer 
for enlightened capitalism (Cecil 1980, Visser 2013). Instead, its core attention is given to the mechanics 
of this novel vehicle for wielding corporate power: their form, their mode of operating, and their effects. 
The camouflaging character of CSR cannot hide the tensions that inevitably arise between what CSR 
purports to do (for society, mainly) and what it actually does in reality (especially for companies 
themselves). Anthropologists in this emerging field have found that CSR’s multiplicity of 
                                               
108 Corporations have featured centrally in studies on a range of studies concerned with the expansion of corporate 
capitalism, from expatriate identities (Kurotani 2005) and migrant labour (Garsten 2008), through to 
environmental pollution (Kirsch 2006; Sawyer 2004), deindustrialisation (Nash 1989) and outsourcing (Ong 
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“expectations, contradictions and frictions” presents some of the richest terrain for research, an 
observation that I seek to reflect in this thesis (Dolan & Rajak 2016:3).  
Among the many themes that characterise the emergent anthropological literature on CSR, one that 
resonates particularly strongly is that of depoliticisation. This thematic interest reflects, and arguably 
arises out of, a long-running concern in political anthropology about the role and influence of 
government and governance (Sharma & Gupta 2006). This can be seen in the fact that many of the 
initial ethnographic studies of CSR have chosen to adopt the same Foucauldian lens as that applied to 
earlier studies concerning the creation and maintenance of power by state agencies and institutions. 
Most prominent of all is the application of Michel Foucault’s theory of governmentality (Foucault 
1991), which, when applied to the private sector, provides a conceptual basis for examining the 
strategies and apparatuses that enable corporations (as with states) to coax and cajole human agency 
and conduct.111 
The anthropology of CSR breaks with the macro-level of analysis of FDI projects that has tended to 
dominate the study of CSR by international business scholars as well as political CSR theorists. 
Prominent in both these fields is the question of how corporations have seized on the procedural, 
heterarchical governance systems of what Colin Scott terms “post-regulatory states” to pioneer non-
sanctionable, ‘soft’ forms of regulation (Scott 2004).112 Drawing on the seminal work of James Ferguson 
in Lesotho (1994), however, a growing number of ethnographers have begun to turn their attentions to 
meso and, to an extent, micro levels of analysis.113 Ferguson argued powerfully that state-led efforts to 
promote development worked as an “anti-politics machine”, with development interventions working 
to decontextualise power structures and discursively transform inequalities and poverty into technical 
problems. As such, instead of seeing their material conditions improve, the supposed beneficiaries of 
development witness the state’s influence over them increase. Ferguson argued that this influence is 
primarily exerted through the exercise of bureaucratic power, a core Foucauldian theme that has since 
sparked numerous studies into the politicising effects of Participatory Poverty Assessments, 
                                               
111 See: Banks & Hulme 2014, Richey & Ponte 2014, Blowfield & Dolan 2014, Dolan 2012. 
112 These soft forms of governance range from self-regulation or co-regulation between public and private actors, 
through to sets of loose guidelines, ethical codes and ‘best practices’ (Mörth, 2004). The growing ethnographic 
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development interventions (Li 2007). 
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participative dialogue techniques and other apparently progressive approaches to economic 
development.114  
An interest in the political nature of CSR represents a natural extension of the above debate. As 
anthropologists and development scholars have noted, CSR apes much of the language and many of the 
techniques of the development sector (Fox 2004). This is particularly noticeable in the case for 
extractivist companies operating in emerging or low-income countries, such as Montes del Plata, whose 
presence is frequently justified by pro-FDI policies premised on corporations’ contribution to domestic 
employment, industrialisation and other drivers of economic development (Loayza & Raddatz 2006). 
The arrival of private companies alongside traditional development actors marks a profoundly political 
shift in roles (Buur & Whitfield 2014), and a potentially dangerous one given the disproportionate 
influence that the representatives of multinational companies have over domestic legislation and 
economic policy (Eweje 2006). Leaders of modern corporations very often seek to distance themselves 
from publicly accepting their level of political involvement, preferring to present the businesses they 
lead as apolitical actors and therefore unburdened by the costly social obligations of the state (Shamir 
2004, Barthold 2013).  
This is where the depoliticising effects of CSR discourses and technologies come into play. Intentionally 
or not, the enactment of business responsibility programmes invariably leads to the political role of 
corporations being downplayed or disguised, while at the same time entrenching their position within 
the political ecosystem of host communities.115 This is achieved in part with the aid of soft law and 
moral voluntarism, both central to the architecture of contemporary CSR (Dentchev et al. 2015). Hence, 
the particular interest of corporate ethnographers on the voluntary standards, ethical codes, best practice 
guidelines and other mechanisms of governance that characterise CSR – which David Craig and Doug 
Porter refer to as the “travelling rationalities” of development doctrines (Craig & Porter 2006:157). This 
has led researchers to inquire how these forms of self-governance are drawing non-corporate spaces 
and actors into the “regulatory province and moral fold” of corporations (Dolan & Rajak 2016:13).  
The influence of CSR is not about companies removing themselves from the political terrain. Instead, 
it is about how the terrain is rearranged to their advantage. This involves reconfiguring the boundaries 
of political space as well as reordering the subjectivities of those within it.116 Here, the CSR anti-politics 
machine really gets working. The examples are multiple: non-market actors recast as consumers 
through pro-poor inclusion programmes (Cross & Street 2009, Schwittay 2011); civil society groups 
reconstituted as “partners” through practices of ‘connected capitalism’ (Foster 2014, Gardner 2015); 
critics silenced via transparency initiatives (Babidge 2015) and oxymoronic discourses (Benson 2010b, 
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Foster 2009); community protagonists rendered dependent through empowerment programmes (Rajak 
2008); families morphed into corporate entities through ties of affect and kinship (Shever 2008). 
Ultimately, whether through discourses (De Neve et al. 2004), disciplines (Rose 1999) or other 
techniques and forms of knowledge, development-led CSR is presented within the burgeoning 
anthropology of corporations as a sophisticated form of governmentality that functions primarily by 
educating its subjects’ “desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs” (Dean 1999:209). 
In summary, according to the company’s own public discourse, the CSR programme implemented by 
Montes del Plata’s management is designed to enact the company as a ‘good neighbour’ and to deliver 
development goods, primarily for those communities closest to the company’s pulp facility. As this 
thesis will show, the mill sponsor’s management are, at best, only marginally successful in this 
endeavour. Instead, a far more significant outcome of the programme, I argue, is the framing of the mill 
operator as benign, responsible and free of political trappings. Again, all three claims are highly 
debatable in the empirical sense. Yet, through a combination of relational management strategies (as 
highlighted in the political CSR literature) and hidden power plays (as brought to light by the 
anthropology of CSR), this dubious depoliticised image of Montes del Plata and the Punta Pereira 
project emerges more or less intact. The result is the company’s successful legitimation or, more 
accurately, the avoidance of its delegitimisation.  
This thesis draws on the critical CSR literature within management studies and anthropology to 
interrogate how this seemingly unlikely eventuality comes to be and, more broadly, what it reveals 
about the workings of CSR’s legitimising power and intent.        
I.7 Research methods  
 
This dissertation represents the output of a single-sited research project. The timing of the field research 
was divided over two separate periods: from October 2012 to April 2013 and from December 2015 to 
February 2016. This provided insights from the field at the most intense point of the mill’s construction 
and in the aftermath of its inauguration, respectively (see Figure 2).  
In keeping with conventional ethnographic methods, my research process drew heavily on participant 
observation, coupled with structured and unstructured interviews (O’Relly 2012). My primary research 
focused on the corporate-community dynamic in the environs around Punta Pereira, particularly the 
four villages that were variously defined as the mill’s “area of impact” by the company’s management 
and as the “Conchillas micro-region” by the provincial government. During my first phase of research, 
the geographic scope of the company’s community relations programme extended beyond the micro-
region, incorporating programmes in the towns of Carmelo and Colonia de Sacramento as well as 
around the Punta Pereira site itself. The company’s community relations team worked out of regional  
 




Figure 2 Montes del Plata’s mill project at Punta Pereira, Uruguay, during construction 
 
office in the provincial capital of Colonia de Sacramento, along with a communications officer. The 
state capital also housed the headquarters of the provincial government as well as a large population of 
contractor staff and senior company executives. The city therefore seemed a logical place to base myself 
during the first iteration of my fieldwork. After the inauguration of the mill, Montes del Plata’s 
community strategy focused much more firmly on the micro-region of Conchillas and, as a result, I 
stayed in the village itself during my second period of field work. The decision on where to locate 
myself was influenced by practical considerations as well. During the construction phase, demand for 
accommodation in the micro-region was extraordinarily high, resulting in the already limited options 
for private rental accommodation becoming very expensive.  
 
Although this thesis is primarily structured as a single-site study, the findings are informed by research 
outside the immediate geography of the mill project (see Figure 3). In order to gather comparable data, 
I visited Fray Bentos on three separate occasions, including a site tour of Botnia/UPM’s mill operations, 
as well as meeting with Botnia/UPM’s community management team in Montevideo. To set the Punta 
Pereira project in its historic and operational context, I undertook a visit of ENCE’s original mill site in 
Fray Bentos (now a nature reserve and conference centre operated by Montes del Plata) and of Montes 
del Plata’s multimillion-dollar nursery facility located on the outskirts of that same city. I also met with 
a wide range of senior executives at the pulp manufacturer’s Montevideo headquarters over the course 
of both periods of research. Interview data from these meetings was complemented by a field visit with 
community management representatives at the company’s regional office in Paysandú, in north-western 
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Uruguay, where its forest management team is based. My research also took on an international 
dimension, incorporating in-person interviews with mill opponents in Gualeguayhú, Argentina, and 
with Stora Enso’s sustainability team in Helsinki, Finland. In addition, I attended a four-day 
international conference and field study on sustainable forestry that was co-sponsored by Montes del 
Plata in the Uruguayan capital.  
 
The bulk of my fieldwork focused on the two main protagonists in Montes del Plata’s community 
relations’ activities: namely, the mill operator, on the one hand, and residents affected by its 
unprecedented investment, on the other. Responsibility for the pulp manufacturer’s interactions with 
residents in the micro-region fell to its Community Relations team. This comprised three female 
managers, with functional support from a male public affairs and communications manager. With the 
consent of the regional Community Director, I regularly joined the team during their everyday routines. 
These involved managing community development efforts, conducting community dialogues, liaising 
with civil society and government representatives, as well as internal planning, strategizing and 
reporting, among other activities. My access extended to most internal team meetings, although 
generally not to meetings considered to be of a strategic or otherwise sensitive nature with senior 





Figure 3 Regional Context of Montes del Plata’s Punta Pereira mill project117 
   
                                               
117 Montes del Plata: 2011. Lanzamiento Proyecto Industrial. Internal PowerPoint presentation. Unpublished. 
 




My field research among community members was more fluid and evolved over time. The formal 
relationship with Montes del Plata was managed largely by representatives of the area’s main civil 
society organisations. It was these civic leaders who were invited to attend consultations, for example, 
or to attend dialogues with visiting delegates. None of these organisations have large memberships and 
many of their leadership figures overlapped. I initially relied on a number of key informants within this 
group in order to orient myself in the field. By and large, residents in the micro region were open, 
hospitable and closely networked among themselves. All these factors made inserting myself into 
everyday community networks relatively unproblematic. In the early phase of my research, I undertook 
a survey of all the retailers and private businesses in the community and carried out semi-structured 
interviews (often multiple times) with all the civic leaders and state functionaries in the micro-region. 
The bulk of my participant research in the region focused on community activities related to the mill 
project. These either took the form of interventions organised by Montes del Plata’s CSR team, such as 
development workshops, trainings or community events, or citizen-led initiatives aimed at lobbying or 
otherwise influencing the mill sponsor. I supplemented this participant research with extensive semi-
structured and open interviews with residents in the micro region, giving equal attention to those who 
declined to participate in the company’s CSR programmes as well as those hostile to Montes del Plata 
or its mill project. 
 
In addition to my first-hand research, I made use of a wide array of secondary sources, particularly 
those pertaining to the company’s CSR programme. These included, but were not limited to, Montes 
del Plata’s policy statements, initial impact assessment report and public performance data, as well as 
those of its co-owners and peers. Given the focus of this thesis on the intersection of CSR and public 
legitimation, I endeavoured to collect as much of the company’s publicity materials during my research 
period, on television, radio and in print. This included all of the company’s press releases and other 
statements to the media, print advertising, brochures and books, as well as video archive footage of its 
MDP TV (Montes del Plata Television) weekly ‘infomercials’. To assess how this information was 
interpreted, I conducted interviews with ten regional and national newspaper and radio journalists and 
editors. Archive data from the two widest read local newspapers, El Eco (Carmelo) and Noticias (Juan 
Lacaze), was used to supplement these interviews. Close co-operation with the CSR team also rendered 
a number of internal documents available to me, notably the company’s strategy document for 
community relations (‘Plan de Relacionamiento Comunitario’), as well as privately commissioned 
public opinion surveys and periodic environmental/social impact data compiled by external consultants. 
Montes del Plata’s management never requested that I sign a non-disclosure agreement nor did I enter 
any other kind of formal or informal arrangement with the company that places any ethical or legal 
restrictions on the use of the information that I gathered during my research. 
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I.8 Methodological strengths and weaknesses 
 
I believe my research approach had a number of strengths. The first relates to time. The juggling of time 
and temporal perspectives is critical to the promissory nature of CSR (Frederick 2006, Louche & Dodd 
2009). Corporate responsibility practitioners will frequently articulate their activities in terms of 
‘journeying’ (Blake 2006). The ‘now’ and ‘not yet’ of the responsible company represents a constant 
and uneasy dialogue. Much like the theological states of salvation and sanctification/redemption, 
corporate leaders will claim that the qualities of responsibility reside ‘in the DNA’ (a classic trope of 
modern corporate communications) of the companies they govern. At the same time, they will maintain 
the the full materialisation of these qualities is an iterative process. So too with corporate-led community 
development: true fulfilment is always just around the corner. To observe this tension between present 
reality and future imaginary, I felt it necessary to observe efforts of Montes del Plata’s management to 
enact the company’s responsibility claims during “el auge” (‘the boom’) as well as in the ‘el despúes” 
(“the afterward”) period.118  
 
Another strength relates to my focus on individual agency. Taking my lead from contemporary 
corporate ethnography, I contend that corporate motives are neither as uniform, nor are internal 
decision-makers as homogenous as depictions by critical theorists and others have historically made 
out (Welker et al. 2011). The corporate form itself is contingent and, within this fragile black-boxed 
entity, CSR managers are continuously engaged in an internal struggle to frame and reframe the remit 
and responsibilities of the business they represent. The internality of this struggle is personal as well as 
managerial (Bitektine & Haack 2015). As Marina Welker warns, CSR managers are not mere ciphers 
and ethnographers should guard against the temptation to treat them as such (2014). Echoing Hirokazu 
Miyazaki’s work on securities’ traders in Tokyo (Miyazaki 2013), she calls on those studying the 
internal and external dynamics of corporations to “take executives seriously as complex, thinking 
subjects who, like us, are engaged in analysing, interpreting, theorising, and criticising capitalism” 
(Welker 2014:35).    
 
A third strength of my research approach is the attempt it makes at balance between company and 
community. In keeping with the natural sympathy of anthropologists for the marginalised and subaltern, 
most studies of international infrastructure investments in emerging economies have typically studied 
up from the vantage point of affected communities.119 While seeking to remain true to this political 
disposition, it is my conviction that a full picture of the co-evolving relationship between company and 
                                               
118 In total, this multi-disciplinary study encompassed six months in the field during ‘the boom’ period and three 
months during ‘the afterward’ period. A pure social anthropology study would arguably have benefitted from a 
more sustained period of field research.  
119 See: Ong 1987, Fortun 2001, Frynas 2005, Sawyer 2009, Sawyer & Gomez 2012. 
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community (Barkay 2011, Muthuri et al. 2009) ideally requires the researcher to take a bridging position 
that allows the vantage points of both protagonists to be equally and accurately observed. As a 
consequence, I declined to ally myself firmly with either of the two sides of the corporate-community 
dynamic and instead endeavoured to keep a foot in both camps. I derive confidence in the value of this 
dual focus approach from its increasing adoption by other ethnographers interested in the social role of 
international business.120 
 
My research approach and methodology also exhibit a variety of weaknesses that need to be 
acknowledged. The first, and most obvious, relates to my choice to adopt a single-site focus. While the 
Punta Pereira site represented the indisputable epicentre of Montes del Plata’s commercial investment 
and its community relations, it does not encompass either one in its entirety. The temptation to see 
Montes del Plata and Punta Pereira as coterminous is a powerful one. The two, after all, are treated as 
such by the corporation itself as well as by the media and other public interlocutors in Uruguay. The 
centrality of the company’s so-called “zone of influence” around its mill facility was also the undisputed 
priority of Montes del Plata’s community relations’ efforts during the period of my fieldwork. This is 
in keeping with orthodox CSR management, which directs corporate agents to prioritise those 
communities affect by, or at risk from, their investments (Prno & Slocombe 2012).  
 
Even so, Montes del Plata’s mill project marks the culmination of a long chain of other commercial 
activities, all of which carry their own sets of social relations. This is particularly true of the artificial 
commercial forests that cover an increasing acreage of Uruguay’s interior. The effects here tend to be 
more individualised and geographically far more diverse, yet the collective impact of changes in land 
use is profound (Carerre & Lohmann 1996). Montes del Plata’s diffuse investment of CSR management 
resources for forest-affected groups, coupled with the absence of a collective social movement to 
challenge commercial forestry’s expansion, partly explain why less attention has been paid to this issue. 
The resources required to obtain a meaningful geographical sample present another cause for them 
remaining under-investigated. Even so, the inclusion of forest-affected communities would provide a 
fuller picture on Montes del Plata’s CSR-led legitimation strategy and should figure highly in any 
follow-up research.  
 
In choosing to focus on the depth and complexity of a single company’s CSR programme, my chosen 
methodology also omits potentially valuable lessons that could be gleaned from a wider baseline of 
examples in other regions and other sectors. As Johanna Sydow notes in her ethnographic study of 
mining company Newmont in Peru and Ghana, standardised CSR techniques do not necessarily result 
in standardised results (Sydow 2016a). On the one hand, this authenticates the importance given in this 
                                               
120 See: Golub 2014, Welker 2014, Rajak 2011.   
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thesis to an analysis of how “local specificities, agency, and counterconduct shape the effects of 
corporate techniques” (ibid:111). On the other hand, the lack of a comparator case(s) creates 
uncertainties as to what is universal and what is particular in the global-to-local application of CSR. 
While consideration of Botnia/UPM’s mill project in Fray Bentos serves to counterbalance this 
weakness in part, the restrictions of timeframes and resources made a full comparative study impossible. 
Further research would ideally incorporate comparative examples of CSR’s use as a legitimising tool 
for extractivist projects, preferably in a geographic setting other than Uruguay. In addition, CSR 
researchers note that management approaches differ by firm type, opening the possibility of potentially 
valuable comparative research into the effects of company size, sector, ownership structure and country 
of origin (Aguilera et al. 2007, Scherer at al. 2016).  
 
Another limitation that arises from the research parameters chosen for this research relates to the 
company’s management activities. This thesis centres its attention on corporate-community relations, 
which represents just one dimension of the CSR agenda. This choice of focus was not imposed on the 
research project prior to my fieldwork, but emerged in response to the grounded realities within the 
field site. Montes del Plata’s CSR officials were primarily assigned to deal with community relations 
in the micro-region. This was reflective of the importance that the company’s management placed on  
good social relations in their quest for a secure social licence to operate. A disaffected or openly hostile 
local populace around its investment site would have presented a potential operational risk, as well as 
raising awkward questions about the project’s legitimacy. Similarly, a successful community 
programme with the delivery of demonstrable development goods strengthens the company’s 
legitimacy. In this case, as with many other large-scale infrastructure investments, corporate-community 
relations are often afforded high priority (Sydow 2016b).  
 
To some extent, all management activities could be said to exert an influence on a corporation’s 
legitimation (Palazzo & Scherer 2006).121 The interactions of corporate agents with key ‘stakeholders’, 
such as government representatives, media professionals and other opinion formers, also influence the 
level of legitimacy afforded to its investment. Access issues presented practical difficulties in 
researching these aspects of Montes del Plata’s legitimacy-building efforts. Neither the company’s 
operational activities (which were carried out largely within the Punta Pereira site itself) nor its 
management of opinion formers (which was led by senior management in Montevideo) were open to 
close observation. Although Montes del Plata’s management built much of the case for the company’s 
                                               
121 Chief among these are operational considerations, particularly those areas with a direct impact on host 
populations. These include approaches to employment (such as workplace safety, pay and contractual security), 
environmental management (notably, the mitigation of noise, air and water pollution) and large-scale 
infrastructure development (such as the construction of roads, ports and logistic facilities). 
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legitimacy around its progressive community policy, other aspects of the wider CSR agenda need to be 
acknowledged. Again, efforts to fill some of these gaps should be the focus of any future research.  
 
Another limitation relates to the policy-forming process within the corporation under analysis. Montes 
del Plata published a set of management principles to govern and shape the ethical conduct of its 
employees. These were drawn up prior to my fieldwork and were applied at various levels of intensity 
across the company’s workforce. Current thinking in the anthropology of CSR maintains that corporate 
culture and ethics are unstable and dynamic, subject as they are to the influences of forces from below 
(i.e. those of employees) and not simply from edicts from above (i.e. employers) (Dolan & Rajak 2016). 
It cannot be assumed, therefore, that CSR policy is implemented uniformly. For reasons of limited 
access and resources, my research focused on how the question of individual agency shaped the 
understanding and practice of the company’s stated policy within the community relations team. Despite 
their disproportionate influence on how CSR is conceived and practised within the micro region, clearly 
the community managers do not hold a monopoly on how Montes del Plata’s stated policy is practiced. 
A fuller picture of how CSR is interpreted by key individuals within the business and how those 
interpretations materially influence ethical practice would require research among a wide range of 
corporate actors, particular those in public facing roles or other functions that impinge on public 
reputation.   
 
The fact that corporations are continually enacted also implies an inconsistent practice of ethics across 
any organisation. Depending on private values, managerial expectations and group dynamics, the 
behaviour of certain individuals and divisions within a corporation will be more consistently aligned to 
the company’s stated values than others. This phenomenon has important ramifications for questions of 
public legitimacy. Central as it is to Montes del Plata’s wider reputation as a “responsible citizen”, the 
management of its community relations is but one face presented by the mill sponsor to its external 
publics. Even within the micro-region itself, the company’s face is not static and consistent. How much 
more so across the corporation as a whole? While the concept of a corporation as a single, uniform 
entity is always subject to internal contestation, it gradually becomes more fixed over time, if only 
because external publics chose to see it as such. In the early stages of a corporation’s life, however, it 
remains in flux. This was very much the case with Montes del Plata. Depending on which aspect or 
aspects of the corporation that its external publics see, hear about or otherwise encounter, opinions will 
differ as to what the ‘entity’ comprises and whether or not it seems legitimate to them. Evidence of a 
responsible approach to community development, for example, could feasibly be contrasted with news 
of air pollution. 
 
Ideally, research on corporate social legitimation would encompass all the public faces of the 
corporation – as a mill operator, as an employer, as a forest plantation owner, as a political lobbyist, as 
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a pulp vendor, as a contractor of services, and so on – and would then seek to ascertain how these shaped 
the company’s legitimacy status. Montes de Plata’s management commissioned periodical surveys to 
gauge public opinion about the company, but these revealed little about how the public arrived at their 
opinion. Residents in the micro-region experience direct and regular contact with the corporation’s 
personnel and material assets, hence their conclusions carry public weight. For most Uruguayans, 
however, their knowledge of the company is mediated through advertising, news media or hearsay. 
Empirically, these mediated interpretations may well prove false or may only represent partial truths (in 
that they tend to focus on just one face of the company). Yet they are ‘real’ from a legitimation 
perspective to the extent that different publics use them to derive a view of the company. To this extent, 
attempts were made to incorporate marketing materials and press data into my secondary research.  
 
Legitimation, however, is not democratically decided. The conclusions of certain groups hold greater 
sway on the granting or otherwise of a corporation’s license to operate (Gehman et al. 2017). The views 
of certain groups hold disproportionate weight because of their knowledge of a company’s real 
behaviours (such as employees whistleblowers or, to a lesser extent, independent auditors) or because 
of their moral authority (notably, affected communities). Both factors corroborate the value of taking 
corporate-community relations seriously. In other cases, control over the means of public 
communication or the political process are the sources of their disproportionate influence over questions 
of legitimation. My research methods did include interviews with media representatives and politicians, 
particularly at a regional level. Ideally a study of CSR’s impact on corporate legitimation would include 
a fuller survey of national influential opinion formers than the limits of time and resources allowed for 
in this particular case.     
 
I.9 Theoretical limitations  
 
In addition to the methodology-related limitations highlighted above, several theoretical tensions run 
through this thesis that would benefit from further multi-level and inter-disciplinary research, 
respectively. With regard to political CSR, Frynas and Stephens (2015) pick up on Aguilera et al.’s 
(2007) focus on levels of analysis to call for more multi-level research in this field – a call echoed in 
business studies research more generally.122 My dual research foci on managerial agency and relational 
business theories endeavour to bring a new micro-meso perspective to the study of CSR management 
in potentially damaging extractivist settings. Projects such as Montes del Plata’s US$2.5-billion pulp 
mill do not represent lone phenomena. Instead, they form part of a model of market capitalism that 
occurs within – and has implications for – wider spheres of political economy and society at large.  
 
                                               
122 See: Aguilera et al. 2007, Hitt et al. 2007, Ployhart & Moliterno 2011. 
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A single-site case study approach has limited capacity to inform discussions of such macro systems. 
One possible route into this macro-level discussion is to examine the national and international 
institutional norms to which Montes del Plata was subject and to interrogate the extent to which these 
framed its CSR approach.123 This would potentially open a more nuanced investigation into the 
particularities of responsible business regulations and norms in Uruguay as compared to global trends. 
Particularly instructive here is the discussion in the political CSR literature on corporate-state 
bargaining and its consequences for national regime setting (Levy & Prakash 2003). Another 
conceivable approach to theorising the macro elements of Montes del Plata’s legitimacy-based CSR 
practices would be to consider if, and how, mainstream political theories might elucidate the dynamics 
behind the birth of the global CSR movement (to which Montes del Plata subscribes) and the moralised 
market economy that it seeks to enact. The political CSR literature signals various possible departure 
points in this respect, with Habermasian (Palazzo & Scherer 2011), Rawlsian (Mäkinen & Kourula 
2012) and Kantian (Whelan 2012) perspectives among the most fruitful to date.  
 
Some theoretical tensions are difficult to escape and must be acknowledged for what they are. One of 
the most evident, and most pertinent to the subject of my research, relates to the division between 
essentialist (Hodgson 2016) and non-essentialist (Zabusky 2002) views of capitalism and the corporate 
form. Historically, business scholars have attributed a fully cognisant, almost god-like capacity of 
multinational corporations to think and act as a single, organisational whole. According to orthodox 
management theorists, the fact that few corporations ever realise such homogeneity of action in practice 
is an abnormality and one to which their strategic frameworks are bent on correcting. The trend in 
anthropology and wider social theory, in contrast, is to view corporations as enacted entities without 
complete self-knowledge, intentionality or unity of purpose. Corporations grow and evolve organically; 
they do not come into being fully formed nor with a predetermined blueprint. The fact that corporate 
representatives present their employers as coherent, unified, moral agents does not make them 
necessarily so; it merely entrenches the fallacy of collective corporate personality and obliges 
researchers to work harder at disaggregating the corporate form (Kapelus 2002). Hence, the prevailing 
interest in the anthropology of corporations regarding the nexus of practice and institutional structure 
in the creation of the idea of a unified corporate entity. Less attention has been given to how practitioners 
operate within the complex system of CSR where authority is diffuse and where vantage points are 
subject to constant change.  
 
The inter-disciplinary focus of this thesis sees it landing in the thick of this theoretical debate, at the 
crux of which lies the question of intentionality. If, as is argued, detachable CSR results in an ecosystem 
of political and social relations that favours the interests of its corporate protagonist, how can this be 
                                               
123 See: Lawton et al. 2013; Rodriguez et al. 2006. 
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explained within a non-essentialist logic that denies unified intent on the part of the corporation? Two 
responses are proposed here. The first theorises that CSR practices follow a standardised logic and 
framework (Rajak 2011:18), which, despite their stated aspiration for “win-win” outcomes, carry with 
them the binding ethos of market capitalism towards competitive advantage and profit maximisation. 
By virtue of what they are and how they were originally conceived, standardised CSR practices exert a 
depoliticising force akin to those observed by James Ferguson in Lesotho (Ferguson 1994). The 
“instrumental effect” of CSR, to use Ferguson’s term (ibid: 256), allows for the promotion of 
corporation interests almost by default and feasibly by accident. In his analysis of CSR in development 
contexts, the anthropologist John Sharp predicted precisely this eventuality (Sharp 2006). Moreover, 
the divergences between CSR and classic development increase the “opportunities for new unintended 
consequences to flow from CSR interventions” (ibid: 220).  
 
It is conceivable therefore that the truncation of social and political relations represents one such 
unintended consequence, thus removing detachable CSR from the realm of god-like knowledge and 
intentionality. The depoliticising effects of Montes del Plata’s stakeholder management approach to 
community relations (see Chapter 2) demonstrate how the embedded capitalist bias towards the 
prioritisation of corporate interest emerges out of the implementation of CSR practices, even when such 
practices are ostensibly designed for the good of others. A similar pattern of outcomes can be witnessed 
emerging from other CSR devices employed by the pulp producers, such as its Community 
Development Forum (Chapter 3) and worker database (Chapter 4). Such consistency might look like 
the result of an intentional strategy imposed by a guiding (and cynical) hand, but it could equally suggest 
the natural outworking of a trait or ethic rooted within the techniques and technologies of CSR that 
corporate agents fail to recognise or acknowledge.   
 
A second response is to ascribe intent and unity not to the corporation as a whole, but to individual 
divisions within it: in this case, Montes del Plata’s CSR unit. Comprising fewer than ten individuals, 
the possibility of a cogent, commonly agreed position is much higher than for an organisation of over 
500 employees from multiple countries located in multiple sites with multiple objectives, both private 
and professional. The CSR unit evidences similar heterogeneity but their team-like structure and close 
working patterns increase the possibility of the division co-evolving towards a position of self-
conscious conformity. This movement towards consistency is not antithetical to a non-essentialist 
perspective, supposing as it does a dynamic process rather than a pre-existing reified position. Nor does 
it suppose an alignment between CSR practitioners and the form of detachable CSR that they help enact 
(see Chapter 2). It is possible that they may not recognise the depoliticising consequences of their 
activities (which might appear naive but would explain their ability to act with moral conviction) or 
they may recognise it but rationalise it internally as inevitable or unavoidable (which would suggest a 
high capacity for self-reflection, but might give way to cynicism). In either case, it takes seriously the 
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genuine belief among most CSR practitioners that they are engaged in ‘doing good’, as opposed to the 
alternative that casts them as fraudsters set on detaching themselves and their employers from the full 
implications of the moral responsibilities that they preach.  
 
While these twin responses help resolve some of the theoretical limitations, neither is entirely 
satisfactory. The policy-setting process requires further attention, for instance. Montes del Plata’s 
Community Relationship Plan, the guiding document of its CSR team for the management of their 
corporate-community relations, reflects many standardised programmatic templates but these still 
needed a degree of selection and compilation. Where did the assumptions and biases behind its creation 
come from, for instance, and how where they embedded within the document? Important questions also 
revolve around the locus of authority, both within Montes del Plata and within its network of social and 
political relations. As the corporation evolved as an organisational entity, to what extent did the CSR 
team have to influence the company’s ethical character or the moral quality of its external relations? If 
authority didn’t lie in full with the CSR team, which was ostensibly mandated to ethicise internal and 
external relations, where did it lie? If authority was dispersed, as it almost inevitably is in a complex 
organisation operating in a complex political ecosystem, how do CSR agents seek to harness it and what 
are the effects of their failure to do so?  
 
Paired together, the twin resolutions also present new theoretical challenges. As an organisation 
becomes progressively more enacted, its levels of self-awareness and self-knowledge grow. As this 
maturation unfolds, the prospect of unintended consequences remaining unnoticed or unchallenged 
reduces. In the wake of Ferguson’s devastating critique, moves to prevent the depoliticising effects of 
development practices have occurred, but they still persist and the work of Ferguson and his many 
successors makes these effects harder to camouflage. It may be the case with CSR, as with development, 
that its protagonists are too vested in its own internal logic to be able to observe or acknowledge the 
depoliticisation of relations and extension of corporate power to which they are party. This closely 
resembles the situation in Montes del Plata’s case. If such effects become recognised for what they are, 
then the non-essentialist argument in favour of unintended consequences would need to be re-examined 
and possibly re-theorised. Enactment theorists make a strong case for the continuous co-creation of 
organisations, but say less at present about how corporate policies and practices become consolidated 
and ‘fixed’ during their institutional maturation.  
 
I.10 Thesis structure  
 
This thesis sets out to interrogate the micro-social processes that lie behind the practice of detachable 
CSR, with a specific focus on corporate-community relations. It takes as read that contemporary CSR 
is self-confessedly ‘strategic’, which leads to a constant tug-and-pull between companies’ ethical 
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commitments and their business imperatives (Chandler & Werther 2006). In Montes del Plata’s 
community relations, this manifested itself in a perpetual negotiation between entanglement and 
disentanglement, association and disassociation, proximity and distance. Analysing how the company’s 
community agents managed these tensions forms the central problematic of this thesis.  
 
As with the arrival of any large extractivist company in a rural area, the decision of Montes del Plata’s 
owners to locate their investment in the micro-region around Conchillas radically impacted the local 
political ecosystem. The chapter interrogates how the primary political players – namely, the micro-
region’s residents and the provincial government - sought to negotiate the upended politics of the micro-
region and position themselves vis-à-vis their new corporate neighbour. In particular, this opening 
chapter examines the issue of representativeness and its role in enacting complex, multidimensional 
entities such as the ‘Community’, the ‘State’ and, not least, the ‘Corporation’.  
 
Chapter 2 picks up on this theme of enactment, turning the lens specifically on the efforts of Montes 
del Plata’s community managers to embody the legal fiction of corporate personhood. One of the 
chapter’s central theoretical themes relates to Alex Golub’s theory of personation (Golub 2014), which 
I apply to Mark Suchman’s typology of organisational legitimacy in an attempt to better understand the 
role of individual agency in corporate ethicising (Suchman 1995). The chapter raises important 
observations about the opportunities for, and limitations of, a corporate entity acquiring moral 
legitimacy versus pragmatic legitimacy through its management of community relations.  
 
Chapter 3 shifts the locus of Montes del Plata’s detachability strategy onto its Foro Comunitario de 
Desarrollo (Community Development Forum), the flagship programme within its efforts at community 
relationship-building. The Forum exemplifies the nature of detachability as a constant process of 
relationship management. Far from resulting in a fixed settlement, its end point is only ever a 
“temporary vantage, unstable achievement, or regulative ideal”, to use Amanda Anderson’s term.124 
In particular, Chapter 3 examines how the twin development orthodoxies of civic participation and 
empowerment encapsulate the detachability principle that underlies Montes del Plata’s CSR efforts.   
 
Chapter 4 reflects on the link between Montes del Plata’s CSR programme and Uruguay’s national pro-
FDI policy. Central to the government’s case for supporting commercial forestry are the knock-on 
benefits for rural employment and productivity. Drawing on Michel Callon’s work on disentanglement, 
framing and marketisation, the chapter interrogates how Montes del Plata’s agents seek to use its Punta 
Pereira mill site to geographically demarcate its responsibilities for employment and job creation. Part 
of the work of establishing an employment enclave is managing the inevitable overspills that result. 
                                               
124  Anderson 2001:32. 
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The chapter analyses how detachable CSR initiatives are employed to deal with such overspills, both at 
a general level (through the promotion of employability) and a very local level (through a worker 
database, among other strategies).  
 
The conclusion sets out the main findings of the thesis. It proposes a number of implications, 










Asphalt Dreams & Political Potholes:   




For many political theorists, Latin America’s contemporary experience of neo-extractivism illustrates 
how multinational corporations use power asymmetries to influence political discourse and public 
policy in their favour.125 In this chapter, I seek to narrow the habitual lens of analysis, shifting from the 
macro and meso levels to a more micro perspective of political relations. I do so in an attempt to reveal 
the instrumental role played by corporate agents in influencing local political relations. Companies’ 
operating environments are all affected to some extent or other by the political ecosystems governing 
them. Efforts by business to make these ecosystems as favourable as possible to their commercial 
interest is commonplace, as the plethora of industry associations and lobby groups illustrates. However, 
the onus on the leaders of Uruguay’s foreign forestry companies to portray their industry as responsible 
requires the management of large-scale operators such as Montes del Plata to temper the use of their 
political power. Their claims to corporate citizenship also behove a position of positive political 
engagement in local affairs. As evinced by Montes del Plata’s experience in this corner of south-western 
Uruguay, detachable CSR is used by the company’s agents to meet both these ends. Yet, as per this 
thesis’ central argument, the result is a form of responsibility that gives their employer the appearance 
of social legitimacy but relieves it of the associated costs.  
As this chapter’s guiding theoretical compass, I turn to contemporary discussions in the political 
anthropology literature about the figure of the ‘leviathan’.126 In line with Alex Golub’s landmark study 
of the Ilipi and Placer Dome’s Porgera mine in Papua New Guinea, I use the term to mean “any black-
boxed corporate entity” (Golub 2014:13). The metaphor of the black box describes the realm in which 
a representative can act; it is shaped by the giving or winning of authority, which is nullified in the 
event that the representative exceeds the limits of the box (Pitkin 1967:39). Golub’s tour-de-force 
                                               
125 See: Burchardt & Dietz 2014, Veltmeyer & Petras 2014, Gudynas 2015, Brand et al. 2016. 
126 The notion of the leviathan as an entity that enables people to act collectively across time and space was 
famously first proposed by Thomas Hobbes. Governing Hobbes’ work was his effort to identify legitimate 
grounds for the idea of sovereign leadership in the early modern state. Recently, the idea has been taken up by 
Michael Callon and Bruno Latour, among others, to “unscrew” the “negotiations, intrigues, calculations, acts of 
persuasion and violence” that individual actors use to speak or act on behalf of others (1981:279). 
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account describes the leviathan as “bureaucracy incarnate”; i.e. an ‘entity’127 that acts in regimented, 
disciplined fashion in accordance with established rules and regulations. He proposes three primary 
types: the community (materialised as the Ilipi, who comprise the local indigenous community), the 
state (a singular body manifested through government agencies and other tiers of bureaucracy) and the 
mine (namely, Placer Dome). The political ecosystem in the micro-region around Montes del Plata’s 
mill project comprised the same basic trio as that identified by Golub: the residents of Conchillas and 
surrounding areas as the local body politic (see Figure 4); the provincial government as the dominant 
local representative of the state; and the mill (namely, Montes del Plata as its project sponsor).128 
Henceforth, I refer to these separate leviathan-like entities as the Community, the State and the 
Corporation, respectively.129  
 
 
Figure 4 Conchillas high street, depicting its unique ‘English-style’ architecture  
 
1.1 Context setting: local political ecosystem  
 
The events described in this chapter revolve around an ethnographic moment that occurred on a hot 
February evening in the upper room of Casa Evans, a former warehouse and now civic centre, located 
                                               
127 Such is the strength of association with autocracy and state power, however, that a more neutral descriptor in 
place of the term ‘leviathan’ would arguably be helpful. The essence of the term - namely, a heterogeneous 
grouping of people or things transmogrified into an apparently homogenous collective bequeathed with 
personality and agency - would justify the use of less loaded alternatives such as ‘figure’, ‘form’, ‘body’ or, my 
preferred choice, ‘entity’. 
128 In Conchillas and the surrounding region, all three entities boast different attributes, ambitions and levels of 
influence. Their creation as both conceptual and material possibilities is less in flux in the micro-region than in 
Golub’s field site, where state governance and industrial activity had been near-absent historically and remained 
highly contested. One of the many extenuated socio-political processes that Golub was obliged to address in his 
in-depth ethnography was the process through which a grouping of loosely related indigenous tribes in New 
Guinea’s former Trust Territory became transformed into an administrative collective, designated by a singular 
term (the ‘Ilipi’).  
129 Where these terms are not capitalised, their meaning is to be read as a more conventional descriptor. 
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in the heart of Conchillas. An outspoken and politically active resident of Conchillas called Pablo130 
had requested that the Intendente131 attend a civic meeting to discuss the state of the local road network, 
which had deteriorated significantly as a consequence of heavy commercial traffic going to and from 
the mill project. Pablo was in his mid-forties and held a non-managerial position at the satellite office 
of communications company Antel. Around 25 members of the local community were also present, 
most of whom were involved in one of the handful of civil society groups in the area. Several 
representatives of Montes del Plata’s community relations’ team were also in attendance. During the 
full course of my year-long fieldwork, the evening’s meeting was the first and only occasion that the 
Intendente would hold a public consultation in person. The deleterious condition of the local road 
network had gathered salience following the death of Cyntia Capellino Sosa, a 22-year-old local 
woman, who had been hit by a bus on her scooter after swerving to avoid a pothole. She lost both her 
legs on impact and died in hospital. 
Looming large in the background of the evening meeting was Montes del Plata’s recent arrival in the 
‘micro-region’132, an event that had thrown the local political ecosystem into a state of temporary flux. 
While the Intendencia133 still exercised jurisdictional authority over core public administration, 
including road maintenance, the greater resources at the mill owner’s disposal led many to argue that 
Montes del Plata should take a more proactive role in the delivery of public services.134 A second factor 
disrupting local political relations was a new federal law geared  towards the decentralisation of 
decision-making in Uruguay (Federal Law No. 18.567 of 2009).135 The new law, which came into force 
at precisely the time Uruguay’s largest FDI project pitched up in the micro-region, aimed to reverse the 
gradual concentration of power that had continued unabated since Uruguay’s military dictatorship 
(1973-1985). In its attempt to devolve power to the regions and increase levels of democratic 
participation, this legislative reform introduced new municipal mayoralties across the country. While 
generally welcomed as a progressive step, the change also resulted in the dismantlement of the historic 
Junta Local system (‘community council’), which for generations had acted as a third tier of 
                                               
130 All names in this thesis are pseudonyms unless first names and surnames are given together. 
131 The ‘Intendente’ is the highest elected official in a provincial government.   
132 In echo of local officialdom, I use the term ‘micro-region’ here to refer to the 15km radius around the mill 
project, which consisted of Conchillas and two other similarly-sized communities, Pueblo Gil and Radial 
Hernandez. 
133 The Intendencia refers to the administration that runs a provincial government.   
134 In the specific case of the local transport network, this political argument was given a moral edge because of 
the company’s direct responsibility for the deterioration of the roads. Adding to this moral pressure to step into 
the shoes of the provincial government were the generous tax exemptions offered to Montes del Plata by 
Uruguay’s federal government, which left the Intendencia with no extra revenue to deal its increased maintenance 
liabilities.  
135 Ley Nº 18.567 Decentralización política y participación ciudadana. http://www.cepal.org/ilpes/noticias/ 
paginas/1/54301/Uruguay_Ley_Descentralizacion_Politica_y_Participacion_Ciudadana.pdf. Accessed 4 June 
2015. 
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government.136 Historically, these locally-elected bodies provided a political link between isolated rural 
communities and the provincial administration.137 The disbanding of the Junta Local exacerbated this 
sentiment even more. 
 
 Figure 5 Casa Evans, the micro-region’s historic building and de facto community centre 
Unlike Placer Dome’s experience cited by Golub, the political struggle around Montes del Plata’s 
operations was less concerned with the enactment of the three contending entities and more about their 
political positioning with respect to one another. Golub’s theory of personation holds that every aspiring 
entity requires a self-designated, appointed or elected individual actor or set of actors who can embody 
and thereby enact the idea of itself as a collective entity in a materially realisable form.138 This 
personation process highlights a profoundly localised struggle for authentic and authoritative political 
representation in the micro-region of Conchillas and, ultimately, for the political legitimacy that attends 
it. Establishing authority through personation and representativeness is a conscious positioning, as 
liable to change as it is to entrenchment. The purpose of this paper is to examine how the practice and 
discourse of ‘responsible’ business enables such political authority to be secured and political 
legitimacy to be gained by an archetypal neo-extractivist investor.139   
                                               
136 A Junta Local comprised five representatives elected on five-year fixed terms. Its remit extended to the 
oversight of waste collection, the development of cultural and recreational activities, the conservation of public 
spaces and buildings, public hygiene and a limited number of other services. 
137 Following the reform, Conchillenses’ nearest representative body had become the mayoralty of Carmelo, some 
35 kilometres away. Residents in the geographically isolated micro-region already felt themselves detached from 
the political process. 
138 This person, or group of persons, acts on behalf of the entity but it behaves, in effect, as the entity as well. As 
a social actant, the entity and its representative(s) are indivisible and interdependent. The former can only become 
mobilised when the latter acts or is acted upon. The latter’s ability to act, meanwhile, relies on the entity conferring 
authority on the representative(s) to do so. Such authority, in turn, depends on the representative’s capacity to 
occupy the black box and personate it convincingly. 
139 By studying both the content of the discussion and the comportment of the discussants, I ask how the micro-
region’s contending entities responded to the political vacuum created by the dissolution of the Junta Local. To 
answer this, a series of subsequent questions must be addressed: In what way did local residents respond to the 
sudden absence of a recognised political representative? What strategies did the Intendente adopt to meet the 
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1.2: The Community: leadership lacuna & the struggle for civic representation  
              
The top politician of the province, Dr. Walter Zimmer, looked weary when he stepped from the car, 
like a man called out unexpectedly at the end of a long shift. His tiredness compounded his reputation 
for gruffness and ill-temper. Yet he had resolved to put on a friendly face, and offered Pablo a warm 
smile as he shook his hand in response. The Intendente had an entourage of only two, his deputy and 
his personal secretary. In a show of respect, Pablo bowed slightly and made a sweep of his arm in an 
exaggerated invitation for them to climb the stairs first. He then followed close the politician’s heels, 
with his fellow villagers close behind. Pablo directed Dr. Zimmer to the front of the room, where a desk 
and single chair were set out for him. The position of the desk placed him directly in the eye-line of his 
audience. Behind friendly gazes, the respective parties were sizing one another up. An expectant hush 
descended. Into the silence stepped Pablo.  
There was no question that this was Pablo’s show. It was he who had instigated the meeting, he who 
had chivvied his fellow residents to attend, and it was he who was now presiding from the front. The 
question was, what were Pablo’s credentials to act as a credible representative for the micro-region’s 
aggrieved residents? A mix of charisma and determination had brought him to this point, but would it 
see him further? Not just through the remainder of the evening, but to a viable positionality within the 
emerging political ecosystem that lay beyond? 
According to Golub, to make oneself a ‘feasible’ leviathan, an individual can attempt to personate pre-
existing entities or empower themselves by creating new entities that they can claim to represent (Golub 
2014:13). The first option supposes the existence of a pre-existing entity in Conchillas. The defunct 
Junta Local had filled that role in the past, although, in truth, it was always a rather toothless force. In 
its absence, the closest equivalent in terms of its bureaucratic formulation and practices was the 
Comisión de Amigos de Conchillas (‘Commission de Amigos’ hereafter). Set up after the arrival in the 
micro-region of ENCE, Montes del Plata’s predecessor, this civil society group boasted articles of 
association, official charitable status, elected members, minuted meetings, and so forth. More will be 
said about the Comisión de Amigos in Chapter 3, but suffice it to say that the group had lost much of 
its initial political capital after the departure of ENCE. As an everyday citizen with no elected political 
post, Pablo lacked the capacity to personate the Junta Local. His attempts to achieve feasibility therefore 
lay very much with the second of Golub’s two options: the creation of a new entity. 
                                               
State’s historic responsibilities to its civic constituents, while simultaneously adapting to the new political realities 
(and opportunities) presented by Montes del Plata’s mill project? And finally, how did the Corporation frame its 
political responsibilities in the community context that it found itself? More bluntly, how far into the micro-
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Pablo’s entity of choice was the Community, a blanket term that camouflaged the heterogeneity and 
internal conflicts within the local body politic. As well as being politically evocative, the creation of 
the Community as an identifiable entity was already largely done. Within the bureaucratic structure of 
the state, Conchillas and the wider micro-region was cemented as a unified administrative bloc.140 
Furthermore, its geographic and societal boundaries had been further clarified by the designation of the 
area as the pulp producer’s “zone of influence”.  
The special status that Montes del Plata gave to Conchillenses and other residents surrounding its mill 
strengthened their grounds as a morally constituted community. Residents from the four main 
settlements in the micro-region became transformed from generic villagers into villagers specifically 
characterised by the impacts of a techno-industrial project of an unprecedented scale, thus 
differentiating themselves from other administrative village collectives. From one of many 
communities, they became the Community to whom the Intendente was willing to listen - or at least 
make a show of listening. 
Once this defined entity was recognised and the agent called the Community was established, the 
question of the moment then turned to selecting a feasible representative voice. This was the role sought 
by Pablo and one that he aspired to invoke during the public discussion about Conchillas’ transport 
infrastructure. The event brought to the fore not only the struggle for representation but also the 
problematic of personation. To quote Golub: “The feasibility of individual actor hinges on their ability 
to successfully personate leviathans, just as the feasibility of leviathans hinges on their ability to be 
successfully personated.” (Golub 2014: 25). For Pablo, or any other individual on a quest for communal 
representative status, success rested on transitioning from being viewed as a “subjective individual” to 
an “objective representative” (Latour 1987:78). 
1.2.1 Descriptive and Symbolic Representativeness: origins, expectations & endorsement  
Pablo’s claims to objective representative status were based on what Hanna Pitkin, in her classic work 
on representation, defines as ‘descriptive’ representation’ and ‘symbolic’ representation (Pitkin 1967). 
Both models evoke the idea of the individual ‘standing for’ the collective; the first on the basis of their 
resemblance to those represented; the second on the basis of the response invoked by the representative 
                                               
140 The state’s recognition of Conchillas gave the village the moral authority necessary for a population group 
produced by governmentality. Unlike an unrecognised subaltern constituency, Conchillenses did not need to fight 
to be recognised as a community. In this respect, the villagers differed substantially from the undocumented 
immigrants, landless peasants and similarly rootless subalterns that justifiably concern many writers on political 
society. Even so, to effectively make their claim, the villagers did need to fight to be heard. 
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among those that they claim to represent (principally in terms of acceptance). Fundamental to the 
success of Pablo’s endeavour in both instances was the micro-politics of recognition in Conchillas. 
In regard to his descriptive representativeness, Pablo’s credentials appeared ostensibly sound. Most 
importantly, he was recognised as a ‘lugareño’ or ‘oriundo’ (literally, ‘a local’ or ‘native’). The society 
of Conchillas could be divided along a variety of conventional demographic, class, party political and 
socio-economic lines. Its history as an isolated industrial colony, however, meant that one of the most 
notable differentiators was the longevity of individual’s residency in the area and their familial ties to 
the early colonists. As a minimum, a resident needed to be born and brought up in the micro-region to 
qualify as a ‘local’. Thus Julio Neves, a Conchillas-born retiree, could comfortably erect a wooden sign 
in his front garden that explicitly identified him as a ‘lugareño’. This was in spite of his being absent 
from the village most of his adult life. The majority of Conchillas’ historic colonial housing stock 
remained in the hands of the village’s early descendants, giving an additional spatial as well as temporal 
dimension to the status of ‘lugareño’ families. 
Over recent decades, the label of ‘lugareño’ or ‘oriundo’ had become an increasingly important 
moniker given the gradual migration into the area of individuals without direct familial connections. 
Historically, this in-migration had been limited and precipitated usually by marriage. Conchillas’ very 
recent emergence as a centre for commercial pulp production had seen the village become a magnet for 
economic migration in a way unmatched since its foundation. To identify as a lugareño or oriundo was 
therefore to associate oneself firmly with a previous, more historically ‘authentic’ epoch; a time when 
the Community (and those who resided within it) was truer to its original self.  
As Penny Harvey and Hannah Knox note in their study of road building in Peru, large-scale 
infrastructure has a habit of bringing together people in new configurations, the boundaries of which 
are not set and are subject to continual negotiation. This “politics of differentiation” between lugareños 
and new(er)comers had always been present in Conchillas, but the mill had brought it to the fore in a 
fresh and distinctly more political manner (Harvey & Knox 2015:75).  
Pablo found himself on weaker ground with regards to his symbolic representativeness. When a symbol 
represents rather than symbolises, “it does not allege anything about what it represents,” Pitkin states 
(1967:99). Because of this lack of information and general arbitrariness, the symbol’s primary function 
is to act as an object or recipient of the feelings or actions intended for what it represents. Critical to 
Pablo’s claim, therefore, was his ability to evoke an emotional, affective or even irrational 
psychological response among his constituents that would solidify the connection between him as 
symbol and the Community as referent. At the most basic level, he needed people to believe in him. 
 
  67 
  
 
In Pablo’s favour was his reputation as a vociferous defender of village interests. Just a few weeks prior 
to the fatal accident of the young motorcyclist Cyntia Sosa, he had openly warned the Intendente in a 
public meeting that the poor state of the roads could lead to just such a fatality. This statement was seen 
as exaggerated at the time by his fellow villagers. Yet, as one long-term resident put it to me, people 
quickly recognised in hindsight that Pablo “had made a good point”. His personal status increased 
further after Adriana Sosa, the girl’s mother, publicly thanked him and apologised for being critical of 
his brash and abrasive style in the past, as an observer close to the issue affirmed:  
“Lots of people in the community started to say that if we’d listened to Pablo, then it wouldn’t have 
happened. They saw that he was right, Adriana Sosa included. So the legitimacy of Pablo came, 
unfortunately, from this incidence of the fatal death.”  
Many parallels exist here with the leadership archetypes observed by Partha Chatterjee in his study of 
the politically marginalised population of West Bengal in the 1980s (2004). In the rural regions studied 
by Chatterjee, school teachers had emerged as the accepted mediators for their communities. Most had 
grown up in peasant families in the same community as they now taught and were therefore considered 
sympathetic to the plight of the poor. As with Pablo, Bengali teachers had fixed salaries, a fact that was 
judged to remove them from immediate economic pressures. Furthermore, they were well-versed in the 
mechanics of state agencies. In much the same way, Pablo’s ongoing party political ambitions, coupled 
with vociferous exchanges with the Intendente and branches of his administration over the years, had 
familiarised him with the legal and administrative procedures of the state. 
Working against Pablo’s symbolic claim was his personality and social background. A strong historic 
deference for political authority and due process continued to hold force in the micro-region, especially 
among its majority elderly and more conservatively-minded residents. This predominant demographic 
not only had clearer recollections of the once-dominant ‘empresa patrón’ (paternalistic company), but 
they had also experienced life under a dictatorial government.141 Both experiences served to enforce a 
cultural ethos of political dependency that was written into Conchillas’ origin narrative as a company 
town. Walker & Co. was the all-giving company and the micro-region’s citizens were its recipient 
dependents, so the well-worn orthodoxy went.  
The connection between Conchillas’ origins and its current mentality of dependent expectancy was one 
that was repeated to me over and over again by residents in the micro-region. The pervasiveness of this 
narrative is evident in a national news report filed in 2012 by Romina Andrioli, a radio reporter with 
family links to the micro-region: 
                                               
141 Uruguay was ruled by a ‘civic-military’ dictatorship from 1973-1985. 
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“I always remember the stories of my grandfather, who used to talk about previous times, of the golden 
time of Conchillas with its rise and how afterwards came its great decline. So for me it’s also special 
that today, aged 91, he is seeing how the village is rising up with this new investment, which came along 
with foreign labour, just as occurred in the original times [of the village].”142 
It was not only residents themselves that recognised the micro-region’s culture of dependency. In 2004, 
Daniel Biagioni, a sociologist and community development specialist, led a grant-funded project in the 
micro-region that was designed to support the development of civil society groups. The experience led 
Biagioni to attach a classic orphan metaphor to the micro-region’s citizens. As he reasoned during a 
lengthy interview with me in a Montevideo coffee shop: 
“If I am an orphan, I need a father. The state has many children. And if you have the father that I have 
- cultured, blond, with money, and who can solve all my problems - then you’re sitting fine.” 
With Walker & Co.’s departure in 1950, however, the micro-region’s residents found themselves 
deprived of the protective paternalism that had enjoyed and grown accustomed to. Suddenly, they were 
no longer sitting so pretty. Conchillenses retained their dependent orphan mentality, but for their 
replacement patrón - the State - they were merely one of many ‘child’ dependants. The implications for 
community mobilisation and development were profound, and will be addressed more fully in the 
following chapter. The important point to note here is how Conchillas’ orphan past fed a contemporary 
political culture of deference and conservatism in the micro-region. 
This legacy worked strongly against Pablo’s symbolic claim to representation. He did not fit the 
tradition Junta-esque mould. He was a low-ranking public sector employee with no high school 
diploma. His conduct was too abrasive. In public debate, the approach of the telecoms company’s 
assistant was much more florid and impassioned than conventional bureaucratic procedure typically 
condoned. Residents variously described him to me as a “loudmouth”, a “joker”, “disrespectful”, 
“unrepresentative”, and so forth. One elderly lady went as far as to call his histrionic and theatrical 
performances as “inapropriado” (inappropriate).143 Pablo was not, and would never be, the refined and 
                                               
142 El Espectador, 8 Oct 2012. http://www.espectador.com/sociedad/249955/montes-del-plata-construye-en-la-
zona-de-conchillas-la-planta-de-celulosa-mas-grande-del-mundo. Accessed 12 June 2014. 
143 While waiting for the Intendente, a middle-aged retailer from the town had been telling me how she thought 
that the relatively low turnout for the meeting was down to the antagonistic culture of political events of this kind. 
Her comments were targeted primarily at the Intendente, but they stood equally well for Pablo too: “People were 
concerned about the heat that these kinds of meetings can produce. There’s always lots of shouting … Plus Zimmer 
is very much a ‘you’re-with-me-or-you’re-against-me’ kind of guy. He’s very brusque. Manito [his deputy] is 
more gentle.” 
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learned type. While residents accepted that his pugnacity could serve as a useful negotiating tool on 
occasion, this did not prevent them from finding it discomfiting.144 
An obvious contender to provide Pablo with external approbation was Montes del Plata. ENCE had 
done much the same for the Comisión de Amigos. While Montes del Plata’s community agents sought 
to retain a cordial relationship with Pablo, they were wary of overly encouraging his claims to priority 
status or community-wide representation. They tolerated him as a show of civic goodwill and, at a very 
practical level, because his vocal style made him difficult to ignore. Out of his earshot, they derided his 
political ambitions as presumptive and even comic. The Intendente treated him similarly and for much 
the same reasons. To be successful as a symbolic representative, an individual needed to be able to call 
forth the same affective response and emotional loyalties as, say, the rising of a national flag or the 
playing of a marching band. No single Conchillense had the capacity to do this, including Pablo. 
1.2.2 Substantive Representativeness: convening & concessions  
A more fundamental problem stood in the way of Pablo’s claims to representativeness and, for that 
matter, those of any other potential claimant in the micro-region. This relates to the type of 
representativeness expected and desired by the local population. While descriptive and symbolic traits 
certainly contributed to a candidate’s claims, the dominant desired model was that of ‘substantive 
representation’ (Pitkin 1967:2010-2014). The emphasis here is on outcomes, rather than behaviour, 
appearance, background, emotional connection or any other individual quality. Could the representative 
deliver on behalf of, or in the interests of, his or her constituents? In Conchillas, this represented the 
fundamental criterion. 
Pablo faced two hurdles. Firstly, he was perceived widely as acting out of his own private political 
interest. Pablo denied this. His motivation for campaigning on the roads was child safety, including that 
of his own two children, he insisted to me. Yet, by the same token, he did nothing to hide his aspirations 
to make it onto the National Party’s candidate list for future provincial elections. “He is always playing 
at politics,” an elderly lugareña from Conchillas once told me, echoing a general sentiment around the 
village (and one repeated by Montes del Plata’s representatives). This was not an impassable obstacle. 
Pablo’s private interests were not necessarily in contradiction to residents’ interests, if by pursuing his 
own agenda he achieved the outcome they too desired, such as safer roads. More problematic was his 
actual capacity to deliver the community’s desired outcomes. With no formally designated powers and 
                                               
144 A further flaw was his lack of endorsement as a feasible representative by non-community members. Some 
theorists have argued that symbolic representation can only exist if it is affirmed by a third party outside the 
representative relation itself; what German political scientists used to refer to as ‘addressat’ (Hermens 1941, 
Hogan 1945). This certainly concurs with Partha Chatterjee’s observations about the teachers in West Bengal, 
who were habitually treated by government authorities as voices of community consensus and actively courted to 
advise on local policy implementation plans.  
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with his claims to civic representation still by no means confirmed, his room for manoeuvre was 
minimal. Yet, try he would.  
An initial test-bed for Pablo’s leadership claims revolved around his ability to convene. In bringing - 
or, more importantly, being seen by his fellow citizens to bring - political decision-makers to the table, 
he was providing a material demonstration of influence. Initially, his efforts here appeared successful. 
It was Pablo who requested the Intendente’s presence at the town hall-style event via a demand to the 
Intendencia and it was he who then extended the invitation to Montes del Plata’s management, who 
consented to send representatives as well. The importance of both parties making good their promise 
explained Pablo’s agitation at the Intendente’s delay. Pablo’s claims required authentication not only 
from below or within (namely, from his constituent villagers), but from above or outside as well. While 
the task of personifying the social totality of the Community is that of a singular individual or singular 
civic institution, it cannot be done alone (Elkholy 2016). At least, it cannot be done prior to the 
claimant’s assertion to personation being fully consolidated. 
For their own political legitimation, the representatives of both Montes del Plata and the Intendencia 
needed to be seen as having consulted fairly and extensively with the local population. A basic 
requirement of a feasible civic spokesperson was therefore to convene a sufficiently representative 
contingent of residents. Pablo was cognizant of this prerequisite. In the lull before the meeting, he 
shared his frustrations about the low turnout with me: 
“Everyone is commenting in the streets, in their houses, in the bars about how horrible the roads are. 
This is the time for the community to come together and to say what we think and what we’ve suffered 
and everything we’re going through. We were hoping, sure, that people would come out and call for 
what they want. The presence of the people - that’s what we wanted. Not to talk, but so that the 
Intendente can see the interest of the people in getting the roads fixed.” 
Pablo’s convening ability was important, but preparatory. It created the ground on which his claim to 
full representation could then be enacted. Yet the acid test could come in the meeting hall itself. Could 
he gain a firm concession on behalf of those he aspired to represent? 
From the very start of the proceedings, it became immediately evident that Pablo’s habitual style had 
altered. Gone was his customary combativeness and disrespect for authority, replaced by a show of 
moderation and respect for protocol. The switch was unequivocally strategic. In the political society of 
the micro-region, in which villagers’ claims were habitually ignored and a sense of abandonment 
prevailed, Pablo depended on theatricality and verbal aggression to provoke external political players 
(i.e. the Intendente and Montes del Plata) into action. Consistent with orthodox stakeholder theory, the 
approach was designed to raise the urgency and salience of his demands, which touched on everything 
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from the provision of social housing to the employment of local residents, as well as to boost his own 
political stature (Mitchell et al. 1997). The transformation into his new guise as fair-minded mediator 
represented another act of image-building. From the perspective of his fellow residents, “Chairperson-
Pablo’ concurred more closely with the conventional spokesperson archetype than ‘Rabble-rouser-
Pablo’. Viewed from the vantage point of the political actors in the room, this more tempered form of 
leadership laid the ground for diplomacy and the possibility of a negotiated settlement. 
The alternation of Pablo’s role from aggressor to mediator appears as morally inconsistent. Yet within 
the political ecology of the micro-region and in light of Pablo’s ambition to enact his representation 
claims, this form of “alternating politics” had an inherent logic (Welker 2014:181). Pablo’s moderated 
approach enabled him to position himself as a credible political agent with a central role in winning 
concessions for the Community. Marina Welker notes a similar pattern of behaviour among the village 
heads of the south-west Sumbawan villages around the Batu Hijab mine, who alternated between 
attacking and defending the mine’s operator Newmont. The situation of the villagers in post-Suharto 
Indonesia differs in two critical respects from the scenario in the micro-region. The effectiveness of 
Sumbawan villagers’ oscillating strategy rested on their ability to evoke the very real threat of violence, 
on the one hand, and on their official status as appointed intermediaries for their community, on the 
other. Neither case was true for Pablo. 
Given the marginalisation of the Conchillas citizenry within the politics of the province, coupled with 
the conservative character of its predominantly elderly residents, Pablo’s bark was widely seen as worse 
than his bite. His primary tactic therefore was to create a public forum in which a negotiation process 
could take place. Having done so, he then sought to preside over that negotiation as a quasi-neutral 
party. This leader-as-mediator model contrasted with the politically more potent spokesperson 
archetype, which positions the individual as fully representative of the collective. Such positionality 
was not feasible for Pablo on account of his as-yet-unsecured authority within the micro-region. 
Furthermore, mediation plays to the image of consensual politics that both the Intendencia and Montes 
del Plata were anxious to promote. For both these parties, it served their own entity claims to represent 
their relationship with the Community as one of mutual cooperation and benefaction rather than one of 
antagonistic concessions and conflict. Should the negotiation process deliver a substantive outcome for 
the community, then Pablo could theoretically claim to have brokered or at least facilitated the deal. 
There is a strong dose of irony in the fact that Pablo, as one of the few agents of social mobilisation in 
this otherwise passive citizenry, should end up transposing himself into the role of intermediator - a 
role that required him to quieten his natural assertiveness and adopt a position of neutral moderation. It 
was not the representative role that Pablo may have instinctively wished for or chosen for himself. Nor, 
even assuming his ability to enact the role, was it necessarily a complete answer to Conchillas’ political 
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marginalisation. As a collective political entity, the Community ideally required a feasible interlocutor 
who could negotiate directly with, and win concessions from, competing entities. However strong the 
local population’s sense of itself as a homogenous “bound seriality of governmentality”, to use 
Chatterjee’s phrase (2004:5), the Community would never enjoy power parity with the State or the 
Corporation. Conchillenses would have to accept that political concessions always had to be negotiated 
rather than seized, gifted rather than grabbed. Even so, given the historical marginalisation of the micro-
region, obtaining a concession on less-than-equal terms was better than their prior experience of 
obtaining no concessions at all. And anyway, concessions are always gifted to some extent. 
The question facing Pablo and those gathered in the hall, then, was twofold: in whose gift was it to grant 
the Community’s desired concession regarding the condition of the roads? And, through what 
arguments or means could the Community use this rare opportunity for direct negotiation to exact such 
a concession? 
The response to these questions revealed another enactment struggle. A dual struggle, in fact. Contrary 
to how villagers envisaged the negotiation ahead, it was not a bilateral dialogue between Conchillenses 
and the Intendencia. What unfolded in the upper room of Casa Evans was actually a tripartite affair, 
and one in which the Community appeared a bystander as the two powerful collective entities in the 
room - the representatives of the State in the form of the provincial government, and the Corporation in 
the shape of Uruguay’s largest ever foreign investor - jostled over where their respective responsibilities 
lay.  
Although the Community held the least political influence of the three, it actually played a vital role in 
this power struggle. Why? Because the Community’s interests - or, more specifically, the defence of its 
interests - provided the battleground on which the two other dominant parties would seek to enact their 
respective claims as collective entities: the State, as the defender of civic rights and the facilitator of 
development goods (Li 2007), and the Corporation, as the responsible neighbour and the bestower of 
development goods. 
1.3 The State: navigating the potholes of representative government 
After Pablo’s introductory remarks brief contributions were made from the floor. None of these lasted 
more than two or three minutes and most were civil in tone. The Intendente sat in silence, listening to 
each short speech. He was a bulky, thick-necked man with a short, scruffy white beard and light blue 
eyes. He was wearing a short-sleeved Airtex shirt that stretched over his ample stomach.  The rest of 
his attire was a well-worn pair of jeans and unpolished boots, the uniform of rural Uruguay. Only the 
branded label on his breast pocket and the expensive watch on his wrist distinguished him from the 
villagers in front of him. 
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1.3.1 The Absent State: righting past wrongs  
The villagers’ comments lasted for about twenty minutes. For the most part, the residents were confident 
in their delivery and heeded the moderator’s instruction to remain on topic. Little was said that the either 
the Intendente or Montes del Plata had not heard before. Complaints were made about the potholes and 
dust in particular. One man also made a reference to the lack of street lighting and the eagerness of the 
traffic wardens to issue local people with fines. Noticeably, the assembled villagers had not come with 
an agreed list of demands. The only theme that regularly cropped up, and around which consensus could 
be said to have existed, concerned a four-kilometre strip of dirt road between Conchillas and Las 
Palmitas (See Figure 6). The road, which is situated at the southerly exit from the village towards the 
new dual carriageway connecting Highway 21 with the mill facility, was judged to be in particularly 
bad repair and urgently in need of asphalting. 
 
 Figure 6 A supply truck travelling to the Punta Pereira site on the Las Palmitas road   
The presentations of the audience revealed the micro-region’s aforementioned culture of political 
deference and dependency. Residents’ concerns were explained, not asserted. Their desires emerged as 
aspirations, not demands. They worked in the language of might, not must. This deferential model was 
mirrored in the physical arrangement of the room as well. The Intendente sat alone behind his desk, 
removed from his rural electors. The Community was dotted among the seats, separated from one 
another, with no formal propositions and with a self-elected ‘spokesperson’ who declined to speak. 
This traditional structure of bilateral political relations paid failed to publicly reflect the shift in power 
relations that had occurred with the arrival of Montes del Plata’s US$2.5-billion mill project. The new 
elephantine ‘entity in the room’, so to speak, was occupying seats in the front row. The deterioration of 
the roads resulted directly from Montes del Plata’s investment and their repair stood technically within 
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its gift. Yet the representatives of the mill sponsor were not invited to take a seat beside the Intendente, 
either literally or figuratively. Nor did they put themselves forward. Instead, the Corporation preferred 
to position itself as an everyday, non-political ‘neighbour’. Its place was among the citizenry (albeit in 
the front), the pulp manufacturer’s agents wanted the room to understand. 
The villagers were not ignorant of the change in the political status quo, yet they showed themselves to 
be unwilling or unable to act on this knowledge. Instead, speaker after speaker doggedly directed his or 
her claims towards the Intendente, ignoring Montes del Plata’s representatives. This appearance of 
political naivety is neither as curious nor as wilful as it initially appears. Since the restoration of 
democracy in Uruguay, successive governments have placed emphasis on the democratic social contract 
as the guiding model of political legitimacy (Rawls 1996). As law-abiding, tax-paying citizens, 
residents in the micro-region have been instructed to expect their elected governments to protect their 
civic rights and deliver developmental goods. From a bureaucratic perspective, the residents’ demand 
that the Intendencia repair the roads was entirely valid and correct. 
The residents’ fierce attachment to a traditional, unipolar form of politics also contained within it a 
powerful emotional component. The vehicles of Montes del Plata’s contractors had without question 
caused major damage to the roads, yet the micro-region’s transport infrastructure was far from 
undamaged beforehand. Every pothole and smudged-out road marker represented the everyday neglect 
that Conchillenses felt the provincial government had dealt out to them year after year. The same was 
true for the unpaved footpaths, the un-mown verges, the dilapidated bridges, the poorly maintained 
clinic, the under-resourced school, and so on and so on. The evening’s dialogue with the Intendente was 
their opportunity to vent their pent-up frustration towards the embodied figure of the State for all their 
perceived abandonment. For the residents, it was as much about righting past wrongs as it was about 
putting right present problems. 
This slow-burning embitterment of the rescued then rejected orphan ran through almost every statement 
from the floor. Julio Neves, the retired lugareño and author of an 80-page booklet on the history of 
Conchillas, expressed it most clearly. “Nothing has been done to maintain the roads since they were 
built eighty years ago,” he informed the Intendente in a calm but firm voice. “It is in your hands to fix 
it,” Nevez said, warming to his theme. “No other company or anyone else can fill your shoes. It’s the 
result of a lack of attention.” His reference to a company was pointed. It revealed a widespread (and 
well-grounded) perception among Conchillas residents that the Intendencia was seeking to abrogate its 
legitimate responsibilities by passing them over to Montes del Plata. The fact that the audience failed 
to countenance this possibility indicated the strength of their moral outrage towards the provincial 
government and their desire for the settling of old scores. “Historically,” Nevez concluded 
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emphatically, “the Intendencia has not helped us at all.” His short speech was met with approving nods 
from around the room. 
For all the villagers’ deep-seated ire at the injustice of their perceived abandonment, their confidence 
in extracting a concession from the bureaucratic-government entity remained weak. A number of 
residents sought to bolster their political case with arguments grounded on common fairness and moral 
authority. For example, several contributors noted the Intendencia’s investment in public infrastructure 
projects elsewhere in the province, particularly in larger urban conurbations. The future of the workers’ 
accommodation blocks at the Punta Pereira site exemplified how villagers felt overlooked in favour of 
others. The blocks were made up of stand-alone rooms bolted together in the style of an army barracks. 
Early in the project cycle, residents had grown excited about the possibility for acquiring the pre-
fabricated buildings after their use to meet local social housing needs. Their hopes were dashed, 
however, after the Ministry of Housing persuaded the company’s senior management to transfer the 
assets to low-income neighbourhoods elsewhere around the country. Another morally inflected 
argument put forward by the villagers related to the danger to public safety posed by the poor state of 
the roads. Twice, the death of Cyntia Capellino Sosa was mentioned from the floor, on both occasions 
with the implied suggestion that the fatal accident had been not only avoidable but that it could happen 
again. 
However reasonable and justifiable their claims, the residents were making their case in a political 
arena, not a court of law. In the old-style unipolar structure of political administration in which they felt 
themselves bound, the Intendente was both judge and jury. To describe the villagers as ‘claimants’ in 
the strict legalistic sense of the term is therefore to overdo it. A better term might be ‘petitioners’ – a 
fact all villagers tacitly accepted. Alicia, a forthright shop-keeper in Conchillas, expressed precisely 
this conviction when the microphone eventually came her way. The dependent subjectivity that 
persisted among Conchillenses was starkly apparent in her use of the language of ‘hope’, rather than 
‘demand’. To quote an extract of her short but emotionally charged statement from the floor: 
“I hope that you’ve come to bring solutions. We are tired of being on about the roads and repeating 
again and again like parrots. So I hope you can offer solutions. We are tired and we feel forgotten. 
Nothing has been done; everything is outstanding: the rubbish, the roads, the village. We’ve never seen 
anything. I hope that we see a bit here in Conchillas, and not always in Carmelo and Colonia, with all 
due respect. I speak for all those here and all those who are not here, and I don’t know why they’re not 
here but I think the whole community should be here, right from up to Santa Rosa [a hamlet on the Las 
Palmitas road] to as far as the port [Puerto Inglés]. I believe that you deserve all respect for your part, 
but I hope that you will give us solutions. We don’t want to go home to our houses criticising … and 
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then come tomorrow everything is forgotten and then the elections come again and we’re back once 
more and so, with all due respect, I hope you have some solutions to offer.” 
Alicia sat down, her cheeks reddened with the emotion of speaking in public. She was the last to address 
the Intendente from the floor. With her call for tangible solutions still ringing in the air, the microphone 
was passed to the head of the provincial government, whose turn to respond had arrived. 
1.3.2. The Protective State: re-asserting hierarchical norms  
The time was now past 10pm. The evening remained humid, and in spite of the best efforts of two 
electric fans the room had become increasingly stuffy. The Intendente did not stand up, choosing instead 
to address the audience from his seat behind the desk. His body language throughout the audience 
presentations suggested a mix of resigned disinterest (looking down at his hands constantly), physical 
tiredness (his shoulders slumped forward) and occasional annoyance (his mouth twisting angrily, often 
followed by a scribbled note on a sheet of paper torn from a notebook). The overriding impression he 
gave off during this rare exercise in public debate and political accountability was one of profound 
dispassion. 
At one level, the purpose of his response was to directly answer the concerns expressed by the villagers. 
As a consequence, his twenty-minute contestation was laden with examples of public works carried out 
by the Intendencia in the micro-region.  In this vein, he regurgitated budgetary figures concerning the 
amount of roads that had been surfaced and the total government investments that had been made. Yet 
when it came to the request to pave the Conchillas-Las Palmitas road, the Intendente took an ambivalent 
stand, arguing that it was “something we will discuss with Montes del Plata”. 
Dr. Zimmer’s detailed account of the Intendencia’s works programme disguised the second, more 
important purpose of his response: to reassert his entity status as the representative of the bureaucratic 
government. Even if the residents failed to recognise the fact explicitly, the entrance of Montes del Plata 
into the political ecosystem of the province challenged the Intendente’s authority as the region’s 
primary gateway to development goods. To return to the symbolic significance of the seating patterns 
in the room and the power dynamics hidden within them, Colonia’s top public official had two central 
objectives: on the one hand, to retain his political positionality with respect to the Community; on the 
other, to move Montes del Plata to a position where it would assume some of the material obligations 
of the provincial government (yet without encroaching on his political authority). In short, it was an 
exercise in political and administrative boundary setting (Peters 2001:34). 
This first task appeared comparatively easy, given the general non-participation of the villagers and 
their lack of feasible representation. Yet this assumed that Conchillenses might not begin to perceive 
Montes del Plata as an alternative viable entity, especially if or when the Intendente succeeded in 
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passing some of its trustee obligations onto the shoulders of Montes del Plata. As detailed below, Dr. 
Zimmer’s opening remarks indicated a conviction that he could assert his authority by appealing to the 
hierarchical norms that electoral democracy had historically imposed on local state-civil society 
relations and with which Conchillenses were traditionally accustomed: namely, a powerful (albeit, 
nominally accountable) government representative and a pliant, subject citizenry.145 
Despite some initial remarks through gritted teeth about his gratitude at being invited and the 
importance he ascribed to hearing residents’ opinions, his instinctive reaction was to revert to type and 
exploit the relative weakness of the assembled residents to hold him to account. A brief lecture on the 
social political contract therefore followed. Happy though he was to engage in a “permanent dialogue”, 
the Intendente said, the Conchillas residents needed to understand that they did not have a free ticket. 
Political demands were “relative”, he explained. Firstly, they were relative to (or, perhaps more 
accurately, conditional upon) public compliance with the “demands” (read: laws) of the state. The 
Intendente gave the example of legislation about helmet use by motorbike riders, which was widely 
flouted in Conchillas. This attitude of non-compliance, the audience was pointedly informed, cost the 
government considerable funds in healthcare and disability allowance in the event of accidents. It was 
a remarkable claim. In effect, the Intendente was linking political accountability in office with civic 
obedience on the street. The onus was thus on the public to conform and submit to authority if they 
wished to participate in political dialogue. 
Second, the community’s demands were relative to the contending demands that the Intendencia 
encountered. Far from being ignored, as the residents contended, the Intendente maintained that 
Conchillas was being shown disproportionate preference in the province.  As he told the audience in no 
uncertain terms: 
“When you consider the situation of the revenues that we have as an Intendencia and compare it with 
all the construction we have planned for every city, then what’s destined for Conchillas is at the top of 
the scale. These unexpected improvements have cost us [the Intendencia] a lot because we need to 
shrink on all sides the budgets that are already established and announced elsewhere.” 
                                               
145 This was in keeping with Dr. Zimmer’s ‘strong man’ political persona. The Intendente was not a natural 
diplomat, nor a politician given to charm offensives. His natural preference was for a style of masculine, muscular 
leadership that prized confidence and natural authority, and which thought little of joint deliberation or consensus-
building. His casual attire and unpolished demeanour confirmed the impression of a man who prioritised 
pragmatism and straight-talking over ideological nuance or protracted discussion. Here was a political leader who 
could get things done, who would not deceive through flattery, who was given to action rather than affect. This 
was Dr. Zimmer as the State. 
 
 
  78 
  
 
Finally, the residents’ demands were relative to the political competencies ascribed to the Intendencia. 
Issues such as the condition of the national highway and the size of the transport trucks using the local 
and provincial road network were the jurisdiction of central government, not the Intendencia, he 
stressed. 
Considered together, the Intendente’s various lines of argument had a dual purpose at their core. The 
most immediate was to dissuade residents from knocking further at the provincial government’s door. 
His basic message was simple: the Intendencia was doing what it could, where it had to, with the 
resources at its disposal; anything else was beyond its scope and/or powers. The Intendente’s second 
purpose was to reassert the traditional political order in Conchillas prior to the mill project: that is to 
say, with the provincial government as facilitator of development goods on the one hand, and with an 
acquiescent rural electorate as grateful recipient on the other. Hence, his lengthy and rather dry listing 
of the government’s public works programme. This was not mere information sharing. Instead, Dr. 
Zimmer was seeking to establish a new narrative that rebutted the popular discourse of the micro-
region’s abandonment by government and, in so doing, firmed up his credentials as a legitimate and 
credible representative of the State. 
That the Intendente should home in on the notion of abandonment demonstrated the theme’s overriding 
centrality to the State-Community relationship. The ubiquitous use of the term ‘abandonado’, coupled 
with the weight given to it by both entities, raises questions as to what the term does, as much as what 
it means. The idea of abandonment in rural Conchillas, I argue, goes beyond its literal descriptor of an 
absent State. Instead, it provides a marginalised public with a means of discursively constituting the 
State, in much the same way as corruption did for the rural Indians described by Akhil Gupta (2012).  
 
Governments may wish to show themselves as coherent, seamlessly administered entities, but that is 
far from how most citizens experience them on the ground. The reality is far messier and more mundane. 
In the Bengali villages studied by Gupta, tales of corruption reflected this experienced truth. Through 
their sub-plots of petty bribery and depictions of pen-wielding potentates, they described how citizens 
engaged with the “discrete and fragmentary” arms of government administration (Gupta 2012:90). Yet 
the narrative world in which such stories unfold supposes a well-intentioned entity in the background. 
Corruption at its core is a story of the intentions of the singular State (‘good guy’) being frustrated by 
the machinery of government (‘bad guy’). 
If corruption was a barrier put up by the agents of governmentality for Bengali villagers, then 
abandonment represented the gaps that these agents allowed to grow in the micro-region. The backdrop 
in both instances was the same: behind people’s everyday encounters with the disaggregated body parts 
of government - be they encounters of corruption or, as in the micro-region, of state absenteeism - stood 
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a vision of the State as a multilayered, translocal yet coherent singular entity. By pointing out at such 
length that the gaps in governmentality were not as deep as Conchillenses perceived, the Intendente 
was affirming that the singular State was not only extant (which the narrative of abandonment assumes) 
but near at hand (which it negates). Moreover, by positing the Intendencia as the principal active agent 
rather than the federal government, Dr. Zimmer was affirming his own place at the centre of this new 
storyline of the responsive State. 
The essence of the Intendente’s new narrative was care for, and accountability towards, the Community. 
Yet establishing a credible alternative narrative had to go further than its mere evocation. Conchillenses 
were, in a curious way, deeply attached to the story of their own abandonment. It placed responsibility 
for their sluggish recent history and general lack of dynamism on the shoulders of others, not their own. 
To buy into the Intendente’s counter-narrative, they had to see it and ideally feel it for themselves. To 
be effective, in short, it had to be affective. The Intendente’s unprecedented willingness to attend a 
public consultation at the behest of the villagers, particularly at such a late hour, marked a move in this 
direction. So too did his efforts - albeit not entirely successful - to adopt a listening pose and a 
conciliatory manner. Beyond behavioural signalling, however, the Intendente was required to provide 
tangible evidence of his new narrative of care. He must, to quote Alicia, prove his willingness and his 
ability to “bring solutions”. 
In the context of the evening meeting, there were two tangible pieces of evidence that the villagers 
wanted to see and on which the Intendente’s entity status and the credibility of his anti-abandonment 
discourse therefore rested. He had to deliver, or facilitate, the villagers’ legitimate and immediate 
demand for an improvement to its deteriorating roads. And, he needed demonstrably to assert his 
authority over Montes del Plata and thus constrain the Corporation as a potentially contending entity. 
His tactical solution, as stated above, was to negotiate privately with the sponsor of the mill in pursuit 
of a mutual accord. As such, he had this simple message for the assembled villagers’ in response to 
their request for the asphalting of the Conchillas-Las Palmitas road: 
“We’ll carry on cutting what we’re doing elsewhere in order to complete what needs to be done on the 
Radial road and the other [road] works that need to be done up to the port [Puerto Inglés]. In 
everything else, it’s a cooperation with Montes del Plata that we’ll have to do together to see what 
willingness there exists on the part of the company . . . We need to sit down and converse with Montes 
del Plata slowly and calmly to determine the part that they can collaborate with. After that, there will 
be another conversation following an accommodation with us. I’m sure that we’ll be able to come to 
an agreement for a second important phase of works. I stress that this is all that I have to inform you.” 
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The audience greeted the statement with resigned silence. Several heads shook. A yet-to-be-negotiated 
“accommodation” with Montes del Plata was not the firm “solution” that villagers like Alicia were 
hoping for. The State might be present, but the local population of Conchillas still felt alone. 
So why the Intendente’s lacklustre response? Why did he not simply commit the Intendencia to asphalt 
the road and thus ensure his status as the protector and provider of the local population’s welfare? After 
all, despite the caveats expressed at the outset of his response about the government’s constrained 
resources, the expense of asphalting a 4km strip of road were trifling compared to other major road 
infrastructure projects around the province. Or, better still, why not compel and cajole Montes del 
Plata’s management to undertake the works itself, thus achieving the road improvement and the State’s 
assertion of authority in a single step? 
1.4 State and Corporation: An uneasy accommodation  
To understand the Intendente’s reluctance to pursue either of these two seemingly obvious strategies, it 
is necessary to step briefly outside the meeting room and consider the broader political relations 
between the Intendencia and the mill’s sponsor. 
After going back and forth with his private office at County Hall in Colonia de Sacramento, I finally 
managed to land an interview with Dr. Zimmer several months after the Casa Evans meeting. I found 
the Intendente seated behind a large desk in his sizeable yet modestly decorated official office in the 
state capital building. His secretary had cleared his diary for 45 minutes and he was in relaxed mood, 
offering me a chair and chit-chatting about my experience in Uruguay. He hoped I was enjoying my 
time in his province. I said I was. 
The subject turned to Conchillas, which allowed me to broach the subject of the meeting about the 
roads. Mention of the event brought a wry smile to his lips. I backtracked and asked him about his 
attitude in general towards the mill project. The question removed the smile from his lips immediately. 
Leaning forwards in his chair and fixing me with a stern stare, he asserted defiantly that the decision as 
to whether to “either invite or permit” Montes del Plata to install its pulp plant in the province was not 
his. Far from it, in fact. He was “hardly consulted”. The negotiation was controlled almost entirely by 
central government, with only minimal feedback from the Intendencia. 
He went on to describe the investment as a “mega project” and a “national asset”, phrases he had 
employed continually during the Casa Evans meeting as well. Although he conceded that the mill’s 
construction was providing a source of temporary employment, he set this against the short and long-
term economic costs that such a large-scale industrial project incurred for the provincial government - 
the maintenance of the deteriorating road infrastructure being a case in point. 
 
  81 
  
 
By admitting his exclusion from the most significant foreign private investment in the history of his 
province, the Intendente was accepting his own marginality in national political and economic affairs. 
The sidelining of the Intendencia was confirmed to me in a private interview with his deputy, Pablo 
Manito, again at County Hall. The smooth-talking Manito (a lawyer by background) stressed that the 
provincial government had “a whole bunch of doubts” about the project, but its hands were tied given 
the central government’s enthusiasm for the proposed mill.146 
The Intendente may not have welcomed the mill project in his province, but it remained politically 
untenable for him to ignore its presence nevertheless. The roads still required fixing and his relationship 
with Montes del Plata still required clarifying.  
1.4.1. The Negotiator State: tethers & accords  
The mill presented multiple challenges to the provincial government, but it also represented an 
opportunity for the Intendente to assert his entity claims. Historically, the provincial government had 
been able to maintain that low public investment in public services arises from a lack of resources, not 
a lack of political will or authority. The arrival of mill, however, dramatically changed this dynamic. In 
Montes del Plata, the province had a potential source of new monies for the public purse. This could 
feasibly relieve the Intendencia of its perpetual budgetary constraints and facilitate its delivery of 
development goods. Just as Pablo looked to win a concession from the provincial government to bolster 
his own entity claims, so the Intendente found himself required to win a concession from Montes del 
Plata for the same reason. 
Dr. Zimmer’s decision to try and obtain such a concession through negotiation was, at one very public 
level, a manifestation of the limits to the provincial government’s authority. Simply put, the Intendente 
could not oblige Montes del Plata to undertake the contested road improvements. The legislative powers 
to do so, such as they existed, lay with central government. And these were powers, it should be noted, 
that the national executive and legislature had shown themselves consistently reluctant to employ, given 
the country’s pro-FDI policy. The tax and duty exemptions written into the Punta Pereira Free Trade 
Zone made this irrefutably clear. Montes del Plata is afforded further legal protection by a bilateral 
                                               
146 To quote Manito in full: “The Intendencia has very little margin to influence the debate. Yet the mill was 
something we discussed extensively in the Intendencia at the time, of course. It was not something that I was 
involved in hands-on. But at the time it certainly generated a whole bunch of doubts. So much so in fact that I’d 
say we were more against than in favour of the project. Yet we knew that in reality we wouldn’t have much room 
for saying ‘no’ once the announcement about the investment had been made considering the revenue it signified 
for the central government. It was always going to be a decision of the central government and it doesn’t really 
matter what we say at a local level. The plant has to be installed. It’s the largest investment in the history of 
Uruguay, so we’re not going to tell them ‘no.’” 
 
 
  82 
  
 
trade deal between Finland and Uruguay that prohibits the latter from unreasonably imperilling the 
profitability of the pulp manufacturer’s investment project.147 
This does not render the Intendente entirely powerless in his relations with Montes del Plata. During 
his response at the evening meeting, Dr. Zimmer had mentioned in passing the ability of the provincial 
state authority to place “tethers” (‘ataduras’) on the company. The mere suggestion that some form of 
constraining power was within the Intendente’s armoury evidenced his desire to be seen by his 
electorate as a feasible authority. But how rooted was that power in reality? 
The Intendente failed to elaborate on the nature of these ‘tethers’ at the time, so I used our interview to 
seek out clarification. In response, he cited a number of restrictions imposed by the Intendencia on the 
mill project and Montes del Plata’s wider operations. The list of examples included: the legal restriction 
of forestry in Colonia province to 7% of total available agricultural land; contractual requirements to 
accommodate workers on multiple sites outside Conchillas; and the obligation for Montes del Plata to 
adopt preventative measures against unskilled economic migration into the region. 
While these ‘tethers’ certainly represented a constraint for the Corporation, their genesis dated back to 
the initial negotiating process for the mill’s approval. This marked a unique moment at which Montes 
del Plata was predisposed to accept a package of measures so as to gain the green light for its investment. 
By the mid-point of the construction phase, those conditions no longer existed. As I pushed the 
Intendente for current binding ‘tethers’, the only “hard” examples he could come up with related to 
bureaucratic interventions, most of which concerned specific planning applications that required sign-
off at a provincial (rather than national) government level. 
In the same breath as his remark about ‘tethers’, Dr. Zimmer had also advised the residents of Conchillas 
about the Intendencia’s ability to establish “accords” (‘convenios’) with Montes del Plata. These 
represented a far lower order of political power and resulted in a much weaker set of obligations on the 
corporation. The convenios were non-binding agreements that emerged out of a process known as the 
Mesa Interinstitucional (Cross-Party Roundtable), an informal monthly meeting at which distinctive 
provincial and central government agencies gathered to discuss their individual activities and to seek to 
improve cross-governmental coordination. The accords essentially represented statements of mutual 
intent, with Montes del Plata and the Intendencia committing in principle to work together on issues of 
                                               
147 2002 Finland-Uruguay Bilateral Investment Treaty. Available online at: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad. 
org/IIA/country/71/treaty/1548. Accessed 3 March 2017. 
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shared interest. The subject areas covered by these convenios included measures to improve road safety, 
combat domestic violence and prevent economic migration.148 
It was this far weaker ‘convenio’ model that the Intendente had proposed to the villagers as a solution 
to the road improvements. The likes of Alicia were sceptical that a “sit down and converse” approach 
would deliver the firm assurances the villagers were looking for. When I asked her about the proposal 
the day after the meeting, she threw up her hands and said the Intendente should have pledged to asphalt 
the road, asserting that “otherwise it’s just more and more talk and no action”. From the perspective of 
political image-making, the Intendente’s proposed strategy could not be more different from the 
classically assertive, hard-ball style that had characterised the beginning of his response. Arguably, 
diplomatic negotiation - especially when conducted with as a hand as weak as that held by the 
Intendente - required a less abrasive approach. At the same time, the Intendente could not appear supine 
before his contending entity, the Corporation. 
Pablo Manito touched on this dilemma in our subsequent conversation at the County Hall. On the one 
hand, he was at pains to describe the relationship between the Intendencia and Montes del Plata as a 
healthy one (“hay una buena relación”, “there’s a good relationship”), in which communication 
channels are always open (“They [Montes del Plata] are always on hand and ready to give us 
information.”) and interpersonal encounters are fluid (“The mill manager often invites me or the 
Intendente to lunch or dinner or a tour of the facility”). On the other hand, the General Secretary said 
that the foreign investor was “in debt” to the local population and that the concessionary measures it 
had initially agreed were not a “large investment” given the size and impact of the mill project. 
With the conditions for negotiation apparently open and the grounds for the Intendencia’s claims clear, 
one would assume the Intendente would have been in a strong position to push hard for a concession. 
Yet Pablo Manito insisted that the Intendencia’s strategy continued to focus on arriving at an accord 
through amicable discussion rather than via political pressure. “We [the provincial government] are not 
ones to abuse our demands,” he added, presenting the Intendencia as a responsible, fair-minded 
negotiator. In reality, the Intendente’s antipathy towards the mill had severely strained relations with 
                                               
148 Conveniently for Montes del Plata, none of the measures established by its agreements with the Intendencia 
fell outside the impact mitigation priorities highlighted in its pre-existing Community Relationship Plan. 
Typically, the company offered financial support or, more often, in-kind resources to support public programmes 
that were led and developed by the Intendencia or other government departments. Towards the beginning of the 
construction process, for instance, Montes del Plata agreed to an accord that would see municipal authorities 
across the country establish registration centres for potential workers at the project. The arrangement, jointly 
coordinated by the Ministry of Work and Social Security (part of the central government), was designed to avoid 
the Intendente’s fear that Colonia would receive a flood of unskilled workers in search of employment at the mill.  
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Montes del Plata’s management,149 while his weak executive powers meant his ability to demand - let 
alone abuse or inflate that ability - was largely a figment. 
To return to the meeting room again, it is worth considering the symbolic positioning of the three entities 
in the meeting hall. The State was sitting in a dominant position at the front of the room; it was on it, in 
the form of Dr. Zimmer, that all eyes were trained. The Community sat facing him, excepting the initial 
moment when Pablo gave his introductory comments from the front. The Corporation, meanwhile, was 
seated with the Community, though in a front-seat position that placed it nearest to the State. The 
objective of the Intendente during the meeting, as I argue, was not to fix the roads but to assert his status 
as a feasible representative of the State and, in turn, to retain the State’s historical status as the primary 
political authority in the locality. For the reasons explained, he was restricted from acting unilaterally 
to deliver a concrete (or, more accurately, a bitumen) solution to the Community’s demand and thus 
secure his commanding position. Hence his strategy of trying to coax the Corporation out from among 
the audience and have it take on the burden of the road repairs. But where to place the Corporation? 
And how to persuade it to distance itself from the Community? 
The ideal for the Intendente would have been to locate Montes del Plata’s delegate in a subordinate 
position, where the assembled residents could witness the State making demands of the Corporation 
and observe the Corporation conceding to those demands. Yet the Intendente in his representative role 
as the State lacked the necessary coercive powers to bring about such an arrangement. The best he could 
hope for was to entice the Corporation to take a seat at a parallel desk, where the balance of power 
would be perceived by the Corporation as more equitable. From this position, the Intendente, as the 
State, could have been seen to confirm his formalised representativeness by negotiating a settlement on 
behalf of his subjects, the Community. 
Such a strategy was not without its risks. Most obviously, the parallel positioning supposed by a 
collaborative solution to the road could be interpreted by the Community as evidence of balanced 
political power sharing between Corporation and State. A risk also existed of the Corporation refusing 
to leave its seat. Montes del Plata’s whole community relations strategy centred on its enactment as a 
fellow neighbour, as just one actor among many other actors who comprised the local population. 
Similarly, its anti-dependency, citizen-led approach to social investment rested on a supposition of 
Community and Corporation figuratively sitting together and working in partnership. So could the 
Corporation be enticed by the State to move, and, if so, how and on what conditions? 
                                               
149 In 2014, Montes del Plata’s senior executives threatened legal action against the Intendencia after the provincial 
authority sought to recover around US$2.5 million in land use taxes from the Finnish multinational. It was claimed 
that the project was exempt from the taxes under the terms of the Free Zone agreement. 
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Dr. Zimmer sat down to a room of stony faces. The residents welcomed the State in human form, but 
they would evidently have preferred a human being who could either fix their roads himself or authorise 
someone else to do so. As far as they were concerned, Dr. Zimmer was good with a scalpel and good 
on a soapbox, but he had yet to prove his competence at getting asphalt laid. As he handed over the 
microphone, his representative authority was hanging in the balance. 
1.5 The Corporation: fixing power relations in place   
 
Montes del Plata’s Señor Areco, a bespectacled engineer in his mid-fifties, took to his feet and accepted 
the microphone. A former employee of ENCE, he had led the original team that identified Punta Pereira 
as a potential alternative to the disputed Fray Bentos site. He had also been involved with the initial 
public consultations in the micro-region, so he was a well-known figure locally. As Montes del Plata’s 
manager for engineering operations outside the immediate mill and port areas, he was responsible for 
the construction of the Ruta 55 extension as well as other transport links to the mill. In addition to being 
affable and polite, he was also well-acquainted with the community’s political landscape. 
Areco spoke for about twenty-five minutes, his voice evenly-balanced and his delivery confident. He 
peppered his arguments with figures and facts relating to the existing condition of the local road network 
as well as citing the company’s past and ongoing transport investments. The depth of information he 
provided was pitched with aplomb; sufficiently technocratic to impress his expert knowledge upon the 
assembled audience, yet accessible enough to make himself intelligible and - to an extent - personable. 
Areco was originally from a rural state in Uruguay, meaning his mannerisms and accent were not loaded 
with the alienating cosmopolitanism of Montevideo. 
As with the Intendente, the company’s spokesperson was anxious to portray the Corporation as 
receptive to dialogue and attentive to the villagers’ concerns. Areco thanked the residents “in the name 
of Montes del Plata” for convening the meeting, a clear signal of his own personating claims. Wearing 
the hat of the Corporation’s official representative, he admitted that the damage to the road network 
represented the “largest impact of the construction process”. He fell short, however, of suggesting that 
his employer was culpable for the deterioration of the roads. To do so would have implied a moral, and 
possibly even a legal, responsibility to accept the Intendente’s invocation to assist with the requested 
repairs. This eventuality was one that Montes del Plata’s management were very anxious to avoid. 
To be clear: it was not the repair work itself from which the Corporation would rather distance itself, 
but rather the obligation - real or perceived - to undertake such a task. Areco did not immediately address 
the Intendente’s request to take on the asphalting, leaving open the possibility of some form of 
concession in the future. An abrupt refusal would not be feasible anyway in light of Montes del Plata’s 
governing ambition to enact itself as a responsible corporate entity. For this reason, the Corporation 
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could not be seen to discountenance the Community’s demands without a show of due consideration 
and legitimate cause. Indeed, Montes del Plata’s enactment ambition might even spur it to take on the 
road repairs, either in full or - more probably - in part. 
The danger of agreeing to take unilateral action was, of course, that of precedence. As stated previously, 
the cost to Montes del Plata of asphalting a 4 km stretch of road was negligible in the scheme of the 
project as a whole; the cost of asphalting every earthen road in the vicinity (and potentially ensuring 
the upkeep of that asphalt for the decades-long duration of the mill) was another matter. More 
importantly, Montes del Plata was adamant that it should not become perceived as an alternative to the 
provincial government. It served the Corporation’s economic interests well if the villagers maintained 
their belief in the delivery function of the government through its various bureaucratic agencies. 
It is useful to return briefly to the physical positioning of the three main entities in the Casa Evans 
meeting hall and its analogous connections with their political positionality. Each contending entity 
operated within its own geographical domain. Whereas the State was translocal and therefore 
(theoretically) omnipresent, the Community and the Corporation were confined by the boundaries of 
the micro-region and the site of the Punta Pereira mill, respectively. From Montes del Plata’s 
perspective, it mattered little that another feasible entity should exercise authority outside the mill’s 
perimeters as long as it posed no threat to the sovereignty the Corporation enjoyed within its private 
domain. In this regard, the legislatively-weak and resource-poor provincial government was preferable 
to either an empowered (and potentially unpredictable) citizenry or a comparatively unknown (and 
possibly less amenable) federal regulator or government agency. 
Symbolically, a refusal to consider contributing to the road network would equate to Montes del Plata 
retiring from the room altogether. This would severely damage its claims to responsibility and thus 
undermine its entity status. It would also change the makeup of the room, potentially leaving a space 
vacant for another actor or actors to enter. Should that new entrant embody the authority of central 
government or be able to activate that authority (through a negative media campaign, for instance, or 
pressure from an international campaign group), Montes del Plata would run the risk of being mandated 
to undertake all or part of the repair work itself. If the Corporation had to shift from its front-row seat 
among the Community, it wished to do so according to its own timetable and to a location of its own 
choosing. It would be through this act of setting of terms and the “fixing of a power relationship” that 
Montes del Plata’s representative most clearly exercised, as well as evidenced, the company’s authority 
as a collective entity (Foucault 1982:794). 
1.5.1. Corporate choreography: defence, detachment & the art of the sidestep   
In light of these considerations, Areco delivered a dual defence in response to demands by the State for 
the Corporation to take action. The first pillar related to the work that Montes del Plata’s operations 
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team had already carried out to improve the road network, both past and present (Figure 7). Repeating 
the Intendente’s own tactic, Areco provided an exhaustive list of completed and ongoing projects, 
ranging from the mill owner’s role in widening, paving and repairing sections of the local roads around 
Conchillas through to its investments in strengthening bridge crossings, improving road signage and 
liaising with the traffic police to crack down on dangerous driving. Future planned improvements 
included roadside illumination between Conchillas and Puerto Inglés, a specific gripe of the local 
population. 
Where Areco differed from the Intendente was in his show of financial transparency: Montes del Plata’s 
total expenditure on road infrastructure to date amounted to “around US$4 million”, the spokesman 
declared. Mention of the number sent a stir through the room, including among Areco’s own colleagues. 
The mill owner was usually coy about publicising financial information relating to its non-operational 
investments. Information about its CSR expenditure was kept very much under wraps. One of the CSR 
managers would later admit to me that the US$4m number had been new to her. She had subsequently 
asked around for confirmation among her colleagues and still remained unsure as to whether this 
headline figure included the Ruta 55 extension or not (in fact, it did not). The amount appeared vast 
compared to the company’s modest community projects. The insinuation underlying all of Areco’s 
comments was that Montes del Plata had already undertaken more than its fair share and thus satisfied 
any moral requirement expected of it.  
 
 Figure 7 The fly-over bridge at the Ruta 55 extension, under construction 
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The second pillar of the Areco’s defence was to distance it from responsibility for the deterioration of 
Conchillas’ road network. The blame, he argued, fell not with the Corporation but with the State and 
its own internal bureaucracy. He explained that Montes del Plata’s original plan had been to build the 
Ruta 55 extension first and afterwards move on to the construction of the mill project. This would have 
averted the need for construction traffic to use the local road networks. Under such an arrangement, the 
foreign investor would have had to take on the risk of starting the intersection without full assurance 
that the mill would be approved. However, the central government refused this project proposal, 
demanding that the road extension and the mill be “bundled up” together. “We could have had the 
highway at least in construction before the plant began,” Areco told the audience. 
Although his finger of blame pointed primarily to the central government, the Montes del Plata 
representative did not exempt the Intendencia. Responsibility for maintenance of the Las Palmitas road 
had been handed back by ENCE to the Intendencia in 2010. This followed a three-year period during 
which the Spanish pulp manufacturer used the route as part of its extensive earthwork operations at the 
mill site. The road had been fully repaired by ENCE prior to being handed back to the Intendencia, 
Areco clarified. He added that the road was widened as much as possible at the time and that to widen 
it more would require the appropriation of landowner’s property. Again, he found cause to render the 
Intendencia culpable: “That [appropriation] falls to municipal planning, which is much harder than 
national planning.” To further distance Montes del Plata from responsibility for deterioration of the 
roads post-2010 or for their subsequent repair, he noted that large milk-container lorries traversed the 
route on a daily basis. Areco maintained that these were as much to blame as any commercial traffic 
related to the mill. 
By sidestepping responsibility for the road network’s deterioration and placing it back on the 
government, Montes del Plata’s agent was re-asserting the company’s physical and moral boundaries 
as a mill-occupying, pulp-manufacturing entity. The social and material world beyond its gates was 
open for contestation; the world within its gates was not. A similar act of boundary-setting detachment 
was required to disentangle the Corporation from the surrounding Community without severing the 
intimate social relations and semblance of care that it had worked so hard to create. In this, its hand was 
somewhat forced by Dr. Zimmer. In a savvy piece of politicking, the Intendente had sought to buttress 
his case for Montes del Plata’s involvement in the road repairs by bleeding the lines between the two 
entities, Corporation and Community. During his response at the Casa Evans meeting, when referring 
to the Intendencia’s alleged prioritisation of public works in Conchillas, he had described the village as 
“a neighbour to the mega-project. Indeed, it, Conchillas, along with Montes del Plata, forms one sole 
project”. 
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The notion of “one sole project” evokes images of the literature on ‘offshoring’.150 The location of 
Montes del Plata’s mill in a free trade zone reflects this trend among multinational businesses to create 
juridical or geographical spaces in which they “can abide by their own rules”, as Hannah Appel puts it 
(Appel 2013:697). Yet, the desire of the company’s management to maintain good civic and labour 
relations restrained it from cutting off local relations. The Corporation may have considered the mill a 
private and apolitical space, yet it still saw fit to venture out into the micro-region – albeit on its own 
terms (which included its right to withdraw back inside the mill at its own discretion). The Intendente’s 
version of “one sole project” essentially accepted the mill as a politically sovereign space, but on the 
condition that its boundaries were extended to incorporate the local population and its social concerns. 
This was something that Montes del Plata’s anti-dependency community relations strategy was 
designed to avoid, oriented as it was around setting limits, not opening new fronts (see Chapter 3). In 
Areco’s view and that of his employer, the development of its project (namely, the mill) and that of the 
community (in this instance, repairing the road network) must not be conflated.  
At the end of Areco’s presentation, neither Pablo nor the community members in the audience sought 
to contest Montes del Plata’s spokesperson. The microphone passed briefly back to the Intendente. He 
took the opportunity to pick up on one or two minor points from the floor that he had failed to address 
earlier (notably an allegation that an increase in fines issued by the traffic police comprised a revenue-
raising measure for the Intendencia). Yet nor did he make any effort to counter Areco’s comments in 
any substantive way. It was close to 10:45 pm when Areco finally finished, so the late hour was no 
doubt a contributing factor to the Intendente’s lack of a rejoinder. 
Another possible reason for the Intendente’s reticence was still hanging in the air. Just before 
concluding, Areco had directly addressed the Intendente’s suggestion that Montes del Plata might play 
some sort of “joint role” in the repairs in the future. Paving the Las Palmitas road was not “currently 
considered in the [company’s] plan,” Areco had stated. Speaking explicitly “as an engineer” (i.e. no 
longer overtly as the company’s representative), he had added his personal reservations about laying 
asphalt as the measure would, in his opinion, lead to an increase in driving speeds. Given that the road 
had a large number of bends, he feared this would make the route liable to accidents. With all that said, 
however, he had assured the audience and the Intendente that he “will transfer the request to senior 
management”. 
It was hardly an emphatic concession. Moreover, it was weakened by Areco’s switch from 
representative status to that of mere emissary. He would only relay the Intendente’s message; he would 
not step forward and make the concession himself. The ability of corporate representatives to slip in 
and out of personating roles exemplified the fragile ground on which the negotiation strategy between 
                                               
150 See: Appel 2012, 2013; Ely & Meyerson 2010; Palan 2006. 
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contending entities rested. Areco’s evasive, chameleon-like performance provides an exemplary 
instance of detachable CSR in practice. 
Yet at least the meeting ended with the conversation remaining open. This left alive hopes that Pablo’s 
moderating strategy might just pay off, as might the Intendente’s attempt to offload his public 
responsibilities. For both men, their respective entity claims had won an extension, if not approbation. 
At the time, this appeared enough to satisfy them. 
The meeting eventually drew to an end with final thanks from the Intendente and his repeated assurance 
that he was at the villagers’ disposal. Immediately, Pablo and the Intendente fell into amicable 
conversation with the representatives from Montes del Plata, who had left their chairs and joined the 
event’s main protagonists at the front of the hall. The residents rose from their seats and joined in the 
friendly chit-chat. After about ten minutes, the Intendente headed out the door and everyone started to 
drift off home. Pablo turned off the lights. The meeting was over. 
1.6. Conclusion: passivity - the price of tarmac  
A few days later, I found myself riding in the passenger seat of Areco’s car on the 40-minute drive from 
Colonia de Sacramento to Conchillas. We lived close to one another and I sometimes grabbed a lift 
with him to work so as to avoid the lengthy bus ride. We were on relatively familiar terms and he shared 
his verdict of the evening meeting candidly. 
What the corporate engineer revealed above all in his frank description of the event was the astute 
manipulation of the local political landscape by the company’s management. In the run-up to the 
meeting, the Corporation was acutely aware of the enactment agendas of both its rival entities, as well 
as the strengths and weaknesses of their respective political positions. Of the Intendente, for instance, 
Areco noted how he needed to “show that he is stronger than he really is in reality”. As he correctly 
identified, the Intendencia’s main lever of influence over Montes del Plata was around the permissions 
process for minor infrastructure works, but these bureaucratic powers were largely “generic” and 
“reactive”. As for Pablo, Areco dismissed him as having “little intellectual capacity” and described his 
claims to leadership as fanciful, self-serving and, above all, fragile. “Everyone knows what Pablo is 
like,” he added offhandedly, referring to his propensity to sound off in public. Moreover, Areco saw no 
difficult in reining him in should the need arise: “He knows that if he makes very serious allegations 
against us, then we will rebut him in public and that will lower his prestige.”  
In line with the detachable approach to CSR adopted by Montes del Plata’s management, Areco 
reflected a consistent policy of depoliticisation. The Corporation “doesn’t want arguments”, he told me 
as we drove. Instead, in his judgement, a “conciliatory” approach was by far the best way forward. 
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Conciliation required the political sting to be taken out of the road issue. In this respect, Montes del 
Plata’s agents did nothing to encourage participation at the event nor to promote recognition of Pablo’s 
leadership claims: two key steps towards the issue’s politicisation. Areco judged that the population of 
the micro-region was politically “pasivo” (“passive”) and that the tendency among residents was to 
“pass responsibility onto a small number to attend”. To be doubly sure, however, Areco pitched his 
presentation in such a way as to reduce the possibility of political agitation. “We speak in technical 
language, so they are afraid of speaking,” he told me. In case I was in any doubt, he reminded me that 
the Corporation was “large and powerful”. It was a fact I was already more than aware of, as was Pablo 
and his fellow residents.  
Areco had artfully prevented the Intendente from politicising the issue too. As long as residents 
continued to look to the State as the rightful deliverer of public services, the Intendente’s ability to 
offload its formal political responsibilities would be limited. Areco reinforced this historic status quo 
by reminding the State representative of his jurisdictional duties vis-à-vis road maintenance. At the 
same time, by intimating that a future concession might be possible, the Corporation presented the 
Intendente with an incentive to pursue a conciliatory approach rather than rock the political boat any 
further.  
The Intendente did eventually receive his concession in a deal struck with Montes del Plata’s senior 
executives behind closed doors. Although the arrangement would not be confirmed for well over a year, 
the mill owner eventually consented to co-finance the 4km strip of road in conjunction with the 
provincial government. Areco’s bosses, the faceless authorities controlling the black box, had come 
good. This served well the Intendente’s status as a protector of the Community’s interests. Las Palmitas 
road could now be added to his list of completed infrastructure projects. That said, the lengthy delay 
meant that by time the road was asphalted, the villagers had moved on to new demands. In this sense, 
the Intendente too found himself trapped in a circular orbit, constantly needing to deliver - or make a 
show of trying to deliver - public goods for those he formally represented.  
The time lag weakened Pablo’s claim to substantive representation too. The connection between the 
Intendencia’s paving machines arriving on the edge of the village and the public dialogue on that hot 
February night many months before was already loose. By the time the asphalt was laid, the link was 
lost on Pablo’s fellow residents. Instead, they too found themselves locked in a circular political process 
from which there seemed no way out. Without a feasible representative to contend with the micro-
region’s two dominant entities, the local population could not persuade either to act on their claims. 
The Corporation merely deflected its claims back to the State, while the State could afford to delay or 
defer its response without major political repercussions. Nothing that Alicia witnessed at the meeting 
had dissuaded her from the widespread feeling among Conchillenses that they remained, as ever, “miles 
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away” from the decision-making entities. Their voice had been heard, but had failed to register. To her 
mind, “the roads are in his [the Indendente’s] hands”. The regrettable fact was that “they are bad 
hands”, as she put it – and, as long as the Corporation failed to act, nothing could be done about it.  
Of the three entities, Montes del Plata was the only one to emerge with the outcome that it desired. With 
respect to its position within the hierarchy of power, it was close enough to the centre of the political 
ecosystem to exert meaningful agency over its rival entities, yet distant enough not to be subject to their 
demands. The Corporation’s interest was to reduce the political attention directed towards itself or the 
impacts of its investment. To remove itself entirely from the political sphere and present itself as 
apolitical was neither possible nor desirable. As Uruguay’s largest ever foreign investor, not only was 
it bound by inextricable political ties, but through judicious pulling and loosening these ties it was able 
to shape the political environment in its favour. Its tactic of depoliticisation was a way of drawing the 
line; of accruing sufficient political representation to fulfil its commercial objectives, but no more.  
In keeping with Foucault’s call to analyse power relations through the antagonism of strategies, this 
chapter endeavours to reveal the nature of corporate power by better understanding the enacted 
positioning of Montes del Plata by its representatives in the micro-region’s evolving political 
ecosystem. The ambition of the mill owner’s management to appear benevolent yet simultaneously 
detached from costly political responsibilities depended on it reinforcing – not destabilising – the 
political status quo. In this respect, the company’s representatives could be seen as allies of 
Conchillenses’ political conservatism. In the final instance, a toothless State and a leaderless 
Community were two entities that they could do business with. Unlike the central government, neither 
posed a risk to Montes del Plata’s operations. Moreover, they helped the mill operator’s management 
enact Montes del Plata as a corporate citizen by allowing its representatives to effectively dictate the 
political responsibilities that the company was prepared to assume. If that meant the Community 
emerging from the process with a ‘pasivo’ sign still hung tightly around its neck, so be it. Such was the 
price of a smooth stretch of freshly laid tarmac.  
 
 




Showing Face:  
Legitimacy, Community Relations and the Role of Managerial Agency 
“We are committed to being a responsible neighbour”  
Montes del Plata’s Management Policy151 
On the afternoon of 22 November 2015, Montes del Plata’s Sustainability Director passed the keys of 
a brand new toilet block to a representative of the municipal government of Colonia. A ripple of polite 
applause arose from the residents of the nearby riverine settlement of Puerto Inglés who had gathered 
on the sandy banks of the Rio de la Plata to witness the inauguration. In the near distance, behind the 
porta cabin-shaped toilet block (Figure 8), rose the huge chimney of Montes del Plata’s US$2.5-billion 
pulp factory. For the previous 15 months, a thin plume of white smoke had risen from the factory’s 
iconic chimney stack, signalling the plant’s full operation. On the same day, Montes del Plata’s CSR 
team organised a series of musical entertainments, children’s games, football competitions and other 
festive activities to celebrate the opening of a new recreation park on the edge of Puerto Inglés. The 
public park, which is located on an area of former scrub land, forms a green buffer between the hamlet 
and the nearby mill.  
 
          Figure 8 The toilet block sponsored by Montes del Plata in Puerto Inglés 
In this chapter, I turn my attentions to the demands that the strategy of detachable CSR placed on Montes 
del Plata’s own community managers. I do so with a double conviction. Firstly, it is these managers 
who provide the primary relational conduit through which the company presents itself and thus form a 
                                               
151 Montes del Plata’s Management Policy: Sustainability. Available at: http://www.montesdelplata.com.uy/ 
sustentabilidad_comunidad.php?lang=es. Accessed 3 February 2016. 
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key link in how its corporate values, ethics and personality come to be publicly known. It is they who 
walk the streets, knock on residents’ doors, hold meetings, field community concerns, and generally 
communicate on the company’s behalf. Understanding how they interpret and enact their role is 
therefore vital to clarifying how detachable CSR informs and influences community relations.   
In turn, a good reputation for community relations helps create the appearance of positive ethical 
conduct and thus feeds into the end goal of CSR: the building of corporate legitimacy. In Montes del 
Plata’s case, as with many other businesses that boast dedicated community affairs personnel, these 
professional agents are instrumental in determining how community relations are carried out and framed 
(Miyazaki 2013: 6-7, 9). The manner in which these personnel employ detachable CSR strategies to 
manage community relations reveals important lessons about the path to corporate legitimacy. How is 
it acquired, who grants it, what are the stumbling blocks to its acquisition, and what form of legitimacy 
can a detachable approach to community relations reasonably expect to deliver?   
In focusing on the role of individual agency, I break from the general trend in the CSR literature towards 
institutional-level interpretations of business-society relations. Born out of the dominant influence of 
institutional theory on management studies, the macro analytical focus habitually adopted by business 
scholars assumes that the size and scope of multinational corporations makes them largely impervious 
to the influence of individual managers152. I do not contest this in most areas of business activity. If a 
single sales manager misses her targets for a month or a product designer opts for one material over 
another, it is unlikely to register on an international company’s overall performance. Yet the 
management of community relations around macro FDI infrastructure projects represents a rare 
exception. For one, the field of such relations is small (the immediate area around a project site), while 
the potential influence on corporate performance is disproportionately large (from reputational damage 
through to contract cancellation). Furthermore, the management of such relations tends to fall to a 
limited number of corporate professionals, as stated previously.  
Of course, the link between individual agency and corporate relations is not exclusive. As will be 
highlighted below, other managers and employees also enter the field and exercise their own agency 
within it. It is also important to recognise that community relations do not enjoy a monopoly on the 
delivery of corporate legitimacy. Legitimacy is a multifarious phenomenon, emerging out of multiple 
reactions by multiple parties to multiple different corporate activities (Suchman 1995). Community 
relations sit alongside relations with government, regulators, media, suppliers, investors and employees 
as just one source of corporate legitimacy. Even within the spectrum of CSR, community relations are 
but one (albeit important) facet of the management agenda. Yet legitimacy is not won as much as 
                                               
152 The role of CSR-minded chief executives marks a rare exception in institutional theorists’ consideration of 
individual agency in determining corporate ethical conduct. See: Mayer et al. 2012, Maak et al. 2016, Maak & 
Pless 2006. 
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granted. In an ‘area of influence’ surrounding a corporate mega-project, such as Montes del Plata’s pulp 
mill, it is community members who do the granting. I contend that it is primarily to individual managers 
that communities grant legitimacy and, through them, onto the organisation that they represent. In this 
sense, organisational legitimacy, as it relates to corporate-community relations, is created personally 
and conveyed vicariously. Notwithstanding the above caveats, strong grounds exist for analysing the 
corporate-community dynamic through a micro mode of examination that prioritises individual 
managerial agency.     
Adopting a micro analysis requires another divergence from business studies in that it takes seriously 
the individuality of the managerial agent. Community managers may all wear the same company 
uniform, but they are not robotic apparatchiks or corporate ciphers, as is all too frequently assumed. 
Instead, they must be seen for what they are: namely, as complex human subjects, adept at self-
reflection, capable of self-critique, and beholden to a rich and varied assortment of private values, 
ethics, competences and motivations (Welker 2014:35). A detachable CSR approach presents them with 
a variety of differing, sometimes competing, managerial narratives and techniques, which subsequently 
enable them to harness these personal qualities in the pursuit of beneficial corporate-community 
relations. Employees across all disciplines are expected to utilise their individual talents, energies and 
skills for the overall good of the company. At a basic level, this is true of all contracted labour. Yet, as 
will be detailed, few business functions require the same extent of personal immersion in the corporate 
cause as the job of community relations. 
With the notable exception of Elana Shever’s ethnographic study of Shell’s community relations 
programme in Argentina, the role of individual managers is largely absent from the literature concerning 
extractivism and its impacts in Latin America (Shever 2008, 2010). Also missing is a critique of 
stakeholder management, which, as will be illustrated below in the case of Montes del Plata, has become 
a staple method through which the management of extractivist companies endeavour to administer and 
ultimately exert control over their social and political relations. This examination of the community 
managers’ search to gain corporate legitimacy through the management of local civic relations 
addresses both these lacunae. The ethic of detachability informs their efforts in at least three ways: the 
attachment of their own moral values to their employer's personhood (referred to as ‘showing face’); 
the detachment of the managers’ professional selves from their private selves in a pragmatic attempt to 
satisfy the interests of influential citizens (a core component of stakeholder management); and, the 
detachment of managers’ personal relations from their material context and their consequent re-
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2.1 Meet the managers: Helena & Teresa  
Before examining detachable approach to community relations of Montes del Plata’s CSR team, a few 
words on the professionals charged with implementing the strategy. The team comprised five members 
of staff: the Director of Sustainability, who was based in Montevideo; a communications and 
government liaison manager plus a regional CSR manager based in the state capital of Colonia de 
Sacramento; and two community relations managers, Helena and Teresa, who spent the majority of 
their time in the micro-region.153 It is the role of Helena and Teresa on which the focus of this chapter 
focuses as the responsibility for enacting the company’s strategy fell on their shoulders.154   
In her early thirties, Helena had a youthful energy, a strong social conscience and a sunny disposition. 
At the time she and I met, her trajectory in Montes del Plata had been relatively short. She had joined 
the company in late 2011 on a temporary contract that was subsequently extended. During the first few 
years in post, she lived in rented accommodation in Tarariras, a rural community about 24 miles from 
the mill site where she was born and brought up. Her family, which is extensive and with whom she 
remains on very close terms, continues to live there. In late 2014, she moved into rented accommodation 
in Colonia de Sacramento after becoming engaged to her boyfriend, a Uruguayan engineer who also 
worked for Montes del Plata.  
Helena had graduated from university in social work and very much saw this as her vocational identity. 
“As a social worker, I …” formed one of her regular refrains. During her early career, she worked for a 
number of non-profit groups in Montevideo. Immediately before joining Montes del Plata, she had set 
up a consultancy practice with a colleague to provide management advice to organisations in the 
voluntary sector. 
Teresa, by contrast, was a self-consciously ambitious corporate professional. Some ten years older than 
Helena, she was born into a well-educated, middle-class family from Montevideo and was the eldest of 
eight siblings. After graduating from university in sociology, where she specialised in quantitative 
analysis, she worked briefly for a consumer-oriented market research company before joining the timber 
producer Eufores as one of its first employees. Then a subsidiary of the Spanish paper company ENCE, 
Eufores became part of Montes del Plata after ENCE’s acquisition by Stora Enso and Arauco. Teresa’s 
initial role was to help negotiate land rentals and sales’ contracts with farmers for eucalyptus plantations. 
                                               
153 In the early stages of the construction period, Helena also had responsibility for managing any issues that arose 
in communities joining the workers’ barracks on the outskirts of Carmelo and Colonia de Sacramento. 
154 Teresa and Helena answered directly to the regional CSR manager. Her line manager, in turn, was the 
Sustainability Director, who held a board-level position. Both of these executives had a light-touch management 
style that afforded the pair considerable autonomy. 
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This experience of community engagement made her an apt candidate for Montes del Plata’s 
community relations team.  
Unlike Helena, Teresa lacked a network of family or friends in the near vicinity. Throughout the 
construction period, she lived by herself in a rented flat in Colonia de Sacramento. While she always 
treated me politely and with patience, she had a reputation among Conchillenses for being bossy and 
distant. She could also sometimes come across as snappy, especially when stressed. She was also known 
to respond in a very defensive manner when faced with criticism. 
The pair may have differed substantially in character, but they shared much in terms of job description. 
Both managers were employed to implement the measures laid out in the company’s ‘Community 
Relationship Plan’.155 This 36-page report, published in 2012, divides the team’s objectives into five 
key areas of attention: local development (see Chapter 3), employability (see Chapter 4), public health, 
youth education, and road safety. Over the course of the construction period, the CSR team developed 
a range of initiatives with governmental and charity partners in an attempt to deliver improvements for 
the local populace around these identified themes.  
Both managers were content for me to join them as they went about their daily tasks, which I duly did. 
Two notable aspects of their work soon became apparent. One was the long hours. Meetings and events 
were often scheduled out of standard office hours when residents would have time off. As such, the 
managers’ working days would often start early in the morning and end late into the evening. A second 
stand-out feature of their job was the range of skills required. On any given day, they might be called 
on to negotiate with local authorities, speak to the media, run a workshop for local residents, liaise with 
external auditors or feed into internal management discussions. The overarching skill required for all 
these tasks was a deftness for people management.  
2.2 Doing the ‘right’ thing: moral legitimacy through personation     
             
The ostensible goal of Montes del Plata’s community relations team was to enact their employer’s 
public claim to being a legitimate moral actor in Uruguay’s booming forestry sector. They framed the 
company’s claims to morality in the language of ‘neighbourliness’. The phrase “vecino responsable” 
and its near equivalent “buen vecino” appear widely in the company’s marketing and advertising 
materials, as well as in the everyday discourses of its representatives.156  
                                               
155 Printed copy provided by Montes del Plata. The document (entitled ‘Plan de Relacionamiento Comunitario’ 
in Spanish) was not made available online. 
156 For example, see Montes del Plata’s Corporate Sustainability Principles:  
http://www.montesdelplata.com.uy/sustentabilidad_comunidad.php?lang=en. Accessed 23 September 2015. 
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Neighbourliness represents a common trope within the lexicon of CSR (Heath & Ni 2010). It speaks to 
a desire by corporations to be embedded within an identifiable community as a constituent member, 
with concomitant rights and (to varying extents) responsibilities. Claims to neighbourliness are 
grounded in a desire to build the reputation of a company as a force for good and an ethical brand, 
value-laden qualities that play well with employees as well as with consumers, policymakers and other 
influencers (Jones 2010). They are, as with all aspects of CSR, related to some degree or other with 
legitimacy building (Wood 1991:699).157  
Being a good neighbour represents an intimately social act. As a basic minimum, it requires engaging 
with one’s fellow neighbours. The truth of this in the micro-region was eloquently explained to me by 
the president of the Sociedad Natavista El Palenque, a civil society group in Conchillas that celebrates 
rural traditions. As he told me during a casual conversation at one of the group’s periodic rodeo events:  
“Here we’re very personal (personalista) in Uruguay. If we don’t see the physical person as a 
neighbour, then I don’t see how they can be a neighbour. You have to be able to see the person to greet 
them. I mean, the company [Montes del Plata] can say anything but without a visible face it’s very 
difficult to appreciate them or maybe even hate them. Because sometimes you have bad relationships 
with your neighbours, right? When you don’t have a visible face it’s very difficult either to like them or 
hate them.”158 
The job of being the “visible face” of Montes del Plata in the micro-region fell squarely with Teresa 
and Helena. They wore the uniform of Montes del Plata; they were often to be found in the local office 
of Montes del Plata (Figure 9); they drove cars licensed to Montes del Plata; they gave presentations as 
the voice of Montes del Plata. It was a role they understood and aspired to meet, with both managers 
regularly drawing attention to the physicality and personality of their corporate agency. Helena did not 
speak in terms of the company and community in the abstract. She used personal pronouns like “us”, 
“me” and “you”. The language Teresa employed to describe the corporate-community relationship was 
rich in human emotion too, whether it was joy at the park festivities or frustration (as will be seen) at 
complaints by certain residents. 
As Helena and I drove around Conchillas one time in her company car, she referenced the importance 
of ‘showing face’ in an unprompted remark. The phrase she used was identical to that employed by the 
Sociedad Natavista president, implying that the concept held a degree of common currency: “In order 
for a company not to run into problems, it [Montes del Plata] has got to show its face [‘mostrar la 
                                               
157 “According to the principle of legitimacy, society has the right to establish and enforce a balance of power 
among its institutions and to define their legitimate functions. This is a proscriptive, structural principle, focusing 
on business's obligations as a social institution, and it implies that society has available sanctions that can be 
used when these obligations are not met.” 
158 Private interview 13/02/2013 
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cara’]. It’s always showing its face and adopting a friendly attitude at the social level as well.” When 
I suggested that she and Teresa were that face, she unhesitatingly concurred: “Yes, we are. We are the 
face of the company, of course. The people have our phone numbers and they call us all the time. Some 
like us, others don’t like us. Some adore us. I don’t have any problem with this. For the company, though, 
this is of absolutely fundamental value.” 
 
 
Figure 9 Montes del Plata’s local office in Conchillas  
 
The value of showing face is recognised in the nascent literature on the anthropology of corporations. 
As Marina Welker and Alex Golub have both argued, companies are not created as fixed, knowable 
institutions but are instead enacted as single entities through the multiple social interactions of their 
constituent members (Welker 2014, Golub 2014). The need to become knowable was essential to 
Montes del Plata’s management at the outset of its Punta Pereira mill venture. For residents of the micro-
region, as for Uruguayans at large, this foreign-owned and newly constituted company represented a 
blank sheet of paper. Even the company’s name – Montes del Plata’ (‘Forests of Silver’)159 – did little 
to elucidate its status or purpose. The objective of showing face is to expedite the enactment process, 
shifting Montes del Plata from a vague, amorphous assemblage of physical assets, capital finance and 
dependent personnel to a position in which it is perceived as an identifiable, coordinated and, ideally, 
                                               
159 The firm’s name is also a play on the Rio de la Plata (River Plate), on the banks of which Montes del Plata’s 
Punta Pereira mill is located. 
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morally legitimate organisation. Thus the corporation is able to extend its claims to personhood, moving 
beyond the limited legal terrain of laws and regulations to a moral realm in which the attachment of 
values and ethics to itself becomes feasible.160  
The objective of showing face may be clear, but how is the process intended to work in practice? Here, 
many of the principles associated with personation can be seen coming into play (see Chapter 1). The 
company elects one or more representatives embodied with the moral qualities to which it aspires and, 
through these agents’ public behaviours and social interactions with parties outside the organisation, the 
company then seeks to transpose these onto its own corporate person. In essence, this tactic of 
“faciality”, as the notion of ‘showing face’ has previously been referred to in the business anthropology 
literature (Shever 2010; Benson 2011), is one of detachment (extracting the moral qualities of the 
corporate agent) followed by reattachment (imputing the Corporation with these qualities).  
Faciality’s premise that ethical values can be imputed from the individual form onto the corporate form 
is based on a Weberian reading of orthodox legitimacy theory. Legitimacy theorists hold that moral 
legitimation is gained by organisation being perceived as ‘doing the right thing’ (Scherer et al. 
2013:263). This is naturally a subjective phenomenon in the absence of any normative standard of 
ethics, necessitating institutions to conform to the predominant social expectations of their target 
audiences or, to use the lexicon of legitimacy, their ‘grantors’. Regarding the key determinants of 
institutional legitimacy, organisational theorists have tended to prioritise the moral qualities of a 
company’s processes (procedural legitimacy), the outcomes of those processes (consequential 
legitimacy), and/or its decision-making structures (structural legitimacy). These categories broadly 
accord with Max Weber’s exploration of legitimate authority; namely value-rational, instrumentally-
rational, and traditional authority, respectively (Weber 1946). Less attention has been paid to a fourth 
possible option: namely, the personal legitimacy of the institution’s representatives. This last option 
closely concurs with Weber’s notion of the ideal-type of charismatic authority, which highlights the 
ability of an individual representative to transformatively infuse an institution with his or her 
“charismatic qualities or aura” (Weber 1946:xxi). It is towards this conceptual end that the personation 
tactic of showing face is oriented.161  
                                               
160 As a legal construct, personhood is vital for contemporary corporations to operate. It allows them to own 
property, enter contracts, obtain access to due process and enjoy other similar privileges associated with individual 
citizens (Avi-Yonah 2005, Sawyer 2006). It also helps them occupy a political terrain in which civic rights and 
social legitimacy become theoretically obtainable. Increasing the probability of such an outcome is where a 
company’s reputation for moral virtue comes in. The better the citizen - i.e. the stronger its reputation for being 
responsible, trustworthy, reliable and so forth - the more likely it is to be welcomed, protected and voluntarily 
afforded the privileges that come with good citizenship (Palazzo & Scherer 2008). 
161 The decision to focus on this fourth option is influenced by the relative lack of influence that Helena and Teresa 
exercised over the other three determinants of moral legitimacy. Because both managers occupied a subordinate 
position within the company hierarchy, they had little say over how significant corporate decisions were made or 
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Declining to diverge far from CSR orthodoxy, Montes del Plata’s management interpreted the moral 
expectations of the micro-region’s resident population as being closely akin to those associated with 
neighbourliness. To do the “right thing” thus became the act of being a “responsible neighbour”. The 
specific characteristics that this entailed was not spelled out in the company’s public communications, 
but it was understood to cover attributes of civic-mindedness rooted in secular ethics as well as in 
Catholic teaching (Barrán 1994). Prominent within this list were qualities such as sociability, amiability, 
geniality, generosity, friendliness, kindliness and thoughtfulness. It was these attributes that the two 
community managers were charged with exhibiting in their relational interactions with residents. 
Whatever natural gifts they had in these respect, they had to be willing to bring these to the job.  
This task of using the personal to work on behalf of the professional constituted a theatrical pursuit. All 
actors require a stage. As already discussed, Montes del Plata’s representatives performed in many 
guises and on many different platforms; not just local, but national and international as well. The 
particular platform designated for the two community managers was the politically sensitive terrain 
surrounding the mill site. It was here, in the micro-region, via their everyday behaviours, actions and 
conversations with local residents, that Teresa and Helena were assigned to make manifest the 
company’s desired values. In line with Erving Goffman’s classic analysis of the theatricality of 
communications, their attempts at neighbourliness were conveyed primarily as expressions that were 
“given off”, rather than (as with speeches and other formal communications) expressions that were 
“given” (Goffman 1969:14). So how did they fare at showing (their) face?   
2.2.1 Personation strategies: charisma (Helena) v rationalism (Teresa)                  
For a detachable CSR strategy to deliver moral legitimation, it requires the company’s representative 
agent to be able to convincingly project to her external audience the desired ethical characteristics. If 
not, these characteristics will ring hollow and will stand little chance of being imputed onto the 
corporate entity she represents. Even if the theatrical competency of the agent is exceptional, the intense 
and continuous scrutiny under which they operate makes feigning such characteristics highly 
challenging. The more such qualities come naturally to the corporate agent, the more authentic they will 
appear and the greater likelihood of their attachment to the person of the corporation.  
In this regard, Helena’s personality and private values naturally conformed to those of the “responsible 
neighbour” model far more so than in Teresa’s case. Helena’s instinct in response to residents’ requests 
was always to help where she could. In situations of conflict or hostility, her natural reaction was to 
listen and search out a solution. On one occasion, for example, I attended a heated meeting between her 
and the mayor of Carmelo. The elected official was frustrated that his repeated proposal for Montes del 
                                               
how internal processes were set up or executed. The exception here in in the area of community relations, which 
marks the boundary of their operational remit and is where their managerial influence was most strongly felt. 
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Plata to transform its nearby workers’ barracks into a university campus after the completion of the mill 
project was getting nowhere. During an awkward twenty minutes or so, Helena heard him out in almost 
total silence, taking notes and nodding as he ripped into the company. Once he had vented his 
frustration, she suggested that a future meeting might be arranged between the mayor, the company’s 
CSR team and the provincial administration to discuss the matter further. This placated the Carmelo 
representative. Her manner was consistently attentive and respectful, two traits that converted her into 
a popular figure in the community.  
Following Helena around and observing her interactions, it became evident that a close fit existed 
between her personal moral qualities and those that Montes del Plata’s management wished to attach to 
the company. At a meeting to judge a selection of children’s paintings submitted for a company-backed 
prize, for instance, she found something positive to say about each contribution, relating the pupils’ 
verve and positive perspective of the future to the company’s commitment to long-term sustainability. 
On another occasion, in a meeting with a local government administrator, she made a point of discussing 
her private passion for women’s rights and her concern about the prevalence of domestic violence that 
she herself had personally witnessed in the community. She did so as a means of grounding her 
subsequent request for the government agency to lend its support to a joint (corporate-government) anti-
violence awareness campaign.  
This instinctive and unaffected use of her personal gifts to build connections and create interpersonal 
relationships on her employer’s behalf conforms closely to the charismatic mode described by Weber. 
The tactic appeared successful. Helena’s moral consistency and authenticity elicited just the kind of 
affective dispositions from residents that the policy of faciality promised. Community members, for 
example, would refer to Helena by her first name, a sign of affection and familiarity that contrasted 
with the more impersonal ‘inginiero’ (‘engineer’) or ‘gerente’ (manager) that they used to refer to other 
Montes del Plata staff. They consistently spoke well of her to me, with “simpática” (‘kind’ or ‘friendly’) 
being the descriptor that residents most commonly attached to her. One elderly resident who had 
regularly dealings with Helena went as far as to call her “una persona simpatica, una santa” (“a friendly 
person, a saint”).  
Helena’s upbringing in the vicinity certainly aided the warm reception she received. Residents would 
commonly bring up shared acquaintances, for instance, or inquire about places or people of mutual 
interest in her home village of Tarariras. Her background as a social worker and a former employee in 
the voluntary sector also enhanced her reputation for care. As one Conchillas resident who knew Helena 
well commented to me:  
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“She has worked with other social groups. It’s not that she’s just come here from nothing, but she’s 
worked with other social groups elsewhere too. She’s worked with youth entrepreneurs as well. These 
things mould you in a distinctive way.” 
Helena was not unaware of her corporate personhood. As with Teresa, she wore the company shirt in a 
literal sense. Yet her exhibition of amiability and empathy evoked a powerful sense of authenticity that 
went beyond contractual obligation or diligent professionalism. These were qualities intrinsic to her 
personal nature, rather than ethical behaviours that she needed to invent or act out. Her behaviour among 
family and friends away from the micro-region remained consistent. She exhibited patience, kindness 
and other neighbourly qualities because that was who she was, not not because (or, not only because) 
this was who her employer wanted her to be.  
For Teresa, the neighbourly touch that Helena enjoyed did not come so easily. If Helena broadly 
conformed to the Weberian charismatic model, then Teresa leaned more towards Weber’s profile of the 
rationalising agent. While not uncivil, Teresa was not what might popularly be described as a ‘people 
person’. Procedural systems, bureaucratic logics and impersonal standard-setting were more her bag. If 
one were to ascribe a personality type to her, then the Belbin Team Inventory’s definition of a 
‘Completer Finisher’ might be closest to the mark (Belbin 2010). Achieving ‘hard’ goals and targets 
was where she excelled; less so the execution of ‘soft’ skills. While undoubtedly diligent and hard 
working, her task-oriented manner gave her an impersonal and somewhat removed air. She rarely 
dawdled for a chat or a catch-up as Helena would, for instance. Instead, she gave the impression of 
being constantly busy and on duty, which, in a very real way, she was. Yet her habit of being regularly 
on the phone, checking emails or just keen to get on created an element of relational distance between 
her and local residents.  
In the rural micro-region of Conchillas, Teresa’s background compounded this sense of distance. 
Coming from Montevideo brought with it a number of social prejudices in Uruguay’s rural interior, 
sentiments motivated in no small part by the disproportionate economic and political power 
concentrated in the country’s capital city. Its residents are seen as better paid, arrogant and, among the 
poorer classes, prone to criminality. Their metropolitan mores also engendered a stereotype of being 
pampered and disconnected from the land. Teresa’s ways of being – how she spoke, how she carried 
herself, how she treated people - automatically identified her as a Montivideña. The biggest giveaway 
was her lack of colloquial ease in the community. A ceremony in Conchillas’ community hall to 
celebrate the end of a remedial English language course offered a good illustration of the cultural 
distance between her and her community constituents. As the company’s representative, she was invited 
to hand out certificates to the successful students. When calling them up, she stumbled over the 
pronunciation of three or four surnames – names that were phonetically complex, but were nonetheless 
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familiar to local residents. This caused embarrassed laughter in the room and evidenced her outsider 
status. It was not a mistake that, I sense, Helena would have made, given her upbringing in the locality.  
For a handful of residents, the relational distance that Teresa generated was pushed to breaking point. 
Frequently, this was sparked by Teresa’s abrasive response to conflict or criticism. News of her response 
to potentially fatal accident at a quarry on the perimeter of Conchillas, for example, had gained notoriety 
throughout the micro-region. Prior to my fieldwork, a scheduled explosion at the quarry had resulted in 
a rock flying 200 meters or so through the air and landing in the school playground. Residents were 
incensed. Their ire only grew when Teresa arrived on the scene and failed to immediately apologise for 
the incident, choosing instead to point the finger at the contractor firm at the quarry. Six months later, 
many in the micro-region were still talking about the incident.  
Teresa also ruffled feathers with her management of the Foro de Desarrollo Comunitario (Community 
Development Forum, see Chapter 3). A cornerstone of Montes del Plata’s community investment 
programme, the initiative was perceived by local civil society groups as encroaching on their space. 
Rather than win them over, Teresa’s assertive approach and lack of social diplomacy led to a public 
argument between her and several of the most active citizens in the community. One of the founding 
board members of the micro-region’s most politicised group, the Comisión de Amigos, featured among 
this number. At the mention of Teresa’s name, her eyes would roll. “Clashes of personality” was the 
euphemism she used to describe Teresa’s various run-ins. On a couple of occasions, Teresa was actually 
reassigned from projects that Helena subsequently picked up. When pressed on her feelings towards 
Teresa, the board member offered the following abrupt verdict:  
“It’s a very intentional role she’s been asked to play. She’s there to filter things. She puts the company’s 
shirt on and doesn’t look either to the right or left. Furthermore, she’s robbed certain ideas from us and 
made out as if they’re from Montes del Plata. She wants to do everything herself, and not let the 
community do it.” 
Even those who had a more balanced view about Teresa still rarely used descriptors such as ‘simpática’ 
about her. ‘Simpática’ and its equivalents are affective adjectives, born out of a level of emotional 
connection that Teresa appeared to be reluctant or, as was more probable, unable to realise. In contrast 
to Helena, Teresa’s professional persona always overshadowed her personal self, eclipsing any positive 
personable qualities.  
As a result, residents’ dealings with her therefore tended predominantly towards the procedural and 
formal, rather than personal and familiar. The imaginations of local people centred more on Teresa’s 
logo-embossed shirt than her face. The garment’s forest green hue and signature MDP logo on the breast 
pocket served to partially disguise Teresa the woman, Teresa the individual and, most importantly, 
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Teresa the neighbour. Instead, they saw her corporate self, the self that could be trusted to defend her 
employer and put the company’s interests first. The contrast with Helena was stark in this regard. One 
elderly resident involved in several community committees summed up the difference between the two 
managers in laconic fashion:    
“[Helena], she puts herself more in the place of the neighbourhood. [Teresa], no: she’s 100% defending 
the company.  
2.2.2 Limits of personation: (im)personators, not proxies   
The mixed responses met out to the two managers indicate that the personation strategy did not entirely 
conform to plan. On the positive side, Teresa and Helena had achieved the objective of becoming 
squarely identified as the face of the company in the locality. As one local shop-owner put it to me:  
 
“I’m not sure what she does, but she’s always there. But like it or not, they are the face (‘cara’) of the 
company.”  
The phrase endorsed a seemingly unambiguous representative role for the community managers (“they 
are the face of the company”). Yet personation depends on a representative’s face not only being 
recognisable in a visual sense, but also in specific (and preferably adorable) moral terms. Here, the 
commentator appears to be less certain (“I’m not sure what she does”). So is this form of detachable 
CSR flawed as a potential route to moral legitimacy?  
On the evidence of the two managers’ experience, the strategy of personation appears to be vulnerable 
to a number of flaws. The most obvious of these is the moral qualities exemplified by the organisation’s 
representative. In Helena’s case, her natural ability to embody the moral traits proclaimed in Montes 
del Plata’s public statements were sound. Her personhood was widely seen as affectionate, caring and 
morally virtuous, as a “buen vecino” (‘good neighbour’) should be. Teresa’s reputation, in contrast, was 
not perceived in a similar light. This was for the simple fact that the moral attributes ‘given off’ by her, 
as per Goffman, were not especially neighbourly (Goffman 1969:14).  
Even if Teresa’s professional demeanour was less pronounced and her personal attributes more like 
those of Helena, the ability of the two managers to attach their moral qualities to that of their employer 
was doubtful. The first hurdle relates to the question of representativeness. However Montes del Plata’s 
agents chose to dress it up, personation is not personhood. Its strength is ultimately suggestive, not 
substantive. Institutions become infused with resonances of their representatives’ moral beliefs and 
behaviours. But resonances are not reality. At best they are intimations of a possible or – in Montes del 
Plata’s case – a desired reality. But they remain aspirational all the same: a hint of what an entity might 
be or could be; not what it definitely is.  
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However charismatic an individual representative, institutions can never be fully or perfectly embodied 
by a single person (or two, as in this specific case of the community managers). Once that individual 
becomes fully known, the detachment between their private person and the organisational ‘person’ that 
they strove to personate became only too clear. They showed face with such persistence and revealed 
their private selves with such openness that residents came to see them for who they were: as private 
individuals with professional obligations to act in a neighbourly fashion. Their representative presence 
thus took on a material and grounded form, not metaphorical one. The agents’ moral qualities were too 
tightly attached to the two individual managers to allow for them to be loosened and reattached to the 
Corporation.  
To an extent, the managers, as materialised and individuated entities in the community, might be 
considered victims of their own success. Precisely because Teresa and Helena were known by name by 
so many residents, no-one in the community ever knowingly conflated the person (Montes del Plata) 
with the (Im)personator (Teresa and Helena). Certainly, there were plenty of Conchillenses who found 
Helena very likeable, yet remained suspect about her employer. Likewise, those who had clashed horns 
with Teresa did not automatically hold Montes del Plata, the entity, to be similarly unresponsive or 
difficult. That is not to say that residents’ opinions about the managers did not colour their view of the 
institution that the agents represented. They did (although precisely to what extent it is difficult to say). 
In this regard, the tactic of personation was not entirely deficient.  
The detachability principle inherent to the managers’ personation strategy also suffered from the 
opposite effect: a lack of interpersonal connection. Despite the managers’ best efforts to put themselves 
about and enact their neighbourliness as widely as possibly, Teresa and Helena still remained an 
unknown entity to some in the community. The shop-keeper’s lack of clarity on their function (“I’m not 
sure what she does”) is demonstrative of the limits to their interpersonal connections that they were 
able to build. The micro-region contained a population of 1,800 people or so, dispersed in small 
settlements over a relatively wide area. Moreover, while some residents made a point of drawing close 
to the managers and participating in the various activities they helped organise, many chose to keep 
their distance. Hearsay and reputation compensated to an extent, providing residents with a second-
hand picture of the two managers’ moral qualities. Yet these are blunt instruments in a personation 
policy based on faciality and face-to-face contact. Not only are the affective impacts of their moral 
qualities diluted by such intermediation, but misinformation and natural bias colour the image of the 
managers received by residents who do not know them personally.   
The specific example of Montes del Plata highlights a further weakness in a personation-based 
approach. This relates to the stage on which the company’s agents were required to act out their 
representativeness. For a corporate agent such as Helena or Teresa to be convincingly perceived as an 
embodied proxy, as personation dictates, he or she ideally requires the stage to themselves. If not, the 
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opportunity increases for rival personators to emerge and for the purity of the original personator’s 
moral messaging to become confused. Already the personation efforts of Montes del Plata’s two agents 
were compromised by their overlapping roles. Teresa’s inability to match the neighbourly attributes 
evinced by Helena created an obvious disjunction between the two, thus undermining the consistency 
of the moral positioning that the pair was tasked with creating.  
The appearance of other corporate actors on the micro-regional stage compromised this search for moral 
consistency and singularity even further. Although Montes del Plata’s management aimed to channel 
responsibility for the company’s local social relations through the two community managers, Helena 
and Teresa did not enjoy relational exclusivity. Other personnel bearing the company’s logo stepped 
intermittently from the wings onto the stage. The presence of Señor Areco’s at the meeting about the 
road network is but one example of many. The Colonia-based regional CSR Director and 
Communications Officer regularly appeared in the micro-region as well. The Sustainability Director 
was a less regular visitor to the micro-region, but she always fronted the company’s CSR programme 
when she did appear, as her speech at the inauguration of the toilet block testified. Conchillas’ most 
publicly engaged residents would have their personal phone numbers too.  
A fourth and final challenge with gaining moral legitimacy through showing face related to the 
individual behind these representative faces. If managers are neither ciphers nor apparatchiks, as argued, 
then one must assume that they are willing to fully engage themselves in the role of personation. This 
requires a readiness to put their private selves to work on behalf of their employer. The two managers 
appeared to accept this. Helena stated explicitly that “we are the face of the company, of course”. Yet 
the pair were always mindful of the limits of their representativeness. They understood themselves to 
be personators, not proxies, of Montes del Plata. Their words, their decisions, their actions: these did 
not equate to those of the Corporation as a whole. One giveaway clue was the way in which they 
occasionally slipped into talking about “Montes del Plata” rather than about “us”. This invariably 
occurred when the topic turned to a decision or policy with which they felt personally uncomfortable. 
So when discussing the company’s anti-dependency policy, for example, Helena would mention it as 
something “they” (i.e. her employer) had pushed through. “Montes del Plata wasn’t sure how they were 
going to do it,” she told me. The subliminal message: they acted distinctly from her. Every day, the 
bounded nature of the managers’ decision-making powers reminded them of this distinction.  
Advocates of corporate responsibility naturally place a high value on moral legitimacy. This is 
especially true for corporations operating in Latin America, where CSR remains heavily influenced by 
a Catholic-inflected form of business ethics (Concari 2016). Historically, this moralised view of CSR 
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has predominated in Uruguay.162 Yet the experience of Montes del Plata’s CSR team in the micro-
region demonstrates the problematic deficiencies of agent-led personation as a means for gaining moral 
legitimacy. Detachable CSR is nothing if not flexible, however. Here, Montes del Plata’s exceptionality 
as one of Uruguay’s few proponents of a more Euro-American mode of CSR is critical.163 Detachable 
CSR offers a more market-friendly approach to ethical management that is content incorporating 
strategic business interests alongside (not in place of) moral principles. With strategic interests comes 
strategic thinking. This gave Montes del Plata’s agents liberty to consider alternatives to faciality that 
did not necessarily have moral conduct at their core.  
In what marked a major departure for Uruguayan businesses, the mill operator’s CSR team bolstered 
their efforts to gain moral legitimacy with a form of community relations that was explicitly 
instrumental and pragmatic. No longer could the community agents lead with their personal selves. This 
change of tack required a change of face. Out from the shadows, their professional selves had to step.  
2.3 Strategic Relations: pragmatic legitimacy via stakeholder management 
Local residents welcomed the idea of Montes del Plata as a “responsible neighbour” that pledged to “do 
the right thing”. The mill operator’s public commitments to environmental responsibility, regulatory 
compliance and similar tenets of Western liberal ethics provided them with a degree of comfort. 
Conchillenses would often tell me how the mill’s sponsor was using the “latest modern technology”, 
for example, or how they were confident that the company would manage its environmental pollution 
in line with regulatory requirements. If these organisational claims to ethical conduct can be endorsed 
and, conceivably, embodied by the behaviours of the company’s local agents, then public trust should 
                                               
162 In Uruguay, this close alignment between CSR and Judeo-Christian ethics owes its origins in part to the 
influential business group, Asociación Cristiana de Dirigentes de Empresas (Association of Christian Company 
Leaders), which was formed in 1952. Among other promotional and didactic activities, the organization runs 
executive training courses at the Catholic University's business school in Montevideo. See: https//acde.org.uy. 
163 Since its founding in 2001, the pro-CSR group Deres has sought to introduce Uruguay’s private sector a Euro-
American form of CSR akin to that adopted by Montes del Plata. While not negating moral ethics, this market-
oriented version of CSR promulgates responsible conduct as a source of competitive advantage and “shared value” 
(Kramer & Porter 2006). In Uruguay, this notion of ‘doing well by doing good’ is beginning to be discussed in 
the business press as well as filtering into management education and corporate rhetoric (Aurrecoechea & Vanrell 
2014, Yapor & Licandro 2015). Deres recently profiled a number of “best-practice” companies in its members’ 
magazine, for example, praising a selection of firms for their ability to generate “added value” through 
responsibility strategies that have increased their market “positioning, competitiveness and, as a consequence, 
their profitability” (Deres 2013). Yet tangible examples remain confined largely to one-off, isolated case studies, 
as Deres’ annual CSR awards testify (Deres 2017). Eight years since it was first established, for instance, the 
Uruguayan branch of the United Nations’ Global Compact has only attracted 31 members (compared to 760 in 
Brazil, 662 in Mexico and 439 in Argentina). Public awareness is also low, with only just over half (52.3%) of 
Uruguayans saying they are familiar with the concept of CSR (Piani el al. 2007). For a full list of UN Global 
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grow and the fears associated with the arrival of an industrial project of such magnitude on their 
doorstep should reduce.   
2.3.1 Neighbourliness: actions, not words   
Yet the “right thing” when it comes to the practice of corporate relations with affected communities is 
not solely defined by the managers’ attitudinal positions or moral behaviours. Residents are as 
interested, if not more, in the material benefits that the company’s agents bring as they are the moral 
attributes that the agents espouse. For example, a Conchillense woman who had a good relationship 
with both Teresa and Helena made the following brief but telling remark about the pair during a casual 
conversation with me:  
“We accept them for the benefit that they bring…it’s a relationship of mutual toleration because there’s 
no other option.” 
The notion of corporate-community relations leading to the delivery of tangible benefits for local 
residents moves the search for legitimacy onto different terrain. From a moral-ethical basis for 
legitimacy based on the embodiment of behavioural ideals, the granting of corporate legitimacy begins 
to take on a far more grounded, exchange-based guise. Indeed, it comes to look like a relationship based 
closely on the rules of non-contractual reciprocity, where self-interest is recognised for what it is and 
intentionally factored into social and political relations (Boddewyn & Buckley 2017). Classic 
legitimacy theory categorises this consideration of self-interest under the banner of corporate 
pragmatism.164  
CSR theory is a broad enough church that it can incorporate the possibility of relational pragmatism 
alongside, or instead of, a moral basis for relations. According to Suchman’s definition, at the centre of 
this more exchange-based form of relations lie the “self-interested calculations” of a company’s 
“immediate audiences”.165 Business theorists have incorporated such thinking into a field of risk 
management known as ‘stakeholder management’ (Freeman 1984). Over recent decades, CSR 
practitioners in Euro-American businesses have drawn on stakeholder management theory to develop 
a suite of methodologies that are designed to organise and direct their social relations.166 Central to this 
‘toolkit’ is the identification of priority ‘stakeholders’, an exercise that is determined largely by the risk 
they pose to a company’s interests or the advantages they can bring (Bourne & Walker 2005).167 In 
                                               
164 See: Suchman 1995:578-580. 
165 Ibid: 578. “Pragmatic legitimacy rests on the self-interested calculations of an organization's most immediate 
audiences. Often, this immediacy involves direct exchanges between organization and audience . . . Audiences 
are likely to become constituencies, scrutinizing organizational behavior to determine the practical 
consequences, for them, of any given line of activity.” 
166 See: Bourne & Walker 2005; BSR 2011; Fryzel 2011; du Gay 2000. 
167 Applied to corporate-community relations, the core determinants in the stakeholder categorisation process are 
two-fold: (a) the extent to which the company affects the stakeholder in question, either now or possibly in the 
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classic detachable CSR fashion, corporate agents are encouraged to distance themselves from low-risk 
individuals and increase their proximity to those potentially able to influence them either positively or 
negatively.  
 
The possibility of such detachability principles being applied to Montes del Plata’s community relations 
was apparent from the outset. In an external assessment commissioned by the mill operator’s senior 
management, explicit reference is made to the prioritisation of certain ‘stakeholders’ over others. 
Written by the international professional services firm PWC, the final assessment report offers the 
following advice (PWC 2010:94):   
“It is not practical and tends to be unnecessary to interact with all stakeholders with the same intensity 
and at all times. To proceed in a strategic manner and clearly establish with whom to interact and for 
what reason before any actions take place will save time and money. For this, it is necessary to establish 
an order of priorities of social actors and, depending on who they are and what their interests are, 
determine the most suitable way of proceeding.” 
Montes del Plata’s two community managers showed a keen awareness of the detachable logic of 
stakeholder management, as exemplified by their shift in attitude towards the residents of Puerto Inglés. 
During the entirety of the mill’s construction period, Montes del Plata’s CSR team had centred their 
local engagement efforts on the village of Conchillas. As well as being the largest and most historically 
significant of the micro-region’s four settlements, it was the site of the mill operator’s local office and 
home to most of the micro-region’s key public services. Of the four settlements, Puerto Inglés was by 
far the smallest (with only about 50 residents) and was largely overlooked within the company’s CSR 
programme. The decision to inaugurate an eco-park and a public toilet block in the riverside hamlet 
therefore marked a dramatic shift in geographic focus for the CSR team. When I put this observation to 
Helena in late 2015, she explained the decision in the following pragmatic terms:  
“Not everyone has the same ranking of priority. Radial Hernández is far away. The trucks don’t pass 
there any more. We almost don’t have contact with them. While Puerto Ingles has the smell [from the 
mill’s incinerator] every single day. Conchillas, meanwhile, lies at the heart of everything. The folk who 
can block the plant are these people . . . If our objective is for them not to stop the operations [pause] 
- which is our main objective - our relationship [with them] is critical. We don’t make links with people 
                                               
future; and (b) the extent to which the company is actually or potentially affected by the said stakeholder (Mitchell 
et al. 1997). A low rating on either score means that the importance of relations with the individual stakeholder 
or stakeholder group in question should be re-prioritised and downgraded. The inverse is true for those judged to 
give a high score. The result of such thinking is to chart the ideal distance of detachment between the Corporation 
and community member on a relational spectrum determined by the latter’s risk profile: more proximate (attached) 
for those categorised as high-risk; more distant (detached) for those categorised as low-risk.  
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because we’re really nice or because we love making links with them; we make these links because it’s 
necessary that the plant keeps operating. And with the local population against you, you can’t achieve 
that. If you keep emitting smells towards these people and you don’t go and speak to them, then you’re 
going to have a picket at the gate and they’re not going to let you enter.”  
This was an altogether more hard-headed and utilitarian approach to legitimacy than the CSR team had 
proposed and played out through personation. Not only did this alternative version seem to negate the 
value-signalling of faciality (“we don’t make links with the people because we’re really nice people”), 
it clearly pointed to a different end goal. Moral legitimacy was all about the positioning of Montes del 
Plata as an ethically-minded entity. This more pragmatic alternative, in contrast, had a much more 
specific and immediate objective: namely, “for them [the community] not to stop the operations” of the 
mill.168 The focus of stakeholder management does not lie on winning residents’ hearts and minds; it 
lies on satisfying their private interests. The influence of the kind of stakeholder thinking promoted by 
PWC is also profound. The resonances between Helena’s claim that “not everyone has the same ranking 
of priority” and PWC’s induction to “establish an order of priorities of social actors” are all too 
obvious.  
For the community agents, this shift in strategy required a shift in tactics. To help their employer either 
increase or decrease its relational detachment from low-risk and high-risk community members 
respectively, the managers had to also perform their own act of internal detachment. Under a 
personation regime, the agents primarily drew on attributes associated with their private selves. Under 
a legitimisation system that prioritised relational pragmatism, this balance was reversed, with the locus 
of managerial agency becoming the representative’s professional self. Stakeholder management 
demands that company agents act as calculating corporate decision-makers capable of relational 
manipulation.  
Needless to say, this evokes an entirely different set of skills and attitudes to the responsible neighbour 
model promoted by personation. Most importantly for the agent, it requires her to detach herself from 
her personal self (i.e. her personal motivations, priorities and ethical values) and attach herself more 
wholly to her professional character (i.e. the strategies, tactics and end goals dictated by her employer). 
In contrast to faciality, the success of a pragmatic stakeholder management approach rests on 
                                               
168 This was not only Helena’s reading of events. Teresa confirmed the same. While filling me in on how the 
community programme had progressed between my first and second trips to the micro-region, Helena’s colleague 
explained how the team had undergone a collective exercise to clarify their programme goals. It was during this 
process that the explicit objective of protecting the mill from community threats had emerged. Teresa told me: 
“As part of our mission to be linked to the heart of the business, what we needed to do was generate a 
predetermined context so that the mill could operate and the construction could reach its culmination. That’s to 
say, an approach to social management that allows us to appropriate a house in such and such a fashion, that 
permits the extension [road] to be built, that enables us to extract materials from the quarries to build the plant, 
and so on.” Private interview, 2 February 2016. 
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community members recognising the agent for the corporate logo on her shirt (i.e. responding to the 
entity she represented) rather than for own individual face (i.e. responding to her directly as the 
embodiment of the entity she represents). No longer were the agents personators of corporate morality, 
but conduits of corporate authority and largesse.   
An ethnographic examination of the stakeholder management approach adopted by Montes del Plata’s 
CSR team to address community relations highlights the problematic nature of PWC’s recommendation 
to “proceed in a strategic manner”. The most obvious of the tensions that arose was the apparent 
dissonance between pragmatism and personation. For Teresa and Helena to speak of their innate 
altruistic neighbourliness in one breath and then talk of reciprocal trade-offs in the next (i.e. community 
development for social approbation) seemed self-contradictory, if not outright duplicitous. A second 
impediment related to the pair’s limited decision-making powers. The community managers did not 
enjoy carte blanche to meet residents’ demands for development goods. The extent of their possible 
largesse extended no further than a small discretionary fund that permitted grants of up to $U 5,000169 
(US$ 150.75) for community-related events such as raffles, anniversary celebrations and charity fairs. 
All significant decisions relating to community-related expenditure had to go through their line manager 
or, in the case of substantial investments, through the Sustainability Director or indeed the company’s 
executive board.170  
A third challenge centred on the agent’s willingness, or otherwise, to conduct relations in the manner 
described above. As stated repeatedly, neither Helena nor Teresa were ciphers. Both were self-aware 
actors in their own right, capable of free thought and – out of the public eye – of self-questioning and 
even critique. A degree of tension between the managers’ two selves - personal and professional - was 
therefore always likely. By the same token, the closer a manager’s personal motivations, ethics and self-
perceptions were to the purposes and policies of the Corporation, the less internal angst she could be 
expected to feel. The rationalising nature of Teresa’s personality, coupled with her long-term trajectory 
in the private sector, saw her fit into a more pragmatic mode of working with little difficulty. She viewed 
herself as a corporate professional, content to “put on the shirt”, as Conchillenses were prone to say.171 
For Helena, in contrast, the pragmatic bias of a stakeholder-based relational strategy rubbed up against 
her social worker self in a way that she found much harder to resolve.  
                                               
169 ‘$U’ stands for the Uruguayan Peso, Uruguay’s national currency. 
170 Compounding these budgetary constraints was Montes del Plata’s preference for a model of development based 
on community-led empowerment rather than cheque-book philanthropy. This was in line with the contemporary 
turn in development theory away from donor dependency (see Chapter 3). The list of repeated demands from 
residents in the micro-region was a long one: a US$400,000 renovation of Casa Evans, a pre-school centre in 
Conchillas, an ambulance for the local health centre, several blocks of social housing. All represented gifts that 
lay outside the managers’ capacity to give. 
171 To “put on the shirt” was a phrase used commonly in the micro-region to identify employees who put loyalty 
to the company’s interests first and foremost. The graphic nature of the phrase implies a clothing over of the 
private individual and an almost physical putting on of his or her corporate identity. 
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2.3.3. Teresa: rationalising relations   
Notwithstanding the above limitations, both managers gave their best shot to the attainment of 
pragmatic legitimacy through the rationalising of relations. As with their attempts at personation, 
however, their levels of success at implementing a stakeholder-based approach differed.   
On this occasion, it was Teresa whose personal attributes, opinions and perceptions of her corporate 
role gave her the natural advantage over her colleague. From the outset, she appeared comfortable with 
viewing the corporate-community relationship through a pragmatic prism. In her opinion, the affective 
ties that govern personal relationships should be resisted and prevented from diverting the company 
from its strategic objectives. This viewpoint is best captured by her frequent evocation of the so-called 
“business case” for community relations. The epitome of folly for a commercial company, according to 
Teresa, was to end up giving “donation after donation” with no link to the “heart of the company”. As 
she explained to me on one occasion, community relations were ultimately a management “tool”:  
“It’s important that we’re not seen as the NGO within the company. We can’t act like an NGO, which 
can happen when you work in a socially-oriented division. If you end up making a strong connection 
with the community but not to the heart of the company, then you’re missing something . . . It’s good for 
us to be involved in the community, but with a certain degree of distance. So our community relationship 
plan has helped us involve ourselves while at the same time maintaining the distance between Montes 
del Plata and the community. Now with four years’ experience, we see the need for a relationship with 
the community that generates proximity . . . but at the same time doesn’t stop us from being ‘la empresa’ 
[the Corporation]. It’s an involvement that is relative.”172  
Clear evidence of the ease with which she embraced a pragmatic approach to legitimacy can be seen in 
an exchange-based relationship she struck up with a local estate agent. This was the talk of the 
community when I returned to the field after the completion of the mill. The two were “always 
together”, one resident told me. Another claimed she “had the ear” of Teresa. In every instance when 
this relationship was mentioned by a resident, his or her tone was always critical and laced with 
suspicion. One politically-minded resident went as far as to suggest that, in spite of appearances, the 
two women weren’t really authentic friends at all. A “marriage of convenience” was the term she used.  
So what was so significant about this relationship, and what did it show about Teresa’s approach to 
obtaining pragmatic legitimacy for her employer? The estate agent was a resident of Ombúes de Lavalle, 
an agricultural town between Conchillas and the state capital.173 She owned a successful real estate 
business in Colonia de Sacramento. Following the arrival of Montes del Plata in the micro-region, she 
                                               
172 Private interview. 2 February 2016. 
173 She was absent on extended vacation during my second period in the field, so I was not in a position to interview 
her or to personally observe the veracity of the statements about her. 
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had established a satellite office in Puerto Inglés to take advantage of the booming rental market in the 
area. When the mill’s massive temporary workforce left, the rental market reverted to its modest pre-
boom days and the estate agent turned her attention to developing Puerto Inglés as a tourist destination. 
She allegedly had a number of tourism-related projects in development and was working closely with 
senior representatives at both Montes del Plata and a new high-end hotel in Puerto Inglés to see them 
through to completion.  
By mid-2015, the estate agent had generated a significant public profile in the micro-region. With it 
came the notoriety of being something of a go-getter and certainly someone with an inside track with 
Montes del Plata. Residents would report her continually cropping up at community events, particularly 
those in some way connected to the mill’s sponsor. She had also insinuated herself into a number of 
civic society groups, such as the new Conchillas Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber was nominally 
an independent body designed to represent the interests of local business people, although its genesis 
owed very much to the political and economic impulse associated with Montes del Plata’s investment. 
The company’s CSR team helped co-found the Chamber’s co-founder and the community managers 
served as very active members. Playing a similar role was the estate agent’s property firm. Promoting 
local tourism soon emerged as one of the Chamber’s driving objectives.  
The estate agent was certainly a useful ally in the endeavour of Montes del Plata’s CSR team to promote 
economic diversification in the micro-region, yet the real relevance of her relationship with Maria lay 
elsewhere. As a resident of nearby Ombúes de Lavalle, the estate agent had become heavily involved 
in a new campaign to clean up the municipal beach in Puerto Inglés. Less showy than the tourist meccas 
of Colonia de Sacramento or Carmelo, Puerto Inglés’ sandy banks have emerged as a popular holiday 
spot for the middle classes in her hometown. In the absence of any remedial measures, the junco 
problem had grown progressively worse, finally arriving at the point where only a narrow channel led 
out from the municipal beach into the bay. Led by the estate agent, a group of Ombúes de Lavalle 
residents had begun petitioning representatives of both the municipal government and Montes del Plata 
to back a clean-up. Among their number were a number of affluent and locally influential individuals, 
including the estate agent’s husband, who at the time was the substitute mayor of Ombúes de Lavalle.  
At around the same time, a separate group of local residents came together to advocate for a clean-up 
of Puerto Inglés’ second beach. This parallel mobilisation, made up of some three dozen residents from 
the micro-region, was initiated under the umbrella of the Sociedad de Fomento Rural de Conchillas (the 
Conchillas Society for Rural Development), a long-standing but hitherto largely moribund community 
organisation. This second group lacked individuals with equivalent political influence of the first. That 
said, it succeeded in generating a level of civic momentum that was difficult to ignore. Every weekend 
for several months, the participating residents gave their time voluntarily to hacking the weeds in the 
bay, strimming the overgrowth above the beach and generally making the area more attractive for its 
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users - all of whom came from the micro-region. From nothing, the Sociedad de Fomento Rural had 
become one of the area’s best supported and most dynamic civil society organisations.  
Of the two groups, Teresa opted to draw closest to the first. Her way in was via the estate agent, with 
whom, as noted by residents across the micro-region, she had become a close ‘friend’. A deal was 
subsequently struck with the municipality that agreed both parties would invest US$30,000 to clear the 
junco and tidy the beach - a commitment that the municipal government ended up never meeting (Figure 
10). This satisfied the Ombúes de Lavalle group, while also opening the door for Montes del Plata’s 
agents to work more closely with the estate agent on the promotion of its tourism development strategy. 
The clear-up of the bay met one of the main demands of the Sociedad de Fomento Rural de Conchillas 
as well, although Montes del Plata did not assist directly with its beach clear-up. On Teresa’s watch, the 
company’s senior management did finally agree to build the toilet and shower block that Helena had 
wanted me to see. This was located at the top of the second beach and, whether fairly or not, was widely 
interpreted in the community as a concession to the local volunteers involved in the beach clear-up.  
 
 Figure 10 The bay at Puerto Inglés, looking out from the municipal beach 
Teresa’s management of the beach issue was politically savvy and calculating. It was also a text-book 
example of stakeholder management. In recognising the political influence of the two protagonist 
groups in the Puerto Inglés affair and addressing their respective demands, Teresa was applying the 
playbook of pragmatic relations. With the Ombúes de Lavalle lobby, she established the relevant person 
with whom to interact (i.e. the estate agent) and adopted a way of proceeding that would satisfy her and 
her constituents (i.e. a joint clean-up effort with the municipality). Because the influence of the 
volunteers was lower, Teresa’s investment in building relational ties with the group was not as intense. 
Unlike the estate agent, the volunteers were unable to help the CSR team advance the mill operator’s 
tourism development strategy either, thus diminishing the agents’ need to establish groups for a longer-
term and more intimate relationship.  
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Teresa’s adherence to a stakeholder-based conception of community relations could also be observed 
in her treatment of Puerto Inglés’ previous claimants. During the construction of the mill, long before 
the emergence of the two groups lobbying for the beach clear-up, a smaller and more fragmented 
collection of Puerto Inglés residents had briefly advocated for the same. Heading the group was Señor 
Ferreira, the ex-manager of a discontinued quarry works that operated on the Punta Pereira site. Aged 
in his seventies, Señor Ferreira is an avuncular character with an outspoken and somewhat domineering 
disposition. A life-long resident of Puerto Inglés, he had fallen out with a large number of his fellow 
residents over the years and commanded little by way of community support. Indeed, the group of half-
a-dozen or so residents that he managed to bring together to petition Montes del Plata’s management 
ended up splitting in two.  
Compared to the groups that came later, Señor Ferreira exerted low political influence and posed a 
minimal social risk to the operations of Montes del Plata. As a consequence, Teresa was able to paid 
little heed to his repeated requests. Rather than refuse him directly, she invited him to submit a written 
proposal for both the beach clear-up and the toilet block. In order for the proposal to be considered by 
the company’s CSR team, it would need to include specific details on issues such as project costings, 
bureaucratic permissions, future timelines and ongoing maintenance. Although Señor Ferreira was 
literate, a written exercise of this kind lay far beyond his personal competence and he duly failed to file 
a proposal.  
When I asked Teresa what she thought lay behind his reluctance to submit the recommended proposal, 
she had little doubt. “Because he didn’t know how to,” she told me frankly. Her habitual guard briefly 
down, she added: “But then we never helped him to do it either.” Teresa’s phrase “hacer un proyecto” 
(‘submit a project’) was one I heard her use dozens of times with other local petitioners. As far as I 
could ascertain, no resident ever did submit a project – at least, not without the direct aid of one of the 
company’s managers. Nor did any group threaten the mill or undertake any similar form of direct action. 
In this respect, the pragmatic risk-based approach to corporate-community relations in which Teresa 
excelled should be defined as a success.  
2.3.4. Helena: dispositional legitimacy 
When I returned to the micro-region in 2015/2016, Helena had been in post for more than four years 
and the strain was beginning to show. During a frank conversation about her work and her future, she 
discussed the possibility of one day returning to the voluntary sector where she could devote herself 
exclusively to a single social cause. Towards the end of this conversation, she shared the following 
reflection about the corporate-community relationship fostered by herself and Teresa:  
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“Now, after four years of experience, we’ve realised that while our community relations programme 
can generate proximity – so they can pick up the phone, say, and speak to us whenever – at the same 
time we can’t stop being the company.”  
In the context of the discussion, by “we” she clearly meant “I”. To “generate proximity”, an essential 
element in the strategy of personation, was an exercise led by her private self with which she felt 
ethically comfortable. “Being the company”, in contrast, the prerogative of pragmatic legitimacy, 
required donning the company shirt in a far more deliberate, far more political manner. The green 
polyester top and khaki cargo pants of the Montes del Plata uniform became a symbol of the transition 
from creating ties of intimacy to generating bonds of utilitarian self-interest. This discomfited Helena 
intensely.  
Her ethical unease at treating people as ‘stakeholders’ was compounded by several related factors. First 
was her own self-perception. Unlike her colleague, Helena preferred to cling to a version of herself that 
existed prior to, and continued outside of, her affiliation with Montes del Plata. This version borrowed 
heavily from her social worker roots. Indeed, the very decision to become a Montes del Plata employee 
and to attach her professional energies to a profit-making entity challenged her self-perception of 
herself. During a casual conversation about our respective university experiences, she admitted that the 
decision was “abnormal”. In the mind of her fellow social work graduates, “everything that sounds like 
capitalism is a bad word, a sin”. To the best of her knowledge, only one other person from her university 
cadre worked for a company. “And in her case, it’s a state-owned firm,” she qualified, the inference 
being that a public company had a stronger social mandate than a privately capitalised corporation like 
Montes del Plata.  
A second cause of unease linked to her motivation for joining Montes del Plata, which centred on the 
potential that she felt it would give her to effect social change. An investor of Montes del Plata’s 
commercial magnitude and political weight, she reasoned, had resources that charities and government 
agencies “could only dream about”.174 As the months and years passed, however, it became clear that 
any substantive developmental incomes arising from the mill project would be slow in coming. This 
left her private motivations unfulfilled, which in turn led her to become frustrated and to start 
questioning her role at the company.  
A full seven years after the ground was first broken for the Punto Pereira mill and well over a year after 
its actual inauguration, Helena and I entered Conchillas together in her car. It was a typically torpid 
afternoon; the plaza empty, the same-old shop fronts largely unchanged, little sign of life. “As you see”, 
                                               
174 Helena’s hope that the resources of the private sector could be mobilized to deliver positive developmental 
outcomes is evident in a Master thesis that she wrote at the Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca, undertaken via 
correspondence during her second year at Montes del Plata: ‘Responsabilidad Social Corporativa, entre lo público 
y lo privado. Conformación de Mesas de trabajo en el marco de la RSC.’ June 2013. 
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she said, placing her palms on the steering wheel. “Nothing has really changed.” She smiled briefly, a 
mix of irony and exasperation implicit in the gesture. Then a blank look came over her. “Nothing at 
all,” she repeated, her shoulders slumping ever so slightly this time. As though remembering herself – 
her corporate self – she began offering up an upbeat account of the development projects that the team 
had in the pipeline. I sensed it wasn’t only me she was trying to convince.  
Helena’s inability to detach herself from the self-perceptions and motivations associated with her 
private self presented her with a predicament. Rather than risk her job and renounce the pragmatic 
aspects of detachable CSR entirely, however, she adopted a modified approach that better 
accommodated her personal ethics. Referred to by the legitimacy theorist Mark Suchman as 
‘dispositional legitimacy’, Helena’s compromise solution rested on her evidencing a concessionary 
intent towards residents in their demands for development goods. In short, she would do what she could 
to meet the interests of Conchillenses. This did not require her to manipulate relations in the manner of 
Teresa. Instead, it obliged her to show that she was well-disposed to using her corporate function for 
the community’s benefit. This tactic accorded with her personal ethics. As importantly, it also dovetailed 
with the proximate personal relationships that she had built up with residents through her personation 
efforts.  
Undermining Helena’s dispositional position was her limited ability to make good her show of 
neighbourly amenability. Despite her change in tactics, the resource and decision-making constraints 
that hamstrung the community managers’ capacity to meet residents’ demands had not gone away. This 
left Helena having to juggle between moral disposition and pragmatic delivery. Her work with a 
community-run health clinic in a poor district of Colonia de Sacramento provides an example of how 
this juggling act played out in practice. The clinic in question was community-funded and was 
struggling with a severe shortage of staff and medical equipment. One of Montes del Plata’s major 
accommodation barracks was located nearby. Initially, the company’s CSR team had feared that the 
small health facility might be over-run by foreign mill workers looking for medical treatment. In the 
end, this did not occur because most workers who needed medical attention went to a privately-managed 
clinic located at the Punta Pereira site. Even after this became clear and the social risk attached to the 
community health centre declined, Helena continued to champion the clinic’s cause. She helped secure 
a small amount of funding from her employer for much-needed medical equipment, repairs and 
redecoration, for instance. She also invested her own energies in its betterment.  
One Saturday, I joined Helena for a full-day community activity that she had set up. The event saw 
children from the local neighbourhood work under the instruction of a local artist to paint a colourful 
mural on the clinic’s front wall. The brightly-coloured painting enlivened the otherwise drab façade. At 
the same time, Helena’s involvement helped engender considerable goodwill towards her among the 
clinic’s voluntary organising committee. This much was in her capacity to give. At a later date, however, 
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after an evening meeting with the clinic’s organising committee, she was lobbied by a committee of 
residents who wanted Montes del Plata to fund a new hospital in the state capital.175 At this point, the 
tension inherent within her dispositional solution became clear. Her employer categorically refused to 
conceive of such a large public investment. In all probability, therefore, delivery of the demand would 
be impossible for Helena to grant. She was well aware of this fact, yet she did not push back on the 
request there and then. Instead, she politely advised the group that she would relay the petition back to 
Montes del Plata. This she did in an internal memo, although to no avail.176  
The practice of not directly rejecting difficult or untenable requests from community groups and 
individual citizens became Helena’s default tactic. Her preference was to refer the matter to someone 
more senior in the company and indicate that a response would be forthcoming in the future. She had a 
selection of phrases up her sleeve to achieve just this: “I can but ask”, “I’ll inquire”, “I’ll see what I can 
do”, “Let’s see”, and so on. Initially, I interpreted this as an intentional delaying manoeuvre, much in 
the manner of Teresa’s pragmatic treatment of Señor Ferreira. When I questioned her about this directly, 
however, Helena disabused me of such an interpretation. Speaking with a conviction that appeared to 
me genuine, she claimed that her referral approach grew out of an effort to be honest and transparent 
with her community constituents – two moral traits inclined towards winning public trust and 
demonstrating good faith (in keeping with her preferred strategy of personation):     
“First comes the management of the message. The message is clear and you’ve got to know how you’re 
going to present things. I’m not going to say, ‘I’m not going to resolve it now’ or ‘This is going to take 
ten years to resolve itself.’ You say, ‘I am managing it’… Principally it’s about transparency. And it’s 
not being any less transparent to manage the message. If I say that I’m going to resolve it in one year, 
then in one year they’re going to ask me for the solution.”  
The ethical basis of her reasoning was certainly open to question. Arguably, a more transparent option 
would be to admit that an immediate resolution is improbable. If her claim to manage the issue was 
indeed a cover-up and she intended to take no action (as per Teresa), then her claims to transparency 
would clearly be morally indefensible. By contrast, should her management efforts be genuine, as 
evidenced in her efforts to champion the interests of the health clinic, then the ethical character of her 
conduct would appear robust.177 Even then, however, Helena’s success was far from secured. In a 
relational scenario framed by exchange-based utilitarianism, her community constituents still found 
themselves with their demands unmet and their self-interests unfulfilled.  
                                               
175 Known as the ‘Comisión de Usuarios de la Salud’ (Committee of Health Sector Users), this unelected, 
community-based group exists to promote the rights of patients within the public health system. 
176 ‘Acta de reunión de Policlínica barrio Los Nogales, 13/11/2012.’ Provided privately via email. 
177 Helena clearly evinced a behind-the-scenes commitment to realise the claims of her community constituents 
in her championing of a jobs database for local residents, as described in Chapter 4. 
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This prompted one of two conclusions on the part of Helena’s local constituents, neither of which cast 
Montes del Plata in a favourable light. The pervasive sentiment within the micro-region suggested that 
Helena was indeed well-intentioned towards the community, but that the authorities in Montes del Plata 
were not. Hence, her inability to deliver. Many residents would therefore praise her character (“she’s a 
saint”), while simultaneously recognising her limited utility. For some, this elicited sympathy. The 
image here was of someone fighting for the community’s best interests, yet having her efforts stymied 
by organisational protocol or policy. Thus one elderly resident who had participated with Helena on 
various community initiatives could say of her: “She’s always very attentive. No one has ever told me 
that they’ve spoken to her and she’s not then offered to help [but] sometimes her hands are tied.” In a 
similar, although less sympathetic vein, a retired taxi driver from Conchillas described Helena as 
“dynamic” and a “fighter” on the community’s behalf, while accurately deducing that the policies 
affecting the community were “not her ideas [but instead] they come from above and she transfers them 
to us”.  
A smaller proportion of residents came to a more damning conclusion. Helena had failed to deliver on 
their demands not because she lacked the necessary capacity to act but rather because, despite her claims 
to the contrary, she lacked the will to do so. She was, in other words, managing the “message”. In this 
respect, she was seen as practising intentional delaying tactics akin to those of Teresa. For this reason, 
it was not uncommon to hear residents lumping the two community managers together. Even if they 
liked Helena at an interpersonal level, they came to believe that both managers were ultimately cut from 
the same (green, logo-embossed) cloth. As one admittedly politically-minded civil society committee 
member from Conchillas succinctly summarised:  
“There’s a good number [in the community] that - how can I say this? – are frankly tired of them … 
They are all talk and very little action. Lots of people are aware of that now.” 
Helena’s dispositional approach was certainly subtler and more morally defensible than one based on 
pragmatic legitimacy’s logic of self-interest and non-contractual reciprocal exchange. Ethical integrity 
aside, however, it was encumbered by numerous impediments and risks. At some stage, her positive 
disposition towards the micro-region’s residents needed to deliver or, at the very least, provide evidence 
that the hope of future delivery was not illusory. If not, her value to her community interlocutors was 
naught, which pushed up the possibility of them withholding pragmatic legitimacy from her employer.  
As Teresa and Helena’s respective experiences reveal, detachable CSR offers a practicable route to 
pragmatic legitimacy but one that is difficult if not impossible to achieve in parallel with a personation-
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based strategy for moral legitimacy. This holds important implications for legitimacy theory, suggesting 
that corporate agents must choose between the pursuit of pragmatic or moral legitimacy but not both.178  
2.4 Virtualising neighbourly relations 
Given the practical and theoretical challenges associated with gaining either moral or pragmatic 
legitimacy, it is tempting to conclude that detachable CSR strategy adopted by Montes del Plata’s 
management was destined to failure. However, to describe the efforts of Teresa and Helena as a busted 
flush would be unfair. True failure would be the withdrawal of legitimation by the community. This 
never occurred. Despite making occasional threats to take direct action (see Chapter 4), Conchillenses 
remained politically passive. Residents never lobbied the media in a coordinated fashion, never enacted 
a campaign on social media, and never impeded the construction process in any way. It should also be 
noted that, with the exception of a handful of local cheerleaders, residents in the micro-region did not 
enthusiastically endorse Montes del Plata either. A fair assessment of the community managers’ efforts, 
therefore that they gave the appearance of corporate-community relations being unproblematic. To the 
outside world, the micro-region gave no reason to suppose that Montes del Plata was not the 
“responsible neighbour” that it claimed to be.  
Herein lies the clue as to why Montes del Plata’s management invested so much energy in pursuing a 
dual legitimacy policy that seemed ill-fated from the start. One of the question marks hanging over the 
corporate-community relationship as a source of corporate legitimation is its limited scope and 
influence. Residents in the affected area of large infrastructure project are but one critical audience that 
a foreign investor must win over. They may not be the most important for the corporation. Government 
officials in the host country can impose fines on companies or revoke their operating licenses. 
International investors can withdraw funding. Senior management can resign and operating staff can go 
on strike. Affected communities have no such powers. As a result, community relations is generally 
deprioritised by international businesses and by the scholars that study them. Compared to core 
company functions such as investor relations, government relations, employee relations or public 
relations, the function of community relations is consistently less well-resourced (Kemp & Owen 2003, 
                                               
178 A major flaw in Montes del Plata’s community-based legitimation policy was that this distinction between 
moral and pragmatic legitimacy was never made. The managers were called on to pursue strategies for both forms 
of legitimacy in parallel. Nor was the division between these strategies always clear-cut, with some programmes 
and activities seeking both ends at the same time. So, on the one hand, the eco-park and toilet block provided a 
platform for Teresa and Helena (especially) to ‘show face’; publicly exhibiting their moral qualities by lending a 
hand at the celebrations, coordinating the entertainment, sharing in the preparation and consumption of party food 
and drink, and so forth. On the other hand, both projects could be seen as strategic community ‘investments’, 
financed by the Corporation to satisfy demands for tangible development goods from a group of community 
constituents. 
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Zandvliet & Anderson 2009). An assessment of community relations in the international business 
literature confirms the side-lining of this issue.179  
Rather than write-off community relations as of secondary importance in the struggle for corporate 
legitimation, I argue that the example of Montes del Plata’s agents invites a rethink of how legitimacy 
building is conceived within the corporate-community context. Legitimacy theory assumes that the 
‘stakeholder’ group targeted by a company’s CSR activities is the principal and final grantor of 
legitimacy. But what if this is not the case? What if the local community is but a vehicle for wider 
legitimacy building among other, more influential stakeholder groups?  
Legitimation, after all, represents a subjective creation. It depends on constituents’ perceptions of the 
organisation that is seeking legitimacy. As shown, the local audiences with whom community managers 
were regularly engaged became soon became familiar with the weaknesses of managerial efforts at 
legitimacy building. Non-local audiences, in contrast, were not privy to the micro-social processes that 
inform such a view. They had no direct relationship with the community managers or the residents with 
whom the managers were tasked to liaise. As was the case with Montes del Plata’s investment in 
Uruguay, external audiences had no direct means of testing the veracity of the mill operator’s public 
claims to neighbourly conduct. Detached from the localised field of social intercourse, an external 
audience’s perception of a company’s claims to positive moral conduct are formed vicariously. It is 
through residents’ assessment of corporate claims to responsibility that their own assessments are 
influenced. To contest a company’ dominant narrative of responsibility, therefore, a counter-narrative 
must emerge. In the absence of such a counter-narrative, there is little but healthy scepticism to question 
a company’s version of events (Laufer 2003).  
Detachable CSR came into play for Montes del Plata’s local agents in the mobilisation of community 
members for the purposes of corporate legitimation beyond the community itself.  Casper Jensen and 
Brit Winthereik’s concept of “virtualising materiality” is useful to understanding the mechanics by 
which such mobilisation occurs (Jensen & Winthereik 2015). In their study of an international 
development project in Vietnam, Jensen & Winthereik show how the project sponsors and the local 
community found themselves variously detached from one another as well as from the project itself. 
The project centred around the construction of a ‘traditional’ longhouse from which residents were 
intended to derive tourist revenues. The intention was for the community to become economically self-
sustaining and to allow the foreign charity workers to disappear. The only shortcoming was that the 
villagers had long since stopped building traditional longhouses and had lost the relevant ancestral 
                                               
179 Since 2000, for example, the Academy of Management Journal has only two articles loosely related to 
corporate-community relations. See: Jiatao L., Yang, J & Yue, D. 2007. Identity, Community, and Audience: 
How Wholly Owned Foreign Subsidiaries Gain Legitimacy in China. Academy of Management Journal, 
50(1):175-190; Kassinis, G & Vafeas, N. (2006) Stakeholder Pressures and Environmental Performance. The 
Academy of Management Journal, 49(1): 145-159. 
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knowledge to undertake such a task. The implementing charity therefore built the longhouse on the 
community’s behalf and then handed custodianship over to local residents. 
The parallel here with detachable CSR centres on the form of community that the charitable 
organisation sought to mobilise. It was not the charity’s intention to faithfully depict what was 
happening on the ground, but rather to externalise a version of events that fitted with the donors’ mental 
paradigm. The charity’s European donors had a picture in mind of target communities being rebuilt 
after the disruption of modernisation and then revitalised through their own entrepreneurial efforts. For 
the reasons explained, the charity’s efforts to effect such a reality were thwarted by the corrosive cultural 
impacts of modernity. Yet this inconvenient truth did not prevent the charity from mobilising the 
community in accordance with the perception of its interpretative audience. Through the use of video 
technology and other publicity materials, the longhouse project was detached from its relational context 
and “rendered in virtual form in order to travel and strengthen longer networks”.180 This virtualised 
version of the community failed to conform to residents’ lived reality, but perfected matched the external 
audience’s perception of what the community should be. The legitimacy of the charity was thus secured 
and donor finances continued to flow.    
The mobilisation of the local community by Montes del Plata’s CSR agents followed very similar lines. 
Social investments were extracted from their on-the-ground social realities and reinterpreted for the 
company’s external, non-local audiences. In this reconfigured version of corporate-community 
relations, community members were presented as willing co-participants in Montes del Plata’s 
programme of neighbourly responsibility and community betterment. The ceremony to inaugurate the 
eco-park in Puerto Inglés encapsulated this external positioning. In a formal statement circulated to the 
local media after the event, the Sustainability Director was quoted as saying: “Montes del Plata seeks 
to be one cog more in local development, interacting with the community, knowing its needs and 
projects, and pushing these towards completion.”181 The same message was reiterated in a video clip 
put together by the company’s communications agency. Set to an uplifting backing track, the short video 
portrayed images of smiling children playing on the new swings and slides, their contented parents 
looking on. Another prevailing impression from the publicity materials was the voluntaristic nature of 
the project.182 This was Montes del Plata digging into its pockets out of the goodness of its heart. With 
                                               
180 Jensen & Winthereik 2015: 210. 
181 Montevideo Portal. ‘Conchillas inaugurates park sponsored by Montes del Plata for public use’. 17 November 
2015. http://www.montevideo.com.uy/contenido/Conchillas-inaugura-parque-de-uso-publico-cedido-por-Monte 
s-del-Plata-290770. Accessed 5 March 2016. 
182 In reality, Montes del Plata was mandated by the federal government’s environmental regulator to create the 
park as a compensatory measure. I had learned this information in a private conversation with a senior Montes 
del Plata executive and subsequently confirmed it via Dinama. Yet no mention of the regulator’s order was made 
in the mill owner’s publicity materials. For a newspaper reader in Montevideo or an internet user in Finland, say, 
there would be every reason to assume that the eco-park and the toilet block represented stellar examples of 
responsible corporate citizenship. 
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a reported price-tag of around US$1m, the eco-park far outstripped all the company’s other community 
investments put together.183  
In relatively crude fashion, the local community and the Corporation’s relations with it thus became 
marketable commodities, with happy village co-participants being photographed, packaged up and 
shared with the company’s national and international network of opinion formers, investors, 
policymakers and others within its “interpretative community” (Fish 1980). Montes del Plata’s regional 
Communications Manager openly admitted to the company’s strategic exploitation of community 
relations in its external communications. During a private interview, he was explicit about both the 
values-based content of the company’s output and the highly targeted focus of this output. As he 
explained: “It’s not that the whole population needs to know. But it’s important that key actors know 
who we are, where we come from, and how we work.” These “key actors” comprise the interpretative 
community to whom Montes del Plata’s community-rich communications are targeted and on whose 
perceptions the company’s organisational legitimacy depends.  
This is not to suggest that the agents’ efforts to gain community-granted legitimacy were not genuine 
nor that such legitimacy was unimportant in and of itself. Instead, it is to argue that community-granted 
legitimacy be placed in a hierarchical continuum that begins within affected communities and 
subsequently expands far beyond them. Obtaining legitimacy from communities impacted by FDI 
infrastructure investments lessens the operational risks associated with these investments. The absence 
of community conflict in the micro-region marked one of the major successes of the detachable CSR 
programme implemented by Teresa and Helena. No days at the mill site were lost due to direct action 
by residents and no negative publicity was generated on their account. These were but the first-tier 
impacts of this success. A secondary set of more significant legitimacy benefits awaited once Montes 
del Plata’s positive community relations were detached from their local setting and repackaged for the 
consumption of all its key non-local audiences.  
To obtain this wider legitimation, the appearance of positive community relations was essential. To that 
end, a photographer or videographer would invariably be in attendance at CSR-related events such as 
the eco-park party or toilet block inauguration. The images they captured would later reappear on one 
or more of the company’s publicity platforms. During the mill’s construction, the primary outlet for this 
content was a weekly “infomercial” branded under the label ‘MDP TV’. These six-minute spots ran on 
local television networks prior to the prime-time early evening news, as well as on the company’s main 
website. The virtualised image of the community figured disproportionately highly in these broadcasts, 
with community-related CSR activities providing the content for around one third (34%) of the episodes 
                                               
183 Montes del Plata press release. https://www.montesdelplata.com.uy/novedad.php?id=226&lang=es. Accessed 
3 March 2016. 
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during my first period of fieldwork.184 Nearly half (48%) of the MDP TV spots during this period, 
meanwhile, were filmed in the micro-region. In addition, environmental management and other 
examples of responsible business (such as health and safety and worker training) appeared in 24% and 
17% of the episodes, respectively. The company’s community projects also formed a staple of its 
communications output to local print and radio media, as well as its nationwide print advertising.  
Teresa and Helena were instrumental in this exercise in virtualising materiality. As core personators of 
the Corporation, they appeared regularly as interview subjects in the MDP TV footage, as well as being 
photographed during community events (Figure 11).185 In a similar way, the company drafted in 
technical experts to discuss environmental and industrial aspects of the mill project, enabling the public 
to put a face to issues of potential concern while also conveying reassuring notions of professional 
expertise and good management. More important still was the community managers’ convening power. 
For it was not primarily the managers’ faces that needed to be shown, but those of their community 
interlocutors (or fellow ‘neighbours’).186 Residents were always portrayed as smiling and healthy, with 
no criticism or negativity given airtime. Invariably, villagers appeared in settings that the two 
community managers had helped engineer and that were heavily suggestive of civic cooperation and 
celebration – the video clip of the eco-park festivities providing a model example.    
The detachable manner in which community relations were processed, packaged and promulgated came 
home to me when I saw a publicity poster of a charity event in Casa Evans that the company had helped 
sponsor. Pictured in the centre of the poster stood an outspoken community representative who I knew 
to have had a public dispute with Teresa. By her own admission, the resident had participated primarily 
as a means of evaluating the motivations of Montes del Plata’s CSR activities at close quarters. By the 
time the poster was published, she had withdrawn from all participation and was barely on speaking 
terms with the community managers. To an external eye, however, the micro-scale politics that lay 
behind the image and the social tensions contained within it were entirely invisible. All that could be 
seen was a happy resident endorsing the company’s image of itself as a responsible neighbour by 
willingly lending her support to its community engagement activities.  
                                               
184 Based on the 29 episodes aired between October 2012 and April 2013. MDP TV was discontinued following 
the mill’s inauguration. Examples of community investments include: the pre-treatment water plant in Carmelo; 
the 80MW renewable energy facility at Punta Pereira that connects to the national grid; the extension of the 
National 55 highway and related construction of a road bridge; and, the workers’ accommodation in Colonia and 
Carmelo, which was destined for donation to the State for low-cost housing. 
185 The community managers appeared in seven of the 29 episodes between October 2012-April 2013. Senior 
managers and technical experts appeared on seven and 15 separate occasions, respectively. 
186 Residents are interviewed in 11 of the 29 episodes of MDP TV between October 2012-April 2013. Over the 
same period during 2011-2012, the figure stood at 23 interview in 26 episodes. 
 




Figure 11 Montes del Plata’s regional community director being filmed for MDP TV 
Another even more stark example of a community image being detached from its context and 
redeployed was provided by a framed banner advertisement on the wall of the mill operator’s Colonia 
office. The banner showed a good-looking forestry worker standing in a commercial forestry setting. 
The phrase ‘Nuestra Gente’ (Our People) was blazoned across the top. I casually inquired of the 
community relations team who the person was, only to discover that they had been desperately trying 
to track him down to sign a model release form but to no avail. Their very own ‘people’ were unknown 
to them. As Suzana Sawyer observes in her examination of television advertising in the oil industry, the 
act of a business publicly framing itself as a human organisation bent on behaving in a morally 
responsible manner “fades out lived realities” (Sawyer 2010:69). For the purposes of Montes del Plata’s 
external legitimacy, the anonymity of the unnamed worker does not matter a jot. He was smiling; he 
looked healthy; he was standing in what appeared to be a verdant, well-managed plantation. Ergo, his 
employer cared for him, for his workplace and for the environment at large. This was the message and 
this, frankly, was all that really counted.  
2.5. Conclusion: CSR, at face value 
Winning social legitimation has become a prerogative for large-scale foreign investors. Without it, they 
face the very real prospect of local opposition to their investment project and the risk of their licence to 
operate being revoked (Morrison 2014). This chapter has sought to add to the existing literature on 
legitimacy theory by adopting a micro level of analysis to the legitimacy building process. It does so 
with the conviction that, as Marina Welker asserts, companies are not dematerialized metaphysical 
actors but collective subjects that result from ongoing enactments involving corporate agents (Welker 
2014:3). In its so-called “area of influence” around the mill, Montes del Plata’s two community agents 
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played an instrumental role in securing social legitimacy for their employer by variously attaching and 
detaching themselves to individual residents and to the interests they represented.  
Historically in Uruguay, corporate legitimacy has been understood to depend on a strong moral 
component.187 In the example of Montes del Plata, the prime instrument for winning moral legitimacy 
was the CSR agent herself, who was charged with infusing her employer (or the image of her employer) 
with her own moral attributes. The policy of personation attempts to extract the ethical values of the 
CSR manager’s private person (i.e. those of the ‘responsible neighbour’ in Montes del Plata’s case) and 
affix them to the corporate person – an archetypal example of the detachability principle in practice. In 
this respect, the mill operator’s agents are more than mere metaphors of the company’s philosophy of 
detachable responsibility; they are intimately engaged in the philosophy’s material application.   
A number of problematic hurdles exist with the implementation of a personation-based approach, 
however, as the experience of Montes del Plata’s community agents reveals. The first relates to the 
ethical capacity of the corporate agent. If, as in Teresa’s case, she lacks the relevant moral attributes, 
then the basis of personation falls apart. The agent shows face, but shows the wrong face. Another 
hurdle relates to the relationship between the individual agent and the corporation. Although the agent 
is presented as the ‘face’ of the company, she does not enjoy a monopoly on civic relations. Even in the 
most isolated project locations, residents in affected communities engage with other actors bearing the 
company’s name and speaking on its behalf. Yet again, the opportunity arises for confusing behavioural 
inconsistencies. A final problem concerns interpersonal relations as the channel through which the 
agent’s values and ethics become known and supposedly transmuted onto the corporation. The very act 
of coming to know the manager, however, highlights her individuality as a corporate agent, not as the 
amalgamated corporation in personified form.  
If legitimation proves difficult to earn through moral conduct, it feasibly be bought by pragmatic 
exchange. One important particularity of the Montes del Plata’s case is the frankness with which its 
agents moved towards the pursuit of pragmatic legitimacy after their attempts at gaining moral 
legitimacy floundered. This novel alternative saw the corporate agents seek to appeal to the self-
interests of community members, as opposed to appealing to their affections or moral sensibilities. This 
shift called on them to act as political brokers and implied a willingness to manage community relations 
in a calculating fashion that ranked residents according to their potential influence on the company. The 
                                               
187 Moral legitimacy relies on a company’s constituent audiences believing that the firm’s foundational ‘DNA’, to 
use the CSR trope, commits the firm to “do the right thing” (Asbury & Ball 2016). This assumes a version of the 
company as a homogenous, knowable and consistent entity, however, in contrast to the fluid, inconsistent and 
multi-agent nature of the corporation as proposed by enactment theorists. One of the functions credited to CSR is 
the bridging of this gap by attaching identifiable values to the corporate form in order to give it a semblance of 
moral virtue and consistency (Dolan & Rajak 2016).  
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element of detachability here centres on the ability of the agent to swap the emphasis on the moral affect 
of her private self (as per personation) in favour of the calculating rationality associated with her 
professional self. Teresa made this transition with ease. She perceived her private self as a corporate 
professional and therefore had little compunction about taking on this persona in her dealings with 
community members. In the Machiavellian methodologies of stakeholder management, she proved a 
natural. In contrast, Helena found it much harder to detach her private ethics and motivations from her 
professional mandate. As a compromise solution, she adopted a dispositional approach to pragmatic 
legitimacy. This saw her demonstrate a positive disposition towards residents’ claims, but without any 
guarantee of their delivery. This satisfied her private ethics, but it ultimately failed as a legitimising 
tactic. From the community’s perspective, their self-interests remained unmet and thus legitimacy was 
withheld. Moreover, her dispositional tactic of deferring community requests to senior executives made 
manifest her status as a weak proxy of the company rather than its universalising personator, thus 
counteracting her personation-based legitimation efforts.  
In introducing the idea of virtualising materiality, however, this chapter has sought to show that the 
community is not necessary the final arbiter of community-based legitimacy. Stakeholder theorists 
argue that corporate legitimation relies on companies satisfying the expectations of multiple 
stakeholders, of whom community members are but one. The practice of virtualising materiality does 
not challenge this assumption. Instead, in true detachable CSR style, the practice enables community 
relations to be detached from their socio-political context and mobilised in support of legitimacy-
building with stakeholders far beyond the frontiers of a company’s localised ‘zone of influence’. As 
with the moral attributes of the individual agents, the idea of a contented community is transformed 
into a detachable asset that can be attached to the company’s image of itself and exploited for its own 
ends. For the investor in Helsinki or the legislator in Montevideo, the image of harmonious corporate-
community relations is presented as an uncomplicated and stable truth, which, conveniently, accords 
with external perceptions of a foreign investor that takes its CSR commitments seriously.  
Soon after my second period of fieldwork ended, Teresa was promoted to a newly-created position 
coordinating the implementation of the company’s CSR efforts across all its various divisions. Helena, 
in contrast, handed in her notice and left the company. Her intention was to return to the voluntary 
sector and build a career with a rights-based organisation. Tellingly, she was replaced by a junior 
manager with a background in corporate communications rather than community relations, a move that 
facilitated the company’s ongoing virtual materialisation of local residents. The future of the two 
community managers indicates the preference of the mill operator’s senior management for a form of 
community relations dictated by rational instrumentalism rather than charisma or ethics. Though the 
community managers may have failed to effectively show face for the company, they did a stellar job 
at showing its true character. 
 




The Reluctant Father Christmas:   
Detachment and Distance in the Delivery of Community Development 
“It’s not our desire to work in a paternalistic way, but to be an agent of local development . . .  
      This is how we’ve operated since the beginning.”  
Montes del Plata’s Sustainability Director188 
 
The handover ceremony for the Community Development Forum (‘Forum’ hereon) took place in the 
central plaza of Conchillas late one afternoon at the end of October 2012. The event organisers had set 
up earlier in the day, erecting a large video screen and projector on one edge of the sparsely furnished 
village square. Music from a set of hefty speakers drew a small crowd of around 50 to 60 residents, 
who mostly huddled around the plaza’s edge. There had been little advance notice of the event, so all 
looked on curiously, waiting for whatever was about to happen. In one corner, separated from the 
resident, stood a gaggle of Montes del Plata employees from the constructions site.  
Joanna, the Colonia-based team leader for the pulp operator’s community relations work, acted as 
compère for the event. To her left and right stood Andrea and Helena, respectively. Flitting around them 
was a cameraman from a local PR agency that Montes del Plata’s CSR team had contracted to capture 
the high-staged ceremony on film. As the music faded out, Joanna picked up a cordless microphone and 
welcomed the residents who had gathered in her Portuguese-accented Spanish (she is Brazilian). 
Today’s event, she explained, was designed to mark the handover of funds for three projects that had 
emerged out of the Community Development Forum (Forum hitherto), Montes del Plata’s flagship CSR 
programme. The process, we were to understand, had been a “great success”.   
In this chapter, I seek to move from the personal and private worlds of the community managers to the 
programmatic and public sphere of their activities. Given the need to demonstrate positive societal 
impacts from their investments, companies typically draw attention to localised CSR activities in and 
around their project zone. These activities are by no means the only realm where FDI’s positive impacts 
are realised, nor, in either net macro-economic or development terms, are they even the most significant. 
The contribution of FDI projects in respect of tax receipts to the public purse, infrastructure 
development, knowledge and skills transfer, national procurement and employment (see chapter 4) are 
potentially far more sizeable. Yet the fate of communities directly affected by mega-projects attracts 
                                               
188 Interview with Infonegocios, 5 October 2015: http://infonegocios.biz/nota-principal-1/montes-del-plata-
invierte-alrededor-de-u-s-1-millon-en-un-parque-forestal-en-conchillas. Accessed 17 January 2016. 
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particular focus, particularly in the court of public opinion, and consequently occupies a 
disproportionate amount of management attention.  
The logic of detachable CSR runs shy of splurging on lavish philanthropic projects, thus denying project 
sponsors the chance to fill their brochures and advertising hoardings with pictures of company-
sponsored hospital, schools and the like. As much as they may wish to extricate themselves from social 
and moral entanglements beyond their immediate operations, foreign investors in emerging markets 
cannot play dumb to local demands for socio-economic development. As the US critical human 
geographer Gillian Hart notes, for corporations to continue to pursue the “little d” development of 
capitalist expansion, they must be prepared to become agents of ‘big D’ Development (2001:650). 
Development is a quid pro quo. The opening of ever-new markets in exchange for the post-World War 
II promise to so-called ‘Third World’ nations that “modern life and improved living standards could be 
open to all” (Cooper and Packard 1997:9). The essential determinant for mega-project sponsors in Latin 
America, whether in the forestry sector or any other extractivist industry, currently turns not on whether 
‘big D’ Development should take place but in what form such development should occur.  
This chapter examines what the development and implementation of Montes del Plata’s Forum concept 
reveals about the options and opportunities that a detachable CSR approach offers to deliver an adequate 
form of localised development. As per the company’s management of the community’s claims to 
representativeness (chapter 1), the end result of their efforts in the micro-region is a curious mix of 
frustrated community expectations and social acquiescence. I will show how Montes del Plata’s agents 
succeeded in abrogating responsibility for ‘big D’ Development through a sophisticated narrative of 
self-actualised progress. To suggest that this was its intent from the outset, however, would be to cast 
the entire enterprise as an elaborate ruse. While theoretically feasible, this would be to run against all 
the ethnographic evidence, which indicated genuine effort on the part of the company’s community 
managers and their delivery partners to make the Forum a public ‘success’.  
The pertinent question instead is what ‘success’ looks like for Montes del Plata with respect to local 
development. How is it conceived, through what methods and strategies is its delivery sought, and how 
does it feed into the company’s overarching legitimation ambitions? These are all deeply political 
questions, in the sense of the political as a “process involving contestation and conflict among different 
people with different interests and claims”.189 As the rather lacklustre response of residents to the public 
ceremony in the plaza revealed, the celebratory of Montes del Plata’s representatives mode was matched 
by the community’s indifference. Rather than ignite potential contestation or conflict, the Forum process 
had helped to quell both. This represented a political, if not a developmental, ‘success’ for Montes del 
Plata. Again, the critical question to address is how a strategy of detachable CSR facilitated this 
                                               
189 Li 2007:228 
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outcome. If one discards the ruse hypothesis, is the achievement of social acquiescence and the 
limitations of development ambitions better understood as an unintended consequence, in Ferguson’s 
sense? The chapter explores these questions in the first section by examining how Montes del Plata’s 
CSR team problematised the issue of local development and rendered it technical. The following section 
discusses how the techniques and assumptions of detachable CSR acted to shape citizens’ development 
imaginaries and render them pliant.    
3.1 Problematisation: historic paternalism                
Montes del Plata is no different from any other organisation focused on delivering ‘development’ in its 
assumption that (a) development is something that communities want, and (b) that they have a right to 
initiate the process for such development and to set its terms. While neither assumption is necessarily 
true, unbalanced power matrices frequently see the trustee for development continuing regardless. For 
this claim to act on behalf of others, albeit for their supposed good, is ultimately a claim to power.  
Across Latin America, the primary trustee remains the state. The arrival of CSR-touting multinational 
companies in low- and middle-income countries, however, has sparked a debate as to the nature and 
extent of state trusteeship. Take the case of British mining giant Anglo American, which is cooperating 
with regional governments in Peru, Chile, Brazil and Colombia to design joint development 
strategies.190 The company’s ‘Collaborative Regional Development’ model reflects a growing appetite 
among state agencies for cooperating with private sector actors on socio-economic development plans. 
Anglo-Dutch consumer goods giant Unilever is pursuing a similar strategy in rural Indonesia, where it 
is working hand-in-glove with government authorities at a district level to design village-based plans 
for economic growth and sustainable agricultural production.191  
In Uruguay, relationships between government ministries and the private sector are fluid and 
collaborations on specific areas of policy are not uncommon, yet the type of intimate cooperation 
described above has yet to occur. At a national and provincial level, trusteeship for development 
planning remains firmly with the relevant state agencies. At a village and district level, however, 
significant governance gaps remained. Correcting the absence of granular, area-specific development 
plans for micro-regions such as Conchillas represents one of the aspirations of the decentralisation 
reforms introduced in 2011, but this was taking time. When the construction of Montes del Plata’s mill 
commenced in that same year, no up-to-date plans existed for the area’s development. The new 
                                               
190 See: Anglo-American Sustainability Report 2017:10. ‘Anglo-American’s Blueprint for the Future of 
Sustainable Mining.’ Available at: http://www.angloamerican.com/sustainability/our-sustainability-strategy/our-
sustainability-strategy/collaborative-regional-development. Accessed 3 July 2018. 
191 See: Unilever press release. 21 January 2018. ‘Unilever and PT Perkebunan Nusantara (PTPN) reach 
agreement to accelerate production of sustainable palm oil in Indonesia.’ Available at: https://www.unilever.com 
/news/press-releases/2018/unilever-ptpn-reach-agreement-to-accelerate-production-of-sustainable-palm-oil-in-
Indonesia.html. Accessed 3 July 2018. 
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mayoralty in Carmelo was only just being established, while the incumbent provincial government (in 
Colonia del Sacramento) evidenced little enthusiasm for creating such a plan. At a provincial level, 
Montes del Plata’s CSR team sought to feed into government priorities through regular liaison with 
public-sector agencies (via the Mesa Inter-Institucional). But at the micro-region level, it was faced 
with more or less a blank sheet of paper.  
One of the first tasks of the company’s small CSR division was to rectify this lacuna, something it did 
largely of its own accord and with little reference either to local residents or state authorities. No 
extensive public consultation process was established to determine local development expectations or 
residents’ priorities. This is despite such consultative practices becoming increasingly commonplace in 
FDI projects across Latin America, especially in the conflict-ridden mining sector (Stevens 2016). The 
defence of Montes del Plata’s management for this apparently arbitrary approach was that they would 
provide opportunities for civic participation through their Forum mechanism. Once established, the 
Forum would provide a mediated space in which citizens could gather and collaboratively determine 
development projects. The Forum mechanism itself, however, was not subject to any form of public 
discussion or debate. Not only was it imposed on the community without warning or invitation by 
Montes del Plata’s management. But residents’ new development trustee also arrived with a clear and 
already entrenched set of ideas and priorities embedded into its structure and mode of operation.  
The origin of these initial biases was the problematisation exercise that Montes del Plata’s CSR team 
undertook in the very early days of its investment. Since James Ferguson’s seminal study on the 
unsuccessful and often perverse outcomes of well-meaning development interventions, critical scholars 
have focused their attentions on the diagnostic process that frames such interventions (Ferguson 1994). 
Ostensibly, problematisation is concerned with identifying deficiencies in order that they might 
subsequently be corrected (Akor 2015). To assist in this exercise, Montes del Plata’s management 
contracted a consortium of accountancy firms to evaluate the social, environmental and economic 
impacts of its proposed mill.192 The socio-economic dimensions of the project fell to the Canadian firm 
EcoMetrix. Although the firm’s remit incorporated the province as a whole rather than just the micro-
region around the mill, its subsequent 164-page report included a modicum of baseline data about 
Conchillas.193 The auditor’s overall assessment errs strongly towards the positive. Key quality of life 
indicators, such as levels of poverty, literacy, child mortality and access to water and sanitation, were 
judged “relatively high” compared to other Latin American countries. The report cites Uruguay’s 
position in 46th place (out of 177 countries) on the United Nations’ Human Development Index (with a 
                                               
192 The consortium comprised Deloitte (Chile), PwC (Uruguay) and EcoMetrix (Canada). 
193 EcoMetrix. 2010. Celulosa y Energía. Punta Pereira. Evaluación de impacto ambiental y social. Informe 
preparado para: Montes del Plata. Available at: http://api.columnis.com/uploads/043/Documentos/archivos_ 
descargables_cepp_mainreport_-espanol.pdf?hash=. Accessed on 5 August 2017. 
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score of 0.83). Moreover, it notes that development indicators for the province of Colonia are among 
the highest in the country. The upbeat assessment extends to the potential impacts of the mill project, 
which are calculated to be generally favourable, especially with respect to the anticipated economic 
stimulus from short-term employment and increased demand for goods and services. While the report 
does identify community concerns regarding increased traffic, internal migration into the area and the 
possible introduction of timber plantations, no major development deficiency is highlighted.  
The diagnostic contracted by Montes del Plata’s management contains a number of in-built biases. Not 
only were the micro-region’s development needs relativised with the rest of the country and the wider 
region, but, more importantly, they were also assessed solely through the prism of the mill investment 
project. The core question was not, ‘Where was the community’s development deficient?’, but rather, 
‘What deficiencies could the mill project introduce?’ From the outset, therefore, development was cast 
as an exercise in mitigation of potential negatives rather than the fulfilment of development needs and 
aspirations.194 In anchoring development within the preoccupations and worldview of the company’s 
management rather than that of residents, the groundwork for a solution based on detachable CSR was 
already in train. 
The methodology of the auditors also begs serious questions as to the inclusivity of the report. Much of 
its qualitative detail relies on two separate surveys based on semi-structured interviews with 26 and 
“around 30” individuals, respectively.195 In addition to the troubling size of their survey sample, the 
representativeness of the informants is also concerning. In both cases, the interviewers rejected speaking 
to local residents in favour of delegates from local and departmental authorities, the private sector, the 
media, and social, religious and cultural organisations. The best indication that the report provides of 
the community’s development needs arises from the knock-on benefits that citizens hoped the pending 
mill project might bring. EcoMetrix’s report highlights two major aspirations on the part of the local 
community: the provision of improved sanitation infrastructure; and, better public services, particularly 
those related to banking, employment training, education and healthcare.196 Both areas are notable in 
that they fall squarely within the traditional trusteeship of the state. 
In its creation of the Forum, Montes del Plata’s CSR team wished to unequivocally express their 
employer’s commitment to community development. Indeed, the term (‘Desarrollo Comunitario’) was 
grafted into the mechanism’s full title, an indelible public statement of intent. Yet they were equally 
adamant that this commitment would not see the mill operator take on the full trusteeship of the state. 
                                               
194 In 2010, Montes del Plata contracted the public opinion firm CIFRA to survey 1,200 householders in Colonia 
province (including in the micro-region). However, the survey was not directed at assessing development needs 
or aspirations, but rather to evaluate public opinion about Montes del Plata and its project. The final report is not 
public, but the key findings are summarised in EcoMetrix’s 2010 report (pp.1:10-1:12). 
195 Both studies were completed during ENCE’s tenure. For summary details, see EcoMetrix 2010, pp.1-10. 
196 Ibid. 
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As was made abundantly clear in the town hall-style meeting with residents and the Intendente over the 
maintenance of the local road network (Chapter 1), the default position of the company’s management 
was to avoid assuming any of the state’s statutory obligations. To do so would incur considerable non-
operational costs that could continue indefinitely and that would certainly diminish the pulp producer’s 
future profitability. The company’s management was fearful of setting a precedent as well. ENCE’s 
experience proved prescient here. The Spanish operator had earned itself a reputation for cheque-book 
philanthropy. The result, according to one of Montes del Plata’s community staff, was that “the people 
just keep asking”. Such permanent reliance marks the antithesis of a detachable CSR strategy.  
Looming large behind the example of ENCE rose the spectre of Conchillas’ founding benefactor, 
Walker & Co. The legacy of the micro-region’s founder cast a long shadow over the whole 
problematisation process. This is not surprising: traces of Walker & Co. pervaded everything in 
Conchillas, from the empty hotel and under-used Protestant church to the thick-walled (and much-
prized) worker bungalows where inhabitants continue to reside today (see Figure 12). In its heyday, the 
company had been even more omnipresent. A British-owned mineral extraction firm, Walker & Co. 
won a profitable contract in 1887 from the City of Buenos Aires to to supply stone, sand and other 
construction materials in support of the Argentine capital’s ambitious public works programme. 
Conchillas was created as the firm’s administrative centre, designed in line with company towns such 
as Copley near Halifax (founded in 1849) and Saltaire near Bradford (1853). Popularised in the late 
Industrial Revolution, this model of urban industrial development was designed to maximise the 
concentration of capital and labour. As such, Walker and Co.’s employees were accommodated on site 
in company’s owned houses, where they had access to company-run healthcare facilities, outlet stores 
and education, coupled with a company-operated narrow gauge railway (the first of its kind in Uruguay) 
to transport them to work at the company’s quarries in Punta Pereira. The company even produced its 
own coinage – redeemable, naturally, in the company-owned store.197  
Less visible yet equally marked is the epoch’s imprint of the micro-region’s hyper-paternalistic former 
protector on the collective psychology of the micro-region. Most relevant to the problematisation 
exercise of Montes del Plata’s CSR team was the sense of historic dependency that they confidently 
asserted was pervasive among the local citizenry. According to the team’s diagnosis, development 
goods were viewed by residents as theirs by perennial right: i.e. not theirs by virtue of being tax-paying 
                                               
197 Workers’ social worlds were intentionally bound up in the life of the company, with recreational clubs, cultural 
institutions and religious activities all linked directly to Walker & Co. The church, the football club, the 
schoolhouse, the infirmary, the railway, the general store: all were paid for, built and overseen by the foreign 
quarry operator. As with all such company towns, the social hierarchy of the governing firm was also built into 
the infrastructure of Conchillas too, with designated areas exclusively for use by the management. The iconic 
example is the Conchillas ‘hotel’, a grand (and now uninhabited) property at the entrance to the village. The 
company’s managers used the property as a kind of gentleman’s club where they could socialise among 
themselves as well as entertain politicians, visiting dignitaries and other well-heeled guests. 
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citizens of the nation of Uruguay, as might commonly be assumed, but theirs as the privileged heirs of 
a benevolent corporate forebear. This was all “part of the idiosyncrasy that we bring from the English 
village,” the owner of one of Conchillas’ traditional bungalows told me. Her subsequent statement, 
which was repeated to me in almost identical terms over and again, makes explicit the connection 
between past and present:  
“Back then, the company did absolutely everything and the people just received. They gave them a 
house, they painted the walls, they cut the grass, they did absolutely everything. So they weren’t 
accustomed to doing anything. And many of these customs remain rooted in the people of the community. 
We don’t know. It’s just a theory some people have given the origins of the village.”  
 
               Figure 12 Street names in Conchillas, depicting its British heritage as a company town  
As per detachable CSR’s emphasis on reducing financial liabilities, the prospect of replicating Walker 
& Co.’s pattern of generous social expenditure was inimical to Montes del Plata’s investment model. 
This manifested itself in the antipathy of the company’s management towards historical comparisons 
between the two companies, as starkly demonstrated in the run-up to Conchillas’ 125th anniversary 
celebrations (held on 25 October 2012). Montes del Plata’s CSR team had contracted a Montevideo-
based anthropologist and museum curator to produce a public art exhibition illustrating the community’s 
history (Figure 13). She proposed telling the story of Conchillas’ industrial past through a series of 
installations in the courtyard of Casa Evans. The idea was accepted, although coolly. Under no 
circumstances was any parallel to be drawn between Montes del Plata and Walker & Co., she was told 
by the company’s Sustainability Director.  
Speaking to me privately some weeks after the anniversary event, the anthropologist-curator 
conjectured about the cause of this anxiety: 
“They [Montes del Plata] don’t want to stimulate the comparison between the two. They were afraid. 
[OB: Why?] I think because they do not consider themselves as the same. Neither the new patron nor 
the new saviour. The people see it that way. But they don’t want that . . . My proposal didn’t refer to this 
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theme, but they were still fearful that the people would interpret it that way. Despite the fact that I 
explained this comparison wasn’t my message, they remained worried. They said, ‘We don’t want them 
to associate us with Walker. Our company isn’t Walker.’”198  
 
Figure 13 125th Anniversary exhibition outside Casa Evans, funded by Montes del Plata  
The fears of Montes del Plata’s management were not without good cause. Over the decades, 
Conchillenses had developed an entrenched discourse of early privilege followed by prolonged 
abandonment.199 The state had failed to fill Walker & Co’s shoes, leaving the community nostalgically 
hanging on for a new private sector patron. As well as being widely repeated to me in private 
conversations, this view is captured in Conchillas’ semi-official history, written by local resident Julio 
Neves. The 75-page account describes the  “rigidez” (“rigidity”) with which the micro-region ran during 
the British era and the consequent characteristics of self-sacrifice (“sacrificados” and humility 
(“humilde”) shown by the company’s closely controlled workforce (Neves 2007:68 & 73).200 The 
                                               
198 Interview. 22 February 2013. 
199 In his personal, albeit rather sentimentalised, historical account of Conchillas, lifelong local resident Ovidio 
Berrutti praised the “co-fraternisation” that communal living and joint enterprise has helped created in this rural 
outpost (Berrutti 1979:22). Standing in sharp juxtaposition to this apparent virtue was the “indifference towards 
one’s closest neighbours” that he believed was evident in city life (ibid). Positive though Berrutti believed 
Conchillas’ isolated solidarity to have been, one might identify in it also the seeds of the community’s later 
abandonment complex (see Chapter 1). 
200 As Señor Neves describes in his account, the working day ran like clockwork, with operating hours from 07:00-
11:00 and 13:00-17:00 every day. Dynamite charges, meanwhile, occurred at 11:15 and 17:15 precisely. On 
Sunday, workers were expected at church. Independent modes of living and private enterprise were notably 
discouraged. Indeed, the neighbouring settlement of Pueblo Gil came into being precisely because no privately-
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divestment of Walker & Co. in the early 1950s precipitated a massive decline in the micro-region’s 
economic fortunes, leading to a “prolonged lethargy” after the British “exodus” (ibid. 68). The 
disappearance of the London-based quarrying firm did not eradicate the cultural “stamp of the English”, 
according to Señor Neves’s admittedly rose-tinted account, which ends with a dream of the micro-
region’s quarries once again “resounding to the song of work”. “Aquí esperamos,” the conclusion runs. 
“Here our hope lies” (ibid: 74).  
Conchillas’ fierce attachment to its industrial heritage and its wistful desire to somehow resurrect this 
highly particularised history in the present age profoundly coloured the perspective of Montes del 
Plata’s CSR team towards the micro-region’s development challenges. It is crucial to note that Señor 
Neves published his history some years before there was any suggestion of a pulp mill being located in 
the vicinity. The peculiarity of a community located in one of Uruguay’s most fertile agricultural regions 
wishing for an industrial solution to its long-standing economic stagnation was noted by Daniel 
Biagioni. A professional sociologist, Señor Biagioni had conducted a series of workshops in and around 
Conchillas in the mid 2000s on behalf the Latin American Centre of Human Economics (‘CLAEH’ 
hitherto), a Montevideo-based non-profit organisation.201 The most surprising comment he remembered 
from his many interviews and interactions with Conchillenses at that time was from a community leader, 
who declared that “the only thing that can save us is a big company”. At that time, the community’s 
great hope had been the construction of a new port in Puerto Ingles. As Señor Biagioni recalled in a 
private conversation with me:  
“In 2005, those who were concerned about the development of the area were thinking only about the 
past . . . The discourse back then was that if the government wouldn’t come to help them, then another 
company needed to come. And this was before anyone had even heard of Stora Enso [Montes del Plata’s 
co-owner].”   
In light of this historic expectation, it is not an exaggeration to describe the arrival of ENCE (and, later, 
of Montes del Plata) as an extremely propitious answer to residents’ developmental hopes. Less 
propitious was the attitude of Montes del Plata’s CSR division towards this popular sentiment. In our 
private discussions, the company’s Sustainability Director was unabashed about her determination that 
the mill operator should detach itself from the weight of paternalistic expectations. Her rationale had a 
strong economic logic to it. Adopting the position of corporate patron, as per Walker & Co., would 
cement the prospect of ongoing philanthropic contributions that could prove never-ending, she argued. 
As she stated to me in no uncertain terms: 
                                               
owned businesses or organisations were permitted to be set up in Conchillas without the company’s explicit 
permission. 
201 The Centro Latinoamericano de Economía Humana (CLAEH) is a non-profit organization specializing in 
community development. http://claeh.edu.uy 
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“What we knew is that Conchillas had a history of having a paternal relationship with the company 
Walker that was the founder of Conchillas . . . So what we did was give a strong message from the 
beginning. If not, what would have happened? You arrive there and you’re like the new company, the 
new father. So you will have one coming here and asking for the public square to be remodelled, 
someone else asking for English classes and someone else asking for improvements in lighting.”  
In line with her advocacy of a detachable CSR position, the Director’s statement conveys the entrenched 
aversion she felt towards assuming unsecured financial liabilities. Both herself and her senior 
management colleagues could not have been unaware that accepting the community’s development 
aspirations highlighted in EcoMetrix’s report would result in precisely the scenario they instinctively 
wished to avoid. Were they to have conceded that poor public services lay at the root of Conchillas’s 
development deficiencies, for instance, it would have been harder to reject community demands such 
as the provision of a public crèche, the restoration of Casa Evans or the maintenance of a local 
ambulance service – three investments that regularly cropped up on residents’ wish-lists.   
That said, if we are to take the community development concerns of Montes del Plata’s CSR team 
seriously, then it is also necessary to take seriously their efforts at problematisation. So when they 
pinpointed the micro-region’s unique culture of paternalism as being the chief drag on its development, 
they did so not (or not only) as a pre-emptive strike against the threat of excessive and ongoing social 
expenditure in the future. They did so because they genuinely believed that the community’s origin 
myth was deleterious to progress. So entrenched was the community’s attachment to its self-image as a 
protected group that the micro-region showed itself to be incapable of moving forwards of its own 
accord. Educated in the logic of neoliberalism and competition, this was the thinking of Montes del 
Plata’s CSR staff. They looked with horror on the model of past corporate-community relations, where 
development goods delivered in exchange for social acquiescence and submission. According to the 
representatives of Uruguay’s largest ever foreign investor, decades of clinging to this colonial 
anachronism had stripped away the local population’s aspirations of self-improvement and belittled 
their entrepreneurial drive. Trapped under the yoke of historic paternalism, Conchillenses had become 
bereft of private initiative and unable to conceive of any form of development other than that granted 
from outside. Such was final assessment of Montes del Plata’s CSR team.   
As Teresa, one of the two community managers, explained to me: “You need to understand that this 
community arose through an English company ... they lived very well, but that was a long time ago and 
they’ve since been left behind, forgotten. The company [Walker & Co.] used to give them food, 
transport, everything, and now they have nothing. It costs a lot to do things for the community and the 
Intendencia has not given very much.” 
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Question marks may well have hung over the scientific rigour with which Montes del Plata’s CSR team 
arrived at its conclusion. Concerns about their employer being falsely perceived as the new Walker & 
Co. undoubtedly influenced the team’s calculations. Yet their minds were firmly made up and the 
problematisation exercise was drawn to a close. Engrained paternalism was the community’s problem, 
the CSR team had resolved, and their field staff were on hand to rectify the issue.  
3.1.2 Rendering development technical  
To arrive at a solution, however, the company’s in-house CSR experts had to “render technical” the 
problem that they themselves had identified (Li 2007). Tanya Murray Li describes the phrase as “short-
hand for what is actually a whole set of practices concerned with representing ‘the domain to be 
governed as an intelligible field with specifiable limits and particular characteristics . . . defining 
boundaries, rendering that within them visible, assembling information about that which is included 
and devising techniques to mobilize the forces and entities thus revealed.’” (2007:7).202 Her description 
explicitly recognises her debt to Nikolas Rose’s work on government through community (Rose 1999). 
Rose’s main preoccupation was to show how the state went about creating the institution of community 
so as to subsequently impose its will upon it. He stresses how the forces of community are mobilised 
by experts such that community members become “governable subjects”203 who subsequently define 
their identities, ethics and behaviours in a manner that is propitious to state control.  
It is not my proposition that Montes del Plata’s management was embarking on such an extensive plan. 
Its intent at the outset was not to transform the entire society of Conchillas so that it could exert its will 
as a state actor might – what James Scott defines as “authoritarian high modernism”.204 A more accurate 
description would be a commercial actor that has had the trusteeship for development thrust upon it by 
a combination of state failure and its need for social and political legitimacy. Its pursuit of development 
must be understood within this context. As with the state institutions studied by Rose and others,205 this 
required the pulp producer’s CSR team to develop an intervention or series of interventions based on 
techniques and solutions available to them as experts.  
Considering the context outlines above, the motivations of Montes del Plata’s CSR executives for 
adopting such a strategy were never voluntary. Moreover, their goals were extremely modest from the 
outset. The level of development delivered had to be just enough to evince credibility and demonstrate 
willing on their employer’s part, but not so much as to endanger the pulp manufacturer’s short or long-
term economic interests. Furthermore, there was never any question that the parameters for the delivery 
                                               
202 For a fuller description of what it is to render development challenges as technical, see Li 2007:123-155. 
203 Rose 1999:xxii. 
204 Scott 1998:154. 
205 See: Sharma & Gupta 2006. 
 
 
  140 
  
 
of community development would be anything but unilaterally prescribed and controlled by the 
company’s management alone. The company’s interests would therefore always remain at the forefront, 
hopefully in accommodation with those of the community but never secondary to them. Together, these 
were the ground rules permitted by the neoliberal mode of thinking that characterised Montes del Plata’s 
executives and that shaped the company’s instinctively top-down, internalised approach to planning. 
The exercise of the CSR team’s expertise had to occur within this bounded framework. As seriously as 
the managers’ development efforts should be viewed, they were never unrestricted but were rather 
always materially constrained and ideologically directed.  
Consistent with both the diagnosis by Montes del Plata’s CSR agents and the precepts of detachable 
CSR, the team set out to design a solution to the problem of historic paternalism. They located their 
answer in its inverse: self-improvement. If the community was to develop, it faced one of two options. 
It could either wait for the state or another external actor (of which Uruguay’s largest foreign investor 
seemed to it to be the ideal candidate) to step in, or it could step up itself. Montes del Plata’s CSR 
experts plumped for the second.  
Teresa, the community manager charged with co-ordinating the Forum, offered me a comprehensive 
presentation on the activities of the Forum during my initial weeks in the field. She explained its 
rationale in the following terms:  
“It is important that they [the local community] manage their own development. They need to define 
their own projects for themselves. It is a community that is used to having things given to it, or asking 
and not having them given. The company [Montes del Plata] cannot give them all they want. It is not 
the philosophy of the company. It is not Papá Noel [Father Christmas]. Furthermore, they get pride for 
working for themselves. That way they can turn their demands into projects.”  
The description contains the two core features of the solution developed by Montes del Plata’s CSR 
experts, both prime examples of detachable CSR theory in action. The first relates to the management 
of their own development, what the company’s CSR team referred to as “auto-gestionarse”. A reflexive 
verb, ‘gestionarse’ literally translates as “to manage oneself”. The action is enclosed, self-containing, 
independent of any other actor other than the individual to which it refers. Just in case the autonomous 
nature of the term was not sufficiently clear, the pre-fix ‘auto’ (‘self’) is added by way of emphasis. 
This is an action to be undertaken unequivocally by the individual involved, ideally free of external 
help, involvement or interference.     
Akin to empowerment, the self-management strategy advocated by Montes del Plata’s CSR team 
positions the individual citizen at the heart of the development narrative. It is those in need of 
development, not those with the capacity to provide it, who become the “cornerstones of sustainable 
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development”, as Catherine Dolan and Dinah Rajak put it (Dolan & Rajak 2016:6). Montes del Plata is 
far from unique in promoting such an approach. Under the banner of CSR, multinational investors 
frequently elect to lend a hand with capacity-building initiatives, skills training, seed funding and other 
activities designed to stimulate local development (Fleming & Jones 2013, Rajak 2011). Yet the onus 
of such programmes remains fixedly on citizens themselves to make good their own advancement and 
that of their communities. In this respect, self-management shares much with other emerging ‘best 
practices’ within the modern CSR movement, such as social enterprise, micro-entrepreneurship and fair 
trade (Visser 2013; Idowu et al. 2013). A guiding telos of all these market-based approaches is to abolish 
any notion of entitlement. Development must be earned, not gifted. The injunction is on citizens to seize 
opportunities proffered through empowerment programmes and similar schemes to help themselves. 
The second key feature of the CSR team’s problem-solving approach is that of project-making (‘hacer 
un proyecto’), described by Teresa as turning ‘demands into projects’. Paternalism is vague in its 
timetabling and inconsistent in its delivery. Recipients get what they are given. It is not theirs to question 
or request. The temporal, material and conceptual characteristics of the gift are all in the hands of the 
gift-bearer. In conceiving as development goods as ‘projects’, rather than ‘demands’, such goods 
become objects over which recipients’ agency can be exerted. As with any project, they can be planned 
out and shaped to their creator’s own design. Just as development has its limits, so projects are not 
infinite in their ambitions or proportions. They are bounded by the availability of necessary resources. 
With a full inventory of resources in hand, however, one can start the process of planning and plotting 
out the transformation of an intangible idea into a concrete reality - much as one would go about 
enacting a project for a techno-industrial pulp mill in a rural corner of Uruguay, in actual fact.  
Although the corporation may be in retreat, it is not absent from such project-making processes. Giving 
citizens the necessary ‘herramientas’ (‘tools’, a favourite word of Montes del Plata’s community staff) 
to develop themselves, corporate agents are passing on the expertise that they assume is both unique to 
them and beneficial to their recipients. However well-meaning (or not) such an action and whatever the 
nature of the tools, such a transfer comes laden with profound power assumptions that carry important 
implications for future relations. As a minimum, the provision of ‘expert’ tools creates a separation 
between the company as the holder of such expertise, and the other (the community) as the group upon 
which such expertise must be exercised. In the development context, it also opens the possibility of 
corporations presenting themselves as architects of community development while simultaneously 
detaching themselves from the long-term provision of services or assistance. Drawing on her own 
ethnographic study of corporate-community relations in Bangladesh, Katy Gardner uses the term 
“disconnect development” to describe this act of corporate retreat through the promotion of civic self-
management. It is difficult to conceive of a clearer example of detachable CSR in practice: the donor 
withdraws, but the work of development (that the company’s agents themselves put in train) continues. 
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In this respect, CSR managers share the oft-repeated cliché among development workers of wanting to 
“put themselves out of a job”.206 Redundancy, for donors, becomes a virtue. In contrast, for those in 
need of development goods, virtue lies in the hard and uncertain task of developing oneself.  
To better appreciate how Montes del Plata’s CSR team engineered a scenario in which local residents 
were tasked to “manage their own development” and to “turn their demands into projects”, let us return 
briefly to the ceremony in Conchillas’ main plaza. After her brief introductory comments, Joanna had 
invited the assembled crowd to watch a short film depicting the work of the Forum. Accompanied by a 
jaunty soundtrack, the the promotional video comprised a montage of participant interviews and footage 
from group meetings. These meetings, which were conducted in various back rooms of Casa Evans, 
gave the Forum its organising framework and it was through them that the expert tools of development 
were imparted.  
As the film’s producers diligently evidenced, the Forum began with several introductory sessions, on 
the completion of which the Forum’s participants broke into sub-groups of three to eight people. These 
subgroups met a couple of times per month on average, with each meeting last several hours or more. 
The number of sub-groups varied initially, but settled out at seven. The purpose of the sub-groups’ 
meetings was for Forum participants to formulate “sustainable community development” projects of 
their own design. Once they had drawn up their project plans, these were submitted to Montes del 
Plata’s CSR team and, if approved, they would receive between US$8,000 and US$17,000 in secured 
funding from the mill operator. 
The accompanying script provided residents with a partial summary of the philosophy that lay behind 
the delivery tools of Montes del Plata’s flagship CSR initiative. In a filmed interview, Teresa led 
residents to understand that the Forum would provide a “space for everyone in Conchillas and its 
surrounding community to organise themselves and to work towards achieving their own needs.” The 
emphasis on development goods emerging from the ‘work’ of the community, rather than as a gift of 
the company, is pronounced. So too is the possessive nature of the output: it was ‘their own needs’ that 
would be met through the company’s CSR programme. But what form should this work take? And how 
should the community’s own needs be determined? The phrase is revelatory in both these respects. The 
Forum would first provide a ‘space for everyone’; that’s to say, the work would be collective and 
participatory in nature. Second, it would be organised. True, the statement suggests that this organisation 
would be participant-led, yet, given the controlling agency of Montes del Plata’s CSR team, even the 
process of self-organisation needs rules and guiding parameters.  
                                               
206 The Guardian. 2017. ‘Working myself out of a job: lessons from leading Invisible Children.’ 17 December 
2015. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2015/dec/17/working-myself-
out-of-a-job-lessons-from-leading-invisible-children. Accessed 4 November 2016 
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In apparent good faith (but no less ironic for it), the company’s Sustainability Director and her 
colleagues had devised a system for delivering self-management (‘auto-gestión’) that relied heavily on 
citizen participation and a corporate-designed bureaucracy. The following sections examine the 
capacity of these two guiding features of the company’s flagship CSR approach to seemingly attach and 
yet at the same time detach Montes del Plata from the process of local development. 
3.2. Participation: distance-making effects 
 
In the back room of Casa Evans, Beatriz sat at the far end of an inexpensive boardroom-style table. It 
was just before 4pm. Above her, a long-armed fan turned lethargically on its hinges. The room’s only 
window was ajar, assisting the fan with the paltriest of breezes.  
In her late thirties, Beatriz was a community development expert with CLAEH, the Montevideo-based 
non-profit that had been leading workshops in the area prior to ENCE’s arrival. After designing the 
Forum model, Montes del Plata’s CSR team had contracted CLAEH as an ‘independent third party’ to 
coordinate the initiative on its behalf. On my arrival in the field, Beatriz was working as the Forum’s 
coordinator, a job she fulfilled with the support of two assistants, Camila and Micaela (see Figure 14).207 
“So, how are we ‘chiquilines’?” Beatriz asked the group, using the affectionate but somewhat 
patronising term for ‘kids’ (akin to ‘kiddiwinks’ in English). The four residents in the room all 
acknowledged her salutation with smiles, and then fell silent as they waited in readiness for the 
discussion ahead. The four comprised two middle-aged adults and two people of retirement age from 
nearby Pueblo Gil and its nearby environs. Together, they made up one of the seven sub-groups that 
comprised the Forum. In the first twelve months of the Forum, they had been working on a plan to 
restore the recreation park in Pueblo Gil, Conchillas’s neighbouring village. Their proposed project 
envisioned repairs to the children’s play area, improvements to the surface of the small football pitch, 
the installation of a low perimeter railing and the provision of some basic outdoor lighting. It was one 
of the three projects to have been approved so far. At the handover ceremony three months beforehand, 
Montes del Plata’s regional CSR manager had handed over a cheque for around US$12,0000 on behalf 
of her employer. The group had been assured that a second payment of around US$5,000 would be 
dispersed on submission of receipts and other related documentation.  
As with all the Forum’s project groups, the consortium for the Pueblo Gil project met roughly every 
fortnight. They had completed the first tranche of work but were struggling to get satisfactory 
paperwork from one of their suppliers. The sub-groups members were concerned that the receipts would 
                                               
207 In her late twenties, Camila was a literature teacher from Juan Lacaze, a city in the south of Colonia province. 
She had also worked with Daniel Biagioni on CLAEH’s previous workshop programme. Micaela was a forty-
something architect based on Uruguay’s West coast, who drove across the country for the Forum meetings. Both 
were employed by CLAEH on a freelance basis for the purposes of the Forum. 
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not be forthcoming and the project would get tangled up in bureaucracy. The afternoon meeting had 
been arranged to discuss progress and to sort out payment of the remaining grant monies.  
The Pueblo Gil sub-group was one of several that I followed closely during my first period of field 
research.208 As usual, the meeting was long and laboured. Beatriz, with her friendly “chiquilines” 
salutations, did her best to tease out some resolutions from the discussions that went back and forth 
between the villagers. Rarely did she cut short participants or directly point out the flaws in their 
suggestions or lines of argument. Instead, proposals and ideas were given space to be formulated, aired 
and talked through in a group setting. The Forum coordinator actively encouraged such discussion, 
drawing in quieter participants and listening in a patient, deliberative manner. At critical junctures, she 
would interject with a piece of advice, often expressed through open-ended questions. “Have you 
thought about this…?” she might suggest. Or “Let’s put this aside for now…” She had, it seemed, a 
professional commitment to remain consistently amiable and well-meaning. 
3.2.1 Unintended consequences: extending dependency & shrinking development  
Despite her efforts to make the Forum process constructive and non-confrontational, however, the 
participative approach to development as mediated by CLAEH was not without its drawbacks. The first, 
and most ironic, was the negative effect it had on actual participation. In the Forum’s first year, Beatriz 
and her colleagues clocked up 40 sub-group meetings and 10 plenary meetings. Each lasted anywhere 
between one and three hours, and the majority occurred during working hours. From a purely practical 
perspective, anyone with a full-time job or caring responsibilities struggled to find the time to attend. 
As one working mother with school-aged children told me: “I’d like to get involved, but what with work 
and the kids there’s no time left.” It was a sentiment echoed by many in her age bracket and with her 
family circumstances.  
 
Even for those who did have time on their hands, the meetings were often felt to be laborious and slow-
moving. “It’s like turning over cheese” was the colourful description that one elderly female participant 
gave me of the first few Forum meetings. Another participant offered a slightly more fulsome account: 
“I grew bored of going to the meetings. They are the same every time. Maybe they asked CLAEH to 
keep the population busy, I don’t know? Time is passing and we’re just listening to the same thing.” 
Both villagers quickly withdrew from the Forum. After a year, less than one third of the 60 or so 
villagers who had attended the introductory meetings were still involved - hardly a quorum for genuine 
community-led development.   
                                               
208 The Forum had discontinued by the time of my return visit. 
 





Figure 14 Beatriz, the CLAEH coordinator, leading a Forum workshop 
 
A second worrying implication of CLAEH’s mediation role over the participative Forum process was 
to implicitly enforce, rather than diffuse, the micro-region’s dependency culture. The Forum’s 
workshop-style meetings represented only one part of the work of Beatriz and her colleagues. Behind 
the scenes, they busied themselves helping participants formulate their projects. This involved 
everything from intervening with a government agency on a sub-group’s behalf, or obtaining 
comparable quotes from suppliers, through to assistance with the actual write-up of project proposals. 
Throughout the process, Montes del Plata’s CSR managers were putting pressure on CLAEH to deliver 
a set of actionable project proposals. Despite months of seeking to impart the basics of project 
management, it was Beatriz’s firm opinion that the villagers remained incapable of developing projects 
independently.  
During a private conversation after one particularly lengthy meeting, she asked meeting to imagine 
what would happen if the Forum’s participants were given US$3 million. “They wouldn’t know what to 
do with that kind of money,” she hypothesised. The problem “is not an issue of money”, she insisted, 
but a lack of knowledge and experience. It was as if the participating residents were infant beginners in 
a swimming class, slowly inching forward into the shallow end of project management yet still in need 
of constant instruction from the poolside. “You need to know how to manage a project, write a project, 
be accountable for the spending.” Her message to participants: don’t go taking off your armbands just 
yet.  
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Accurate or not, Beatriz’s critical assessment of the residents’ capacity levels exemplifies the 
unintended consequences of the ‘expert’ involvement in the development process. Despite Beatriz’s 
personal charms, no-one in the room was in any doubt of the professionalism of CLAEH’s lead 
representative. She dressed in office-wear, spoke self-assuredly, and demonstrated ready familiarity 
with Excel, Powerpoint and related computer software - all in stark contrast to most of the participants. 
To emphasise her expertise, she was constantly flanked by her assistants Camila and Micaela, whose 
role was to take notes and advise on project specifics but whose near-silent presence served to 
accentuate CLEAH’s professional authority and, by extension, that of Beatriz. That participants, as non-
experts, should defer to Beatriz and her colleagues represented a natural impulse on the part of the 
Conchillenses involved in the Forum. In this sense, every two steps forward towards self-management 
marked one step back towards dependency.  
The Forum’s participative focus also gave rise to a third concerning phenomenon. Not only did 
participation appear to leave the community partly detached from its own development process (either 
through non-participation in the Forum or through CLAEH’s expert presence), it also detached the 
community from alternative modes of civic participation. For all its fanfare, the Forum was not the 
micro-region’s first experiment in community-led development planning. In 2005, a group of residents 
had created a formal civil society organisation called the Comisión de Amigos de Conchillas (‘Friends 
of Conchillas Commission’). Much like the Forum, the organisation’s stated mission was to design and 
execute projects of general community benefit. Without capital reserves of its own or a ready source of 
finance, its list of actual accomplishments was minimal. When Montes del Plata’s acquisition of 
ENCE’s assets was announced, the Commission only numbered about five or six active members. Their 
focus had narrowed too. From community development in general, it had become focused almost 
exclusively on plans to renovate Casa Evans. Even here, its plans remained at blueprint stage.  
For Montes del Plata’s CSR agents to execute their chosen strategy for the micro-region’s development, 
an uncontested terrain was required. How could residents acquire its expert tools of self-management 
if they affiliated themselves with a participative process other than that of the company? The micro-
region was only big enough for one participation-based development initiative – and if citizens were to 
participate in the Forum, as Montes del Plata’s CSR team wished, then it meant preferably not 
participating in another.  
Montes del Plata’s CSR managers first began by trying to win over the Comisión de Amigos to their 
cause. The organisation’s leaders described how the pulp manufacturer held several consultations with 
them prior to the Forum’s creation. Their advice was asked and discussions about possible future 
collaboration were had. It was with “considerable surprise and shock”, therefore, that the leadership 
received news of the establishment by the CSR team of a parallel organisation with very similar goals. 
When the Comisión de Amigos  subsequently submitted a request for help with the restoration of Casa 
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Evans, “the company distanced itself”.209 The leadership consequently made it known that they would 
not participate in the Forum, but would continue with their existing structure.  
According to the Comisión de Amigos, this precipitated a “smear campaign” against the group aimed 
at “neutralising”210 its influence. Montes del Plata’s CSR managers denied any calculated plan to 
undermine the Forum’s predecessor. True or not, the company’s community representatives were 
certainly not above criticising their rival development entity. Among the disparaging remarks that I 
personally heard included descriptions of the Comisión de Amigos as a “clique” and an organisation 
dominated by “vested interests” that “never held public meetings”, that “generated conflicts” and, 
heavens above, “managed everything by WhatsApp”. Such remarks caught on. Soon after the Forum 
had been set up, some residents had even come to refer to the denigrated organisation as the ‘Comisión 
de Enemigos de Conchillas’ (‘The Commission of the Enemies of Conchillas’). The nail in the coffin 
for the organisation’s leaders was the decision to contract CLAEH. The conceptual and administrative 
origins of the Comisión de Amigos were rooted in the workshops that the Montevideo-based non-profit 
organisation had led half-a-dozen years beforehand. The leaders talked of their “hurt” at having been 
“betrayed” by their former advisors.211  
In these various respects, the CSR team’s chief mechanism for delivering local community development 
conforms to now well-honed critiques of participation. The participative turn in international 
development has occupied the critical attentions of anthropologists and development scholars since it 
emerged almost three decades ago as a mainstay of development orthodoxy (Williams 2004). Now, the 
same preoccupations are shifting into the private sector as the theme of participation emerges as a core 
tenet of contemporary CSR management (Maclagan 1999). From the plethora of ‘multi-stakeholder’ 
initiatives that provide CSR with much of its regulatory architecture (such as the UN Global Compact, 
of which Montes del Plata is a signatory) through to local NGO-business alliances, the onus on 
collaboration and cooperation is endemic (Garsten & Jacobsson 2007). 
Early critics noted how frequently participative development approaches fell short of their promise of 
being bottom-up and open.212 More recent scholarship is strongly influenced by James Ferguson’s 
classic work on development protocols and practices as an ‘anti-politics machine’ (Ferguson 1994). By 
                                               
209 Interview with Ganiela Fonte, 11 December 2012. “When Montes del Plata first came, they asked us about 
everything. They came to us for whatever question and we gave them them everything. However, when we started 
demanding things, the company distanced itself.” 
210 Interview with Ganiela Fonte, board member of the Comisión de Amigos. 3 February 2016: “What we’ve 
always said is that some of us in the Comisión de Amigos were a thorn in the side for them [Montes del Plata]. 
We always pointed out their mistakes, and we were the only ones who weren’t like everyone else saying that they 
were the only good thing [for the village]. We alone marked its progress step by step and what the rules said, and 
we alone put forward what the community wanted. So that in a way is what made them keep us in their sights. 
Their strategy was to neutralise us … but we’re the only group that has stayed firm.” 
211 Interview with Adriana Alonso, board member of the Comisión de Amigos. 30 January 2016. 
212 See: Nelson & Wright 1995; Mosse 1995; Goebbel 1998; Biggs 1995. 
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focusing on civic involvement, Ferguson showed how advocates of participation fail to acknowledge 
or challenge the wider power structures in which local participants operate and the economic 
prerogative by which they are bound. Traces of the same disregard are evident in modern business-
charity partnerships, as revealed by corporate ethnographers such as Katy Gardner et al. (2012), Dinah 
Rajak (2011) and Johanna Sydow (2016a).  
Of particular relevance to this case is the role played by CLAEH as facilitator in helping to perpetuate 
the power structures that lie behind the Forum, as opposed to allowing such power to be distributed or 
dispersed. CLAEH’s representatives were not responsible for hard-wiring the initiative’s hegemonic 
bias: it is there in the centralised, participation-based design of the original model for the Forum. In 
creating a collective space where public discussion could be carried out and group decisions could be 
made, the CSR team was enacting a classic co-optation technique known as ‘channelling’ (Coy & 
Hedeen 2005). A catch-all term for a range of activities, channelling describes efforts by dominant 
actors to divert and ultimately co-opt real or potential antagonists or challengers. The effective side-
lining of those who chose not to participate in the Forum and the forced isolation of the Comisión de 
Amigos represent two cruder examples of participation’s channelling effects. If participation is the door 
through which citizens must pass to obtain CSR-led development, then non-participation is an act of 
self-exclusion or self-detachment from CSR’s promise of development. The blame falls on the citizen 
for not participating, not on the company’s agents (or their employer) for designing a door through 
which citizens may not wish to pass or cannot pass.  
3.2.2 Bureaucracy: the bringing of ‘order’ 
Once entrance has been negotiated to the participation process, a second phase of detachment then 
occurred. The establishment of the Forum had successfully streamed community energies into a single, 
closely governed body, thus allowing those directing that body to have the opportunity to concentrate 
their persuasion efforts and shape parameters for debate. In Montes del Plata’s case, its chief means for 
exerting such influence was as strikingly effective as it was seemingly benign: bureaucracy. 
Montes del Plata’s CSR team did not see it in these terms. To their mind, placing innumerable rules for 
how the Forum would work and setting standards for how projects should be drawn up was not about 
the reinforcement of power or the shaping of civic imaginaries of development. It was simply about 
good management. If the micro-region’s residents were to learn how to bring about their own 
development projects for themselves, then they would need to get organised. For a huge and complex 
industrial operation like a pulp mill, organisation was everything. Success in Montes del Plata’s world, 
bound as it was by the hard and fast laws of physics, business and government regulation, lay in 
establishing clear plans of action and then executing them with precision. By imposing a bureaucratic 
structure around the Forum, it was merely acting to type.  
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The word for Montes del Plata’s CSR experts was ‘order’. Speaking to me in the company’s Montevideo 
headquarters, the Director of Sustainability described the foundational intent of the Forum in the 
following terms: “So what we did there was design, with the help of CLAEH, this Forum - the original 
intention [of which] was to put some order in the requests of the community.”213 Participation would be 
central in this process, she clarified. The Forum was to be a “space where they [the community] could 
debate internally and prioritise internally”. To debate, however, one ideally needs guidelines as to the 
issues at stake. To prioritise, one needs criteria against which to judge the relative importance of those 
issues. Quickly, a bureaucratic structure is born. Again, Montes del Plata’s CSR executives saw space 
for debate as a virtue and instituted it as a core aspect of their effort to impart self-management. Indeed, 
the commitment to participative debate appears in the very first of the Forum’s five stated objectives: 
“to organise and develop community ideas, based on methodological tools”.214  
 
As the Forum process unfolded, it became clear that a large proportion of the ‘tools’ that Montes del 
Plata’s CSR team had in mind were bureaucratic in nature. As well as the internal debates of which the 
company’s Sustainable Director was so keen, every meeting of the Forum’s sub-groups was also 
characterised by extensive form-filling and paper-shuffling. Project plans required documenting, grant 
applications needed approving, receipts necessitated checking, amendments demanded authorising. 
Before long, Forum participants would attend meetings carrying large folders full of all the papers they 
had amassed during their months of attendance. Overseeing and controlling the bureaucratic process 
was the Forum’s administrator, CLAEH. Much of the organisation’s labours in this respect fell to 
Beatriz’s two assistants, who spent a good part of the sub-group meetings silently taking notes and 
checking forms. Between meetings, this information would be transferred into Excel sheets that Beatriz 
would use to monitor progress. From this would be born future to-do lists for participants and update 
reports for Montes del Plata.  
The full weight of bureaucracy imposed on the Forum’s participants became evident to me during one 
of my regular visits to Raquel’s house. A Conchillas resident of retirement age, Raquel had been heavily 
involved in the Forum, participating in up to three different sub-groups at one stage. After the Forum 
ceased (in late 2014, after two years), she emerged as an exemplar of the initiative’s success. The 
company’s CSR team spoke enthusiastically about an annual cake-making competition that the 
energetic grandmother had set up. The third iteration of the competition, which had just occurred when 
I returned to the field in late 2015, took place in the upmarket Colonia West hotel and had attracted 
entrants from across the country (see Figure 15).  
                                               
213 Interview. 13 March 2013. 
214 Cited in a PowerPoint Presentation given by CLAEH’s facilitator Beatriz on 16 December 2012. 
 





Figure 15 Colonia West Hotel, Puerto Inglés’ deluxe new tourist offering 
 
Pitched as an evocation of Conchillas’ English heritage, the competition had grown out of a prior 
initiative established by Raquel through the Forum. Together with two elderly friends, she had 
successfully launched a project to establish a tea shop in Conchillas. The enterprise proved to be ill-
judged, however, premised as it was on an influx of tourists to the village following the mill’s 
inauguration. The tourists never arrived and, after less than a year, the tea shop closed its doors. It was 
shortly afterwards that Raquel came up with her proposal for the cake-making competition, which she 
launched with the help of a one-off donation of US$ 300 from Montes del Plata.   
Reflecting on her experience of the Forum in early 2016, Raquel recalled a number of false starts. An 
avid collector of postcards, she had initially set her heart on establishing a postcard museum in her 
house. It took a number of months, going back and forth with the Forum’s moderators, to persuade her 
that this might not be as compelling a tourist attraction as she thought. A subsequent proposal to improve 
the village’s tourist infrastructure by building some public lavatories also came to nothing, this time 
because of concerns about maintenance costs. Eventually, she and her fellow sub-group members struck 
on the idea for a tea shop, which gradually took shape in 2014, during the Forum’s second year of 
operations. As we sat in her kitchen chatting over coffee, the recently widowed Raquel was bubbling 
with enthusiasm. Fresh from the success of the third annual cake-making competition and with the 
disappointment of the tea-shop’s failure behind her, she was considering plans to develop a new 
competition in mind, this time for gardening.  
Early during our conversation, Raquel had got up from the table and walked to a low cupboard set 
against the wall. Pulling open the large top drawer, she had removed two large piles of papers and a full 
ring-binder folder. As she described her involvement in the Forum, she dug out items from the pile to 
illustrate different stages of the process. The many documents she retrieved over the course of our 
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conversation included introductory materials about the Forum, guidelines on project planning from 
CLAEH, sheets printed with meeting agendas, cost estimates from suppliers, receipts for the purchase 
of goods and services, correspondence with government agencies and service providers, marketing 
materials and much else besides. She was keen to stress the lessons she had gained in developing a 
project (“hacer un proyecto”), the core goal of the Forum’s self-management objectives. Her hand 
reached for a collection of administrative forms printed on A4 paper. Each ran to eight pages. “We 
learned to fill in the necessary forms,” Raquel explained. She even allowed herself a small boast, telling 
me how she managed to complete the task “without even using a computer”.  
As she elaborated on her form-filling expertise, however, it became evident that she viewed project-
making almost exclusively as a bureaucratic endeavour. The forms were there to be mastered in order 
for funds to be released from Montes del Plata. The value of the paperwork as a pedagogic exercise in 
project planning beyond the confines of the Forum were lost on her. I asked if she felt confident she 
could initiate an idea like the tea shop or cake-making competition without the support of the company’s 
CSR managers. Her response was frank: “Probably not”.  
As Annelise Riles argues, bureaucracy – and the documents that emerge out of it – represents an 
instrument of political and ideological control that carries with it the potential to shape both individual 
persons and society at large (Riles 2006). Montes del Plata’s CSR staff were already on record as 
viewing the Forum as a way to “put some order” into community requests and to “turn the list of 
[community] demands into projects”. So what happened to community demands as they were put 
through the company’s project-making bureaucracy? How were the development imaginaries of 
residents such as Raquel changed and reshaped when subjected to the ‘ordering’ of the Forum’s 
documentation?   
One of the most obvious and consistent effects of the Forum’s bureaucratic process was to diminish the 
size and ambition of residents’ development hopes. Like a science fiction-style minaturisation machine, 
community aspirations entered the project-planning system established by the Forum only to emerge as 
a fraction of their original selves. In the way of bureaucratic process, they did so ‘naturally’ and non-
violently. Embedded within the forms over which Raquel claimed such mastery were project-planning 
principles such as resource efficiency, value for money, budgetary control and long-term sustainability 
that carried an air of everyday orthodoxy. For executive decision-makers in an engineering-minded 
company of Montes del Plata’s size and sophistication, the adoption of a logically appraised approach 
to new projects in which each successive step was identified and evaluated ahead of time hardly merited 
a second’s thought. The company’s operations managers at the mill similarly treated this mode of 
working as everyday orthodoxy. Montes del Plata’s CSR team came from the same stock. Yes, their end 
goal was the delivery of development goods rather than cellulose pulp, but the same fundamentals of 
project planning still applied. Hence, the step-by-step design of the Forum’s project-making documents. 
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For each stage of participants’ wished-for project, an empty text box was provided on the Microsoft 
Word-formatted planning document into which detailed information had to be inputted: needs 
assessment, community objectives, overall timetable, itemised budget, project outputs, opportunities 
for matched funding, future revenue streams and so forth. Where necessary, corroborating 
documentation was also required, such as official estimates from contractor firms, comparable product 
prices and written guarantees of financial or in-kind assistance.  
The requirements imposed by Montes del Plata’s CSR team were similar to the company’s conventional 
approach to project planning, yet they differed in two important respects. The first was the pervasive 
emphasis placed on the notion of ‘sustainability’. The term was central to the CSR team’s advocacy of 
a philosophy of self-management. When I asked the company’s Sustainability Director to define the 
descriptive phrase written into her very job title, she answered by way of an illustrative example. 
Imagine the installation of a public lavatory in Conchillas, she said, citing an idea mooted by several 
villagers at the outset of the Forum. She continued as follows:   
“Let’s say we put a public toilet in next month. What happens in two months? You are going to the 
public bathroom, who changed the toilet paper? Who cleaned it? Who is repairing it? ... We want to be 
able to facilitate certain things for the community, like putting in a public toilet, say. But we also want 
to be encouraging the community to think about the projects from a sustainability point of view also. 
Saying, ‘Okay, you have to know that if you have a public toilet in the future, then it isn’t the end of the 
story.” 
As with many other buzzwords that abound in professional development circles, the director’s choice 
to respond with an analogy rather than a clear-cut definition highlights the slippery nature of the term 
‘sustainability’ (Cornwall & Brock 2005). However, one foundational facet of sustainability to emerge 
unequivocally from her response was the capacity of a project to exist independently of third-party 
support. A sustainable project, in other words, represented the polar opposite of the kind of 
philanthropy-style projects promoted under the dependency regime of Walker & Co. The outworking 
of such thinking was rooted in the Forum’s bureaucratic framework. Each sub-group, for instance, had 
to provide up-front, documentary evidence of their project’s viability beyond the initial grant provided 
from Montes del Plata. Despite appearances, the company’s CSR team did not view the handover 
ceremony in the plaza as the end of the project-making process. Instead, it marked a moment of 
transition; the point at which the company’s agents would supposedly step away and the Forum 
participants would take charge of realising their projects for themselves.  
In this respect, the financial support mediated by the CSR team was conceived as seed funding. It was 
there to help give life to the community’s development ambitions, but no more. The job of nurturing 
and maintaining fell at the residents’ door. In order to cover future project costs, therefore, Forum 
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participants were encouraged to come up with ways that their proposed projects could generate their 
own revenues. If this proved impossible, then Forum members were expected to demonstrate other 
funding streams or partnership agreements that could ensure their project’s future viability. To promote 
such long-term thinking, Montes del Plata’s CSR team only guaranteed that up to 80% of start-up costs 
would be covered; the remainder had to be procured from government agencies, contractor firms or 
other sources.  
The promotion of ‘sustainability’ as a central tenet of the Forum resonates with both normative power 
and moral positivity. This was a foreign investor seeking to create a brighter, self-regenerating future 
for a local populace by borrowing from development ‘best practice’ and promoting self-management. 
‘Sustainability’ has the same “ring of optimism” to it that Andrea Cornwall and Karen Brock observe 
in other catchphrases beloved of development policymakers, such as ‘empowerment’ and ‘participation’ 
(2005:1). When transposed from the purity of theory to the cold logic of bureaucracy, however, 
‘sustainability’ takes on a distinctly less idealised hue. The community’s hoped-for development goods 
became reconfigured from conceivable realities that were near-at-hand to far vaguer possibilities 
residing in a contingent future. Citizens found themselves obliged to step into the future to evaluate 
potential eventualities of projects that had yet to come into being. Many project ideas presented during 
the Forum process fell foul to this requirement for bureaucratic fiction-making. So the toilets don’t get 
built today because their proponents could not adequately conceive or account for how the toilet paper 
would be provided tomorrow. In this way, sustainability’s futuristic dimensions ended up inhibiting 
present-day actions and thus shrinking the ambition of hoped-for projects or curtailing them altogether. 
Such an outcome has all the hallmarks of an intervention predicated on detachable CSR.  
Raquel’s aspiration to create a postcard museum was one such project to fall at the sustainability hurdle. 
How would she staff it? How would she cover the costs of marketing to bring in visitors?  These were 
question she could not answer. With CLAEH’s polite mediation, she was encouraged to think up another 
idea that would fit better with the project-making framework set out by Montes del Plata’s CSR team. 
Other ideas came and went in a similar way. The most credible of these was the restoration of Casa 
Evans, Conchillas’s iconic historic building which had fallen into a sorry state of disrepair over the 
years. The Comisión de Amigos had drawn up a plan for its restoration, including architectural 
drawings, full costings and government permissions. The projected cost was US$400,000, far in excess 
of the projects envisioned by the Forum. Instead of rejecting the project on cost grounds, however, the 
repeated message from Montes del Plata’s CSR agents was that the project plan did not have realistic 
prospects of generating income to cover future running costs and was therefore “unsustainable”.  
Augustina’s experience of the Forum’s bureaucratic requirements charted a similar course. A manager 
at Conchillas’ small public library, Augustina lived in a modest home in Pueblo Gil with her mother 
and much younger siblings. She had joined the Forum at its outset with the aim of obtaining monies 
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from Montes del Plata for the revamp of her village’s poorly maintained recreational ground. As 
instructed, she formed a sub-group and began drawing up a complete modernisation plan for the park, 
including new equipment for the children’s play area, a new surface for the football pitch, a perimeter 
fence to stop motorbike-riders using it as a shortcut, flood lights, tiered seating for spectators, toilet 
facilities and changing rooms, among other improvements. However, as the months passed and she and 
her fellow sub-group members wrested with the Forum’s bureaucratic requirements, her ambitions 
gradually reduced in scope. The toilets and changing amenities would be too expensive to maintain, she 
was forced to concede. If past experience was anything to go by, the playground equipment was likely 
to be quickly vandalised. One by one, features were modified and the project diminished.  
Exacerbating the reductive tendency of the Forum’s project-making bureaucracy was the reluctance of 
Montes del Plata’s CSR team to confirm its overall budget. Forum participants were therefore left 
constantly second-guessing what or what not might be considered a reasonable project proposal. 
Camila, one of the CLAEH assistants, elaborated on the difficulties of working without clear budgetary 
transparency: 
“For example, if we could say, ‘there is US$50,000 and we’re going to approve five projects’, then 
everyone would know that there was US$10,000 for each project. But they [Montes del Plata] would 
never talk about a final amount. We had various meeting to make the case for providing a figure because 
the people weren’t prepared to invest the time in putting together a project if they didn’t really know if 
the company was going to give one peso or not.”  
The lack of transparency over the total funds available was curious. One probably explanation was the 
CSR team’s desire to avoid presenting their employer as a philanthropic grant-maker in the Walker & 
Co. mould, as per its auto-gestión policy. Other possibilities are that the company’s management did 
not have a fixed budget in mind (although this is unlikely for such a technocratic organisation) or that 
the final figure was low and it was reluctant to reveal this fact publicly.215 Whatever the reason, 
confusion reigned and the sense of the community’s development aspirations being pushed ever further 
out of reach by the transforming power of corporate bureaucracy was compounded.  
The feeling that the Forum framework turned projects from being imminent to residing in some ill-
defined, insecure future space was aggravated by the delays incurred by the bureaucratic process. Most 
of the initial projects submitted through the Forum took over eight months to prepare and submit. Three 
or four months then passed before participants got word from Montes del Plata’s CSR agents as to 
whether their proposals had been approved or not. Despite being broadly positive about her experience 
                                               
215 The total sum of the Forum’s first tranche of projects amounted to a mere US$34,000 - one third of CLAEH’s 
reported management fee and an infinitesimally small proportion of the mill project’s US$2.5 billion overall price-
tag. 
 
  155 
  
 
of the Forum, Augustina was not above sharing the general criticism among participants of the Forum’s 
circuitous bureaucracy. As she told me: 
“The process has been really slow. We started in February and what are we now? October. And the 
project has only just been approved for submission. There’s been a lot of going back and forth. There 
are meetings most weeks. We didn’t go to all the meetings. It felt like some were happening just for the 
sake of it.”  
For the duration of this time, participating villagers had no assurance that the promised funds would 
ever materialise. After a prolonged wait, Augustina’s project was signed off by the company’s 
management.  The final grant came to US$17,000 grant, with 70% delivered up front and the remainder 
issued on provision of receipts and other related documentation. This was less than half of what her 
sub-group had hoped for at one stage, but Augustina seemed content when I spoke to her as the project 
implementation phase was wrapping up. Her attitude seemed one of relief at having successfully 
navigated the Forum’s bureaucratic twists and turns as much as joy at the minor improvements to the 
park that she had eventually secured. Indeed, she hardly mentioned the initial aspects of her plan that 
she had been obliged to lay aside. Her only reference was to the provision of floodlights, which she was 
hoping might result from a match-funding agreement with the Intendencia.  
The effects of Augustina’s passage through the Forum’s bureaucracy went further than her acceptance 
of a diminished version of her original plan. The experience caused a fundamental shift in her 
development imaginary. Months on from signing up to the Forum, she appeared to have fundamentally 
reconceptualised the high ambitions with which she had begun. As she told me in the garden of her 
home, a stone’s throw from the recreation ground:  
“In reality, we just wanted the basics. To fix the children’s play area, to put in lights and to fence the 
play area to stop the kids on motorbikes going across. We didn’t ask for a swimming pool or spectator 
stands or anything like that. Just the basics.  
By agreeing to participate in Montes del Plata’s flagship CSR initiative, residents were knowingly or 
unknowingly subscribing to its bureaucratic regime. As they diligently filled in the Forum’s forms and 
struggled to conform their project ideas to its rules and requirements, the wheels of bureaucracy turned 
and their development imaginaries slowly but surely mutated.  
3.3 Conclusion: an ill-fated experiment in autonomous development 
 
The CSR team closed their flagship initiative quietly. After a second round of projects was approved in 
2013, it broke for the summer and never re-opened. The participants I spoke with on my return to the 
micro-region expressed little surprise and no complaint at this turn of events. The feeling among all 
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parties was that the programme had run its course. According to figures presented by Beatriz at a year-
end meeting of all Forum participants just before Christmas 2012, the previous 12 months had seen 40 
sub-group meetings held and a sum total of three projects approved. For all their efforts, community 
members had secured a mere US$17,515 in grant finance, with a further US$55,535 subject to approval. 
The funds were not negligible, but nor were they significant enough to make much of a dent on the 
micro-region’s material development.   
It would be easy to cast the Forum as an example of Montes del Plata’s management deliberately 
detaching the company from responsibility for the delivery of substantive development goods.  If the 
CSR team’s preferred policy of ‘auto-gestión’ (self-management) was indeed a ploy to dupe the micro-
region’s residents and betray the mill operator’s public commitments, then it was a clever one. On the 
face of it, here was a company eschewing the tradition of corporate paternalism, with all its associations 
to colonialism and recipient subjugation. Instead, the local populace was being liberated through an 
empowering collection of “methodological tools” geared towards the provision of autonomy and 
community-directed development. The alignment between the outcomes of the Forum and the 
overarching interests of Montes del Plata’s management strengthen the idea of corporate hoodwinking. 
In light of the governing aversion among the company’s governing executives to unsecured 
philanthropic contributions, the development philosophy trumpeted by the CSR team conveniently 
demanded that the Corporation avoid playing ‘Papá Noel’ and stave off digging into its metaphoric 
grotto (shareholder dividends). If that meant that the community had to settle for inferior development 
goods, then so be it. Self-management was a habit to be formed, a skill to be mastered. IF residents 
persisted, however, today’s modest advances would turn into future leaps forward. So ran the company’s 
public promise. The elasticity of detachable CSR meant this apparent subterfuge went disguised under 
the cloak of ‘responsibility’.  
Yet the very perfection of such duplicity gives cause for suspicion. In the complex, multi-actor 
environment of real world relations, perfectly-executed conspiracies rarely, if ever, prove possible. 
Adding to this cautionary note is the weight of ethnographic evidence, which indicates that the CSR 
managers were genuinely committed to the idea of the Forum as a vehicle for sustainable development 
(as they understood the term). More importantly, the development-as-conspiracy proposition 
fundamentally misunderstands the nature of detachable CSR. A CSR strategy based on subterfuge 
implies full, unequivocal detachment from a company’s stated or assumed responsibilities. The 
corporation does not simply distance itself; it breaks all ties to moral claims. Detachable CSR, in 
contrast, supposes a far more fluid and equivocal relationship between a company and its 
responsibilities. Under a detachable CSR regime, a company’s attachments to its responsibilities may 
well vary between tight and loose but they never break from the relational continuum altogether. The 
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critical questions for detachable CSR, therefore, concern how this distance-making occurs and what 
role businesses have in creating and managing it.  
In this chapter, I have set out to show how Montes del Plata’s CSR team addressed these questions in 
their design and implementation of the Forum. In its attempted embrace of contemporary development 
doctrines (particularly those relating to non-dependency), the company’s flagship CSR initiative marks 
one of the first major experiments in non-philanthropic development assistance by a private-sector actor 
in Uruguay. The Forum grew out of an approach to CSR that took seriously the community’s wish for 
improvement and the company’s pledge to deliver it. However, as shown, the company’s CSR managers 
were not working with a free hand. Uruguay’s largest investor would help deliver development, but 
within strict financial, temporal and political limits. The CSR team’s solution consequently had to avoid 
long-term or open-ended social obligations, as well as evade any suggestion that responsibility for local 
development lay chiefly at the company’s door. Hence, the detachable nature of the team’s final 
intervention. The CSR managers were being asked to attach their employer to a form of development 
that inspired public credibility, while simultaneously detaching it from the kind of substantive 
development goods on which such credibility usually rests.  
To some extent or other, this dilemma is common to all for-profit entities faced with external demands 
for community development. To resolve it, my contention is that one must look to the process of 
problematisation. Multinational corporations are not charities nor governments, so a means of 
mitigating social expectations must be found. This requires calculation. The CSR team’s choice to 
pinpoint a legacy of corporate paternalism as the reason for the micro-region’s long-standing 
development problems provides just such a calculation. In a stroke, the decision succeeded in turning 
the development dilemma facing Montes del Plata’s management on its head. Far from being the 
solution to the community’s development aspirations, as residents imagined, the deep pockets of 
Uruguay’s newest large-scale foreign investor became a barrier to such hopes. In line with development 
orthodoxy, Montes del Plata’s CSR professionals came to believe their role was to withdraw ever further 
from the field of development. Only by detaching themselves in such a way could space be created for 
the true champions of development – the residents themselves – to step forward. 
Understood in such terms, the presentation of self-management as the solution to the problem of 
paternalistic dependency makes logical sense. So too does the Forum as the company’s chosen delivery 
mechanism. By instructing residents in the methodologies of project-planning, Montes del Plata’s 
flagship CSR initiative was intended to help the community detach itself from its dependent past and 
reattach itself to a future of its own independent making. Just as the problematisation process was 
imbued with the CSR team’s internalised modes of perceptions and practices of calculation, so was the 
design of its solution. In its business-like vocabularies, hierarchical governance and hyper-rational 
modes of judgment, the Forum was every bit an offshoot of Montes del Plata’s broader management 
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culture. In the Forum’s bureaucratic framework, the business’s technocratic and procedural bent shone 
through with particular force.  
The effect of such bureaucracy was to reconfigure residents’ development imaginaries into projects that 
the corporation defined as “sustainable” and therefore “manageable”. Not only did the all-pervading 
notion of “sustainability” diminish development aspirations, it pitched their delivery into an idealised 
future, thus detaching it from realisation in the here and now. Full development goods become a distant 
prize, to be collected after the Forum’s bureaucratic hoops had been jumped through and the 
“methodological tools” of self-management had been mastered. This marked a finality that met the 
limitations imposed on the development process by Montes del Plata’s CSR team but fell short of the 
community’s pre-reconfigured hopes.  
The case of the Forum reveals two important aspects of detachable CSR. The first relates to the intent 
of the company’s management. Detachable CSR is not about camouflaging irresponsibility in a show 
of fictional ethics, however much the end result may suggest so. The desire to act responsibly is genuine. 
This is not to suggest that the management of a company such as Montes del Plata necessarily strive to 
fulfil the full responsibilities ascribed to the entity they manage. Resource constraints, conflicting 
priorities and business realities invariably put companies out of sync with public expectations. What 
detachable CSR does is provide the managers of such companies with a viable means to legitimise the 
gap that consequently arises between social expectation and corporate practice. In the case of the Forum, 
Montes del Plata’s CSR team achieved this by switching responsibility for delivery of development 
goods from their employer to the community. The Corporation thus became the facilitator of 
development, rather than development’s primary creator. The ethic of detachable CSR is neither about 
maximising opportunities (as CSR advocates argue) or imposing constraints (as CSR critics maintain), 
but about managing the constant tension between the two. In this respect, detachable CSR represents a 
halfway house. Viewed as such, the intent of Montes del Plata’s management to deliver development to 
Conchillenses should rightly be considered genuine – albeit in a highly compromised form.   
The Forum’s second revelation centres on the relationship between detachable CSR and the exercise of 
corporate power. From start to finish, the implementation of detachable CSR represents a highly 
managed process. This is one way in which it differs from a CSR strategy premised on detachment, 
whereby a company seeks to distance itself entirely from involvement in its moral responsibilities (by 
outsourcing responsibility to a corporate foundation, for example, or operating at full arms-length 
through an industry body). Montes del Plata’s CSR managers are intimately involved in designing, 
implementing and appraising the community’s development progress. Far from walking away, they map 
the individual steps that residents must take to complete their journey to self-management. Ironically 
for a mechanism designed to strip participants of their cultural predispositions (to dependency), Montes 
del Plata’s CSR staff prove unable to free themselves from their own organisational proclivities.  
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The company’s technocratic and procedural approach to problem-solving and decision-making 
inculcated the participative technologies promoted by the Forum from start to finish. In such a 
controlled setting, the prospects of residents becoming fully autonomous and charting their own 
independent course carried the hallmarks of failure from the start. As long as Montes del Plata’s 
contracted third-party was hand-holding participants through the community development process, then 
there could be no escape from the social relations of patronage and clientelism. Likewise, as long as the 
self-management process was being bankrolled by Montes del Plata, the “moral bonds and coercive 
properties of the gift” would always undercut its attempts at revoking the community’s attachment to 
paternalism.  
If the Forum had an unintended consequence, it was not the whittling down of the community’s 
development hopes through participation and bureaucracy, as critics of the participative turn post-
Ferguson might well conclude. Such a diminution accorded with the company’s development 
philosophy: take basic steps first, then larger steps should follow. Instead, the Forum’s chief unintended 
consequence was the ongoing dependency born out of the controlling approach of Montes del Plata’s 
CSR team to self-management portended.  
“The arrival of Montes del Plata in Conchillas was seen as a huge opportunity by the community, who 
had expectations of improvements [and] of resolving problems both old and new.” So declared the 
narrator in the promotional film during the handover ceremony in the plaza. The small number of 
successful projects to have reached the approval stage and the lacklustre attitude spoke to the passing 
of this opportunity for improvement. Instead, the statement augured a well-intended yet ill-fated 
experiment in granting civic autonomy over development by a company attached to a self-defeating 
culture of control.    
 




Jobs in the Frame: Employment and Employability in a Pulp-Producing Enclave 
 
Sergio was installing a flat-screen television when I called to see him at his house in Radial Conchillas 
on a warm Saturday morning in February 2013. His home was a three-bedroom modern brick structure, 
built at the bottom of the half-acre garden of his parents’ rectangular-shaped lot. His parents’ house 
looked out on the national highway that connects Colonia and Carmelo, and divides this small rural 
settlement of 288 inhabitants in half.216 The westerly view from his back porch stretches out towards 
the Rio de la Plata estuary over extensive pasture land. The mill’s iconic chimney was hidden behind 
the curve of the sloping farmland, at a distance of about twelve kilometres.  
Six days a week he travelled along the rutted country road from his house to the guarded gates of the 
mill, where he had a job with an Argentine construction contractor. Prior to Montes del Plata’s arrival, 
he had held a mid-ranking sales job at an agricultural goods firm in the nearby town of Ombúes de 
Lavalle. A chance meeting with an old friend had seen him get his foot in the door at the mill. His initial 
contract was for just 50 days. When his employer then tried laying him off, Sergio joined the main 
construction workers’ union SUNCA, which intervened on his behalf and secured him an extension to 
his contract. At around $U 35,000 (around US$1,140) per month, his pay was well above his previous 
salary. He more than doubled his income by renting his house to four Polish contractors for US$1,800 
per month. The new television provided tangible evidence of his change in fortunes.  
At the time, Sergio was living the “auge” (the boom) that many residents in the micro-region predicted 
when the news of Montes del Plata’s mill first reached them. Their confidence in a positive knock-on 
effect for the local economy was not pie-in-the-sky optimism. Residents in Fray Bentos had experienced 
a similar uplift in household incomes when Botnia/UPM began construction of its mega-tonne mill 
eight years previously. As with Sergio, many residents took advantage of the rise in real estate demand 
to rent out their homes, while local business owners benefited from the rise in spending occasioned by 
the flood of foreign workers in the town (see Figure 16).217 For most, however, direct employment as 
contract workers on the mill construction constituted the primary reason for rises in their household 
incomes.218  
                                               
216 Ecometrix 2010, p.3-4 
217 Rents for a standard two-bedroom house in Conchillas spiked at US$1,600 in 2013, at the height of the mill’s 
construction, before falling back to historic rates of around US$600 after the mill’s inauguration. CIFRA 
2015:36. 
218 Ibid. In 2015, only 13% of the population in Conchillas had incomes of under $10,000, compared to 35% in 
2010.  
 





Figure 16 Rental prices in the micro-region nearly tripled during the ‘boom’ period 
 
Yet by early 2013, two years into the construction of the mill, job prospects for semi-skilled and low-
skilled workers like Sergio were beginning to look more precarious. As the project moved towards its 
more technical completion phase, contract firms required industrial electricians, specialist welders and 
other workers with more advanced training than most Conchillenses possessed. With the end of the 
employment-led boom looming, a group of local workers had begun to lobby Montes del Plata’s 
management for long-term job security. Their focus was not just on the construction period, but on 
employment opportunities once the mill was operational.  
This placed the Corporation in a predicament. The promise of new jobs often represents a major factor 
in the legitimation of large-scale foreign infrastructure investments. Yet, despite its immense size, a 
state-of-the-art pulp mill such as Montes del Plata’s Punta Pereira project offers very few direct jobs for 
workers who lack advanced technical or professional expertise. Although the CSR team had no wish to 
frustrate local employment expectations, they and their operational colleagues had previous little 
capacity to satisfy them either. So how did the company’s CSR division seek to resolve this conundrum? 
And how did their policy of detachable CSR contribute to the design of a workable solution?   
 
4.1 The Punta Pereira Enclave: framing, over-spilling and the politics of employment 
In answer to these questions, I draw on the work of Michel Callon (1998a, 1998b)219 concerning 
disentanglement, framing and marketisation in order to understand how Montes del Plata’s management 
                                               
219 See also: Callon 2007, Caliskan & Callon 2009, 2010. 
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sustained the myth of the mill operator as a creator of employment. In doing so, I follow a number of 
scholars interested in CSR who have sought to apply Callon’s ideas to companies’ management of their 
socio-political relations (Tsing 2004, 2009, Appel 2012). Callon’s concept of framing has provided 
considerable conceptual value to anthropological research given its applicability to the understanding 
of specific physical spaces and the relational interactions within, between, and outside these spaces. 
One such ‘stage’, to join Callon in his use of Erving Goffman’s powerful theatrical image, is the 
corporate enclave (Goffman 1974). The legal, geographic and discursive particularities of export 
processing zones and other forms of exclusive economic zones have made them symbolic ‘problem 
spaces’ where the interests of transnational capitalism trump national sovereignty, workers’ rights and 
anything else that might impinge its expansion.220 The application to enclaving holds particular 
resonance with the detachable CSR strategy developed by Montes del Plata’s management, which 
concentrated primarily in and around the bounded terrain of the mill operator’s industrial operations at 
Punta Pereira.  
Callon’s notion of framing also allows for a political reading of Montes del Plata’s detachable CSR 
policy as it related to employment. The notion of framing implies not only physical boundaries, but the 
existence of institutional frameworks as well.221 Although Montes del Plata’s operations may have 
appeared to have been unfolding entirely independently behind the guarded fences of its Punta Pereira 
site, the company’s investment project actually existed within a highly regulated institutional context. 
It was the institutions of the Uruguayan state that established the project on a tax-free basis, that 
permitted this Chilean-Finnish investor to process wood for pulp, and that granted it the liberty to 
employ individuals for their labour. The steadiness of this institutional framework is essential to the 
stability of the demarcated operating world that an infrastructure investor such as Montes del Plata 
depends on. In this respect, it is important for large-scale project sponsors that enjoy state concessions 
and institutional protections to comply with the political logic that supports their investments. If not, 
institutional frameworks have a habit of shifting. Montes del Plata’s show of supporting local 
development through job creation, as espoused in its CSR discourse, correlated with the logic of the 
government’s pro-FDI position and thus helped stabilise the corporation’s US$2.5-billion investment.  
                                               
220 See: Ong 2006, 2007, Tsing 2009, Cross 2010, 2011. The link between enclaves and detachment has been 
widely noted. A prime example is Hannah Appel’s account of an oil company’s compound in Equatorial Guinea, 
in which she shows how corporations put to use the physical separateness of their operations to abdicate 
responsibility for the knock-on effects or ‘externalities’ that occur outside their walls (Appel 2012). Jamie Cross’ 
study of institutionalised precarity in a South Indian special economic zone comes to similar conclusions. As 
Cross notes, detachment is “built into its physical design, its legal constitution, the political economy of its 
investments, and the social architecture of relations between manufacturing companies that locate inside them and 
the people they employ” (Cross 2011:36). 
221 Callon gives the example of a commercial agreement between a university and a business. For the physical 
relations expected of the contract (joint office space, conference calls, shared documentation, etcetera) to be 
preserved and reproduced, a set of binding institutional devices are required (rule of law, protection of intellectual 
property, and so forth) (Callon 1998a:250). 
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The act of framing is not inevitable or easy. It requires work on the part of the framing agent, which, in 
respect to the social expectations around Montes del Plata’s employment potential, fell primarily to the 
the CSR team. Ever consistent, they turned to the discourses and practices of detachable CSR as their 
preferred instrument for undertaking such work. The application of detachable CSR to questions of 
labour speaks to the extensive literature within economic anthropology and beyond regarding the 
commodification of the individual (Polanyi Levitt 1980, Esping-Andersen 1990). Creating, exploiting 
and, often, laying off low-salaried workers has become a dominant concern of academics and activists 
alike with the rise of globalised supplier chains.222 Arguably, there has been less focus on the de-
commodification of workers. What happens to individuals when work is withdrawn? The effects this 
has on their personal identities as well as on their socio-economic welfare can be profound. For a foreign 
company investing in a developing market economy, being associated with such an eventuality carries 
political risks – even more so if that company presents its investment as a driver of development, as in 
Montes del Plata’s case.  
Another facet of Callon’s theory of disentanglement and framing that speaks to the issues of 
employment and CSR is that of ‘overflowing’. Try as companies might to ‘bracket’ the world of their 
operations from the wider social and political worlds in which they find themselves, this is not always 
possible. As Callon argues, the assumption that “boundaries are drawn between the actors interacting 
with one another on the one hand and the rest of the world on the other, does not imply a total absence 
of relationships” (1998:249). Economists have tended to see the continuity of extraneous relations as a 
failure of framing, the solution to which is to find ways of plugging the ‘leakages’, often by internalising 
problematic relations within a revised frame. Anthropologists prefer instead to highlight what Callon 
refers to as the “omnipresence of connections with the outside world” (1998:250). Complete framing 
is, by this account, an impossibility: overflows are the norm. This does not totally negate the value of 
framing, but it requires corporations to design strategies for negotiating the relational overspill that 
inevitably occurs. Enter detachable CSR.   
With respect to the employment dilemma facing Montes del Plata’s management, how they choose to 
address these labour-related overflows is essential to their company’s social legitimation. If pulp 
production and forestry more generally is politically presented as a job creator, then news of a major 
investment in the sector naturally gives rises to expectations of work opportunities. Such expectations 
are particularly high among affected communities, for whom employment is often seen as recompense 
for the negative socio-environmental impacts that extractivist projects provoke (Esteves 2008). “We 
gave you our tranquilidad [peace and quiet] in exchange for jobs.” So declared a local resident in 
Conchillas during a public meeting coordinated by Montes del Plata’s CSR team. Most of the literature 
on CSR and employment focuses understandably on relations within the workplace: health and safety 
                                               
222 See: Collins 2003, Flanagan 2006, Raworth 2004, Tsing 2009. 
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standards, diversity considerations, pay imbalances, employee volunteering, ownership structures, and 
so forth (Cohen 2017). Using Callon’s notion of ‘overflowing’, this chapter seeks to extend this 
traditional focus and ask how detachable CSR is employed to shape and manage the highly politicised 
topic of employment relations with non-workers.   
To fully understand the pivotal political nature of employment for Montes del Plata, it is necessary to 
set the issue in the wider context of the political economy of Uruguay’s forestry sector. To this end, 
some brief scene setting is provided. The chapter then divides into three principal sections, each 
reflecting the work of detachable CSR within Montes del Plata’s framing strategy. First, it asks how the 
pulp manufacturer’s CSR agents sought to disentangle their employer and its investment from relations 
of expectation and create a separated workforce. Second, it analyses how the discourses and practices 
of detachable CSR assist in managing the relational overflows that resulted from the permeability of 
their framing efforts. In particular, how was the idea of employability mobilised to responsibly reframe 
the mill operator’s entanglements with non-employees outside the gates of its Punta Pereira enclave? 
And, third, it keeps with the theme of overflowing by interrogating the response of the CSR team to 
efforts by a group of local residents to reframe labour relations in line with their interests.  
4.2 Job creation, productivity and the political economy of the forestry sector in Uruguay 
Since the first major reforms of the Forestry Law in the 1980s, themes of sustainable production and 
national development have permeated discussions surrounding Uruguay’s national project of forestry 
expansion (Uruguay XXI 2016, 2017). Successive government administrations have justified the 
nation’s pro-FDI stance on the grounds that it promotes technological transfer, stimulates domestic 
investment, creates employment, and generally boosts national productivity (Castillo & Garcia 2012). 
This concurs with the development-oriented arguments put forward by multilateral lenders and echoed 
by politicians in both developing and developed economies (Deininger et al. 2011, World Bank 2017a). 
By 2013, FDI flows into Uruguay as a percentage of GDP were the highest in Latin America after Chile 
(5%) (OECD 2016). The recent boom in Uruguay’s pulp industry is presented as one of the jewels in 
the crown of the country’s proactive policy of FDI promotion, which marked up year-on-year growth 
from 2002-2014 (Uruguay XXI 2016).  
Not until the 1970s did either international business or development scholars begin to seriously question 
the foundational assumption that FDI presents a net gain in development terms. To this day, many 
governments disregard or downplay the effects of FDI beyond its impact on GDP, whether positive or 
negative (Narula & Pirelli 2016). Over recent decades, scholars have made up for lost time with a host 
of cost-benefit analyses of FDI, with developing countries a particular focus (Metaxas & Kechagia 
2016). At a macro-economic level, orthodox economists have set out to make a robust case in favour 
of FDI, albeit not without its shortcomings (Dunning & Lundan 2008, Iamsiraroj & Doucouliagos 
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2015). Influential studies include Aitken & Harrison’s landmark research on Venezuela (1999), which 
broadly supports the pro-growth position, as does Borensztein et al.’s analysis of 69 developing 
countries over a 20-year period, although with notable caveats (1998).223 
FDI’s benefits are by no means universally accepted, particularly when the lens is narrowed to the micro 
level. Not only has FDI’s impact on productivity been called into question (Gunby et al. 2017, Girma 
et al. 2015), but scholars have also highlighted its negative impacts on welfare (Hlalefang et al. 2017), 
levels of corruption (Delgado et al. 2014) and increases levels of economic inequality (Herzer et al. 
2012, Suanes 2016), among other downsides. With respect to labour specifically, high standards of 
human capital are shown to be a driver of FDI (Noorbakhsh & Paulomi 2001, Cleeve et al. 2015). Even 
so, the arrival of foreign investors is also associated with disadvantages for workers, including a 
downward pressure on wages (Feenstra 2010), an increase in precarity (Cross 2010), and the 
institutionalisation of labour informality under the guise of flexibility (Kabeer 2000). 
Establishing a positive nexus between labour productivity, economic growth and FDI marks a key 
political priority for the Uruguayan government. Consistent reports argue that the country’s economy 
is held back by labour market inefficiencies (IMF 2018b). A recent worldwide survey on national 
competitiveness ranked Uruguay a dismal 121 out of 137 countries for the efficiency of its labour market 
(Schwab 2017). One of the chief preoccupying issues for Uruguayan policy makers is that of low labour 
productivity (OECD 2014). Despite increasing at a modest 1.9% per annum, the country’s labour 
productivity rates trail those of its regional peers such as Argentina (2.3%) and Chile (2.7%) as well as 
the bottom ten OECD countries in terms of GDP per capita (2.7%) (OECD 2014:61).224 Productivity 
problems offset the macro-economic advantages that more positive labour market trends would 
otherwise bring.225 The provision of productive jobs that enable people to earn a living and fulfil their 
potential is also associated with individual development outcomes, both material and non-material, such 
as physical and mental wellbeing (Wilson and Walker 1993, Clark and Oswald, 1994).  
The desire of the Uruguayan government to cement the link between FDI and labour benefits explains 
the emphasis on the provision of high-quality jobs. Uruguay XXI, the government’s FDI promoter, 
places particular stress on export enclaves like Montes del Plata’s Punta Pereira site as comprising “very 
                                               
223 Importantly, Borensztein et al. note that higher productivity levels are determinant on host countries having 
sufficient human capital to take advantage of technology flows. 
224 The OECD uses GDP per hour to calculate labour productivity. The measure represents how efficiently labour 
input is used in the production process. Labour input is defined as total hours worked of all persons engaged in 
production. Labour output differs from labour input depending on the presence and/or use of other inputs, such as 
capital, intermediate inputs and economies of scale. See: OECD Compendium of Productivity Indicators 2018. 
Available at: https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/industry-and-services/oecd-compendium-of-productivity-indicators_ 
22252126 
225 Chief among these is Uruguay’s high rate of labour force participation (in 2014, 62% of working-age adults 
were in employment, around average for the region) and its comparatively low levels of unemployment (which 
bounced back from highs of 17% after the 2001-2002 economic crisis to around 6% by 2014) (OECD 2014:28). 
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successful tools for economic development”226 (Uruguay XXI 2017c:22). The Uruguayan parliament is 
currently considering a new bill that would expand the country’s provision of special economic zones. 
The government’s FDI agency describes the proposed legislation as “incentivising high quality 
employment, the creation of national added value, the development of high-tech activities and 
innovation, the decentralisation of economic activities and regional development” (ibid:26). A panacea 
for Uruguay’s human capital and overall development, in short.  
FDI growth is presented by proponents of international trade like the IMF as a corrective to the 
country’s productivity problems, with the forestry sector leading the charge (IMF 2018a, 2018b). The 
logic is appealing. Foreign investors, especially those in techno-industrial industries such as pulp 
manufacturing, are expected to introduce sophisticated technologies and management methods, thus 
sparking a demand for high-skilled labour (Narula & Pinelli 2016). The provision of high-quality, well-
paid jobs by foreign investors will, it is hoped, stem the trend in the Uruguayan labour market for 
workers to shift out of sectors with high labour productivity, such as manufacturing and utilities, and 
into low-productivity sectors, such as trade and restaurant services (IMF 2018b:43).  
The promise of positive labour spillovers thus provides a foundational argument on which the political 
legitimacy of Uruguay’s foreign pulp investors stands (or, feasibly, falls). An onus is therefore placed 
on the owners of Botnia/UPM and Montes del Plata to demonstrate that the jobs created by their 
investments conformed to the government’s description of high-quality, productive employment. In this 
chapter, I argue that achieving this end presented the primary goal of the framing exercise that Montes 
del Plata’s CSR approach was designed to facilitate. The relationship between FDI and job creation has 
a long and uneasy relationship in the economic and international business literature.227 Mainstream CSR 
theorists have sought to strengthen the pro-FDI cause by arguing in favour of positive spillovers for 
labour when ethical business practices are adopted (Amini & Dal Bianco 2017). Responsible human 
resource management, meanwhile, is pitched as a stimulus to higher labour productivity due to its 
positive impact on the recruitment and retention of high-skilled employees (Lado & Wilson 1994, 
Turban & Greening 1997) and the promotion of employee empowerment (McWilliams et al. 2005).  
This framing is not without its difficulties. The starkest of these relates to the limited quantity of jobs 
created in the two agro-industrial enclaves that comprise the focal points of Uruguay’s pulp 
manufacturing capacity. The number of direct, full-time employees wearing the emblazoned badges of 
Montes del Plata, for example, amounted to a mere 690 in early 2018.228 This comparatively low figure 
is consistent with the findings of Nicolás Lorenzi’s longitudinal study of FDI between 1960 and 2011, 
                                               
226 Uruguay XXI. (2017a). Opportunities for Investment: Foreign Direct Investment. Montevideo: Uruguay. 
227 See: Van Loo 1977, McMillan 1999, Markusen & Venables 1999, Qi 2007, Wang & Yu 2007, Wang 2008. 
228 See: Montes del Plata website: ‘Nuestra Empresa’. Available at: https://www.montesdelplata.com.uy/%20 
espanol/nuestra-empresa-2. Accessed 8 February 2018. 
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which revealed a minimal positive effect on direct jobs and a neutral effect on indirect jobs (Lorenzi 
2013).229 In the context of the country’s national development objectives, the increases in human capital 
and wage incomes represented by the direct jobs created by Montes del Plata and Botnia/UPM was 
minimal (even at the highest end of the estimated range). As a consequence, both companies evidenced 
a preference for stressing the ‘total jobs created’, as opposed to direct employment, so as to demonstrate 
the alleged job multiplier effects of their investments. Another difficulty associated with the 
employment-based developmental case touted by pro-forestry Uruguayan politicians is the negative 
impact on non-forestry workers. Several studies in Latin America have shown how the introduction of 
commercial plantations can displace non-forestry rural workers, with poor rural women hit particularly 
hard.230 In this same vein, the exponential recent growth of Uruguay’s forestry sector coincides with a 
decrease in rural employment (Cardeillac et al. 2015).   
Despite the less-than-convincing relationship between FDI, job creation and rural development (Li 
2011), the model of agri-industrialisation epitomised by the mega-mills of Botnia/UPM and Montes del 
Plata was ‘birthed’ through deliberate state intervention (Ehrnström-Fuentes & Kröger 2017a). As 
Joaquín Cardeillac & Diego Piñeiro note, the Frente Amplio saw agri-business FDI as a means of 
reinvigorating the rural economy by replacing “traditional entrepreneurs . . . more inclined to profit 
from speculation” with the fresh capital and organised production of international investors (Cardeillac 
& Piñeiro 2017:378). In this way, the Frente Amplio administration hoped to reverse what it perceived 
as the growing “social disarticulation of the Uruguayan countryside” (ibid).  
As seen in previous chapters, Montes del Plata’s CSR managers had already endeavoured to show their 
employer to be a responsible neighbour and an agent of community development. Now the challenge 
was to see if they could help substantiate the government pro-FDI case by adding ‘employment creator’ 
to that list. Commercial and operational constraints meant the mill operator would never become a 
major employer. Via some inventive framing (and reframing) of its role within the Uruguay’s rural 
labour market, however, Montes del Plata’s CSR team resolved to give the task their best shot.  
 
4.3 Employment: payroll politics inside the enclave 
The first step in the team’s strategy was to detach their employer from public expectations of 
employment. The base position they sought to establish through their detachable CSR policy was that 
                                               
229 The low correlation is explained by the generally weak trading relationships between foreign investors and 
domestic Uruguayan companies. 
230 See: Piñeiro 2008, McElwee 2009, Ferreira 2009. 
 
  168 
  
 
the country’s largest foreign investor did indeed create good, well-paid jobs, but that these were 
restricted to the operational enclave of Punta Pereira.  
The proposition was not without its objectors, especially in the locality around the mill. Back at his 
house in Radial Conchillas, Sergio did not mince his words. “They [Montes del Plata] said there would 
be work for all who wanted it,” he told me emphatically. It was a claim that I heard repeated over and 
again in interviews and informal conversations with residents and other commentators during my first 
period of fieldwork.231 Asked who exactly had given residents in the micro-region this assurance, Sergio 
simply said a “general manager” (a generic term for a senior executive) at Montes del Plata. Although 
the CSR team regularly questioned this version of events in public, one of the community managers 
would later privately admit to me that a visiting executive from Stora Enso (the mill operator’s joint-
venture partner) had said as much. “Looking back on it now,” she commented, “it was one of the biggest 
mistakes we made.”  
The gravity that she apportioned to this ‘mistake’ seemed to me somewhat overblown at the time, but 
it made sense when placed within the context of the intense efforts of Montes del Plata’s management 
to frame its role as a job creator. The ‘jobs for all’ phrase marked an aberration, an explicit contradiction 
of the company’s desired positioning. It wanted residents in the micro-region to understand that places 
on its pay-roll were finite. The Sustainability Director explained the reasoning to me in the following 
fashion: “We are a pulp manufacturer; we are not a construction company. Large-scale engineering 
and construction is not our expertise.” Hence, Montes del Plata had contracted the Austrian engineering 
giant Andritz, a global specialist in large-scale industrial infrastructure projects, to manage the mill’s 
construction. Of the 6,300 or so people employed at the Punta Pereira site at the height of the building 
process, no more than 700 were ever directly employed by Montes del Plata.232 The remainder were 
employed by Andritz or one of its sub-contractors.   
Over recent decades, the kind of contracting model adopted by Montes del Plata has emerged as a core 
feature of capitalist production in the globalised age (Dicken 2007). The social and economic effects of 
this phenomenon have sparked a rich and ongoing debate.233 While not denying the importance of such 
discussions, the germane point to note here is the ethical detachability that an outsourcing approach to 
                                               
231 During the height of the mill’s construction phase, a senior aide to the Intendente confidently assured me that 
“everyone who wants a job has one”. 
232 Lignum. 8 September 2014. Inauguran planta de celulosa Montes del Plata en Uruguay. 
www.lignum.cl/2014/09/08/arauco-y-stora-enso-inauguraron-planta-de-celulosa-montes-del-plata-en-uruguay/# 
(Accessed 14 May 2018). 
233 Orthodox business scholars extol the cost advantages and competitive edge that contracting short-term labour 
on super flexible terms brings to international manufacturers and service providers. This is the “FDI-led growth” 
of which the likes of the World Bank and IMF strive to promote (World Bank 2017a). Critics of the outsourcing 
of labour characteristic of global value chains, meanwhile, are equally vocal in their concern about the corrosive 
effects of such employment practices on workers’ rights and on economic development (Frynas 2005,⁠ Pegg 2006,⁠ 
Soderling 2006).  
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employment relations can offer FDI sponsors. The advantage of not hiring workers directly is self 
evident. By outsourcing their labour requirements, companies are able to erect legal, contractual or 
metaphorical walls around their employment offer that demarcate which workers are inside and which 
are outside the frame of employer responsibility. As Katy Gardner notes in her study of US oil and gas 
company Chevron in Bangladesh, by removing itself form “direct dealings” the company is able to 
justify not extending to its subcontracted workforce the same “ethically irreproachable standards of 
employment” that it reserves for its own direct staff (most of whom are foreign nationals or non-local 
Uruguayans) (Gardner 2012:173).234 
In echo of the Sustainability Director’s comment above, the approach of her team to creating such a 
demarcation was to tie their definition of Montes del Plata to the pulp production processes in which 
the company specialised. These process were scientifically complex and technologically sophisticated, 
the company repeatedly emphasised in its public communications. The image of the Punta Pereira site, 
with its vast cooling towers, digitally-managed control rooms and labyrinthine network of metallic 
piping, added to the sense of almost space-age scientific ingenuity. Once the mill project neared 
completion, Montes del Plata’s operations team began to lay on regular guided bus tours for dignitaries 
and everyday citizens. During these trips a technical expert would impress on them the cutting-edge 
nature of the industrial exercise unfolding outside the window. The takeaway message was that the 
pulp-making enclave that the Corporation occupied was a preserve of such world-class manufacturing 
that only the most qualified professionals were competent to enter in and operate it.  
The tactic of the CSR team and other senior management of using discourses of professionalisation to 
disentangle Montes del Plata from the widespread expectations of job creation placed upon the mill 
operator was not unproblematic. The first, and most obvious, hurdle was the company’s unavoidable 
need for low-skilled wage labour. Try as Montes del Plata’s management did to position the business’s 
commercial activities as relating exclusively to the manufacture of pulp, such framing presupposed the 
prior existence of a facility where such pulp manufacturing could occur. In 2011, despite ENCE’s 
preliminary site preparations, the micro-region of Conchillas was no more prepared to make pulp 
cellulose than it was to produce microchips or assemble automobiles. Indeed, when the fence was first 
                                               
234 José-María Muñoz and Philip Burnham come to a similar conclusion in their examination of the link between 
subcontracting and CSR in ExxonMobil’s Chad-Cameroon pipeline project (Muñoz & Burnham 2016). In this 
instance, the project sponsor not only restricted the promise of ethical employment, but actively paraded the 
privileged labour conditions enjoyed by its own workers as a stimulus for subcontractors to follow suit. In this 
way, what is being withheld is (in the tautological manner that only CSR discourse is capable) then re-categorised 
as a generous “corporate gift” - a recompense, if it can be believed, for the “meagre” spin-offs that the 
subcontractors obtained in terms of capacity building, technology transfer and technical training (2016:174). 
Further evidencing CSR’s oxymoronic outcomes, Jamie Cross’s study of the application of ethical accounting 
regimes by an Indian diamond supplier serves to distance the firm’s multinational customer from legal, moral and 
social obligations to its outsourced workforce (Cross 2011:35). 
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erected around the Punta Pereira site, the acres of grassy scrub inside the perimeter bore no difference 
to the landscape outside.  
Montes del Plata’s solution was to hire in contractor firms and place the obligation on them to recruit, 
employ and ultimately lay off their own low-skilled labour supply. In this way, the construction workers 
employed on the Punta Pereira site who were paid (albeit indirectly) out of Montes del Plata’s 
investment capital were always kept at arm’s length. The company depended entirely on the labour of 
these workers, yet their status as contracted labour denied them the rights or relations that such a 
dependency would normally suppose. However, this apparently neat division was not without its 
tensions. A clear example here can be seen in the industrial disputes that periodically flared up during 
the construction process. Trade unions operating at the site complained variously about wage terms, 
employment benefits and workplace safety standards, among other issues. Montes del Plata’s 
management endeavoured to enforce the artificial separation it had created between its ‘own’ employees 
and contractor staff by insisting that the complaints be directed to the supplier firms who were in the 
mill operator’s employ. Despite this assertion, the mill operator’s senior management still sat in on 
negotiations and even facilitated the delivery of certain concessions, albeit as a ‘responsible’ 
intermediary and arbiter rather than as an employer.  
The treatment of industrial disputes by Montes del Plata’s senior management highlights the feasibility 
of an extreme form of framing that excludes the need to take relationships in to account. A notable 
defender of this position is Pierre Bourdieu (2000). In his adoption of a temporal reading of framing, 
he argues that the framing agent can accurately calculate the likely responses to their intended actions 
and then incorporate these inside or outside the frame. Callon questions the calculative capacity granted 
to the framing agent by Bourdieu, arguing that the volume of potential interactions with the multiple 
actors involved in creating a framed enclave are too great to ever be fully understood or managed. 
Hence, according to Callon, frames are liable to ‘overflowing’ (Callon 1998a). This requires the frame 
to be continually stabilised. To achieve this, the directing agent has to draw on a range of devices and 
elements (what Leigh Star and James Griesemer refer to as ‘boundary-objects’ (Star & Griesemer 1989) 
that can reset the parameters of the relational frame. If not, the frame ruptures and the prospect of 
transacting in an efficient ecosystem unburdened by costly social and political obligations becomes 
untenable. The acknowledgement by Montes del Plata’s management of the presence of contracted 
wage labour within its enclave comprises precisely the kind of reframing that Callon argues is both 
necessary and constant.  
If contract workers were to be incorporated into the infrastructural ‘ring fence’ that is the Punta Pereira 
site (as they must if the mill operator was to have a physical plant where its pulp manufacturing could 
occur), then the logic of detachable CSR demanded that such an incorporation occur in a way that 
maximised the advantages to the business while limiting the risks or obligations. How, in other words, 
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could the breaching of Montes del Plata’s labour enclave be used to advance the corporation’s 
legitimation agenda, yet avoid the augmentation of its social, political and moral liabilities? 
An answer to the first of these dilemmas, I contend, is discursive. Just as Montes del Plata’s management 
attempted to define the direct employment opportunities linked to their investment as technical and thus 
restricted, so they sought to portray its contract labour force as ‘local’ and thus laced with political 
capital. In the initial negotiations for the US$2.5-billion pulp mill project, no stipulation was placed on 
Montes del Plata to hire workers from the immediate locality – a trend that has become increasingly 
common in extractive projects around the world, particularly in the hydrocarbon sector (Esteves et al. 
2013). In keeping with its desired status as a responsible neighbour, however, the company’s 
management did go as far as to publicly commit to promote local employment. To quote their 
unambiguous pledge directly:235  
“Montes del Plata maintains the commitment to offer quality employment and to prioritise access for 
local manual labour to job opportunities that the company generates in its diverse operations, as much 
on the forestry side as on the industrial side.” 
To demonstrate compliance with this (non-binding) commitment, Montes del Plata’s human resources 
division began publishing periodic breakdowns of its contract workforce during the mill’s construction 
phase. The updates provided the total number of jobs created at the Punta Pereira construction site, 
ranging between 3,000 to 6,300 during 2011-2014.236 This helped demonstrate a positive macro impact 
on employment of Uruguay’s pro-FDI policy, as per the central government’s wish. This total figure 
was then subdivided into Uruguayan and non-Uruguayan workers.237 Again, this served to help the 
central government build its employment-based case for foreign-financed, export-oriented projects of 
this nature. The mill oeprator’s Uruguayan contract workforce was also sub-divided between ‘local’ 
and ‘non-local’ workers.238 This distinction marked a further nod to the central government, which was 
preoccupied with internal economic migration – a factor in Botnia/UPM’s investment in Fray Bentos, 
                                               
235 Montes del Plata: ‘Employment Opportunities’. Available at: http://www.montesdelplata.com.uy/ 
oportunidades.php. Accessed 2 August 2016. 
236 El Observador 2014:4. 
237 According to figures provided to the El Observador newspaper, the ratio of Uruguayan contract workers (4,267 
in total) to foreign contract workers (1,027) was around 1:4 during the initial, labour intensive construction phase. 
See: El Observador. ‘Ciudad obrera de difícil manejo.’ 16 July 2012. Available at: https:// 
www.elobservador.com.uy/nota/ciudad-obrera-de- dificil-manejo-201271622210. Accessed 3 June 2018.  
238 See: El Observador 2014:22. According to documentation submitted by Montes del Plata’s compliance team 
to the government’s Comisión de Seguimiento in September 2012, ‘local’ contract staff (i.e. workers from Colonia 
province) represented 30.75% of the total Uruguayan contract workforce (1,351 workers of a total of 4,393). See: 
Montes del Plata. (2012). Celulosa, Energía y Terminal Portuaria Punta Pereira, Septiembre 2012. Available at: 
https://www.mvotma.gub.uy/component/k2/item/download/8975_88d9b5e424aeae6fbc28b67d5230fe78. 
Accessed 3 June 2018. 
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which had led to social and housing difficulties that the federal government was anxious to avoid 
second-time round.  
Effective as this revision was at incorporating the spillover of contract wage labour into Montes del 
Plata’s narrow employment frame, its success as an exercise in legitimacy-building was more limited. 
For one, it was impossible to hide the fact that the vast majority of the jobs created by this US$2.5-
billion FDI project were only temporary. For the central government, the Punta Pereira project was a 
stop-gap, not a solution. Even as the mill was being built, Uruguay’s construction trade unions were 
pressurising José Mujica’s administration to sign off other large-scale infrastructure projects in order to 
generate future labour demand.239 A second challenge was the level of unemployment in the province 
of Colonia, which was among lowest in the country.240 As a consequence, while the higher wages at the 
Punta Pereira site were welcomed, job creation per se did not represent a political priority for the 
provincial authorities. As at the national level, what politicians and their electorate chiefly cared about 
was not jobs alone, but jobs that were better-paid, more permanent and, most importantly for the 
government, more productive. Lastly, the generous definition of ‘local’ (i.e. the entire province of 
Colonia) by Montes del Plata’s management failed to address the expectation of residents close to the 
mill that prioritisation would be granted to them in the allocation of employment.  
Julio, a friend of Sergio who also had a temporary job at the mill construction site and who had arrived 
to help with the installation of the television, gave voice to the disgruntlement felt by many in the micro-
region:  
“The agreement that we’ve heard about is for work in the province. They [Montes del Plata] call it 
‘local employment’, but by ‘local’ they mean statewide. They’ve never spoken about Conchillas itself. 
We’ve entered a database of jobs, but it’s huge and what we’re asking is that those in Conchillas be put 
first . . . Because what happens is that within the province of Colonia there are thousands of people, 
and Conchillas is very small. So if it goes to some sort of draw for the whole province, then Conchillas 
won’t get a look in. But who receives a bigger [negative] impact of this company than us here in 
Conchillas? Neither Colonia nor Carmelo does. It’s Conchillas that is suffering all these changes.” 
As the enclaving efforts of Montes del Plata’s management reveal, all attempts at disentanglement result 
in the possible opening up of new entanglements. Thus, while the pulp producer may have absorbed 
temporary wage labourers into its revised borders, it did not succeed in hermetically sealing its frame.  
                                               
239 Confirmed in a private interview with SUNCA president Faustino Rodríguez, 14 February 2013. 
240 In 2011, unemployment in the province of Colonia was at a historic low of 3.2%. See: Observatorio de 
Mercado de Trabajo. 2013. Colonia: Serie Informes Departamentales. Available at:  https://www.mtss.gub.uy/ 
documents/ 11515/73fe068a-4a9e-428f-9c47-e660fc4f2e68. Accessed 10 May 2016. 
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For the company’s detachable CSR policy to effectively deal with the employment expectations it faced, 
drawing a line at the perimeter fence of Punta Pereira would not suffice. As with any given actor, the 
objectives, intentions, interests and projects of Uruguay’s largest foreign investor “cannot be 
dissociated from the network of interdependencies in which the actor is enmeshed and to which he or 
she is continuously contributing” (Callon 1998a:252).241 This is not to say that the constant work of 
framing and reframing is redundant. The hard-fought insistence of Montes del Plata’s management on 
its own payroll as the boundary of its employer obligations was relatively well-secured. Yet, the mill 
operator’s iconic status as the figurehead of the country’s pro-FDI policy, coupled with the attributes 
of CSR attributed to it by management, complicated the severing of “links with the ‘outside’ world”.242  
4.4 Employability: skills training, rural productivity and political legitimacy  
Given its ongoing entanglements in the wider political discussions about FDI and rural productivity, 
Montes del Plata’s management required an additional strategy to cope with the employment-related 
overflows emerging out of their initial enclaving efforts.  
In the style of detachable CSR, the CSR team’s answer eluded the obvious in preference for the 
chimeric. Rather than provide direct employment, as per the hopes of local residents like Sergio, the 
CSR team chose to focus their efforts on the promotion of employability. To retain the integrity of the 
mill operator’s protected enclave as well as its status as a responsible company, Montes del Plata’s CSR 
agents would use their employer’s resources to help people into work outside the walls of the 
corporation walls as opposed to inside them.   
As solutions go, a policy of employability represented an understandable and partially defensible way 
for the pulp manufacturer. Senior management in Montes del Plata’s operations division refused to 
brook the idea of incorporating hundreds of local job-seekers into its direct workforce, arguing that it 
would be commercially unviable.243 A bloated payroll, as all investors know, holds out the prospect of 
thin profits. At the same time, the mill operator could not ignore the high public demand for jobs, 
especially from local residents who carried a justifiable moral claim for recompense for the social 
disruption caused by the mill’s construction and future operation. To turn a blind eye would to be 
branded irresponsible and uncaring, the precise opposite of what the company’s well-resource CSR 
programme sought to achieve. In the same vein, a refusal to engage in public discussion around 
employment and labour productivity risked undermining the pro-FDI arguments on which the support 
of the government stated and on which rested the basis of Punta Pereira’s status as a legally privileged 
                                               
241 See also: Burt 1992; Callon & Law 1997. 
242 Callon 1998a:253. 
243 Private interview with Señor Areco on 24 October 2012; substantiated by SUNCA general secretary Oscar 
Andrade in a private interview dated 28 February 2013. 
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enclave. Therein lay the possibility of the company’s public legitimacy being withdrawn and favourable 
trade terms revoked.244  
The depth of entanglement of Uruguay’s new foreign pulp manufacturers in the state’s justifying 
discourse for agro-industrial FDI was made abundantly clear to me on a warm December day in 2012, 
in Montevideo’s business district. In a rare example of cooperation, Montes del Plata and Botnia/UPM 
had helped convene a full-day conference on the future of their industry. ‘Sustainable forestry’ was, 
predictably, the governing theme of the day. The two giants of Uruguay’s nascent pulp manufacturing 
sector were collaborating with the international environmental group WWF on a trial initiative called 
New Generation Plantations.245 The goal of the scheme were no less than the creation of “an ideal form 
of plantations that contribute positively to people and nature”. This objective was to be illustrated first 
hand to a group of foreign industry representatives during a four-day study of the companies’ facilities 
following the conference. The conference itself, however, provided an opportunity for industry and 
government leaders to map out their overarching ambitions for the forestry sector as a whole.  
The keynote address was given by the Minister for Agriculture, Tabaré Aguerre, who credited the 1987 
Forest Law 15.939 (a reform of the 1968 Forestry Act) with liberalising Uruguay’s forestry sector and 
permitting “the most important foreign investments in the history of this country” (see Figure 17). 
Coinciding with the Law’s 25th anniversary, the Minister waxed lyrical about the benefits that the 
legislative reform had brought about. Along with the boost in forestry product exports (totalling US$1.2 
billion per year, a one hundredfold increase on 1987 figures)246 and the expansion in transport 
infrastructure, the senior government official emphasised the provision of employment. In total, 18,000 
new jobs had been created in the sector since 1987, he noted. With this figure still ringing around the 
room, he held up the recent investments of Montes del Plata and Botnia/UPM as the epitome of 
Uruguay’s “intelligent policy of insertion into the global economy”, which he deemed imperative for a 
“century that is different”. A key aspect of this ‘intelligent’ policy was the future “productivity of people 
working in forestry”. This feature, he added, was “essential for any business” but required the “very, 
very important” provision of vocational training.  
                                               
244 In mid-2018, with negotiations ongoing between the Uruguayan government and UPM over a third huge pulp 
mill, the majority (57%) of Uruguay’s adult population said they did not support generous tax breaks and other 
incentives for multinational investors. El Pais 22 July 2018. Exonerar de impuestos a UPM divide a uruguayos. 
https://www.elpais.com.uy/informacion/politica/exonerar-impuestos-upm-divide-uruguayos.html. Accessed 25 
July 2018.  
245 For information on WWF’s New Generation Plantations programme, see: http://newgenerationplantations.org. 
246 With the inauguration of Uruguay’s second major pulp mill in 2014, forestry would begin to challenge bovine 
beef as Uruguay’s largest export commodity, with the two commodities closely matched at 14% and 16% of total 
exports come 2015. See, Free Trade Zones in Uruguay, published by Uruguay XXI, May 2017. 
http://www.uruguayxxi.gub.uy/informacion/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2016/08/Free-Zones-Report-May-
2016.pdf. Accessed 1 July 2016. 
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In case the suited executives from the conference’s two commercial sponsors had missed the Minister’s 
point, the Director of Uruguay’s Forestry Department then took to the podium to spell it out. Impressive 
though the forestry industry’s growth rates had been (6% per annum over the previous decade) and 
despite the “important advances” Uruguay had achieved with respect to employment and labour 
standards, Pedro Soust insisted that more was required if modern forestry was to fully realise its socio-
economic potential. Critical to this realisation, he maintained, was the reconfiguration of the rural 
worker. From a low-skilled, low-paid ‘peon’ in the traditional agriculture sector, she (and, more 
probably, he) had to ideally become a high-skilled “productive” agent within Uruguay’s evolving agro-
industrial system. The answer to this was to “get the training necessary to become part of the productive 
process”, he concluded.247  
The Minister’s instance on the importance of training and skills development in rural development 
inspired the employability proposition that Montes del Plata’s CSR team developed to deal with the 
overflows from the company’s enclaving policy. The policy resulted in a number of separate activities. 
Chief of these were several six-month training courses for adults. The CSR division contracted the 
government-backed National Institute for Employment and Professional Training (INEFOP) to run the 
courses, which took place in the nearby town of Carmelo. Around two dozen citizens participated. The 
courses provided them with basic instruction in accounting, marketing and other business 
administration skills. Participants also received help in designing a business plan for a proposed new 
venture. After graduations, the intention was for these ventures to be converted into real-world, 
productive enterprises. In the event, many of the participants dropped out before the end of the training 
and only a small handful of those who did graduate actually set up a micro-enterprise of their own. Two 
of these (a kiosk in the Carmelo workers’ barracks and a laundry service in Conchillas) depended 
directly on demand generated during the mill’s construction phase and closed after the project’s 
culmination. The third was a small general store and photocopying service on Conchillas’ plaza, which, 
                                               
247 In the closing section of his speech, the Forestry Department chief elaborated more extensively on this theme: 
“It is our intention to promote and encourage industry to come to take advantage of the primary material [timber] 
that we are already exploiting, but which we believe we can increase. This is what we’re working on. It is also 
our intention to train people located in the rural areas so they can benefit. It shouldn’t just be those of us living 
in cities who end up learn a specific skill and then going out to the countryside. Young people who are already in 
the countryside should be learning the necessary skills too. The problem at the moment is that these young people 
come to the cities because in the countryside there aren’t opportunities for them to get the training necessary to 
become part of the productive process.” 
“Also we want social integration. We want to create a connection with people about what working in the forestry 
sector entails and what forestry production means. People have to feel for themselves what the benefits of forestry 
are. Working in the sector shouldn’t just be about acquiring the means to feed their families or buy a new 
motorbike. No, no, it’s something else. It’s the integrated development of the person that we’re interested in. 
Because in that way we can make an important contribution to overcoming the (socio-economic) gap that we still 
have in this country. Statistics show that the level of poverty in rural areas has substantially diminished and it’s 
my belief that the forestry sector is an important causal factor for this.” 
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given the presence of several other very similar stores in the village, was struggling to stay afloat when 
I left in 2016. The fourth was a sex shop in Carmelo. 
 
 
Figure 17 A fast-growth eucalyptus plantation in central Uruguay 
 
Not one to be dissuaded, the pulp manufacturer also pursued two other employability-related initiatives 
within the Punta Pereira enclave itself. The first was a programme designed to train up local high-school 
students to work as technical operators at the mill once operations had commenced. The initiative 
conformed perfectly to the government’s desire for rural youth with low levels of human capital and 
poor employment prospects to be inserted into the agro-industrial workforce as productive workers. 
The second initiative represented a coordinated effort between Montes del Plata, the two main 
construction unions operating at the Punta Pereira site (SUNCA and UNTMRA) and the Uruguayan 
University of Work (known by its Spanish acronym as ‘UTU’). The programme saw UTU, a state-run 
tertiary education provider specialising in vocational training, provide courses of between one and two 
months’ duration in ‘industrial assembly’ (focusing in particular on electrical installations and industrial 
soldering).248 The employability advantages of these schemes was highly questionable. Not only were 
                                               
248 UTU. 2013. ‘Entrega de certificados’. Press Release 18 December 2013. http://snep.edu.uy/noticias/3337/. 
Accessed 4 September 2016. 
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the numbers of total beneficiaries low,249 but the outputs in terms of productivity were also minimal.250 
So should attempts by Montes del Plata’s management to manage the labour-related overflows of its 
framing efforts be considered a failure?  
 
In empirical terms, the response cannot be anything but affirmative. In private, the company’s 
representatives admitted as much. In a rare moment of candour, one of the community relations 
managers told me how the company’s efforts to promote entrepreneurship within the micro-region were, 
in reality, “very quiet” and “not very justified”. By her analysis, the sticking point was cultural: “A 
society like this one has simply never had a culture of entrepreneurialism.” Yet, to focus overly on the 
hard numbers and concrete outcomes of Montes del Plata’s employability efforts is to misplace the 
locus of their legitimising effect. Employability represented a priority for the State, not the Corporation. 
In line with the ethic of detachable CSR, the company’s orientation was towards managing the moral 
and political overflows from its enclaving attempts; its purpose was not to invest substantively in 
resolving them. UTU, for instance, runs courses in forestry management and wood-related industrial 
engineering in the northern province of Rivera, one of the highest timber producing regions of the 
country. If Montes del Plata’s CSR team was serious about increasing the productivity of human capital 
for the forestry sector, they could have supported the expansion of UTU’s training in other regions. 
Likewise, it could have thrown its financial muscle behind the Technological University of Uruguay 
(UTEC), a state-funded tertiary education facility established in 2014 to promote “technical, 
pragmatically-oriented courses” in economic sectors differing from skills shortages. Again, it did not.  
Montes del Plata’s publicity materials, on the other hand, gave off a very different impression. Read at 
face value and Uruguay’s largest ever foreign investor could almost be mistaken for a public-minded 
training agency. In its official statement about the aforementioned truck driver’s training programme, 
for example, it describes the programme as evidence of “the importance of positioning the industry as 
one that generates quality employment and opportunities for growth”.251 A corroborating quote is then 
                                               
249 A mere 25 young people were accepted on the youth technicians’ programme in the first two years. For the 
two years of the UTU programme, meanwhile, around 800 contracted union members working at the mill project 
received a certificate. See: Montes del Plata. Press release, 16 February 2012. Montes del Plata está capacitando 
a jóvenes para trabajar en la operación técnica de la planta. www.coloniaya.com/noticia.php?id=3891. Accessed 
28 June 2018. the minuscule number of beneficiaries: a mere 25 young people in the programme’s first two years. 
See: Montes del Plata. Press release, 16 February 2012. Montes del Plata está capacitando a jóvenes para trabajar 
en la operación técnica de la planta. www.coloniaya.com/noticia.php?id=3891. Accessed 28 June 2018. 
250 The exception with regards to productive labour was the technicians’ programme. However, in keeping with 
Callon’s proposed framework, the example conforms more closely with the integration of overspill through direct 
employment (i.e. the above enclave model) rather than the looser employability strategy described here. Similarly, 
the exception with regards to the low number of beneficiaries (i.e. the 800 or so recipients of UTU certificates), 
the knock-on effects were felt predominantly in the industrial construction sector, not in rural agro-forestry, as 
government discourse would suggest. 
251 Montes del Plata. 2018. Montes del Plata apuesta a la capacitación y al desarrollo laboral en las comunidades 
locales. Press release. 9 February 2018. https://www.montesdelplata.com.uy/montes-del-plata-apuesta-a-la-
capacitacion-y-al-desarrollo-laboral-en-las-comunidades-locales-8?nid=541&&page:1!=10. Accessed 29 May 
2018. 
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provided from Diego Carrau, head of the company’s forestry operations: “At Montes del Plata, we are 
always pushing to promote local employability as part of our commitment to development and our 
prioritisation for the communities where we have a presence”. Up to this day, the first point on the 
company’s list of Frequently Asked Questions centres on the number of jobs created by its 
investment.252 The precise answer is 630 direct jobs, yet, consistent with its desire to show its wider 
impact on rural productivity, the figure is immediately qualified by the assertion that these jobs “form 
part of a large productive chain that includes more than 6,000 employment opportunities in 13 
provinces”.253 Outside Montes del Plata’s industrial enclave, in other (their?) words, opportunities for 
productive labour are flowing thanks to pulp production. 
The content of the company’s discourse may be questionable, but it is at least consistent. Right at the 
outset, with news of the government’s authorisation of the mill still fresh, Montes del Plata’s 
communications team put out a public call for the ill-fated INEFOP programme. The country’s new 
pulp producer would be organising an introductory workshop to help Colonia residents “visualise the 
potential for generating an enterprise of their own”.254 This notion of pulp promoting new, exciting 
opportunities for productive labour is anything but a one-off. Shortly afterwards, the company’s 
publicity department announced a “mutually beneficial” programme for rural youth in Durazno, located 
in central Uruguay. The project involved 25 young adults being loaned small herds of sheep and cattle, 
which they could graze on company-owned land. To quote Montes del Plata’s corporate communication 
manager, the scheme aimed to: “promote the settlement and development of youth in rural areas [using] 
training and proposals for the productive integration of livestock farming and forestry as  means of 
spreading employment opportunities in Montes del Plata’s value chain”.255  
Back in 2011, at the official inauguration of Punta Pereira as an export zone, Erwin Kaufmann took to 
the stage to publicly declare his aspiration for the company that he oversaw. It was Montes del Plata’s 
profound desire, he informed the assembled dignitaries and national media, to be “a relevant actor in 
the development of the country, creating [value] chains that are productive, efficient and long term”.256 
                                               
252 https://www.montesdelplata.com.uy/english/our-company-2. Accessed 25 July 2018. 
253 Montes del Plata. 2018. Preguntas frecuentes. https://www.montesdelplata.com.uy/nuestra-empresa-2#trabajo. 
Accessed 29 May 2018. 
254 Montes del Plata. 2011. Seminario taller para emprendedores en Colonia del Sacramento, Colonia. Press 
release. 26 June 2011. https://www.montesdelplata.com.uy/seminario-taller-para-emprendedores-en-colonia-del-
sacramento-colonia-8?nid=412&page:1!=14. Accessed 4 September 2013. 
255 Montes del Plata. 2013. Pequeños productores de Durazno ingresan ganado bovino y ovino a predios forestados 
de Montes del Plata con el fin de ampliar su área de producción. Press release, 5 September 2013. 
https://www.montesdelplata.com.uy/pequenos-productores-de-durazno-ingresan-ganado-bovino-y-ovino-a-
predios-forestados-de-montes-del-plata-con-el-fin-de-ampliar-su-area-de-produccion-8?nid=532&page:1!=10. 
Accessed 3 September 2013. 
256 Montes del Plata. 2011. La zona franca de Punta Pereira quedó inaugurada oficialmente con un acto que tuvo 
lugar en el predio donde se construirá la planta de celulosa. Press release. 18 July 2011. 
https://www.montesdelplata.com.uy/la-zona-franca-de-punta-pereira-quedo-inaugurada-oficialmente-con-un-
acto-que-tuvo-lugar-en-el-predio-donde-se-construira-la-planta-de-celulosa-8?nid=408&page:1!=14. Accessed 4 
September 2013. 
 
  179 
  
 
This was not the fly-by-night investor of globalisation critiques, scouring the world in search of cheap 
labour and then moving on at the first hint of wage inflation, union unrest or other labour-related 
inconveniences. Rather, this was the lead protagonist of Uruguay’s upbeat and outward-looking 
economy, bent on fostering (indirect) rural employment opportunities for the country’s lasting benefit.   
The Uruguayan government, as the chief proponent of this new-look economy, could ask for little more. 
Prior to the arrival of Botnia/UPM and Montes del Plata, the principal respondents to the state’s efforts 
at market liberalisation were regional grain producers, mostly Argentine and Brazilian. Attracted by 
comparatively low land costs and short leaseholds, they introduced a highly-capitalised model of 
modern agricultural production to Uruguay that brought about a substantial boost to agricultural 
production, primarily in soybeans, wheat and other cash crops. Their impact on rural wages and skill 
levels was minimal, however. Premised as their profit targets were on high agricultural commodity 
prices, these investments were invariably short-term and transient. When global prices fell, as they did 
in 2015, many simply upped and left. The motivation for companies working to such a capricious 
business model to invest in building the capacity of Uruguay’s rural labour force was negligible.   
In its new CSR-espousing pulp investors, however, the Uruguayan state had a pliant collaborator with 
which it could co-construct the rhetorical architecture required for its liberalising vision of an advanced 
agricultural economy. Any opportunity provided by Montes del Plata to endorse the connection between 
agro-industrial FDI and fresh possibilities for productive labour were therefore seized upon by the state. 
It is no coincidence that President José Mujica’s only visit to the mill project during my fieldwork was 
occasioned by the graduation of the first tranche of workers on the UTU training course.257 To maximise 
the political symbolism of the visit, which was followed minute by minute by the national press corps, 
the Minister for Industry and the Minister of Labour were also both in attendance.   
After a lengthy ceremony to hand over the training certificates to the course participants, President 
Mujica gave a short speech. The workers’ canteen where the event took place was packed with union-
affiliated contractors. From the back of the room, a bank of television cameramen trained their lenses 
on the Frente Amplio leader. The mill project be viewed “from a distance” (i.e. with a view to its wider 
or longer-term benefits), the country’s President began. In a clear nod to the alleged human capital 
advantages of agri-industrial FDI, he went on to explain how “individual capacity is only developed 
when there is opportunity”. Montes del Plata’s mill, he specified, was that opportunity.258 
                                               
257 The president’s visit took place on 20 December 2012. 
258 On 8 September 2014, at the official inauguration of Montes del Plata’s mill, President Mujica would again 
praise the “enormous range of activities” generated by the “advanced technology” at the mill. As well as the high-
quality direct jobs on offer at the mill, he drew attention to the project’s “lateral support” for rural employment 
and employability more generally.  See:  El País, 8 Sept 2014: Mujica valoró planta de Montes del Plata como 
"un salto del Uruguay". http:// www.elpais.com.uy/informacion/mujica-valoro-planta-montes- plata.html. 
Accessed 12 August 2016. 
 




After his speech, Eduardo Brenta, the Minister of Work, took the microphone. He confirmed that that 
project was “especially valuable” for the training and equipping of “human capital”, emphasising that 
such gains endured long beyond the immediacy of investment project itself. Señor Brenta would return 
again at the end of the year for the next graduation ceremony, this time without his boss. In a media 
statement prepared by the government, the training course was described as helping participating 
workers “access job opportunities in future projects of great importance that will develop the 
country”.259 This claim to an obvious and apparently incontestable link between vocational skills, 
productive labour and national development could have been taken directly from Montes del Plata’s 
own copybook. It was a point drummed home by the Minister for Labour in his address at the graduation 
ceremony. As he assured the course graduates: “To have committed yourself to start and finish this 
training will open many doors in Uruguay that we are now seeing spring up.” Indeed, it was the 
minister’s judgement that Uruguay was witnessing nothing less than “the birth of a new country”. 
 
The entanglement of Montes del Plata in the government’s development discourse is clear not just from 
the overlap in language, but the coordination in public communications. Both handover ceremonies 
were the subject of separate press releases published simultaneously by the President’s Office, the 
Ministry of Labour and Montes del Plata.260 Much of the material is identical. Interestingly, however, 
Montes del Plata’s public statement regarding the December 2013 event included additional quotes 
from representatives of the labour organisations involved in the training programme. The messages 
were predictable. “The newly learned skills are, firstly, a benefit for all the workers and their families,” 
Ignacio Otegui of the Construction Chamber is quoted as saying. Likewise, SUNCA president Faustino 
Rodríguez stresses the importance of “these kinds of undertakings to bring further benefits to the 
country, in addition to their own [i.e. Montes del Plata’s] operations."  
 
Reflecting on the inevitable overflows in the framing of contractual arrangements and relations, Callon 
notes that the sources of such spillovers “are to be found in precisely those elements that give it its 
solidity” (1998:255). Tokenistic as Montes del Plata’s wider employability programme may have been, 
it was enough to serve the government’s purposes. In this sense, establishing the mill’s (alleged) wider 
impacts on labour was as critical to cementing Montes del Plata’s investment as was its ability to 
securing (real) labour within its own industrial enclave.  
                                               
259 Oficina de Presidencia. (2013). Obreros de Montes del Plata recibieron diplomas de UTU en técnicas de 
montaje industrial. 23 December 2013. Available at: https://www.presidencia.gub.uy/comunicacion/ 
comunicacionnoticias /obreros-montes-plata-utu-capacitacion-montaje-industrial. Accessed 29 May 2018. 
260 Montes del Plata. 2013. Over 700 Montes del Plata construction workers completed on-site training courses. 








4.5 ‘Jobs for all’: moral overflows, local workers & the detachable database   
 
The success of Montes del Plata’s detachability approach was not completely universal. Within the 
fence line of Punta Pereira, the pulp manufacturer’s relatively small direct workforce was well 
remunerated, securely employed and, as a consequence, largely content. Outside Montes del Plata’s 
enclave, its management had given just enough reinforcement to the notion of an extended, 
employment-providing value chain to keep the company’s political overseers happy.  
The only discontented party that remained was made up of those who lived in the immediate vicinity 
of the Punta Pereira enclave. Like Sergio, many residents held determinedly to the widely reported (but 
unclearly attributed) pledge of “jobs for all”. In early 2013, during the latter period of my first period 
of field research, the construction process was entering a transitional phase. From the initial earthworks’ 
stage, which required high volumes of workers, the mill project was becoming more orientated towards 
complex engineering work and the installation of industrial machinery, for which fewer workers were 
required. In a civic meeting in the run-up to Christmas, Montes del Plata’s CSR representatives had put 
forward their case for the enclaving of long-term jobs; namely, the aforementioned imperative for full-
time employees be equipped with technical skills or advanced managerial capabilities. This was 
grudgingly accepted by residents, but it did not quell their insistence that Montes del Plata provide short 
and long-term employment opportunities at its mill. 
In his description of framing and overflows, Callon distinguishes between ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ situations. 
He defines the former as highly unstable scenarios in which the list of actors and identities overflowing 
from the frame morph and fluctuate, creating “hybrid forums” in which facts and knowledge become 
so contested that the opportunities for re-framing become almost impossible (Callon 1998a:260). Given 
the complexities of industrialised societies, hot scenarios had become increasingly the norm, Callon 
argued. Three decades on and a generation of globalisation later, this is even more true today. ‘Cold’ 
situations are increasingly rarer, but they have the benefit of being simpler and easier to manage. The 
list of actors is known and, as effective framing predicates, their demands and responses are relatively 
easy to predict.  
Conchillas’ protesting workers presented an archetypal ‘cold’ situation. Numerically limited, 
geographically contained and politically isolated (see Chapter 1), the residents demanding employment 
at the mill had limited negotiating power to breach the labour barriers erected by their new pulp 
manufacturing neighbour. In the backroom of the Club Uruguayo, on a sweltering evening in early 
January 2013, a group of just over three dozen residents met to discuss the options ahead of them (see 
Figure 18). They sat on plastic chairs borrowed from the bar area of the Club, which served as the down-
 
  182 
  
 
at-heel headquarters of Conchillas’ amateur football club. All the attendees, who ranged in age from 
their late teens to their early fifties, had contract jobs at the mill.  
 
 
  Figure 18 Club Uruguayo, bar and social centre located just off the main plaza in Conchillas.  
Presiding over the meeting was Sergio and his friend Julio. Two months previously, Montes del Plata’s 
CSR team had met with the workers to discuss their demands for employment. This earlier meeting had 
resulted in a compromise in which the team pledged to establish a system whereby the residents’ 
curriculum vitae would be collected and entered into a “worker database”. The details of the database 
would then be shared with contractor firms at the mill. Julio and Sergio had recently met with Helena, 
the community manager responsible for overseeing the database initiative, and had called the meeting 
in Club Uruguayo to update their fellow workers on progress.  
 
The summary account provided by the two men did little to inspire confidence. The good news was that 
the mill owner was apparently about to sign two major contracts with construction firms for the next 
phase of the mill project. This would supposedly generate more than 100 new jobs. The bad news was 
that, although Montes del Plata’s CSR team had promised to pass on the database to the new contractors, 
no guarantees could be offered. All the same, Sergio’s overall impression from their dialogue with the 
manager (which I attended as an observer) was broadly positive. Montes del Plata’s representatives 
were genuinely committed to pushing forward the database proposal, he told the assembled workers. 
His advice to them was therefore to wait and see how the matter unfolded. Julio agreed but stressed that 
the lack of tangible results meant the workers should not let up the pressure. Should the database 
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initiative not bear fruit, he proposed, the group should call for a follow-up meeting with a more senior 
official at Montes del Plata. The meeting was put to an open vote. Every hand went up in assent. 
A month later and the cautious optimism of the two leaders was burning less brightly. Several local 
residents had been called in for interviews via the database, but only two firm jobs had been offered to 
the best of the group’s knowledge. Julio was becoming particularly nervous, threatening to “go to the 
papers” or even block the road to the mill if more tangible results were not seen soon. As he rightly 
surmised, every week that passed without progress, the possibility of local residents getting a foot in 
the door at the Punta Pereira site shrank. As he told me:   
“It won’t be too many months before many of the people end up with no work. That’s why we’re anxious 
that we don’t let this opportunity pass by on the pavement in front of us. And we’re not going to let it 
pass by. When this finishes and the plant is finished, we don’t want it on the other side of the road. We 
want it to pass by us, to benefit us. The only way that we’ve got that they don’t forget about Conchillas 
is for our people to have work. Or at least the largest number of people as possible.”  
The physicality of his description indicates that, for a tranche of working-age Conchillenses at least, 
the notion of Punta Pereira as an employment enclave went beyond mere metaphor. Julio wanted the 
limits of the mill site to extend right up to his front door (to draw on his own imagery), not to pass by 
on the pavement in front as seemed likely to be the case. For him and his colleagues in the Club 
Uruguayo, the possibility of attaching themselves to long-term employment at the mill felt tantalisingly 
close. Yet, if Montes del Plata declined to open the gates to them, they would remain permanently 
locked outside looking in, a willing labour force detached from what the company’s co-owner promised 
were the “many job opportunities” waiting inside.261  
If the employment-related entanglements between Montes del Plata and the Uruguayan state were 
political in nature, then those with the local community were moral. On this score, the Conchillense 
lobby group was adamant. Over and above the promise of “jobs for all”, the likes of Sergio and Julio 
felt they had in their own way ‘gifted’ Montes del Plata permission to locate their mill on their doorstep. 
In doing so, it was their opinion that a classic dyadic exchange relationship had been set up with the 
company (Carrier 1991). At the meeting at which the database initiative was announced, one of the 
workers had declared: “We exchanged tranquillity for jobs”. In other words, to make good the reciprocal 
repayment for its (perceived) debt, the pulp manufacturer was obliged to provide permanent local 
employment.  
                                               
261 Stora Enso. ‘Montes del Plata mill’. http://biomaterials.storaenso.com/AboutUs-Site/Pages/Montes-del-
Plata.aspx. Accessed 29 May 2018. 
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Obviously, the granting of formal permission to build the mill was beyond the workers’ gift to give. 
That said, mega-industrial projects are harder to green-light in the event of vocal community opposition. 
The workers in the Club Uruguayo were not blind to this. From their perspective, their quiescence at 
the arrival of the mill should not to be read as a non-action, but rather as a proactive signal of support. 
Non-mobilisation was, in this sense, the community’s gift to the pulp manufacturer. Nor was it a ‘free 
gift’, in the Derrida sense of note being “perceived or received as a gift” (Derrida 1992:16). “We 
exchanged tranquillity for jobs” – a phrase regularly repeated by Conchillenses in various forms – made 
explicit to the management of Montes del Plata the workers’ understanding of the conditional and 
inalienable nature of their initial quiescence (a ‘thing gift’).  
The workers’ conception of the debt relationship between themselves and the mill’s owners has 
important implications within Callon’s framing schematic. As a foreign multinational investor, Montes 
del Plata operates in the conventional commodity economy in which a marked distinction exists 
between objects and persons (Mauss 2017 [1925]). Classic Marxist theory would construe Sergio and 
his fellow productive residents in the micro-region as workers in a class-based society, in which objects 
of exchange tend to assume the alienated form of a commodity. Commodities are alienable objects 
transacted by aliens, in a state of reciprocal independence (Marx 1967 [1887]:61). Gift exchange, in 
contrast, is based on reciprocal dependence between non-aliens, akin to a clan system. Commenting on 
clan-based exchange systems in his classic ethnography of the Pikot, in East Africa, Harold Schneider 
remarks that: “Between strangers there is a strict pecuniary relationship; this aspect is less marked 
between neighbour and tilia (trading partners), and is least so between clansmen and best friends” 
(Schneider 1957:286). By asserting their earlier quiescence as an inalienable gift, the workers were 
therefore challenging their status as mere objectified workers and subtly but significantly demanding 
their right to be considered as something similar to neighbours. Theoretically, as a “buen vecino’ (‘good 
neighbour’), this was a form of relationship towards which Montes del Plata’s management should have 
been sympathetic. Yet the enclave model that the company had worked so hard to establish depended 
on non-specialist workers remaining as alienable, commoditised, morally detached labour. To accept 
the local workers’ proposition of employment as the reciprocal response to a moral gift exchange would 
not just reposition its protective fence, but potentially rip it down entirely.  
The same reasoning made Montes del Plata’s management wary for a second reason. Were they to 
accept the local workers’ proposal of long-term employment as a form of gift exchange, it would place 
the local workforce in a position a gift-debt (Gregory 1982:48). Placing the strategic motivations of the 
company’s management aside for a moment, is it not curious that Conchillas’ workers should be willing 
to assume such clear subjugation? Not necessarily. One must recall the historic culture of highly 
dependent labour on which this former company town was founded and under which it lived for over 
seven decades. It is also necessary to consider the workers’ limited room for negotiation. Proposing a 
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conventional commodity exchange with Montes del Plata was, in effect, a non-starter for them. Under 
the laws of value to which such exchanges are subject, the workers would need to offer something of 
equal value to the permanent jobs that they sought. Without the requisite skills for managing or 
operating a modern pulp mill, however, their offer of labour would fall far short of equivalence. The 
withdrawal of their acquiescence could feasibly comprise a more valuable alternative. In place of what 
local residents could bring to Montes del Plata’s enclaved operations (i.e. their labour), their value 
would be determined by what they do not bring (i.e. civil unrest and protest).  
If Conchillas had been Gualeguaychú,262 the Argentine town at the centre of the conflict against 
Botnia/UPM, there may possibly have been mileage in such an exchange. Yet Conchillas was quite 
different. Shaped by a history of cultural conservatism and political passivity, residents were unlikely 
to deliver on Sergio’s threats of direct action.263 Nor was the Conchillenses’ proposal unique. Indeed, 
the notion of capitalism reproducing itself through the imposition of binding obligations on 
marginalised workers who exchange their labour as an unrepayable gift has become a quasi-orthodoxy 
in contemporary economic anthropology (Cross 2014). For those gathered in the Club Uruguayo, the 
importance of gaining employment at almost whatever cost was starkly revealed in a throwaway 
comment by one of the protesting workers. Discussing the potential threat of pollution from the mill, 
the resident categorically stated that he was “not bothered”. His reasoning: “As long as the project 
provides work, then I don’t have any problem with it.”  
The problem, instead, lay with Montes del Plata. Regardless of the clear advantages in power relations 
presented by the workers’ proposal, the mill operator’s enclave model was premised on it detaching 
itself as much as possible from extraneous labour demands. The Corporation did not want unskilled 
Conchillenses on its payroll. Yet, at the same time, it could not ignore the moral overflows that its 
project had produced. Despite attempts to brand workers from across the province as ‘local’, its public 
responsibility claims required it to acknowledge (and, preferably, address) the desire for employment 
by some in its designated ‘area of influence’.  
Acknowledgement was the easy part. During the workers’ first meeting with representatives of Montes 
del Plata, Juan da Silva had taken to his feet to address the fractious residents. A robust, straight-talking 
former journalist and Ministry of Environment employee, Señor da Silva managed the company’s 
regional press and government relations. In an ameliorating tone, he described the workers’ request for 
                                               
262 See above, page 23. 
263 Julio conceded the low probability of Conchillenses taking direct action against Montes del Plata in light of 
the community’s culture of passivity. As he remarked on one occasion to me: “They [Montes del Plata] came 
here because there are my positive things about the location, in my view. They came knowing that the plant was 
authorised already. But they came and did their studies too - of the people, of our profile. It’s very difficult to 
come here and not see that the people are very peace-loving (pacifica), patient, that they’re not going to complain. 
And up till now, they’ve got the proof on the table.” 
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long-term jobs as “legitimate” and congratulated them (somewhat patronisingly) on their “exemplary 
attitude to keep working”. If he was in their shoes, he would be demanding the same, he said. The 
company spokesperson then left them with an assurance: “We’re taking this seriously. You are right not 
to think that this will come from the sky. You need to defend your rights.” Proof of the company’s 
seriousness came in the form of the worker database. It was not a guarantee of employment, but nor 
was it a complete padlocking of the door. Work might be available, albeit uncertain and indirect. Such 
a compromise solution represents classic detachable CSR in action: the simultaneous ability to give and 
withhold, to promise and deny, to dangle hope but hold back certainty.  
To understand how Montes del Plata’s management calculated the pitch of its response, it is instructive 
to return again to Callon’s distinction between ‘hot’ and ‘cold’. As well as a binary set of scenarios, his 
frame theory proposes two basic forms or stages in the resolution process: the identification of 
overflows (‘hot’) and the framing or calculation of those overflows (‘cold’) (Callon 1998a:266). 
Identification was straightforward: the workers’ insistence to meet with Montes del Plata’s 
representatives clarified the demands of the former and left both sides fully aware of the issues at stake. 
According to Callon, negotiating overflows depends on prior knowledge of the “possible world states” 
or the ready identification of such states. This requires the identification of key actors, the stabilisation 
of interests, the expression of preferences and the acceptance of responsibilities (ibid: 261). A 
combination of past experience of community relations and ongoing dialogue with the lobby group’s 
protagonists enabled Montes del Plata’s CSR team to hedge against the issue escalating.  
Again, Conchillas was not Gualeguaychú. In the case of the latter, the town’s residents had been able 
to amplify their demands (in their case, to relocate the mill projects away from Fray Bentos because of 
pollution fears) by drawing new, powerful actors to their cause; notably, the regional and national 
governments, plus a network of international campaign groups (Giarracca & Petz 2007). Sergio and 
Julio’s group stood no such chance. The creation of highly localised jobs was not the primary concern 
of the Uruguayan state; general employability was. Moreover, it was a concern that the CSR team had 
appeared to satisfy through the employability initiatives they helped develop and deliver. Nor is job 
creation a cause that typically attracts campaign-minded civil society groups, particularly when support 
from labour unions is absent, as in this case. The Conchillense workers were alone – and the company’s 
CSR team and senior management knew it.   
Indeed, the workers’ isolation extended into social dynamics of the micro-region itself. Montes del 
Plata’s mega-plant represented a profound shift in the political economy of the region. From a system 
centred around low-skilled, low-leveraged, traditional agriculture orientated towards the domestic 
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market,264 the mill ushered in an export-focused, techno-industrial form of agri-business that was 
heavily reliant on foreign finance, highly-skilled labour  and state support. This new reality was one to 
which many in the micro-region preferred not to attach themselves (see Figure 19).  
 
 
 Figure 19 A young ‘gaucho’ at a rodeo organised by Conchillas’ Palenque Nativist Club 
 
Rural landowners felt particular animosity towards the new mode of agricultural production symbolised 
by the mill project. Their reasons were, in part, pragmatic. The spike in demand for short-term contract 
workers at the mill had reduced the supply of available manual labour and caused wage rates to 
inflate.265  
                                               
264 In 2010, on the eve of Montes del Plata’s arrival, over half the population of Conchillas (55%) were working 
in some form of agriculture - the primary sector being dairy (10%), arable (24%) and cattle-raising (12%). Source: 
PWC. October 2010. Social Impact Assessment (EIS) of Punta Pereira Pulp Mill and Power Plant Project, p.77. 
265 Javier Barcena, a local cattle breeder and president of the Palenque Nativist Society, an important folkloric 
cultural group based in Conchillas, summed up the frustration felt by him and his peers: “At the moment, there 
are a lot of people who have left the rural sector to work there [at the mill]. It’s very difficult to find people to 
work. The people that you can find are very irresponsible. They are linked to the unions as well, which makes it 
hard to work with the rural labour force.” They had ideological and political objections too. Pulp production 
resulted in land being diverted for food production to the production of non-food goods, something Señor Barcena 
and his fellow traditionalists thought scandalous. “It’s something else entirely, to give land to make paper for a 
foreign multinational and to stop making food for ourselves,” he exclaimed in disgust. His use of the words 
‘foreign’ and ‘multinational’ were also pointed. In his opinion, state subsidies for agri-based FDI projects in the 
form of tax breaks and other exemptions enabled firms like Montes del Plata to “compete unfairly against us”, 
 
  188 
  
 
A similar lack of sympathy for their cause was expressed by the owners of local retail outlets, 
agricultural supply services and other small businesses operating in the micro-region. Again, labour 
constraints proved an important contributor to their lack of solidarity. Among the most vitriolic in this 
group was the owner of the petrol station and garage in Radial Conchillas. She employed six mechanics, 
whose skills would have stood them in good stead for well-paid jobs during the construction phase. 
When I asked if any of them had left to work at the mill, she reacted fiercely. “This is all just a huge 
‘changa’ [odd-job]. I’ve always treated my mechanics well and I’ll continue to do so long after the jobs 
at the mill have dried up. They know that very well.” The idea of the labour opportunities during the 
mill’s construction representing a lucrative, yet finite, stop-gap also extended to residents with 
permanent posts in the formal economy, particularly those working in the public sector.266 
Not all those Conchillenses who distanced themselves from the fight for employment at Montes del 
Plata’s mill did so as a matter of choice. Many were alienated from the labour market on account of 
their age. In 2010, around one sixth (17%) of the population of Conchillas was retired. The historic 
culture of conformity and respect for authority was strong among the micro region’s older population, 
making the prospect of this elderly demographic  protesting improbable.267 Adriana Sosa, a lady in her 
mid-50s who ran the tourist office, told me in a private conversation about the “concern and worry” 
that the elderly people in the village felt about the mill’s arrival given the social conflict surrounding 
the Fray Bentos project previously. “It made us realise that we are pacifist,” she added.268 Estimating 
that the elderly population comprised almost half the population,269 she contrasted the popular dislike 
of “a racket [bochinché] or problems” with the near universal popularity of taking a siesta: “When 
                                               
given the multiple taxes to which “us, Uruguayan producers” were subject. The micro-region was also home to a 
small number of artisanal honey producers and organic farmers, who also opposed the capital-intensive, agro-
industrial model that Montes del Plata’s pulp mill represented. Neither party consequently expressed any solidarity 
for Sergio and Julio’s group. 
266 Marta is illustrative of such attitudes. A mid-career accountant working for a bank in Montevideo although 
with family in Conchillas, she was one of few local residents equipped with the kind of personal profile sought 
by Montes del Plata. Indeed, the pulp operator’s finance division had offered her a job at the outset of the project, 
but she turned down the invitation, arguing that she had no desire to “give up a long-term career option for a 
short-term opportunity”. Much like the term ‘changa’ used by the garage owner, Marta described the mill project 
as a “zafra” - literally, the “sugar harvest”, a time of temporary yet finite abundance. 
267 PWC 2010:77. 
268 Many of the elderly in Conchillas had the reflexive capacity to acknowledge the negative effects of their 
political torpidity but still they declined to act. Gustavo, a 74 year-old retired taxi driver and life-long resident of 
Conchillas, was frank about this paradox: “We’re conformists. If we weren’t so conformist, I think we’d be better 
off. We wouldn’t have complied with what they said when they told us, ‘we’ll do this, that and the other’, in the 
case of the company that is. If the Intendente or a politician comes and promises this or that then does nothing, 
then we say nothing, we keep our mouths shut. Here in the community, there’s never been a march or a strike. 
Nothing, neither in private or in public. We are very laid- back. If someone had organised a march, it wouldn’t 
have been supported.” 
269 This estimate is roughly correct if under-18s are excluded and the benchmark for elderly is set low. 
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SUNCA came to the town one time beating their drums, everyone was taken aback. The village is full 
of elderly. We’d seen this sort of thing on television, but never in person here,” she added.270  
In summary, Conchillas’ aspirant workers lacked sufficient political support at every level – national, 
region and local – to mobilise other actors in support of their cause and to make the struggle for 
employment ‘hot’. Simultaneously, the shift in the local political economy occasioned by its hyper-
modern agro-industrial project had enabled Montes del Plata’s management to create a enclaved work 
space that few local residents wished to attach themselves to, even if they could. For local workers in 
the micro-region’s ‘changa’ economy, the subjugation of their labour was the only realistic method to 
secure the ‘gift’ of long-term employment. For anyone in secure employment, however, the incentive 
to fight for permanent employment at the mill was small. As a consequence, local solidarity for the 
workers at the Club Uruguayo was limited, further marginalising Sergio and his colleagues.  
This goes a long way to explaining the half-hearted nature of the CSR team’s response to the moral 
overflow represented by local employment demands. The worker database represented a classic 
illustration of detachable CSR in action. At one and the same time, it promised working-age 
Conchillenses attachment to Montes del Plata (through employment at the mill), while also portending 
detachment (in the form of a low-paid job with one of the mill operator’s sub-contractors). The initial 
announcement had been met with a brief spate of enthusiasm on the part of both Montes del Plata’s 
CSR team and the workers. The former commissioned a recruitment agency to collect the résumés of 
workers potentially interested in contract work with suppliers to the mill and, after a brief interview, 
register their details in a shareable file. In the first two or three months after its launch, a mere 161 
individuals requested their details to be entered (less than one tenth of the micro-region’s population).271 
Of these, most conformed to the profile of those who met in the back-room meeting of the Club 
Uruguayo: predominantly male (83%), prime age for manual labour (average 32 years old), and low 
skilled (83% failed to complete high-school or further vocational education).272  
On returning to the micro-region after the completion of the mill’s construction and the commencement 
of operations, the database initiative had petered out.273 The reason for its truncated lifespan were 
                                               
270 The cultural antipathy of the micro-region’s elderly population towards protest was strengthened by their 
detachment from the world of work. Commenting on the round-about nature of Montes del Plata’s community 
development programme, Amelia, the mother of the young lawyer Juan Carlos, reflected that she no longer had 
the energy to participate. As she remarked: “If I was here fighting for a job for myself or for something else for 
me, perhaps. But no, not at this stage of my life.” In effect, their attachment to the deferential industrial economy 
of the past, coupled with their separation from the productive economy of the present, meant that the micro-
region’s retired population of Conchillas were doubly estranged from the workers’ cause. 
271 Details of the database are based on a private internal report by Advice, dated 7 January 2013, which was 
provided to me by Montes del Plata’s Sustainability Director. 
272 CIFRA 2015:4-5. 
273 Montes del Plata declined to publish how many of these 161 individuals obtained work through the database, 
either in public or private. Of the dozens of residents that I spoke to in the months afterwards, not one was able to 
cite an example of a secure job offer obtained through the scheme. 
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disputed,274 but its efficacy in dealing with the moral overflows that emerged from the framing efforts 
of Montes del Plata’s management were in no doubt. On the surface, the pulp manufacturer was able to 
point to the initiative as a demonstration of its civic responsibility, in accordance with its CSR pledges. 
In reality, it achieved its end goal of detaching the mill operator from the employment demands of local 
workers.  
Right back at the workers’ initial meeting with Montes del Plata’s representatives in December 2012, 
the company’s local spokesperson Señor da Silva had made Montes del Plata’s position clear. “You’re 
not going to be an employee of Montes del Plata, but it’s possible to be an employee of a third party.” 
This had been widely accepted at the time, even by the most militant of residents. Instead, they had 
settled for the prospect of jobs with contractors. The spokesperson’s statement had come with a further 
qualification. “… although no-one can oblige anyone to employ anyone.” Having agreed to participate 
in the detachable CSR solution presented by the company’s CSR team (i.e. the worker database), Sergio 
and his colleagues had found themselves having to accept this second declaration as true as well.  
Once the mill was operational, Montes del Plata’s industrial site provided 32 full-time posts (11% of 
the total) and around 150 contract jobs (16% of the total)275 for residents from the micro-region and 
surrounding areas.276 Among this second group was Sergio, who obtained employment with a contractor 
involved in the management of the Punta Pereira loading port. His experience of mobilising the local 
workforce evidently gave him a taste for labour politics as he went on to become a vocal trade unionist 
at the site.277 The general feeling in the community was that the contractor jobs on offer were little 
different from those that had existed prior to Montes del Plata’s arrival. Unlike during the construction 
period, when high labour demand saw pay levels for low-skilled manual labour shoot up to double the 
historic average if not more, wage rates adjusted back to normal.278  
                                               
274 Speaking to the community manager responsibility for the project in late 2015, she would deny such 
intentionality. Instead, she blamed “certain tensions” between the firm’s CSR team and its Human Resources 
division for the database not being widely or enthusiastically shared with contractor companies. 
275 By late 2015, the database had grown to 322 candidates. Of these, 117 had jobs linked to the pulp mill, mostly 
either for contractors or other service providers. It remained unclear how many actually acquired these jobs 
through Montes del Plata’s intervention, although the general consensus was that the figure was minimal. 
276 Report submitted by Montes del Plata for the Comisión de Seguimiento, 15 October 2015. Available at: 
http://www.mvotma.gub.uy/portal/sala-de-prensa/item/10007248-comision-de-seguimiento-montes-del-
plata.html. Accessed 8 November 2016. 
277 CIFRA 2015. By December 2015, the number of job-seekers on the database had grown to 322 candidates. Of 
these, 71% (229 individuals) were in employment of some kind, while 13% were unemployed and seeking work. 
A further 16% were out of the labour force but not in search of employment, usually because they had retired or 
taken on caring roles in the family. Of this 71% of employed individuals, just over half (51%, equivalent to 117 
workers) had acquired work at the mill, either directly on Montes del Plata’s books (6%) or with contractors 
(22%), or other service providers to the mill (23%). 
278 CIFRA 2015. In 2015, 49% of Conchillenses earned between $U10,000-20,000, a rise of a mere 2 percentage 
points on the 2010 figure. 
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“We’ve returned to normality,” the owner of Conchillas’ most successful convenience store reflected a 
year or so after the mill’s inauguration. For her, proof that the ‘jobs for all” hopes of the early days were 
now defunct was evident from the response of the micro-region’s young adults. Of the hundreds that 
had returned during the construction period, only a few had stayed on. “Why would they come back?” 
the local business owner asked rhetorically. “Not everyone can work for Montes del Plata.” Franco, a 
20-year-old wheelchair-bound resident, concurred. “Hardly any of my friends who have left to study or 
work elsewhere have come back,” he told me in early 2016. Only his disability prevented him following 
them.  
As a tool for local employment, the detachable CSR solution of the worker database left much to be 
desired. But as a mechanism for protecting its industrial enclave from costly moral obligations without 
compromising its claims to ethical responsibility, it was close to flawless. 
4.6 Conclusion: enclaving employment 
This chapter has endeavoured to show how Callon’s notions of framing and overflows help bring to the 
fore the detachable nature of the employment strategy developed by Montes del Plata’s CSR team and 
wider management. The company’s need for long-term employment is limited, yet its requirement to 
legitimise its investment through the presentation of itself as a generator of jobs is profound. Detachable 
CSR helps resolve this dilemma.  
The first, and easiest, step is to create an enclaved workplace. The Punta Pereira site was designed in 
such a way as to present a physical, guarded barrier to aspirant workers. Only authorised personnel, 
with a pass around their neck and their name on the payroll, could enter. An exception was made during 
the construction period in order to provide the high demand for low-skilled manual labour, yet the 
framing of this employment was always contractual and short-term. Beyond the barred reality of the 
site’s guarded entrance gate, representatives of Montes del Plata’s CSR and human resources teams 
repeatedly stressed that direct employment at its “state-of-the-art” pulp manufacturing facility was the 
sole preserve of qualified professionals and high-skilled “tecnicos” (technicians). In addition to the 
security checks at the gate, this discourse placed an imaginary yet tight additional seal around the 
operating facility. A banner may as well have been fixed to the Punta Pereira fence line declaring: ‘Non-
professionals need not apply’. 
This did not occur. And the reason it did not was because Montes del Plata’s political legitimacy as a 
responsible corporate entity was bound up in the ability of its management to give strength to the 
government’s argument that agro-industrial FDI projects promised new jobs (among other benefits). 
Reframing the Punta Pereira enclave to incorporate these political overflows and allow more full-time 
employees within its fence line represented a commercial non-starter. As with almost all modern 
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industrial mega-projects, the mill operator’s profitability partly relied on the use of cutting-edge 
technologies to reduce labour requirements and cut long-term wage costs. In order to satisfy the 
government’s job creation discourse, Montes del Plata’s CSR team and other public spokespeople 
instead emphasised the ‘indirect’ jobs that could be created in its supply chain. To enhance the 
credibility of the alleged nexus between FDI, forestry and employment, the CSR team developed an 
array of small-scale but high-profile employability initiatives. 
This two-pronged solution proved sufficient to prevent the political overflows occasioned by its project 
from challenging either Montes del Plata’s own legitimacy or the legitimacy of Uruguay’s pro-FDI 
economic policy. By discursively positioning the mill project as a contributory factor to the 
government’s labour-oriented development agenda, the Frente Amplio was able to continue credibly 
pushing its FDI/employment line. In late 2017, the President’s Office would announce a third multi-
million US dollar pulp mill (to be built by UPM).279 Seven years after giving the green light to the Punta 
Pereira project, the Frente Amplio’s pro-FDI arguments remained unchanged. Hence, the very first 
section of the eight-page investment agreement summary stressed the mill project’s projected creation 
of “new employment throughout the whole value chain from forests to export markets”.280 The true 
marker of success for Montes del Plata’s detachable CSR approach was that this link between pulp 
production and knock-on employment opportunities should have been produced without significant 
additional investment on its part.  
Montes del Plata’s CSR team also faced a moral overflow relating to the expected contribution of the 
mill investment towards local job creation. In keeping with the distancing ethos of detachable CSR 
initiative, the team’s managers dealt with this by passing responsibility for employment onto local 
contractors. As a public show of good intent, they introduced the worker database system to facilitate 
the connection between workers and contractors. This proved unfruitful. Those residents who did 
succeed in securing a job with a contractor continued to find themselves as marginalised workers. 
Rather than being marginalised within the traditional rural economy as before, they now occupied a 
marginalised place in the techno-industrial agro-economy ushered in by Montes del Plata’s mega-
investment. Given the lack of skills, know-how and capital of local residents, their full integration into 
this new world of work was even less likely than in the low-skilled, low-tech rural economy of before.  
 
Almost all large-scale FDI projects alter a region’s political economy to some extent. Such was the 
unprecedented size of Montes del Plata’s US$2.5-billion investment and such was the advanced 
                                               
279 Oficina de Presidencia, 2017. ‘Investment Agreement between the Republic of Uruguay and UPM.’ 
Available at:  https://medios.presidencia.gub.uy/tav_portal/2017/noticias/NO_Y823/resumen_ingles.pdf. 
Accessed 12 May 2018. 
280 Ibid. p.2 
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sophistication of its agro-industrial mode of production, however, that its transformative effects were 
exceptional. Given the dramatic nature of the break it occasioned with the rural economy of the past, 
the Punta Pereira mill throws into unusually sharp relief FDI’s political economy effects. The same is 
true of the efforts by the company’s management to contain and mitigate these effects. These efforts, 
divided into the three distinct stages described above, are characterised by distinctive sets of relational 
negotiations. It is through these negotiations that the strategy of detachable CSR is executed and on 
which its success lies. Callon’s framing theory, I maintain, provides a useful framework for 
understanding these negotiations and the CSR discourses and practices that define them. It presents the 
deliberative agent in any given transaction as an inescapably networked actor (homo apertus as opposed 
to homo clausus). Rather than force corporate agents to open up in situations of uncertainty (as per 
Montes del Plata’s position as an alleged job creator with few jobs to offer), the corporate agent should 
be seen as already embedded in relational networks in which his or her agency can be enacted.  
 
From a detachable CSR perspective, the question revolves around how these relational ties might be 
shortened (attached) or extended (detached) as necessary. The deft calculative ability of Montes del 
Plata’s management is illustrated here in how they chose to frame their employment proposition. They 
presented it as geographically and professionally restricted on the one hand, while simultaneously 
managing the political and moral overflows of this restrictive framing on the other. Helping the 
community agents accomplish this was their ability to determine what alliances the company needed to 
strike within its network and what conflicts were best avoided. This saw the company’s CSR division 
help attach their employer to the government through the provision of employability schemes as well 
as to the community through the facilitation of potential (indirect) employment. Insubstantial though 
these attachments were, they were firm enough to sustain Montes del Plata’s public legitimacy despite 
its detachment from any hard and fast employment obligations beyond its fence line.  
 
By the time the mill’s turbines were fired up, the boundaries of the Punta Pereira workforce and the 
foundations of the government’s pro-FDI arguments were both fully secure. All that was left hanging 
was the promise of ‘jobs for all’ for Conchillenses. Regardless of what the Stora Enso representative 
had led residents to believe, the prospect of Montes del Plata’s pulp mill overflowing with jobs was 
never realistically in the frame.   
 
 




              “No somos perfectos, pero somos confiables”    
“We are not perfect, but we are trustworthy”281 
At the outset of this thesis, I proposed the notion of detachable CSR to describe the overarching 
approach that Uruguay’s largest ever foreign investor took to the management of its social and political 
relations. By way of conclusion, I consider what Uruguay’s largest techno-industrial foreign investment 
project to date reveals about: the qualities and characteristics of detachable CSR; the mechanisms that 
a company such as Montes del Plata employs to effect it; and, the lessons that might be drawn from 
these understandings.   
Detachable CSR: corporate relations, legitimation & moral disposition  
The phrase ‘detachable CSR’ attempts to capture the liminal, transitional state of engaged 
disengagement that characterises the moral connection of modern companies to wider society. To win 
and retain legitimacy, international corporations cannot remain amoral actants, devoid of relational 
connections. Foreign investors must establish at least minimal relations with government authorities 
(Chapter 1), community members (Chapter 2 & 3) and its workforce (Chapter 4), among others, if they 
are to reduce their exposure to social and political risks. For sponsors of major infrastructure 
investments, the sheer physicality of their business endeavours thrusts them into a network of moral 
relations, whether their owners and managers welcome these or not.  
The governing ideal for Montes del Plata’s management was to maximise profitable relations and to 
minimise non-profitable relations, while keeping the incumbent costs of all types of relations to the 
lowest level possible. Detachable CSR provides major foreign investors like Montes del Plata with a 
framework for achieving just this kind of truncating of relations. The condition of detachability is best 
understood as one of constant movement and negotiation, rather than a fixed or permanent state. Modern 
corporations are continually drawing and redrawing the space between themselves and those 
institutions, groups and individuals with whom they find themselves in relationship. In this respect, 
detachable CSR is best seen as an ongoing exercise in distance creation, with relational spaces 
sometimes contracting and sometimes expanding but rarely standing still.282 
                                               
281 Management motto of Montes del Plata’s community relations team. 
282 The fact that Montes del Plata operated from a free trade zone afforded it a degree of physical and judicial 
separation from its immediate environs, yet the company rejected a bunker mentality. This was largely because of 
the value that civic engagement brought, principally in the form of enhanced reputational assets and operational 
security (through the avoidance of community unrest). However, when its agents stepped out from behind its 
fences, the drawbridge of corporate detachability remained up. The sense of physical distance and divisibility that 
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Another key characteristic of detachable CSR is its profound pragmatism. The company’s management 
ethic was neither CSR alone nor detachability alone, but rather detachable CSR. The twinning of these 
two seemingly discordant themes allows an advance in the rather stagnant debate as to the moral quality 
of CSR.283 For the most part, multinational corporations are neither looking to save the world in the 
name of sustainable development nor sacrifice it in the cause of capital accumulation. Instead, they are 
looking to address any potential legitimacy concerns so as to secure their investments. If not, they face 
the risk of new or increased impediments from legislators or other market regulators, including the 
public in their guise as consumers and voters (Sethi 1975, 1979). Hence, Helena’s ultra-pragmatic 
remark about building links with local residents not “because we’re really nice” but because residents 
are “the folk who can block the plant” (Chapter 3).  
 A third distinctive attribute of detachable CSR is its iterative nature. The metaphor of journeying in 
contemporary CSR is widespread (Zadek 2004). Close reading of the annual CSR reports of large 
corporations will invariably describe their authors as being ‘on a learning curve’ or ‘on a journey’. The 
iterative metaphor of journeying turns the moral assurances of CSR from principles that are realised 
perpetually into promises that are realisable in the future. Thus, Montes del Plata’s failure to exhibit 
consistent neighbourly conduct can be put down to imperfect knowledge or inadequate decision-making 
systems, say, rather than a misalignment between its stated values and its present actions.  
This observation substantiates Montes del Plata’s preference for an ethical position characterised by 
moral disposition rather than tangible delivery (which comes at a high economic cost). Claims to 
responsible corporate-community relations were structured around its status as a proactive citizen or, to 
use the CSR team’s preferred term, a “vecino responsable” (“responsible neighbour”) (See Figure 20).  
                                               
pervaded life within the Punta Pereira free trade zone carried into the corporate-community relationship that lay 
beyond. In the sense that detachability was exported into the social architecture of the micro-region and was 
“constantly performed in the everyday operations of management”, it can justifiably be considered a guiding ethic 
in Montes del Plata’s community relations (Cross 2011:36). 
283 On the one hand, proponents of CSR make much of the social, environmental and economic benefits that a so-
called “triple bottom line” approach to capitalism can bring (Henriques & Richardson 2005). Their critics, on the 
other hand, have little difficulty in locating evidence of the continued destruction caused by international 
corporations, even when dressed in their best CSR clothing (Fleming & Jones 2013). Yet both groups 
mischaracterise the discourse of CSR, with the first interpreting it as a genuine attempt to merge business goals 
with social purpose, and the second dismissing it as a duplicitous disguise of corporation’s profit-seeking intent. 
This has led to an ideological impasse between CSR as “the good, the bad and the ugly”, to borrow from Bobbie 
Banerjee (2009).  
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               Figure 20 Plaque erected in Conchillas plaza (‘Greetings to the People of Conchillas’) 
 
Yet moral disposition must go beyond mere rhetoric to be effective as a route to legitimacy. In the case 
of the residents of the micro-region, this meant believing that detachable CSR could potentially deliver 
material benefits in the future, even if those benefits were temporarily not apparent or were not as yet 
fully realised.284 An oft-repeated motto of the Montes del Plata’s community relations team ran: “We 
may not be perfect, but we are trustworthy.” As the maxim indicates, the company’s agents expected 
moral inconsistencies. With this in mind, community relations becomes an exercise in the building up 
“goodwill” in order to retain credibility in the company’s moral disposition when “failures, miscues and 
reversals” occur, as they invariably do (Suchman 1995:579).285  
                                               
284 Examples include: the promise of repairs to the Las Palmitas road, which gave Pablo the faint possibility of 
one day realising his claims to representation (Chapter 1); the Forum, which dangled in front participating 
residents the carrot of empowerment and the future-oriented promise of market readiness (Chapter 3); and, the 
worker database, which proffered the hope, albeit small, of future employment (Chapter 4). 
285 Speaking to me about the company’s CSR programme, Montes del Plata’s Sustainability Director was explicit 
in this regard: “Hopefully, this will kind of build a goodwill base [so] that when something bad happens…it’s not 
the first thing that they have heard about us. Okay, they put it in the context of what they do know about us. So if 
it’s some accusation against us, they may give us the benefit of the doubt. At least they may say, ‘I know they are 
doing this and that, so it sounds a bit weird what you are telling me.’” 
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Detachability: CSR’s ever-present aide  
With any CSR strategy, the proposing company’s management is required to lay out their moral stall. 
In Montes del Plata’s case, the board defined its chosen moral qualities in the Management Policy, key 
tenets of which were published on posters in the company’s workplaces and across its suite of corporate-
branded materials.286 The Policy contains a specific section on community relations in which the mill 
owner commits to exude “humbleness”, espouse “integrity” and elicit “trust”, among other virtues.287 
Most specifically, local residents were led to expect the mill owner to “contribute to the economic and 
social development of the communities” in which it operated.288  
As argued, these are statements of aspiration, not affirmations of fact. The company’s community 
managers were involved in a continual exercise of detachability that saw them constantly truncating 
and extending social relations, as attested by Señor Areco’s positioning in the town-hall meeting with 
the Intendente (Chapter 1), Teresa’s hands-off/hands-on management of the Forum (Chapter 3) and 
Helena’s uphill struggle to action the worker database (Chapter 4), among other examples.289 To deliver 
on the CSR division’s ultimate goal of securing Montes del Plata’s social legitimation, the agents had 
to execute their practice of relational detachability in a way that did not appear to contradict the mill 
operator’s claims to responsibility.  
Two possible approaches to CSR management exist to achieve this image of consistency. The first 
assumes that all such claims are false and detachability represents an intentional technique to reduce a 
company’s moral liabilities. This conspiratorial view is common to CSR’s critics (Blowfield & Frynas 
2005, Banerjee 2014). However, the ethnographic evidence in this case does little to substantiate the 
company’s community agents as fraudulent and knowingly underhanded. Instead, the members of 
Montes del Plata’s CSR team demonstrated a deep and personal belief in the ‘win-win’ nature of their 
activities.  
An alternative theory to that of conspiracy is therefore required to adequately explain the depoliticising 
and anti-developmental effects of Montes del Plata’s detachable CSR policy. The evidence presented in 
this thesis leads to the conclusion that the company’s CSR practices were fatally hamstrung in a manner 
that its agents were either unwilling or unable to acknowledge. I argue that the CSR team’s entire 
                                               
286 See: Montes del Plata’s Management Policy: http://www.montesdelplata.com.uy/sustentabilidad.php?lang=en. 
Accessed 13 August 2014. 
287 See: Montes del Plata’s Corporate Sustainability Principles. http://www.montesdelplata.com.uy/ 
sustentabilidad_comunidad.php? lang=en. Accessed 13 August 2014. 
288 ibid. 
289 The implementation of ethical auditing and reporting methodologies (Poovey 2008), the act of making 
development ‘technical’ (Harvey & Knox 2015), the co-optation of opposition and the collusion of allies (Burchell 
& Cook, 2013; Petryna 2010), and the manipulation of everyday discourses (Benson 2010a, 2010b; Foster 2009) 
are just some of the other popular management devices identified by contemporary corporate ethnographers. 
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management approach was laced with an ethic of detachability that not only structured the pulp 
manufacturer’s civic relations, but also framed its relationship to its social and moral responsibilities. 
Infused with the profit-maximising logics of corporate capitalism, the CSR strategies that Montes del 
Plata’s agents designed and implemented were inexorably bounded and restricted in a way that appeared 
natural within the company’s organisational culture and moral philosophy. Hence, the possibility of 
pursuing a flawed strategy with good intent.   
Montes del Plata’s management is not exceptional in creating a CSR strategy inculcated with the tenets 
of neoliberalism and an ethic of detachability. What does mark this case out, however, is the intellectual 
and material resources that went into the design of such a strategy as well as the steadfast consistency 
with which its agents sought to apply it. The decision to structure its flagship community development 
initiative around the theme of empowerment illustrates both these traits. In addition, it exemplifies the 
unrecognised internal discrepancy that characterises the practices and policies of detachable CSR. The 
CSR team’s doctrine of auto-gestión (literally, ‘self-management’) aligned perfectly with the market-
based mentality of the company’s agents. Appealing to core capitalistic notions of individual choice 
and self-determination, community members would be trained up in the kind of ‘human capital’ skills 
that would enable them to chart their own path and forge their community’s developmental destiny. 
When their efforts failed, the community managers placed the blame squarely on the residents for 
“simply never [having] a culture of entrepreneurialism”, to quote Helena. The suggestion that the mill 
operator’s efforts to promote such a culture might have been hamstrung by detachable CSR’s internal 
tensions appeared not to occur to the managers. 
For the most part, the company’s detachable CSR programme delivered outcomes that were anticipated 
by management, if not always celebrated. The community managers would certainly have liked more 
examples of ‘win-win’ solutions, for instance. Yet, as long as the mill operator’s social legitimacy 
emerged secure, then they could rest assured that their main task was complete. If this required a highly 
calculative approach to social and political relations, as detachable CSR does, then this was merely par 
for the course. A micro-level analysis of Montes del Plata’s corporate-community relations indicates 
that the (de)politicisation of certain community claimants (as evidenced most manifestly in the 
stakeholder management tactics described in Chapter 2) was entirely normalised within the team’s 
pervading ethic of detachability.  
Thus, what appears to external critics (not without some justification) as CSR’s manipulation of social 
relations for corporate advantage is alternatively interpreted as the epitome of good management by 
corporate agents who are institutionally and culturally wedded to a system of detachable CSR. The 
treatment of the Comisión de Amigos de Conchillas by Montes del Plata’s community agents illustrates 
this rationalisation of ‘responsible’ relationship management very well. Identified as a potential threat 
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to the company’s control over the development discourse in the micro-region, the community-led group 
and one-time interlocutor with ENCE was persistently side-lined. The group’s perseverance persuaded 
Montes del Plata’s community representatives to restore relations after the pulp facility commenced 
operations. As a consequence, the mill operator’s senior management later agreed to sign off on a (much 
diminished) plan to finance Casa Evans’ restoration. Notably, the agreement came with the caveat of 
governance reforms to the local charity. These fresh elections for its board, which resulted in several 
individuals sympathetic to the mill project joining the Comisión’s decision-making executive.  
The illuminating revelation here is not the manipulation of social relations by the company’s agents, 
which is to be expected, but rather the positive interpretation that they gave of the event. As one of 
Montes del Plata’s CSR team concluded: “It was a super interesting process because in reality what we 
were able to achieve was to organise the group in such a way to generate trust. It’s ended really pretty 
well because what we have now is a group with new people who are more neutral and those who used 
to control it all no longer can do it just themselves.”290 The statement encapsulates the capacity of 
detachable CSR to invisibly (“you don’t see anything”) detach and reattach relations so as to neutralise 
potential threats to corporate power (“people who are more neutral”) and minimise development 
obligations (“changes . . . aren’t going to show their fruit for years”). The result is an imperfect, yet 
pragmatically adequate, form of corporate legitimation (“generate trust”) extracted not from a 
demonstration of business responsibility but rather from the calculated management of social relations.  
The agent’s description was no mea culpa. This was a corporate manager testifying in good conscience 
to a deployment of corporate power that she clearly saw as morally defensible. The ethic of detachability 
treats individual relations in agglomerated form. Managers are encouraged to detach and reattach 
themselves and their employer from social relations as far as the company’s commercial interests 
demand and as far as its economic liabilities allow. As long as the final ledger of the company’s net 
social capital is positive and its legitimacy is secured, then the CSR manager can be satisfied that her 
job is done. No command-and-control system is required to effect such an outcome. No conspiratorial 
blueprint is needed. The pervading ethic of detachability within CSR management – as it pertains to 
community relations at least – is sufficient to direct the actions of corporate agents in such a way as to 
guarantee the interests of the mill’s owners are prioritised without explicit instruction to do so. To 
characterise Montes del Plata’s CSR managers as apparatchiks is therefore erroneous. Equally, to 
describe them as free agents is misplaced. They may be the deliverers of detachable CSR rather than its 
recipients, but it is as difficult for them to detach themselves from its pervading logic as it is for the 
micro-region’s residents.  
                                               
290 Private interview: 16 December 2015. The manager’s quote continues: “If you look from outside, you don’t see 
anything in reality. But for someone from inside, you see various changes, which aren’t going to show their fruit 
for years.” 
 
  200 
  
 
Implications for practice & research 
The ethic of detachability embedded within CSR has a number of implications for corporate-community 
relations, particularly in reference to conflict. It was noted up front in this thesis that Montes del Plata’s 
Punta Pereira project marks a study in conflict without conflict. Indeed, this is one of the exceptional 
characteristics of the case. As social movement theorists note, grievances alone do not explain social 
mobilisation (McAdam et al. 2001, Wolford 2010). Conflict also requires the presence of a specific 
combination of cultural (Hellström 2001, DaMatta 1992), economic (Silver 2003) and/or political 
(Tarrow 2011) factors to be in place.  
In the case of the Conchillenses, the community’s very particular culture of historical political passivity 
and its inopportune lack of civic representation (Chapter 1) combined to reduce the likelihood of 
residents collectively mobilising of their own accord. With few if any external actors lending support 
to their cause, this improbability increased yet further. In this regard, the Punta Pereira mill project was 
very different from the conflict-ridden UPM/Botnia project in Fray Bentos. Across the River Uruguay, 
the central and provincial governments of Argentina swung behind the local protestors in 
Gualeguaychú, as did the country’s well-organised environment movement and its powerful national 
media. Uruguay’s political heavyweights, in contrast, had a pre-existing bias in favour of modern pulp 
productions. Most notably, the national government aspired to a FDI-led growth model, while the 
country’s influential construction unions desired jobs (Chapter 4).   
Montes del Plata’s management cannot be criticised for the array of CSR discourses and practices that 
they employed. Compared to conventional practice in Uruguayan businesses, the internal resources that 
the company’s leadership dedicated to CSR and the public weight that they gave it was truly 
exceptional. As demonstrated, this unprecedented emphasis helped strengthen the pro-pulp 
predisposition of Uruguay’s key political actors. Another related effect was the stifling of opportunities 
for a counter-narrative to emerge that might challenge the pulp manufacturer’s responsibility claims. 
As noted in Chapter 2, the appearance of community acquiescence was vital in enabling the virtualising 
materiality of this simplified imaginary of corporate-community harmony. Here, the co-optative power 
of detachable CSR’s participative preference is all important. Whether intentionally or not, residents 
are drawn into a set of asymmetrical power relations that hold out the (often illusory) promise of 
development goods in exchange for consent and cooperation (Chapter 3). Participative spaces, such as 
town hall-style dialogues (Chapter 1), community events (Chapter 2) and public meetings (Chapter 4), 
also give the company’s representatives the opportunity to physically enact their employer as a single, 
consistent entity that is both socially engaged and corporately responsible.    
One practical option for communities that wish to contest the negative impacts of large-scale FDI 
infrastructure projects is to withdraw their participation in the project sponsor’s CSR activities. This act 
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of detachment would, in theory, serve to weaken the detachable effects of CSR that permit firms to 
dictate the terms and distance of corporate-community relations. On the flip-side, detachment removes 
community members from the source of development goods. This was the predicament faced by the 
members of the Comisión de Amigos after they withdrew from the mill operator’s flagship Forum 
initiative (Chapter 3). Moreover, as actor network theory makes clear, full relational detachment is 
practically unachievable. Even if the residents of the micro-region were to turn their back on the pulp 
manufacturer, the company’s physical infrastructure, its personnel and its discursive presence (via 
signage, press, social media and so forth) would prove inescapable.  
A more pragmatic mode of resistance would be to game the stakeholder management logic that governs 
so much of detachable CSR’s approach to corporate-community relations. As per PWC’s initial advice 
to Montes del Plata’s CSR team, social actors should be categorised in an “order of priorities” and their 
interests attended to accordingly. Conventional stakeholder theory holds that firms determine the 
respective salience of claimants according to attributes of power (i.e. to influence the corporation), 
legitimacy (of their relationship with the corporation), and urgency (of the stakeholder’s claim 
regarding the corporation) (Mitchell et al. 1997). Numerous potential avenues exist for local 
communities to strengthen these attributes and thus augment their salience.  
In the case of the micro-region, correcting the local political deficit by authorising a credible 
representative to replace the junta local would have marked a crucial starting point (Chapter 1). This in 
turn would have facilitated stronger political ties with the intendencia and other external actors. Another 
alternative would have been for the residents to make good their periodic threats to take direct action, 
as per Gualeguaychú’s blockade of the international bridge connecting Fray Bentos to Argentina. A 
related lesson from the Gualeguaychú protest is the value of building networked alliances with 
international campaign groups. All these options assume the community’s prior ability to counter its 
entrenched political passivity.  
The difficulties for marginalised groups to realise such tactics should not be underestimated. In addition 
to their peripheral political status and resource constraints, the discourses and practices of detachable 
CSR are designed to counteract such salience-building endeavours at every turn. The struggle by 
workers in the region to gain preferential treatment in the job market highlights CSR’s pernicious 
effects. Despite the community’s rock-solid claim to legitimacy as the mill’s most proximate 
neighbours, Montes del Plata’s CSR team succeeded in depoliticising residents’ demands for permanent 
employment through a combination of employability schemes, the expansion of ‘local’ as a 
geographical descriptor, and the implementation of the worker database (Chapter 4).  
The implications of this thesis for future research, meanwhile, are various. First and foremost, I maintain 
that it is important to move away from long-standing assumptions that corporations are the inevitable 
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adjunct to neoliberal capitalism and instead consider how modern corporations are enacted as moral 
entities. As part of this endeavour, more attention should be given to socio-political and cultural 
conditions that give birth to modern international companies. Not only are corporations shaped by such 
conditions, but they also shape them to their advantage. In this thesis, I have interrogated how this dual 
dynamic occurs in the localised ambit of corporate-community relations. Adopting an agent-centric 
perspective offers new insights into how managers seek to attach moral virtues to a faceless foreign 
investor such as Montes del Plata and how this contributes towards the legitimation of extractivist 
investments. An opportunity exists to ask how comparable this process is to other fields of corporate 
enactment, such as the interface between companies and government, consumers, investors or even 
their own workforce. 
A second implication is to take seriously the role of individual managers in the study of business 
organisations. This requires a reversal of the tendency in institutional theory to neglect managerial 
agency or to focus on a narrow tranche of senior executives at the top of the corporate hierarchy. 
Corporate agents are not ciphers; they have their own private motivations and moral codes. The degree 
to which these are attached to their identity as a corporate agent has important ramifications for the 
corporate-community relationship.291 In particular, greater awareness of the distinction between the 
private and professional personhood of corporate agents helps explain how company policies take on 
new and sometimes unexpected shapes. A sensitivity to agents’ individuality also invites careful 
reconsideration of critical theorists’ customary depiction of CSR as a duplicitous cloak to ethicise 
companies’ profit-making intent. Proponents of this view too readily assume that corporate agents are 
unquestioningly complicit. They are not. Detachable CSR demands a degree of detachment on their 
part too – precisely how much depends on how well they find the ‘company shirt’ fits.  
Another possible avenue for future research centres on resistance strategies to detachable CSR. As 
highlighted in the introduction to this thesis, one of the exceptional features of this case study is the 
absence of conflict surrounding Montes del Plata’s investment. The company’s success at avoiding the 
kind of social and political tensions that beleaguer so many similar large-scale extractive projects in 
Latin America should not be interpreted as evidence of harmonious relations. Instead, I argue, it points 
to the effectiveness with which oppositional groups and critical narratives were suppressed. The ethic 
of detachability that governed the CSR team’s interventions in the local community contributed 
significantly here.  
It is imperative not to mistake detachability for detachment. As argued consistently in this thesis, large-
scale foreign investors cannot relinquish their relational attachments entirely without imperilling their 
                                               
291 For example, Teresa’s rationalising nature caused her to struggle to effect the morally-infused strategy of 
‘showing face’. Similarly, Helena’s charismatic character and private ethics meant her ability to pursue the more 
pragmatic approach to legitimacy-build preferred by her employer. 
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social legitimacy. This leaves the door open for affected communities to potentially influence the terms 
on which such attachments are constructed. In the case of Montes del Plata, this did not occur. The 
asymmetries of power and resources inherent to the corporate-community relationship made it very 
difficult for residents to resist the CSR team’s constant re-distancing of relational attachments (towards 
greater proximity or lesser proximity, depending). Other communities in Latin America have had 
greater success, as the litany of anti-extractive protests prove. As more extractive FDI corporations 
begin to follow Montes del Plata’s lead in developing sophisticated and well-resourced CSR 
programmes, applying the lens of detachability to conflict studies could provide novel and timely 
insights.  
 
In the end, civic resignation became the hallmark of Montes del Plata’s detachable CSR policy, not 
corporate responsibility. This outcome proved an obvious disappointment for local residents who had 
put their hopes in a reinvigoration of the region’s industrial heritage. For Uruguay’s largest ever foreign 
investor, however, the policy helped deliver an overwhelming pragmatic success despite its moral 
shortcomings.   
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